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Abstract
Apartheid South Africa was variously imprisoned, exiled, and engaged in the task of 
homecoming. This troika permeated society as reality, symbol and creative capital; as a 
political reality each of the experiences distilled the diverse human possibilities and potentials 
of apartheid. This is a study of the linked political encounters of detention/imprisonment, 
exile and homecoming, as well as the more general dynamics of oppression and resistance 
and the culture of violence, through the life story genre. Within the dynamics of struggle the 
focus of the thesis is on the transformative nature of resistance, in particular auto/biographical 
counter-discourses, as a means through which opponents of apartheid retained/regained 
agency and power.
The main aim of the thesis is to articulate and apply a theory of life story praxis in the context 
of political contestation. The theory has five main components. Firstly, the life story in such 
contexts is marked by the imperative for narratives to be provisional, partial, tactical, to be 
managed in accordance with an evolving political purpose. The second component relates to 
the violent collaboration of state and opponent in identity construction and interpretation.
This argument facilitates, as the third theoretical premise, a broad definition of texts that 
either are auto/biographical or impact upon the context and process of narration. Fourthly, 
lives are told many times over, identities are repeatedly un/remade, within an arena that is 
dense with prior versions and/or a discursive void. Finally, I argue that the ownership and 
meaning of life story narratives are provisional and contested while retaining a dominant 
narrative and political truth. In the main body of the thesis this theory is applied to the life 
stories of incarceration, exile, and homecoming.
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Introduction
Imprisonment, exile and homecoming were definitive societal experiences in apartheid 
South Africa. While they operated on numerous levels - as metaphor and symbol, in 
space and time, both socially and psychologically - the figure of the conventional 
political prisoner, exile, and returnee, banished behind bars, beyond South Africa's 
borders, circumventing such bars and borders, provided the source for the various 
meanings attached to their respective conditions. They were first and foremost concrete, 
material, political experiences. In the three decades from 1960 to 1990 in the region of 
78,000 people were detained without trial; thousands became political prisoners; and 
perhaps 60,000 went into exile.1 Nevertheless, beyond this core meaning it is also 
necessary to consider the metaphorical and symbolic capital attached to such 
experiences in a society variously imprisoned and in exile.2
Central to apartheid's design were the layered spaces of confinement and exclusion, 
mutually enforcing insides and outsides: lives were lived within an evolving cross-hatch 
of enclosure/delimitation and estrangement/alienation. The prison extended from 
pervasive state interference and control in everyday life, to house-arrest, banning, 
detention and jail, through the occupied and terrorised townships to the bantustans, the 
borders of South Africa, and beyond: "we take our gaols / On our backs like pilgrims"
The stature of those affected and the nature of the confrontations and human suffering 
endured, meant that the significance of these modes of oppression exceeded narrow, stark 
| statistical approximations. On detention see Human Rights Commission 1990a:2, also 
^  1990:410-13. I know of no source which calculafe‘S"“arfr~overaXr^Figure for the number of 
political prisoners incarcerated under apartheid. On exile see Bernstein 1993:10, also 
1994:xii. The total number of exiles is hard to gauge. It appears that fewer than 60,000 
returned to South Africa in the early 1990s, but some may have returned unrecorded while 
others who left as exiles have settled abroad.
2 Many experienced a lifetime of harassment much of which can be framed in terms of 
confinements and exclusions, imprisonment and exile. Christopher Merrett writes: "In 
terms of variety of experience, Helen Joseph stands out. By the mid-1980s she had been 
banned four times [a measure which variously restricted freedom of movement, association 
and expression], listed , house arrested, jailed four times (detained and convicted), 
and involved in a Treason Trial lasting five years" (1994:76, [] bracketed comment my
own). She was also subjected to raids, hoaxes, obscene, abusive and threatening phone- 
calls including death threats, and phone tapping; as well as various attacks on her home 
and attempts on her life (Joseph 1986, especially 237). Numerous others lived similarly 
persecuted lives (see, for example, W. Mandela 1985, especially 97-111, also 13. Mandela 
articulated her banishment to Brandfort in the Orange Free State in terms of both 
imprisonment and exile).
(C. J. Driver, "Letter to Breyten Breytenbach from Hong Kong", 1984:273). Political 
opponents moved between various 'jails', became their own jailers, had their homes 
turned into prisons. The contours of exile mapped out a similarly layered, if inverted, 
terrain. Exile was the prison turned inside out. External, political exile was augmented 
by various forms of internal exile and displacement including imprisonment and 
banishment, forced removals and the numerous spatial levels of segregation - from the 
micro-places of everyday life to the bantustans - political exclusion and psychological 
alienation. "To live in South Africa", wrote Lewis Nkosi, "is to live in permanent exile 
from oneself' (1965:123). The exfoliative layering and images of both imprisonment 
and exile created the pathways, horizons and imaginative capital of everyday life; they 
were also profoundly embedded in the culture of violence.
In South Africa, there are prisons and prisons. Prisons for whites, prisons 
for blacks, prisons for... males... prisons for... females... prisons for 
common-law offenders, prisons for political prisoners, medium prisons, 
maximum prisons, ultra-maximum prisons. South Africa has many 
prisons. The whole of South Africa is a prison... compartmentalised into 
sub-prisons. Sometimes these prisons exist side by side, fence to fence or 
wall to wall... [many other prisons are] intangible and invisible... They 
imprison the whole population. The whites in South Africa live in a 
variety of prisons... the Maximum Prison of Fear... the Ultra-Maximum 
Prison of Prejudice... Some whites are prisoners of their conflicting 
consciences... Others live in the Central Prison of Greed... Blacks are 
familiar with all prisons in South Africa. The physical and the 
psychological... [t]hey cannot escape imprisonment for one moment.
(Dingake 1987:122-3, also Cook 1974:6-13)
In a similar vein, Breytenbach writes with reference to exile: "One could nearly 
postulate that South Africa is the homeland o f exile. There are many kinds of 
banishment: the physical... but also a spiritual or cultural one... and the political exile..." 
(1986:77). Notions of imprisonment and exile not only saturated apartheid society but 
were also irreparably intertwined, joined in the currency of oppression and resistance. 
Frequently, for the political activist a terrible choice had to be made between the two - 
"[tjhey exchange one form of living death for another" (Breytenbach, 1986:74) - while 
many were forced to endure both.s As these observations suggest, this thesis 
characterises imprisonment, exile, and homecoming as interlinked, implying one 
another as alternative fate or resolution, components within a never completed cycle, 
which opponents of apartheid inhabited, entered, left, often repeatedly, at the same or 
different junctures.4
The three main waves of opponents entering detention/prison and exile coincided with 
the major periods of repression/resistance. The first wave occurred after the Sharpeville 
shootings in 1960, following which a number of measures - a State of Emergency, the 
declaration of the ANC and PAC as unlawful organisations, a series of detention laws 
and other legislative initiatives - effectively crushed resistance. The second followed the 
unrest sparked off by events in Soweto in June 1976, which as a defining moment came 
to symbolise the resurgence in black political opposition during the 1970s. The third 
and final mass incarceration/exodus took place during the upsurge of resistance in the 
mid/late-1980s, a period characterised by a series of States of Emergency from 1985 
until 1990. The outer limits of these three periods - 1960 to 1990 - provide the main
3 The choice, such as it was, between imprisonment and exile, was rarely an easy one to 
make. One reason for this was a perception that while imprisonment bestowed a certain 
honour, exile was a form of desertion and abandonment bordering on betrayal: see Benson 
1990:206-15, Bernstein 1989:253,261,2 67-8,274,296,308, Jordan 1986:165-7, Thuso Mashaba 
in Bernstein 1994:70, Ntantala 1993:232-3, Resha 1991:181-3,190,237,243, Segal 
1963:283,288,303.
4- Within the South African literature this linkage is most powerfully captured in Hilda 
Bernstein's extraordinary book of testimonies, T h e  R i f t : T h e  E x i l e  E x p e r i e n c e  o f  S o u t h  
A f r i c a n s  (1994).
4time frame for this study as they constitute the core decades of apartheid repression.
The analysis also on occasion harks back to the decade after the National Party came to 
power in 1948 when the repressive apparatus underwent formative phases of 
construction, and, more frequently, forward beyond 1990. This latter period has been 
the era both of mass homecoming and of confronting the question of how, within a new 
dispensation, to deal with a violent and oppressive past. Apartheid's consequences, like 
its genesis, were not always apparent at the time of its most hegemonic reign.
Within this timeframe this thesis aims to investigate the nature of the phenomena under 
discussion - detention, interrogation and torture, imprisonment, exile, and homecoming, 
within the context of apartheid - while acknowledging that they varied over time, from 
place to place, and therefore, where appropriate, also colouring this nature with change 
and difference. Perhaps the main reason for this focus is that the nature and evolution of 
these traumatic experiences provide a gateway to the essence and evolution of the wider 
political dynamic of apartheid itself. These encounters between the state and its 
opponents distilled the values and power relations of apartheid, focusing and 
concentrating dimensions of repression and resistance (pain, fear, violence, courage, 
death, power) and competing human possibilities and extremes with unique clarity:
ordering them into an encompassing structure, presenting] them in such 
a way as to throw into relief a particular view of their essential nature.
[They put] a construction on them, [make] them, to those historically 
positioned to appreciate the construction, meaningful - visible, tangible, 
graspable - 'real'... (Geertz 1973:443-4)
The study, therefore, addresses itself to encounters which unmasked the values, power 
relations, dimensions of struggle and diverse human potentialities within apartheid; 
encounters which were sifted through its essential, evolving, ideological prism.
5Race under apartheid functioned as both motivation and explanation. To be black, for 
example, was to be inherently guilty, to have almost inevitably experienced, and to 
never be free from the fear of, some form of incarceration. Blacks were imprisoned for 
what they collectively were rather than for what they had individually done (Franklin 
1989;xv). In the words of a young black woman: I break the law because I am alive'"
(in Gordimer 1989:271). Normal life was criminalised and politicised. Under some 
security legislation the accused was presumed guilty until proven innocent. The result 
was a Kafkaesque world in which a person could be "accused of guilt", caught up in 
pervasive but impenetrable structures - an essential part of the judicial system being that 
'"you should be condemned not only in innocence but also in ignorance"' - designed to 
manufacture guilt and process the guilty (Kafka 1953:54,73-4,59). Sam Bhengu in 
Wessel Ebersohn's novel Store Up The Anger, is told by his captors, y o u  are guilty. 
Only the guilty come here'" (1984:145). Such a scenario gestures towards a form of 
'objective' genetic guilt, the implications of which - racial guilt becoming inevitable, 
irretrievable, comprehensive, isolating - have been powerfully illustrated this century by 
both the Holocaust and apartheid (see Gutierrez 1984:301). It was this sense of primal 
guilt that constituted apartheid's "unconscious will to genocide" (Gordimer 1989:304).5
And to be guilty was inevitably to encounter state violence which was authorised as 
logical and necessary from within the ideology it served while appearing extreme and 
disproportionate from without (see Richards 1983 :181-3). One method of repression 
anticipated and invited another. Legally sanctioned abuses led to others which are 
illegal and extra-legal; the extraordinary became ordinary; the temporary became
5
These arguments also applied to some extent to opponents more generally. This 
statement by Breytenbach is emblematic: "1 am guilty... All that's still lacking is the 
crime to fit the guilt" (1985:38, also 214-15,343). In T h e  S c h o o l m a s t e r ,  a novel by Rose 
Moss, the protagonist, David Miller, on trial for bombing the Johannesburg railway 
station, is described as pre-judged, as already dead in the judgement. While conducting 
his own defence he states: "’1 don't plead anything. I have been found guilty already. 
What I plead will make no difference'" (1981:203-4,231).
6permanent. Society acclimatised itself to rising levels of brutality and brutalisation. 
Anything and everything became permissible. Ultimately this process enabled the 
simultaneous, evolving use of the hydra of violence as finely tuned instrument, sifted 
through the ideological premise of apartheid - for example: blacks were tortured before 
whites and were generally more likely to be subjected to torture; the vast majority of 
those who died in detention were young African men - and of violence as pervasive, 
indiscriminate weapon that eclipsed all thresholds, even those purportedly held sacred 
by apartheid itself. In a dynamic characteristic of the operation of violent oppression the 
boundary between the two forms of violence became blurred. The message was clear: 
if/when circumstances required, no outcome was unthinkable, no-one was immune, 
there were no sacred spaces or places of sanctuary and refuge (see Franco 1985).
Beneath the veneer of order maintained through violence and absolute power lay 
another related reality: a country living in perpetual emergency. "The tradition of the 
oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception 
but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this 
insight..." (Benjamin 1973:259). Due to apartheid's legislative iron fist the declaration 
of a State of Emergency became unnecessary, for example following the Soweto 
uprisings in 1976, or a natural extension of the norm, as from 1985 to 1990. In perpetual 
crisis, control and order became locked in a violent embrace with chaos, fed both from 
and into the fires of rebellion, while communication was reduced to the reciprocal 
exchange of a seemingly infinite reserve of violence and fear.6
In outlining the mechanisms and essence of apartheid oppression this study draws 
widely on the work of Michel Foucault in relation to incarceration, power/knowledge,
c
These remarks by Raymond Williams are pertinent: "The essential point is that violence 
and disorder are institutions as well as acts... while such institutions are still 
effective, they can seem, to an extraordinary extent, both settled and innocent. Indeed 
they constitute, commonly, an order, against which the very protest, of the injured and 
oppressed, seems the source of disturbance and violence" (1992:66).
7truth, discourse/writing, the body and space. Beyond and within these considerations, 
my analysis of identity politics - specifically the un/remaking of identity in situations of 
extreme violence - applies aspects of Elaine Scarry's argument, set out in The Body in 
Pain: The Making and Unmaking o f the World (1985). Foucault and Scarry, however, 
can be criticised for allowing inadequate space for resistance. Both targeted and random 
violence were as likely to politicise and mobilise as to destroy and deter. A central 
objective of this thesis is to write, not only the specificities of apartheid oppression, but 
also the dynamics of struggle, into these theoretical articulations, to extend their range 
and application, and to explore ways in which opponents of the state defied the 
imposition of passive victimhood. Allen Feldman's Formations o f  Violence: The 
Narrative o f the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland (1991) has been of 
considerable assistance in this task, particularly in relation to incarceration and my 
discussion of the narration of life stories in the context of political contestation. The ebb 
and flow of resistance and repression, and their respective cultures, were locked 
together in a relationship characterised by dependency, a paradoxical complicity, and an 
unambiguous animosity. While acknowledging the imbalances of power characteristic 
of these interactions, this study seeks to explore a series of subversive potentials and 
processes, specifically the mechanisms, techniques, strategies and discourses of 
resistance.
The core of my argument in relation to the interaction between oppression and 
resistance is that the architecture of the former contained within it the building blocks 
of the latter. Weapons in the conflict were double-edged, subject to duplication/ 
mimicry, distortion, management, contestation, and reversal. The oppressed found 
innumerable ways to retain/regain agency and power; the meaning of the text of 
repression was continually rewritten by the subversive punctuation of resistance. That 
there was resistance in detention, prison and exile is well known, its form, diversity, and 
inventiveness, less so. I hope to begin to address this lacunae, particularly with regard to
8a range of written and discursive strategies of resistance. The potentially transformative 
nature of resistance in the face of a repressive machinery is forcefully captured by 
Michael Taussig’s notion of the passage through the "space of death". Detention, 
imprisonment, exile, even homecoming, were such 'spaces'. The 'space of death' is a 
threshold "that allows for illumination as well as extinction", a space of transformation: 
"through the experience of coming close to death there may well be a more vivid sense 
of life". Some pass through and return to tell the tale, thereby providing a "powerful 
counter-discourse because, like torture itself, it moves us through that space of death 
where reality is up for grabs" (Taussig 1987:4,7,9). It is with such counter-discourses 
that this study is chiefly concerned.
The South African literature on detention, political imprisonment and exile is 
voluminous. The documentary profile includes monitoring and reports from civil 
liberties organisations, official archives and pronouncements, trial records, literature 
from the liberation movements, academic studies, auto/biographical accounts, and 
fiction. This thesis is motivated by the coexistence of the political and creative 
centrality of these experiences to apartheid and the large, contested, both expanding and 
contracting resource base of documentation, with the absence of sustained analytical or 
theoretical treatment of the subject matter.7 It seeks to provide a corrective to this 
absence which, while drawing on a range of experience within oppression/resistance 
and various relevant disciplines, focuses on articuating an analysis of the triptych of 
incarceration, exile, and homecoming under apartheid through the lens of literature, and
7
Analytical/theoretical treatments have come in their most sustained formr in relation 
to detention/imprisonment, from psychology {Foster et al. 1987, Chabani Manganyi and du 
Toit eds. 1990) and law, where the work of scholars such as Dennis Davis, John Dugard, 
and A. S. Mathews has spearheaded oppositional legal critiques. With the exception of J. 
U. Jacobs - whose work represents a patchwork of interesting critical interventions 
rather than an attempt to construct a sustained theoretical response - most literary/ 
cultural criticism has taken the form of isolated articles about individual writers 
and/or texts. The paucity of analytical response, both generally and specifically in 
relation to literary/cultural studies, is equally if not more pronounced in relation to 
exile and predictably reaches it zenith with regard to the recent phenomenon of mass 
homecoming. A range of studies of a more general nature or about countries other than 
South Africa have been used in formulating my arguments in relation to both torture, 
detention and imprisonment (du Bois 1991, Davies 1990, Feldman 1991, Franklin 1989, 
Harlow 1987, Millett 1995, Peters 1985, Weschler 1990) and exile (Heilbut 1983, Jay 
1986, Rieff 1994, Seidel 1986, Ugarte 1989, and various works by Edward Said).
9more specifically through the life story. One way into an analysis of the life story is 
through autobiography.8
Autobiography
If I'm not for myself, who will be for me?
If not this way, how? And if not now, when? (Levi 1987a: 127)
Autobiography is a notoriously slippery genre; a literary form of revelation and 
obfuscation, truth and narrative manipulation, at once transparent and opaque. These 
characteristics are made manifest in a tendency to evade attempts to categorise, pigeon­
hole and define, in a 'not quite-ness' - autobiography manages to combine being "not 
quite history" and "not quite fiction" (Starfleld 1988, Coullie 1991) - which represents a 
point of entry into the uniqueness of its insight. J. M. Coetzee has stated: "All the facts 
are too many facts. You choose the facts insofar as they fall in with your evolving 
purpose"; and furthermore that a distinction should be made between "truth to fact" and 
what he calls "the more vexing question of a 'higher1 truth" (1991b: 117-18: also Kohli 
1981:69-72). To gain access to a 'higher' truth, the truth behind the facts, I will argue, 
autobiographical accounts need to be read not as exact evidence but according to a 
different register of authenticity, within a different economy of validity and legitimacy:
Q
Although the main focus of my analysis is written autobiographical texts, the genre of 
the life story is understood to span the written and oral, autobiography and biography, 
state and subject. There is a greater corpus of critical work on the South African life 
story and auto/biography, but similar observations apply to those outlined above in 
relation to the scholarship about incarceration, exile, and homecoming. Perhaps the most 
notable interventions have taken place with reference to autobiography and confession 
{J. M. Coet2ee) and women's autobiography (Margaret Daymond, Dorothy Driver, among 
others). For a range of articles on autobiography in southern Africa, see the special 
issue of Current W r i t i n g  3(1):1991; for an overview and critique of the use of oral 
sources/testimony in southern African Studies, see Hofmeyr 1995. More generally, the 
available literary, theoretical work on auto/biography is immense. Work on identity 
politics in the context of violence, of an inter-disciplinary nature and from a range of 
social sciences, has been most useful in constructing my theoretical framework. Scarry 
1985 and Feldman 1991 have already been mentioned. Young (1987,1990) has influenced many 
of the arguments outlined in this in'^roduction relating to the interpretation of 
autobiographical texts, while ideas articulated by Felman in Felman and Laub (1992) 
provide an important input to the theoretical development detailed in the last chapter. 
Also see the reworking of certain of Barthes' more narrowly literary notions, below.
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I think... that the testament sort of holds up the body almost. This line, 
this body, with its wounds... saying there's something true about what I'm 
saying, the evidence of it is my life. So... sitting here, I keep getting these 
[...] a comrade brings it to me and says, 'I've just found these things 
again, I haven't read them again' - he probably has and is shy about it... 
about to be deployed in... he wrote these things down. Now the 
truthfulness of them, probably very trite stuff about stars and democracy 
decrees and so on... But... what makes this real, is that this is someone 
who thinks he may well be about to die, it's the context out of which it's 
emerging... authenticity isn't the profundity of thought or whatever... but 
it was written in blood so to speak... he's saying: this is it, I was there 
once, this is what I wrote. I'm happy to have survived these things, but, I 
didn't necessarily expect to. And there's a lot of that... And it’s always 
like this, usually in ink on school exercise books, and its the same 
thoughts... an amazing number of people wrote... bom of this kind of 
existential type of, maybe this is, I want to say something, I want to leave 
a record for, family, movement, whatever. (Cronin interview)
The autobiographer is not a neutral medium through which events write themselves, but 
is rather, as both the raw material and the source of its interpretation, an active agent 
shaping a narrative in which events are selected, ordered, dramatised, simplified and 
passed over in silence. Given such an understanding, the focus shifts away from 
autobiographical accounts as documentary realism and towards locating the foundation 
of literary testimony's privilege as a source elsewhere: in the insider's intimacy with 
events portrayed, the manner in which experience is grasped, interpreted, related, 
claimed as one's own, in the truth and power of lived experience. Herein, I argue, 
resides the genre's 'higher' truth. Autobiographical truth as a process of self-reclamation, 
-discovery and -creation, is a truth, a personal statement of felt truth, 'my'truth, rather
than the truth. The protagonist in Coetzee's Age o f Iron, Elizabeth Curren, writes of:
"my truth: how I lived in these times, in this place" (1991a: 119, also Moss 1981:225). 
Truth is constituted by diverse motives and engenders its own effects; it is a choice, a 
profoundly political choice and self-positioning.^ Over this somewhat one-dimensional 
autobiographical landscape, however, lies the shadow of the state.
The Life Story and the State
The vexed relationship between experience and its representation is further complicated 
in a politically fraught environment. In addition to the literary obstacles to the 
representation of truth/reality - the absence of an unequivocal empirical connection or 
verifiable referentiality between text, writer and experience, what Young calls the 
"displacement of testimony" (1987:411-14) - opponents were caught in a world that was 
systematically calculated to deceive. Within the official world of apartheid, violence 
was done to, and through, language and the word. The definition of terms, such as 
communism and terrorism, were rewritten to the extent that they became a nonsense. 
The government denied that they sanctioned detention without trial, that torture or 
custodial deaths due to torture took place, that there were any political trials or political 
prisoners. Meaning itself was rewritten, enabling what Taussig calls the magical realism 
of state discourse (1987:4). In a similar vein, Scarry coins the phrase "false motive 
syndrome" to describe repressive acts which are accompanied by explanations of 
motive so arbitrary that they seem intended as demonstrations of contempt (1985 :57-8). 
Meaning itself was rewritten. But the promiscuous and fictional truths of the state had a 
murderous reality: "the line between reality and illusion is effaced. For, to the extent 
that they believe something to be real and act accordingly, that thing does become real" 
(Breytenbach 1985:49, also 51).
Q
On the distinction between textual authenticity and authority as fact see Young 
1987:411,416,419-21, also 1990:49-50. On truth, authenticity and authority also see J.
M. Coetzee's "Confession and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky" (1992:251- 
93; and see the interviews with Coetzee contained in the same volume).
12
The politics of truth raises questions, central to both repression and resistance, about the 
inter-relationship between the discourses of truth and power. Apartheid South Africa 
was the site of a disparate array of truths that were mutually dependent and seemingly 
irreconcilable, and of opposing discursive strategies which sought to establish the 
nature of apartheid itself The production of truth was thoroughly imbued with 
fundamentally unequal relations of power, but nonetheless remained subject to 
continuous and violent contestation. Truths were revelatory because of tactics of power 
immanent in their very being. Implicit in truth were the methods for its production, 
articulation, and dissemination, as well as for the implementation of its effects. Implicit 
in these methods was a narrative of the past, a political positioning in the present, and a 
vision of the future. The relationship between power and truth was one of reciprocity.
Now I believe that the problem... [consists] in seeing historically how 
effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are 
neither true nor false... The important thing... is that truth isn't outside 
power, or lacking in power... Truth is a thing of this world... Each society 
has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true... There is a battle 
'for truth', or at least 'around truth'... [truth being] 'the ensemble of rules 
according to which the true and the false are separated and specific 
effects of power attached to the true'... (Foucault 1980:118,131-2, and 
133)“
Power was the ability to determine the truth; that which gained currency as the truth fed
10 Also see Foucault 1978:58-73, 1991:27-30, and Shiner 1982.
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constellations of power. While in no way denying the reality of oppression and/or 
resistance, this argument shifts attention in relation to apartheid life stories onto the 
social and political life of truth (Taussig 1987:xiii-xiv).
As one aspect of the political life of truth, from resistant lives and life stories have 
come, and will continue to come, the most punishing and far-reaching assaults on the 
apartheid state's official versions of events and history. Among the reasons for this are 
that the life story genre is a democratic open house that can be entered through the door 
of autobiography, with its accessible and flexible requirements in terms of form and 
content, through the aperture of oral testimony, or, as will be discussed in more detail 
below, through any number of other entrances. For both cultural and political reasons 
the elaboration of identity invariably links the individual to the collective, the private to 
the public, and the personal to the political. Winnie Mandela speaks of being married to 
the struggle (1985:65), and outlining a construction of identity apparently shared by self 
and state, claims:
I have ceased a long time ago to exist as an individual. The ideals, the political 
goals that I stand for, those are the ideals and goals of the people in this 
country... My private self doesn't exist. Whatever they do to me, they do to the 
people in this country. I am and will always be only a political barometer... I am 
of no importance to them as an individual. What I stand for is what they want to 
banish. I couldn't think of a greater honour... Here I am, I am twenty-two 
million... (26,42, also 27,76,83-7,124,149)
The life story variously carves out an unsettled and unsettling space from which the 
voiceless can speak and be heard. It provides a thread of continuity that weaves 
meaning through the otherwise fragmented, disparate, chaotic. Yet the stories of 
detainees/prisoners, exiles, and returnees, constructed at vital thresholds of power,
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privilege and pain, often maintain both a sense of fracture and coherence, of fracture 
within coherence, which is simultaneously a reflection of experience and of its narrative 
reworking. They are, as a result, an aid to survival and carrying on. Such narratives 
offer what Hofmeyr calls "transitory forms of power" (1988:4): they allow the narrator 
to control, relive, transform, (re-)imagine events, and to lay claim to and construct 
chosen identities, social interactions, and communities. The genre invariably performs 
an overtly political function because by laying claim to such forms of power, it enters 
into a conflictual relationship with the state. The aim of the life story, after all, is 
usually to proclaim a self in the face of its official destruction and denial, to reclaim an 
identity from that which is officially imposed and sanctioned. Apartheid can be so 
effectively critiqued by these narratives because they combine generality and 
commonality in relation to history and politics with particularity and specificity, by 
exploring the ways in which the components of apartheid were grounded, experienced, 
became real, and have been remembered in lived lives and communities. Thus, the 
autobiographical is transformed into a genre that can serve a radical agenda and play a 
role, through its strategic interventions, in emancipatory politics.
In many ways the kind of subject demanded and projected by the state and those ranged 
in opposition to it were the same, an example of mimicry and reversal: fixed, one­
dimensional, unified selves confronted one another, in a landscape peopled by 
caricatured heroes and villains, across the abyss of ambiguous and compromised 
selfhood. But, for opponents of the state in particular, such formulations of identity were 
both embraced and rejected, complicated in their forced imposition by manipulation and 
distortion, continually reworked in their self-construction by an evolving political 
purpose and context. Alongside the censorship, obfuscation, distortion and demonisation 
of lives by the state, for example, was the necessaiy secrecy, evasion, and disguise of 
oppositional self-preservation. The result was events, situations, moral choices and lives
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that were "half-told" and "half-known" (Gordimer 1995:35).“ An inner tension, 
therefore, ran through the auto/biographical enterprise in which the central impulse 
towards a kind of identity fundamentalism or essentialism was continually undercut by 
the imperative for narratives to be provisional, partial, contingent, tactical; to be 
managed in accordance with an evolving political purpose, in order to take their 
appointed time and place on the narrative and political battlefield.
The political life of truth, therefore, was a contested arena. Weschler writes: "History... 
is a battle over who gets to say 'I1 (or at the state level, who gets to say 'we' - 'we, the 
regime[...]' or ’we, the people')" (1990:237). Under apartheid, life stories were most 
revealingly constructed at the interface between the state and its subjects/opponents, 
during moments and encounters when both were seeking to inscribe and were 
contesting lives. In this context, life stories were a paradoxical and unharmonious 
chorus of state and subject, neither simplistically autobiography nor biography but 
uncooperatively and violently collaborative. Added to and laced through the more 
common forms and agents of collaborative self-structuring and -formation - family, 
society, culture, place - was the violence implied by the politics of apartheid. The lives 
of its opponents were overtly written by the state, and written in more subtle ways by 
the structures and institutions of an oppressive society that, consciously and 
unconsciously, externally framed and/or were internalised within the process of 
oppositional self-narration. A broad range of texts either were auto/biographical or 
impacted upon the context and process of narration. Components of this collaborative 
violence included the primary text of apartheid, its laws, confinements and exclusions, 
discourses and silencing. It was against and through these texts that counter-discourses 
were written. Again, while the balance of power was unequal, it was contested. The
11 With the decline of apartheid, life stories are being told in a different context of 
narration, the implications of which will be addressed in the conclusion.
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individual both wrote and was variously written, wrote whilst simultaneously being 
written.12
Given the argument that lives were contested through a range of texts, it becomes 
imperative to define textuality broadly and the life story in particular as taking on 
various, even innumerable, textual forms: oral and written, those articulated in the 
spoken/written word and those inscribed in other mediums and practices, public and 
hidden transcripts (Scott 1990), the purportedly truthful and the manifestly fictional.* 
Part of my theoretical endeavour in this thesis is to expand the textual range of life story 
representations. For prisoners and exiles, life story texts ranged through the confession/ 
statement and court record, the tortured body, the walls of confinement, the various 
blank spaces of exile/exclusion, and the conventional written or oral life story. "Power 
is based", therefore, "on this proliferation of texts, textual doubles, textual substitutes, 
and transcriptions" (Feldman 1991:136). In this context of multiple texts and authors, 
identities were repeatedly un/remade; life stories were told/narrated many times over 
into a void characterised by the prohibition/illegality of writing, by silence and 
censorship, and/or juxtaposed with and superimposed on one another, told/narrated 
many times over into an arena dense with prior contested versions:
12 Such process of writing/being written also applied, if to a lesser degree, to the 
state. On the active, middle, and passive forms of the verb 'to write', see Barthes 
1970, and Coetzee 1984.
13 If, as Young argues, facts/events and the way they are understood, interpreted, 
represented, recovered, reconstructed, and invented in narrative, are fundamentally 
interdependent, then the difference between fiction, particularly realist fiction, and 
autobiographical testimony - and indeed oral and written testimony - becomes both 
complex and subtle. As constructed narrative forms they raise many of the same 
questions; what kinds of understanding - explaining presuppositions, interpretative 
matrices, paradigms - are brought to experiences/events and, therefore, shape 
representations and memory? What consequences and actions are predicated on these 
understandings? How is a sense of authenticity and authority generated within the 
narrative? A variety of narrative/textual forms are used in this study on the 
understanding that they represent forms, not so much of evidence, as of partial and 
complementary knowledge in relation to lived lives. These forms are interrogated as much 
for the manner and context of their construction as for the resonance of their 
knowledges (see Young 1987,1990; especially 1987:420. On the relationship between 
fiction/the imagination and reality, characterisation and self/writer/real lives, see 
Gordimer1s essay, "Adam's Rib; Fictions and Realities” (1995:1-19)). Important 
contributions to the debates briefly outlined above also include Samuel and Thompson 
eds. 1990, and the work of Hayden White; see 1973, 1978.
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The self is always the artefact of prior received and newly constructed 
narratives... In a political culture the self that narrates speaks from a 
position of having been narrated and edited by others - by political 
institutions, by concepts of historical causality, and possibly by 
violence... as a political subject. The narrator writes himself into [a]... 
history because the narrator has already been written and subjected to 
powerful inscriptions. (Feldman 1991:13)
Such life stories took their place within an intertextual network in which the text was 
underwritten and permeated by other texts, with which it circulated, interacted and 
resonated in the construction of meaning. In such a network, the life story could be 
liberated from its author, made the subject of contestation in the space between the state 
and its subjects. Texts, including auto/biographical texts, were tom from their original 
referent, 'owned' and controlled by no single author(ity) and, therefore, became double- 
edged weapons which could be turned against their author or original intention/ 
meaning, un/remade in the service of a variety of political purposes. While such 
relational meaning and identity is not fixed but rather unstable and multiple, neither is it 
completely fluid and arbitrary. The complete erasure of the author as a source of textual 
authority, intentionality, and meaning duplicates and repeats the denial and destruction 
of the self inherent in oppression. The resistant and resisting self narrates against the 
grain of imposed anonymity and voicelessness. Depending on the context, author, text 
and meaning can be firmly anchored together or cast/wrenched adrift from one another; 
while texts have no single or correct meaning or interpretation, they retain a dominant 
intention, purpose and truths Meaning, the axis of truth and power, within any text, in
14 In a construction useful to this analysis Roman Jakobson writes in his essay entitled 
"The Dominant": "The dominant may be defined as the focusing component of a work of art: 
it rules, determines, and transforms the remaining components... guarantees the 
integrity of the structure", and of "a point of view which combines an awareness of the 
multiple functions of a poetic work with a comprehension of its integrity, that is to 
say, that function which unites and determines the poetic work" (1987:41,43).
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short, can be strategically appropriated, manipulated, assigned and contested by 
particular parties in various contexts, but retain a dominant trajectory.15
In summary, what follows attempts to provide a study of the culture of violence, of 
oppression and resistance, in apartheid South Africa through the medium of the life 
story and, more precisely, an assessment of the nature of auto/biographical counter­
discourses from within the linked encounters of incarceration, exile and homecoming. A 
related endeavour is that which seeks to articulate a theory of life story praxis, its 
construction, form, content and role, in the context of violent political contestation, the 
main components of which are the intrinsic politicisation of the life story enterprise, the 
violently collaborative nature of identity construction and interpretation, a broad 
definition of auto/biographical textuality, the repetitive nature of narration into an arena 
at once discursively full and empty, and the ownership/meaning of the text/self as 
provisional and contested while retaining a dominant narrative and political truth. 
Finally, through the analysis of oppression/resistance and auto/biography under 
apartheid I hope the thesis and its theoretical undertakings will have wider applications 
and resonances with regard, respectively, to the political condition and literary form.
The chapters in Section 1 examine two inter-related narratives of detention and 
imprisonment, the written and the somatic. Chapter 1 explores the ways in which 
detainees/prisoners lives were variously written, by the state (in interrogation, political 
trials, and so on) and by the incarcerated themselves (most comprehensively in 
autobiographical accounts), as competing powers of writing contested a given life. 
Although writing towards divergent archives of the self, life story texts were scarred 
by the violence of their collaborative construction. The second part of the chapter 
examines the implications of oppositional autobiographical narratives for relations of
15
The above paragraph reworks the writings of Roland Barthes on the death of the author 
and inter-textuality. See, for example, Barthes 198 0,1981,1988.
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truth and power. Parallel to the un/remaking of the self by oppression and resistance 
through the written word, was the un/remaking taking place on the surfaces and depths 
of the body. The written word and the body were weapons in the incarcerative 
encounter, the primary textual representations/interpretations of interrogation, torture 
and incarceration more generally. Chapter 2 traces the passage of the body as self/world 
through the incarcerative ’space of death’, and the manner in which it becomes a 
violently collaborative text at the interface between opposing powers of writing, a 
textual representation of the process of torture and custodial death. The resistant 
capacity of the body is related to its collaboration with the senses and the layered spaces 
of incarceration. The chapter continues by plotting the passage of the dead body as it 
links the torture chamber and the court room at the inquest, and through its inscription 
and interpretation establishes their essential similarity and difference, before moving on 
to a discussion of the different ways in which the body in pain/death is represented and 
interpreted within fictional, as opposed to legal, discourses. It concludes by stressing the 
importance of the body as a sanctuary of memory.
Section 2 focuses on exile and homecoming. Chapter 3 picks up the theme of the 'space 
of death’ from the previous chapter to examine exile as a similar 'space' in which death 
was physical, social, spiritual, creative. As with imprisonment, this space harboured the 
potential for a transformative, resurrective counter-discourse. This leads into a 
theoretical discussion of exile in relation to postcolonialism, globalisation, and 
nationalism. Two case studies then contextualise these various themes: the first in 
relation to the place of Sophiatown and in the person of Bloke Modisane, and, the 
second, in a move from an individual to an organisational experience of exile, 
examining the ANC in the Frontline States.
Chapter 4 outlines the potentials and ambiguities of the creative process, and writing in 
particular, as an ongoing agent of survival and transformation in exile. Exile, with its
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precariously balanced potential for creative life and death, in which violent 
collaboration again marked lives and their telling, can encompass the unfolding of a 
repetitive, autobiographical creative process. The two writers discussed, Breyten 
Breytenbach and Es'kia Mphahlele, have been both inspired and maimed by the 
condition. The (non-)resolution of return, when the sentence of exile was effectively 
over, crystallised the permanence of their exile as complete, natural, a universal 
condition, but also effected its transformation, in a way that recast the past and present, 
into the fold of retrospective migrancy. This simultaneous and paradoxical 
metamorphosis represents an un/remaking of identity, imagination and creative 
portfolio. The blurring of definition, direction and purpose inherent in long-term exile 
moves those affected, often very reluctantly, into the domain of positions associated 
with the migrant. As the implications of this blurring are the result of an impositional 
attrition they fail to have the more positive repurcussions that migrants, emigres, and 
expatriates enjoy, having embraced these positions from the start of their journey.
Chapter 5 looks at some of these more positive repercussions in the life and work of one 
such expatriate writer, Dan Jacobson. Less committed to and bound by politics and 
place, the expatriate is caught between worlds, confronted with crossing over between 
them, within a multiple exposure that implies a state of perpetual negotiation and 
translation. While the exile projects the insights of exile back onto a South African 
context, the reverse is also possible: South Africa and the understanding and 
perceptions gained there projected onto a variously defined elsewhere. Jacobson has in 
a sense been two writers, a South African writer and then a writer living and writing 
about elsewhere. But he remains a writer who speaks to and of South Africa; it being 
the place through which the world makes itself known and that continues to influence 
the worlds made available to him. For such a writer the agents of collaboration are both 
violent and non-violent, of the state and society. The chapter concludes with Jacobson's
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return to South Africa as a 'territory of time' through autobiography and as a travel 
writer.
The chapters on exile and expatriation resonate with the many homes and homecomings 
associated with the South African diaspora. Chapter 6 discusses the complexities and 
ambiguities of home/coming, the rupture of return as a culminating act of state-induced 
collaborative violence, and the ongoing dialogue between home and exile.
Section 3 consists of a single chapter, chapter 7, which examines the role of the witness 
within the life story genre and the symbolic importance of imprisonment and exile. 
Apartheid established and depended upon the absence of a community of witnessing, 
and remains as a result a contested event, beyond unanimous collaboration. As a result, 
to (bear) witness became a potentially violently collaborative contest over identity and 
meaning, and one that extended beyond state and opponent to condition interactions 
between subjects and within society. Testimony in such a context needs to be both seen 
and seen through. This chapter analyses Rian Malan's My Traitor's Heart and the 
collaborative narrative Poppie by Elsa Joubert and Poppie Nongena as lives lived and 
told on different sides of the apartheid crime, within history as crime, as the space of 
the annihilation of, respectively, the 'other' and the self. While they were neither 
prisoners nor exiles in the conventional sense, they were so at a symbolic level in that 
confinement/proximity and estrangement/distance structured ways of seeing and being. 
When superimposed, one on the other, such lives generate the power of'communities of 
testimonial incommensurates’ and perhaps provide one answer to the question of how to 
reclaim and preserve a past for the future.
The conclusion summarises and concludes the key arguments of the thesis and 
culminates in an analysis of the role of life stories in the context of South Africa's 
political transition.
SECTION 1 - INCARCERATION
Chapter 1: Detention, Imprisonment and the Power of Writing
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i) The Worlds of Detention and Imprisonment
"7 am the regulations'" (First 1965:84)
Indefinite detention without trial is a starkly expressive encounter in the lexicon of 
oppression.1 As a repressive mechanism it evolved in South Africa - through the 
familiar mantra of emergency legislation, the 90-day law of 1963, the 180-day law of 
1965, the Terrorism Act of 1967, and the Internal Security Act of 1982 - to create a 
particular kind of world. The co-ordinates of this world included interrogation, torture 
and, perhaps the most destructive component of all, solitary confinement. During a 
period which spanned three decades, a person could be abstracted into a closed lawless 
world - devoid of judicial control, independent access or social contact - within which 
the state could do what it liked, in the manner in which it liked, for as long as it liked. "I 
believed they might keep me forever" (Serote in Bernstein 1994:331). In 1964, a 
member of the Security Branch told Ruth First, quite simply: "7 am the regulations'". 
Over a decade later, as this exchange from the Stephen Biko inquest illustrates, nothing 
had changed:
1
In the following argument the discussion of detention without trial relates primarily 
to detention for the purpose of interrogation (detainees were also held as a preventive 
measure, as potential witnesses, and due to a variety of other, unofficial, reasons) and 
to detainees held by the state. Clearly both the circumstances of detention and the 
manner in which it was used varied, over time, in relation to specific legislation, and 
so on. It remains possible, however, to distil the essence of the experience, 
particularly through its most brutal manifestation. While it was the South African state 
which was responsible for the vast majority of human rights violations in this and all 
other arenas during the apartheid era, abuses were also committed by the liberation 
movements. Most of the ANC's abuses took place within its camps in southern Africa. 
Allegations made in this regard, and responses to them, can be traced in the following 
sources: Amnesty International 1992, Ellis 1994, Ellis and Sechaba 1992:124-40, and a 
number of articles since 1990 in the journal S e a r c h l i g h t  S o u t h  A f r i c a .  The ANC itself 
established four commissions of inquiry - the Stuart, Jobodwana, Skweyiya and 
Motsuenyane Commissions - to investigate allegations of human rights abuses made against 
the organisation.
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Mr. Kentridge [lead counsel for the Biko family]: Where do you get your 
authority from? Show me a piece of paper that gives you the right to keep a man 
in chains - or are you people above the law?
Colonel Goosen [Chief of the Security Police in the Eastern Cape]: We have full 
authority. It is left to my sound discretion.
Mr Kentridge: Under what statutory authority?
Colonel Goosen: We don't work under statutory authority.
Mr Kentridge: You don't work under statutory authority? Thanks very 
much, Colonel, that's what we have always suspected. (Woods 1979:281)
The detainee was totally at the mercy of those whose job it was to have no mercy 
(Amnesty International 1984:18). Some languished in detention for years. Torture was 
widespread, systematic and institutionalised. At least 73 political detainees died in 
custody.2 Agents of the state could exercise absolute power with impunity and the 
shared knowledge of this fact was their most powerful weapon.
Once/If brought to trial and convicted, detainees became political prisoners, and 
experienced a related, but different, kind of violence in a related, but different, kind of 
world. Political prisoners were denied privileges for all or part of the apartheid era that 
were granted to other prisoners as a matter of course: for example, suffering from poor
2
Human Rights Commission 1990a:2. The pervasiveness of torture became clear due to 
allegations from a variety of sources: former detainees, defendants and state witnesses 
in political trials, and so on. On this pervasiveness, see Amnesty International 1978, 
Bernstein 1972, Detainees' Parents Support Committee 1982, Foster et al. 1987, United 
Nations 1973; also see Foster and Skinner 1990:218-23.
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classification and slow advancement - prisoners were classified in one of four groups, D 
to A, generally moving towards A over time, thereby gaining additional privileges - 
enjoying no remission of sentence or parole, and being denied access to news.3 For 
black prisoners these conditions were made even worse by institutionalised racial 
discrimination. Makhoere states: "If you want to find out what racial discrimination is, 
just go to any South African prison" (1988:23). As for the regulations governing the 
administration of prison life, prisoners were denied access to, knowledge of, and 
security within such regulations, which were interpreted and applied in as stringent and 
arbitrary a manner as possible:
After we applied for and secured a copy of the prison regulations to see 
what we were entitled to know and have, he [Colonel Gericke] said 'I can 
break you by applying the regulations if I want to'. It was a declaration of 
intent (if not war) and in response we were detennined to use those 
regulations to break as much of the system as possible. (Hirson 
1995:327, also 340)
Any rule can become an instrument that can be turned against you. And that was 
a constant fight in prison. Firstly, to get to know what the rules are. Secondly, to 
get some consistent application of the rules, and thirdly to get the application of
3
The classification system was used as a weapon: upgrading and downgrading, and the
granting, withholding and withdrawal of privileges more generally, were used to reward 
and punish behaviour, as threat and sanction. Privileges were double edged (Alexander in 
Alexander et al. 1992:301-2); there was no privilege without pain (N. Mandela 1995:593). 
Classification determined whether a prisoner could study, the number of letters sent and 
received, the number and length of visits, and, in later years, whether these could be 
contact visits or not, and the ability to buy food and newspapers. Political prisoners 
challenged/rejected the classification system arguing that it was manipulative and 
insulting, and that they should all enjoy the same privileges. Classification was 
systematically used to demoralise and penalise; it was divisive, fostered tension, and 
through both general and selective liberalisation created problems for 
group/organisational unity thereby undermining resistance; and, it created a form of 
dependence that could be turned against the prisoners. On occasion there was conflict 
between generations and organisations over approaches to classification. Long terms 
prisoners, whose struggles to improve conditions provided the material benefits that 
helped people survive imprisonment, and who creatively/imaginatively used 
improvements/privileges to continue resistance, had the most to lose by jeopardising 
these hard won advances and by the prospect of having to start again from scratch within 
a prison term that was lengthy or had no foreseeable end (see Buntman 1996:153-7).
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the rules with people using their discretion... They can use so many petty little 
things to get at you. You see, the rules and regulations... cover every aspect of 
your life, and then they get interpreted viciously. (Hogan in Schreiner ed. 
1992:34-5)
The outcome was entirely predictable. The prison official became "a petty tyrant... 
[whose] tyranny was absolute and inescapable" (Lewin 1976:82, also 80,84), while the 
implication of giving the prison authorities "untrammelled discretion" was 
administration by institutionalised "bureaucratic tyranny" (van Zyl Smit 1987,1988).
The severity of conditions was compounded by the arbitrary and vindictive manner of 
their enforcement.4
In important respects, therefore, detention and imprisonment were inter-connected 
worlds, characterised by absolute state power and lawlessness. And yet strategies of 
resistance were an integral component of this scenario. The detainee, for example, 
struggled for footholds of resistance from within an environment characterised by their 
calculated absence: by a "permanent impermanence" (Ntuli 1980:34), by isolation, 
vulnerability and a lack of control/knowledge, by uncertainty, disorientation, 
dependency and apprehension. The encounters between torturer and detainee, and to a 
lesser extent between warder and prisoner, were among those which distilled the 
essence of apartheid and its adversaries with unique clarity:
4
Control by the courts over the exercise of discretion by the prison authorities was 
limited and ineffectual. The courts gave various very clear signals with reference to 
the 'rights' of detainees and prisoners: they generally refrained from serious criticism 
of legislation designed to limit the 'rights’ of detainees and prisoners; they 
consistently interpreted legislation restrictively, maintaining an entitlement to a 
narrow range of 'necessities' or 'basic rights' rather than 'privileges' or 'comforts'; 
and they signalled to the prison authorities that they had a very wide area of 
discretion with reference to the latter in which the courts would not readily intervene 
to protect prisoners against what amounted effectively to arbitrary rule.
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it is an experience of huge intensity... it covers all the emotions... 
everything is reflected in it... it was... devastating... Because you're 
stripped to nothing, you're exposed to yourself in a way that doesn't 
happen in any other situation. So that it does become a standard and you 
always go back to it... At the same time it was an experience that you 
can't recreate... the whole situation is totally artificial... And as soon as 
you're out of it, it's gone... [an] experience which was like none other... 
something you can never get away from. (Lewin interview)5
The worlds of incarceration, and particularly the dark rooms of interrogation, were a 
crucible of repression and resistance. What was the nature of these worlds? What was 
their truth and power?
State Truth and the Power of Writing
... police files are our only claim to immortality. (Kundera 1992:87)
The shadow of torture hangs over the interrogational encounter. The structure of torture, 
as described by Elaine Scarry (1985), has essentially three elements, the first of which is 
the destruction and obliteration of the detainee's world, self and voice/language through 
the infliction of pain. "Prison is the crucible of unmaking" (Breytenbach 1996:161).
The overwhelming nature of this destruction helps explain Emma Mashinini forgetting 
the name of her youngest daughter ("this pain... was the greatest I have ever had": 
1989:86, also 89-90) and the failure of Molefe Pheto to recognise his own daughter ("I 
realized the toll their interrogation had taken on me, to the point where I disowned my
5
Also Bam in Alexander et al. 1992:297, Lelyveld 1987:198.
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own daughter... I wept late into the night that day": 1985:192). An altogether different 
world is imposed in the place of all that has been lost: "they had not only broken me, 
they had changed me. They had taken me from my world, cut me off from anything that 
could prop me up as part of my world, and made me a part of their world" (Lewin 
1976:31).
In the second stage of torture, pain and the dissolution of world are made visible and 
objectified, most obviously through the making of a confession. It cannot be seen as a 
betrayal because the things that could be betrayed - self, friends, family, country, cause - 
have ceased to exist. The detainee is deprived of all control over, and therefore all 
responsibility for his/her world and words:
World, self and voice are lost, or nearly lost, through the intense pain of 
torture and not through the confession as is wrongly suggested by its 
connotations of betrayal... To assent to words that through the thick 
agony of the body can be only dimly heard, or to reach aimlessly for the 
name of a person or a place... is a way of saying, yes, all is almost gone 
now... even this voice, the sounds I am making, no longer form my 
words but the words of another. (Scarry 1985:35)
The regime doubles its voice by making the detainee's voice its own; the detainee 
echoes the brutalised and brutalising voice of the interrogator; the detainee's life is 
displaced by the words of another as the state narrates itself through his/her pain. 
Following assault, Steve Biko suffered from a form of brain damage known as 
echolalia: the meaningless repetition of speech. "'Once they take you there, you'll have 
to prepare many yeses'" (in Lelyveld 1987:196, also 205-6). Torture, therefore, is used 
to continuously reproduce the state's ideology and vision of reality through its wounded 
and broken subjects as the detainee is written by/through the layered violence of
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repression. The detainee's self, world and voice/language, mind and meaning, are 
de/reconstructed, un/remade, in the image of the state (see Folena 1989:228-9).6 Truth is 
mediated, even colonised, by pain - "Pain is truth; all else is subject to doubt" (Coetzee 
1982:5) - and becomes itself the subject of torture. What, in this context, in its 
anticipation, ongoing present and recording/remembrance, is the truth?
It was not that I knew any secrets, but what if I were broken to the point 
of telling lies which could incriminate the innocent? (Benson 1990:207)7
Always they wanted the truth, when I had no more truth to tell. I don’t 
think they ever really understood that in fact there was nothing to give 
away. But they always tried to find it, this nothing. (Mashinini 1989:75, 
also see 76-7,81)
'No, that is the truth I have’... But I told them I've already told you the 
truth, so I don't know which truth now do you want... 'If the truth is what 
I know, then I will tell you.' (Dilimeni in Bernstein 1994:73-4)
6
J. U. Jacobs, has also argued that the interrogator's truth is a pre-established 
fiction into which the mind of the interrogator is obsessively locked. What is sought is 
verification, confirmation, and ultimately compliance (1991). As one interrogator told a 
detainee: "'We've got you and today we shall beat all the politics out of your head
because you don't want to listen.'" (Abel 1995:226). And taken a step further: "'We
shall squeeze you empty, and then we shall fill you with ourselves'" O ’Brien tells 
Winston Smith in George Orwell's Nineteen E i g h t y - F o u r .  "'Power is in tearing human minds 
to pieces and putting them together again in new shapes of your own choosing'" 
(1983:220,230). On the relationship between torture and the voice/narration, also see 
Slaughter 199 7.
7
Many activists worried about their ability to protect people and information, about 
losing control. Grace Cele says of her violent interrogation, "I didn’t know what I was 
capable of saying or doing" (in Bernstein 1994:203). In her novel, D e a t h  i s  P a r t  o f  t h e  
P r o c e s s ,  Bernstein writes in relation to the character Indres, "He is afraid now not of 
their acts of violence, but of his own thoughts over which he no longer has control, the 
names and deeds floating through his head. He feels that if they only stand close enough 
to him, and keep quiet, then they will hear. He shuts his mouth and holds his teeth 
together in case words spill out" (1986:220); and: "Someone else has been talking from
his mouth" (222, also 221,227-8,309).
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Eventually... I told them that they could advance any reason and I would 
accept it. I would write the statement corroborating whatever they 
suggested, and I would sign it under oath. (Pheto 1985:132, also see 133-
5)
Within this regime of truth the interrogator is "the master of truth" (Foucault 1978:67, 
also see Pfohl and Gordon 1988). The interrogator knows: knows everything and knows 
nothing, knows the detainee who knows nothing about them, knows more about the 
detainee than the detainee knows about him/herself. What he does not know he can find 
out or invent. The interrogator pretends to know more and/or less than he actually does, 
is clever and/or stupid, the good guy and/or the bad guy. Distortion and lies are the tools 
of his trade. The detainee is pursued relentlessly, bombarded with questions, left with 
no place of sanctuary, "no opportunity to withdraw, to reorganise, to reflect" 
(Schlapobersky in Bernstein 1994:84).
Q: If a detainee... on being interrogated... says 'I am not under any
circumstances prepared to give you any information whatsoever' do you 
leave him alone or do you take further steps?
A: Well, he's got to be asked again.
Q: And again?
A: Yes.
Q: And again?
A: Yes.
Q: And again?
A: Yes
Q: And again?
A: Yes.
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Q: Well then supposing you had a case of a suspect who was
detained because you, the police genuinely believed that he could give 
certain information, and if in fact your belief was wrong and this man 
couldn't give you information, would you keep on questioning him over 
and over again?
A: I would question him, yes.
Q: You would, over and over again?
A: Yes.
Q : That would be a dreadful thing to happen to a man wouldn't it, if in fact
you were wrong?
A: Yes.
Q: It would be. And all that that man would be able to see as far as his future
is concerned would be an endless vista of imprisonment coupled with 
repeated questioning?
A: Yes.
(extract from the inquest proceedings into the death in custody of the detainee, L. S. 
Ngudle: Riekert 1985:121)
The detainee is left waiting, to anticipate and fear in silence, with nothing but themselves 
to fight against. A question is asked but no chance is given to reply or no interest is 
shown in the answer; no questions are even asked; answers are provided, dictated, 
rehearsed. Deliberate contradictions, reversals of reality and roles, create an 
atmosphere of disorientation, distortion and delusion/illusion, in which the detainee can 
confess things into happening (Breytenbach 1985:118) and can confess to almost 
anything: "'High Treason' / 'skinny dipping' / 'eating my great-aunt' / 'desecrating the 
sabbath' / 'instigating the twentieth century,' / or whatever State Security requires that 
week" (Gottschalk, "Petition to my Interrogators", in Oliphant ed. 1992:456-7). The 
detainee is afraid and intimidated, susceptible to suggestion, confused, and often
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compliant, on some occasions to such a degree that s/he is convinced of the veracity of 
his/her own false, fabricated confession (see West 1985, also Foster et al.
1987:43,147).8
Within the process of making a confession the detainee becomes a participant in the 
production of state truth, by articulating it in an alien and alienating language and 
narrative form and by providing a signature for its outcome (Foucault 1991:37-40,43- 
4,65-9, Weschler 1990:15). The making of a confession is part of the broader structure 
of torture whereby the detainee becomes complicit in his/her own un/re-making, 
complicit in torturing themselves (Mashinini 1989:87,90). A paradoxical identification 
and dependence, for example, is constructed and manipulated so that the detainee 
becomes eager to talk and to please. Breytenbach writes: "it becomes possible for one 
ultimately to be like a rabbit assisting wide-eyed and without kicking at one’s own 
eating" (1985:51, also 62). The detainee either becomes complicit in the production of 
state truth, or, if s/he refuses to co-operate, complicit in his/her own pain. Breytenbach 
captures the process of torture and interrogation from the perspective of the 
interrogator:
You are programmed. I cleanse you. I break you in. I break you down to
the pure outcome of spontaneous confession and give-away and self-
oblivion... You must just say. Say that which I must hear. Tell that which 
I know... You are my book. I create your past. Your future is in my 
hands. I leaf through all the painfully constituted files on your comings 
and your goings, the records of your thinking and the organigramme of
8
In the 1960s, in conjunction with the construction of a legislative stockade - "It was
in the sixties, however, that the flow of enactments became a flood, and by the end of
the decade the State security apparatus, by now a frightening engine of misery and 
destruction, had been fully constructed” (Mathews 1985:200) - the state security and 
intelligence system was subjected to a profound and sinister reorganisation. The 
Security Branch/Police changed from being an amateurish operation in the 1950s to one 
which was both professional and ruthless (Merrett 1994:38-9,58, Nicol 1991:329-34, J. 
Slovo 1996:85-6,94,121,143, Wolpe 1994:118,191).
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your associations... I know already. I always know. But I must prove.
You are the confirmation. You prove. You are of my making. I am the 
controller. I slit open, and then I sculpt... Write for me your cacography...
I am your reality... Describe your relationships to me. Tell me about 
what is veiled. Admit even to that which you don't know. Be glorious!...
Why dost thou not love me? (57-9, also 25)
It is this process that is objectified in the confession. Power and powerlessness, and 
their relationship with truth, take on a written textual dimension. Often the detainee 
writes and rewrites a story which carves a groove in their minds (Sepamla 1986:60); 
until they get it 'right'. Breytenbach states, "they do not ask you any questions; they 
simply say, 'Write'; and I've written volumes, volumes. My life is eaten up by words. 
Words have replaced my life" (1985:28). The words of the state replace the life of the 
detainee. The written word is the truth and as such it wields power. The confession - 
secured by violence and against the detainee's will and therefore an inherently 
ambiguous form of truth - is the primary way in which the effects of state truth and 
power are (re)produced within interrogation. Within the state archive, the status of the 
confession is that of its first and most damaging document, the general standard 
governing the production of official truth which, as such, conditions all that follows.9 
What Foucault calls the "power of writing" plays an essential part in the mechanisms of 
discipline.
9
In South African law a statement/confession could only be admitted as evidence in 
court if it had been repeated before a magistrate or justice of the peace (often a 
senior police officer) and reduced to writing. A written record of what the detainee had 
said during interrogation, which had not been formalised in the above-mentioned fashion, 
could not be produced as evidence in court. Also in relation to admissibility: whereas 
prior to 1977, the prosecution had to prove that a confession had been freely and 
voluntarily made, with the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Act (1977) the 
presumption changed so that the confession was assumed to be freely and voluntarily made 
unless the accused could prove, on a balance of probabilities, otherwise.
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This turning of real lives into writing is no longer a procedure of 
heroization; it functions as a procedure of objectification and subjection.
The carefully collated life of mental patients or delinquents belongs, as 
did the chronicle of kings or the adventures of the great popular bandits, 
to a certain political function of writing; but in a quite different 
technique of power. (Foucault 1991:192, also see Harlow 1987:124-33)
Individuals are situated "in a network of writing", "in a whole mass of documents that 
capture and fix them".10 The documentation of this state biography/profile or archive 
represents an ongoing de/re-construction of the oppositional self as subject and victim; 
the police file is theatrically displayed and flaunted within interrogation as an exhibit of 
state knowledge and power: immortality in the fonn of a police file. Pheto describes his 
police file quite simply, "[m]y life history" (1985:23), while Sachs writes:
I too have a dream, that there will one day be a world without police 
files... My biography is there, little details and big events that I have long 
forgotten, recorded in the files of at least five countries, probably nearer 
twenty. One day I look forward to examining the biggest one of all, that 
of SACHS, ALBERT LOUIS (aka ALBIE) at Security Headquarters in 
Pretoria. This is the Book that records implacably all the events of my 
life... (1991:58-9)
10
This archive is given a more active definition by Matsuda, as what he calls "the 
memory of the state": "a structure of investigation, a central organization of dossiers
and files, descriptions and clues and correlations, acting as a system of storage and 
retrieval - transforming 'identity1 into 'identification'... Yet this accumulation of 
clues, documents and pieces of information did not only wait passively for 
examination... The information was exploited, circulated, sent by rail and transmitted 
by telegraph. Ultimately it formed part of a network of technologies and. judicial 
mandates which moved with the vagabonds it hoped to track down. The 'memory' of the 
institution did more than remember - it acted" (1994:74).
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Ultimately, Scarry goes on to argue, the issue at stake is power. She asserts that the 
purpose of torture/interrogation is not to elicit information ("what masquerades as the 
motive for torture is a fiction" (1985:28)), but visibly to deconstruct the detainee’s 
voice, and that to see the question as motive is to provide the torturer with justification, 
while to see the answer as betrayal makes the detainee rather than the torturer, the 
detainee's voice rather than the pain, the cause of this loss of self and world (and of the 
process of rewriting). Such misplaced absolution and conferring of responsibility "turn 
the moral reality of torture upside down" (35). Within the state's 'regime of truth', 
however, pain is both objectified as confession, and falsified as the confession is read as 
betrayal rather than a cry for help, thereby ensuring that the pain is neither 
acknowledged nor addressed. Instead real human pain is converted into the regime's 
fiction of power.
In the final stage of Scarry's structure of torture the objectified attributes of pain are 
translated into the insignia of power. What is experienced by one as a continual 
contraction, of self, world and voice, is for the other a continual expansion. One 
person's pain becomes another person's power through "the obsessive mediation of 
agency" (45). Everything is absorbed into the realm of weaponry, which can refer 
equally to pain and/or power, from the torturer’s fists and questions, the prisoner's 
family, mind, body and voice, to the truth and the written word. The weapon as a 
physical fact inflicts pain. As a perceptual fact, the weapon makes pain visible and 
enables some of pain's attributes to be attached to the regime. The prisoner's pain is 
perverted into fraudulent assertions of power, objectified pain is denied as pain and read 
as power: thus it is not the pain but the regime which becomes incontestably real and 
true, not the pain but the regime that is able to eclipse all else, not the pain but the 
regime that is able to dissolve the world. It is the truth and power of the state that 
triumphs.
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The State Witness
The destruction of self and world and their reformation in the image of the state, the 
complicity and incorporation into another world, was most definitive and irreparable for 
those who became state witnesses and testified in court against their former friends and 
colleagues. First writes: "Van Zyl once said to me: 'You have something to sell. Sell it 
and get yourself out of here.' Sell others and save yourself..." (1965:131). However, 
there was a price to pay for this transaction - "After all the trauma, to go back to the 
community and be rejected again. It means you are killing this person twice over" 
(Mashinini 1989:94) - a price for which there was no ready currency:
you could forgive, you had to forgive, anyone who simply told the police 
what he knew - what seemed unforgivable was that, though you broke 
because you were alone, you were prepared, when you came back to a 
more normal world, still to practice your solitude to the extent of 
betraying your friends so that you could save yourself... the step that 
made you a traitor was not that which told the police what they probably 
already knew, but that which turned you into a state witness when you 
were prepared to barter your friends for your freedom. (Driver 
1971:115)"
11
In most autobiographical prison writing the story of the state witnesses ends at the 
trial and no indication is given about their subsequent lives. One of the most 
fascinating aspects of Driver's novel, E l e g y  f o r  a .Revolutionary (1971), is that it 
looks at the character James Jeremy and the way in which he is perceived by himself and 
others after appearing as a state witness. Also see S. Jacobs1 "Diary of an Exile" 
(1986), which tells the story of a lawyer whose past - notably his role as a state 
witness against someone who subsequently dies in custody - haunts and destabilises him 
in exile, and Gordimer's T h e  L a t e  B o u r g e o i s  W o r l d  with regards to the character Max Van 
Den Sandt who commits suicide after turning state witness (1982: especially 19,55, also 
79-80).
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We had been friends... and we had been through things together which 
made for very close friendship and comradeship. That was over, done, 
and nothing could ever redeem the change. I sat in the dock and went off 
to be sentenced. They stood in the witness box and bought themselves a 
sort of freedom. Now - after my seven years inside - 1 am free and 1 am 
sure I have had the better part of it. I sat in the dock where there was 
plenty of room, lots more room in the dock for others with us four 
accused. They stood alone, in the box, where there was room only for 
one, like in a coffin. (Lewin 1976:72-3)12
A few state witnesses were willing accomplices - "drowning men who clutch the hair of 
their best friends, pressing them down into suffocating seas of jail and death to save 
themselves" (Bernstein 1989:145) - who broke quickly, manufactured their evidence to 
suit the requirements of the state, to protect themselves at the expense of others, and 
became travelling witnesses testifying at numerous political trials.13 To become such a
witness was to acquiesce to and choose the destruction of a self and world after the pain 
had been removed and some level of control regained. It was to take on the enemy's 
voice and world as your own, to live the apartheid lie. It was to voluntarily extend 
complicity to participation in the official rewriting of others and thereby become 
irreparably rewritten oneself. It was the most complete restructuring of self in the image
One of state witnesses who testified against Lewin, and others, was John Lloyd, 
'Ernest' in Lewin's prison narrative, who, as the parliamentary candidate for the Labour 
Party in Exeter, England, was the subject of considerable controversy in relation to his 
South African past over thirty years after these events. Lewin was quoted as saying, "'I 
was totally betrayed. There can be no reconciliation, no question of redemption, no 
question of forgiveness'". The same newspaper carries the personal testimony of Lloyd 
himself ("'I do not condone terrorism'", I n d e p e n d e n t  o n  S u n d a y , 29 October 1995). After 
refusing to stand down, Lloyd was sacked as the Labour Party's parliamentary candidate 
for Exeter.
See Bookholane in Russell 1991:60, Dingake 1987:118,132, Joseph 1986:159-60,162, 
Lewin 1976:72.
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of the state. Who was the real person, the activist or the state witness? What did they 
genuinely believe?14
Both the written confession and the evidence of the state witness, as an integral part of a 
wider political function of rewriting, fed into the political trial. The political trial 
became a part of the South African landscape as the courts were enlisted to serve 
political goals. It was in the court room, where the written word - as the statements/ 
confessions of detainees and state witnesses, as the law, as judicial procedure and 
judgement: as the collaborative product of institutional practices of writing - was most 
conspicuously a lie, that it was most overtly read as and became the truth; where 
individual pain was most obviously and publicly converted, on the basis of the multiple 
rewritings of the state, into state power.15 Ashforth asserts that "the real seat of power is 
the bureau, the locus of writing" (1990:5). Techniques for the production of state truth
14
Those who were 'turned' under interrogation not only became state witnesses but were 
also recruited to work for the security establishment against their former comrades, as 
spies, agents and double agents, and, in later years, as members of death/hit squads. 
All, however, were in their different ways remade in the image of the state.
It is important to note that there were different kinds of state witnesses. Some were 
unquestionably more victim than villain. Farm workers and domestic staff from 
Lilliesleaf farm, for example, were used as state witnesses in the Rivonia trial in 
1963-4 involving the core of Umkhonto we Sizwe's (MK's) leadership. Although not linked 
to any oppositional political activity they were subjected to lengthy periods of 
detention in solitary confinement - supposedly to secure their protection - and torture 
prior to giving evidence. Such treatment for witnesses, the political and the non­
political, became widespread. Their often hopelessly compromised evidence was delivered 
in an atmosphere of fear and terror (see Lewin 1976:38-9,69-70 - and on state witnesses 
in the same trial: Hirson 1995:287-8,308-9,314-5,320,322-4,326-7,329,331-3 - also Moss 
1981:204-5). There were also those who retracted/refuted statements made in detention 
and refused to give evidence for the state in court, thereby bringing upon themselves 
the prospect of further detention and/or a prison sentence for contempt of court/perjury 
(see Amnesty International 1978:30-3, Bernstein 1972:15-16,28, Dingake 1987:131-3, 
Joseph 1986:159-160,224, Naidoo 1982:204, Sachs 1990:284). Bernstein has written 
particularly perceptively about the many faces of the state witness (1989, especially 
144-78, 1972:21-5). More usually detainees refused to become a link in the chain of
persecution. Some, like Jeremy Cronin, were insulted by the mere suggestion: "and that
was actually the point at which I was most angry with them. That was almost the most 
humiliating thing that happened to me, to be offered this. Because my whole self image 
was, I do make mistakes... but I was a communist... so I was outraged that they s h (...], 
to become a state witness which, I mean, was just not even, didn't enter into the 
picture" (interview).
15
Moss writes the following about the character David Miller in her novel The S c h o o l  
M a s t e r : "and every day in the courtroom they unravelled the meanings of his life. He
stood in the evidence piling around him like litter. Strange wrappings, words he had not 
remembered, fragmented conversations, fell around him as though he had become... 
something for the dustbin, the coffin" (1981:203-4).
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and the co-habitation of truth and power conspired to produce the ultimate reality of the 
state power of writing: death, or more usually, imprisonment.
Discourses on Torture
Commentators on present-day torture, including Scarry, invariably argue that it is no 
longer employed, or primarily employed, to extract information and that the emphasis 
on that particular variant of the truth has been displaced by the desire to break and 
destroy: "It is not primarily the victim's information, but the victim, that torture needs to 
win - or reduce to powerlessness" (Peters 1985:164). There is some support for this 
hypothesis from South Africa.16 But torture served, and more generally can serve, a 
variety of inter-related ends and objectives: to secure a statement/confession, the truth/ 
information, and/or a recantation and denunciation/renunciation; to elicit confirmation, 
the recording of the already known/determined in and through the voice and words of 
the detainee; to politically identify/create/brand those deemed torturable;17 to spread a 
climate of terror and intimidation by parading broken victims (organisations, peoples), 
and, thereby, to undermine the societal capacity to hope and to act; to impose order and 
control; to hunt down and eradicate false truths and their adherents, and in so doing to 
purify state truth through the denial of difference and dialogue; to indoctrinate and
16
See Abel 1995:216,218,226-7,253-4. The following is from Ken Barris1 short story 
"Double Exposure": "He understood the politics of the situation. It had lost any
function other than to demonstrate his impotence. It had nothing to do with gathering 
intelligence or gaining information. It had everything to do with power" (1988:85-6).
On the discourse of tprture as predicated on an attempt to establish, uncover, 
maintain distinctions between groups within a population, and the wider implications of 
the desire to chart the ambiguous boundary between the torturable and the untorturable, 
see du Bois 1991: "Torture in... South Africa... creates what Sartre calls another 
'race,' a species that is rendered, by the activity of the torturer, non-human... the 
torture reduces the particularity of difference, of otherness, to that fact of being 
tortured" (152-3).
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convert; to punish, coerce, engender respect, subjugate and humiliate, induce 
helplessness, vent rage, seek revenge and to engage in pure sadism.’8
The emphasis may indeed have shifted within contemporary torture towards the 
imperative of power to obliterate the oppositional self. And yet to speak of distinct 
regimes of torture is misleading. Torture is a violent collaboration of means, objectives 
and outcomes, in which truth and annihilation can be, perhaps necessarily are, pursued 
simultaneously:
'His work is to find out the truth. That is all he does. He finds out the 
truth'... When I see Colonel Joll again, when he has the leisure, I bring 
the conversation around to torture. 'What if your prisoner is telling the 
truth,' I ask, 'yet finds he is not believed? Is that not a terrible position?
Imagine: to be prepared to yield, to yield, to have nothing more to yield, 
to be broken, yet to be pressed to yield more! And what a responsibility 
for the interrogator! How do you ever know when a man has told you the 
truth?' 'There is a certain tone,' Joll says... 'Training and experience teach 
us to recognise that tone.'... 'I am speaking of a situation in which I am 
probing for the truth, in which I have to exert pressure to find it. First I 
get lies... then pressure, then more lies, then more pressure, then the 
break, then more pressure, then the truth. That is how you get the truth.'
(Coetzee 1982:3,5, see also 96)
Torture's role within different regimes of terror can vary significantly (see, for example, 
Pion-Berlin 1994:108-9). Under apartheid, it was the servant of a racist ideology. But it
18
For discussions of the objectives of torture see du Bois 1991: especially 145-57, 
Peters 1985:161-4, Scarry 1985 and Weschler 1990:237-42,265-6.
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was also an inexact practice rooted in the specificities of time, place, personality and 
context. During Michael Dingake's first interrogation he was told '"We want 
information. Information while in the course of a second period of interrogation 
this had become: "'I want confirmation! Confirmation! Confirmation from you!'" 
(1987:105,153). This specificity extended to the micro-times and -places of 
interrogation, from hour to hour and room to room, for both detainee and torturer. 
Torture was a flexible tactic or strategy. It was a component of the wider functioning of 
violence, the significance of which in part resided in the manner in which it unsettled 
and manipulated thresholds and boundaries: between torture as a precise instrument in 
the service of a prevailing ideology/regime and torture as an agent of random and 
generalised terror, between discreet methods, objectives and results, between pain and 
power, truth and fiction, the oral and the written, the conscious and the unconscious, the 
self and the state, betrayal and resistance, order and chaos:
In the end my mind could no longer betray: the surface from where the 
tongue can be steered was couched in lies, in mist, in unreality. Names 
and places and events had been rearranged ingeniously, in coordination, 
under a rule of sheer terror. Reality was out of reach and so was I[...] I 
had become unbreakable, I was beyond talking, I had gone beyond.
Beyond some line, but I still don't know which. Beyond some terrible 
limit. (Pastoors in Schreiner ed. 1992:17)
The truth and power of torture was precisely this terrifying unsettling and remaking of 
reality.19 The destructive force of torture resides in its simultaneity, in a complex
19
Another example of this phenomenon is the way in which state violence blurs boundaries 
within and between aspects of oppression. In apartheid South Africa, the torture- 
punishment-discipline evolution plotted by Foucault in D i s c i p l i n e  a n d  P u n i s h  was 
reworked within detention and imprisonment. The evolution to some extent characterised 
the passage from detention to imprisonment, but in various forms and to varying degrees 
its components also coexisted simultaneously within both detention and imprisonment. An 
extended historical/temporal evolution was accompanied by an intense spatial and 
strategic relationship marked by simultaneity as much as by transition. The spectacle of 
torture, the display of broken bodies and minds, retained its power: "To reduce a person
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process of inter-related and overlapping parts, which feed into and from one another.
The process and its consequences are, in the end, both intended and unintended, 
conscious and unconscious, the subject of control and direction but also risk and 
unpredictability. Due to the proximity of absolute power and control to their absolute 
absence, to chaos and rebellion, torture's ultimate strength is also its fatal weakness. 
From the beginning, the momentum and totality of repressive violence is undermined by 
internal tensions and contradictions, by a lingering inexactness. These cracks and 
fissures in the edifice create the footholds for resistance.
To recognise torture as encompassing a range of means, objectives and outcomes 
requires a modification of Scarry's powerful but partial three point structure for torture. 
The following discussion begins by addressing one such avenue of modification: 
resistance.
At the Interface Between Opposing Powers of Writing
No power or truth is absolute. Within the interrogation process the detainee retained a 
residue of each. Many of the South African detainees who made statements claim to 
have participated in a damage-limitation exercise and/or in a fictionalising process. The 
line of demarcation between truth and fiction was blurred deliberately and unwittingly 
both for and by the detainee during torture and interrogation. Detainees entered 
interrogation armed with 'legends', believable and defensible alibis - "a legend is 
actually very close to some kind of truth" (Langa interview) - prepared for every 
anticipated eventuality.20 If'legends' proved ineffective a second, and related, line of
to a weakness of babbling, to confuse him in private and parade his humiliation 
publicly, constitute a sickening spectacle, which affects the whole society"
(Breytenbach 1985:343, also 180, see du Bois 1991:153-7).
20
In a way that strangely parallels the capacity of detainees to be convinced of the 
truthfulness of their forced and false confessions, Langa also claimed that 'legends' 
were sometimes so convincing that the detainee came to believing them.
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defence in the making of a statement was often an attempt to 'control' or 'manage' the 
process, to choose a point at which and the manner in which to 'settle', to try and define 
the parameters within which a statement was made while again constructing a plausible 
story. This latter exercise could be attempted in various ways. Through preparation and 
practice - activists were trained in resistance techniques, read prison memoirs, discussed 
and handed on an accumulation of experience, prepared names to divulge, answers to 
questions - through silence, lies, and divulging a narrow truth - "truth, but not the whole 
truth, so help me God!" (Singh interview) - through playing smart and stupid, and 
through feigned ignorance and loss of memory. It was possible deliberately to forget in 
order not to disclose, to erect mental barriers between that which could be sacrificed, 
that which should be held in reserve, and that information that had to be mentally 
partitioned off, preserved at all costs. During the course of an interrogation it sometimes 
proved possible to piece together what the interrogators' knew and what they did not 
know and therefore wanted. Detainees bought time, and even satisfied their captors, by 
revealing information that was useless or already known, and by only implicating 
themselves or those out of the country or otherwise no longer vulnerable. Detainees 
came to cherish their small but significant victories: the familiarity with and 
anticipation of interrogation techniques - Cronin describes finding himself "smiling in 
recognition of [their] moves" (interview, also see Wolpe 1994:186) - reversals in the 
flow of questions and answers, the successfully 'managed' statement that brought with it 
the sense of having retained and regained something.21 As methods of interrogation
evolved and grew in sophistication over time, so too did the methods of resistance.
Those detained in the early 1960s, however, were badly briefed, inexperienced, and ill- 
prepared for what lay in store. The official line was that torture and interrogation should
For descriptions of attempting/making a 'managed' statement see, for example, 
Breytenbach 1985:343, Dingake 1987:103-6, Hirson 1995:288-9, Jenkin 1987:36, Pheto 
1985:55-6,60,71-2,93-5, Sachs 1968:241-55, Wolpe 1994:193-4.
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be withstood and that no statement should be made.” But virtually everybody, 
eventually, made a statement of some kind, and in time many received guidance about 
how it should be done:
the training that we would give comrades would be you are not to make 
any statement whatsoever for the first three days, so hopefully that will 
enable the structures that you are working in to dismantle whatever is 
happening and to get incriminating things somewhere else. And then you 
will make, depending on how much pressure is put on you, you will 
make a series of statements giving as little information as possible in 
each successive statement and there are certain things you have in your 
mind that you will not make a statement about. But at a certain point you 
have got to satisfy them that they think they have got everything that you 
know, and that might take three, four, five, six bad weeks... so... it was 
a... series of statements giving more every time but hopefully 
withholding the absolute vital information and giving comrades at least 
three days before you said anything, regardless of what they did to you... 
what they had to give was stuff that incriminated them that didn't 
incriminate other people. And, because people don't want to incriminate 
themselves they would be very careful about what information they gave.
But, the incrimination of other people... was absolutely the final thing 
when you thought they were actually going to kill you... And it worked.
(Schoon interview)
22
Both a degree of unpreparedness and an echo of the hard line approach were to endure 
within opposition circles. On the former see Foster et al. 1987:93-4,124,163,197-8, also 
115,146-7,164-5.
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This process of pain-, truth- and information-management was an extraordinarily 
difficult task. Beyond the inevitable coercion was the fact that the detainee was in a 
position of radical unknowing, ignorant, often, about what the interrogator already 
knew, about what within the interrogator's discourse was true and what was fiction, 
about the source of any given piece of information and who among any other detainees 
had said, or was likely to say, what, and about how any incriminating evidence might be 
used. The detainee was continually double-guessing, covering old tracks, re-inventing 
him/her self, working from fragments and on hunches, straining the bounds of 
consistency and the believable. This was the life story at its most creatively provisional, 
and selectively strategic. The end result, however, was that the detainee managed to 
distort the echo of the torturer’s voice. Using the meagre resources available, 
interrogation became an arena of contestation and the statement, written with, against, 
through, by the state, a violently collaborative text, a textual synthesis of lives, truths 
and powers:
the testimony takes on a new interest as the intersubjective production 
of... inquisitor and... witness, a convergence of imaginations more than 
an objective account of real events. This convergence takes place within 
a monstrously asymmetrical dialogue, to be sure, but one in which there 
is nevertheless an exchange, with real violence traded for a narrative of 
violence. (Tedlock 1993:147)
It is possible to construct a chain of violent collaboration that went beyond the 
immediate encounter between interrogator and detainee to encompass a wider 
circulation of life stories in/through which the detainee confronted mobile interrogation 
teams and police files, the continual recycling of information and people, detainees 
played off against one another, used to break and inflict violence on one another, state 
witnesses telling "the full story, his story, my story, our story" (Lewin 1976:70); and,
more generally, the active memory of the state. Numerous, diverse, sometimes 
contradictory accounts of lives converged on an arena that extended into the political 
trial and beyond, an arena dense with prior versions, with lives jointly told, already told, 
pretold and foretold.
The chain of violent collaboration extended in various ways beyond the confines of 
interrogation. Existence for the detainee and prisoner was structured around 
mechanisms that enabled some kind of contact to be maintained with other detainees/ 
prisoners and that opened windows onto the outside world. Such contacts represented a 
reaching out and a (re)connecting, provided a means for the retention/restoration of 
voice, self and world, and were frequently written in form: from illicit writing serving 
all kinds of purposes on surfaces as varied as toilet paper and cell walls; to the writing 
and receipt of letters, smuggled newspapers, studying, and so on. The loss of writings 
was often devastating, signifying the/another loss of self and world: "That's the greatest 
loss that I had in my life"; "And I was lost. That was really a most terrible moment" 
(Matlou, Schlapobersky in Bernstein 1994:78,86). Such activities, at the interface 
between opposing powers of writing, helped to shape the beginnings of an oppositional 
power of writing that challenged the hegemony of official discourse, and its truth-power 
dynamic. The written word was intrinsic not only to the structure of repression but also 
to the structure of resistance.
Prisoners' letters provided a symbolic transformation of, and transportation between, 
worlds and forms of the written word. Writing was again able to be the bearer of hope 
and comfort, of a different kind of truth and power. The prison walls receded. This is 
Breytenbach writing about seeking sanctuary at night from the singing of those 
condemned to death:
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your letter is delightful, larger and lighter / than the thought of a flower 
when the dream / is a garden, / as your letter opens / there is an unfolding 
of sky, word from outside, / wide spaces... of the orange tree decked out 
in white blossoms / opening with the sun, / 1 could smell it on the balcony,
/ 1 can smell you... I will be suspended from the sky of your words, / give 
that I may dwell in your letter / all the days of my life... your letter is 
wonderful... as your letter opens / there is an unfolding o f sky, word from 
outside, / memory, ("your letter", 1988:92-3, also 1985:173,370-1: 
inserted slash marks [/] are my own and are used throughout the thesis to 
indicate the end of a line within poetry)
This reclamation of the word did not go uncontested by the state. Problems arising from 
correspondence, for example, were fairly uniform. Both the content and length of letters 
were strictly circumscribed. In addition to being cut, censored - "There was something 
else - 1 could just read the word ’power’ the prison had blacked out" (Gordimer, 
"Amnesty", 1992:251) - lost, delayed and withheld, letters were often subject to other 
mindless and petty stipulations. Some forms of harassment were cynical in the extreme. 
Dingake complains that with the passage of time the withholding of letters became 
"common and indiscriminate", and that the censorship of outgoing mail ended when it 
became too vulnerable to outside scrutiny but was replaced by a policy that required 
prisoners to simply re-write their letters. This policy was "a master plan which enable 
prison authorities to pose as angels to the outside public while behaving atrociously to 
the prisoners" (1987:166-7). As the quotations below illustrate, sometimes 
disillusionment set in: the first is from an account by a prisoner, the second is from a 
poem to/for a detainee.
So little happened on the Island or, rather, so little happened that we 
were allowed to write about, that getting something to say was quite 
difficult and we never got much pleasure from writing. We wanted the
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contact, but with hardly anything to communicate we would throw it 
away and destroy our few painfully put together thoughts. (Naidoo 
1982:188)
This letter comes to you / empty of the things / 1 wanted to say / empty of 
the shock, the horror, / the pain of the day / framing only black marks / 
on a white page / framing only hopes / in a fearful age / this letter comes 
to you / with all my love / but / empty... (Pillay, "A Letter to Bandi", in 
Oliphant and Vladislavic eds. 1988:211)
The incarcerated responded to the official apparatus of control with their own counter­
strategies such as smuggling and writing using private codes of meaning. According to 
Dingake, letters, visits and other channels of communication were a "lifeline" that "kept 
us going in spite of their frequent use by officialdom as instruments of mental torture" 
(1987:159-60,171). Various arenas of continuous contestation and invention were 
established. To provide another example, during most of the apartheid era political 
prisoners were officially denied access to all news, with the partial exception of 
demoralising and destabilising news.23 By depriving prisoners of knowledge about the 
world outside, the authorities attempted to isolate, demoralise and depoliticise a vital 
political constituency, thereby rendering them ineffective, while prisoners - through 
smuggling, interrogating new prisoners and information gleaned from trips outside, 
through visitors, letters and studying, criminals and warders, through arranging 
fragments into a greater whole and reading between the spoken and written lines - 
sought to fight this asphyxiating regime. Naidoo, for example, states: "Newspapers were 
our lifeblood. We ate, slept and dreamt news, and were in a constant war with the 
authorities over it - we to get it, they to keep it from us" (1982:131), and: "Every single
23
See Breytenbach 1985:35-6, Dingake 1987:120, Gregory 1995:134-5,175, also 197, N. 
Mandela 1995:504, also 607, W. Mandela 1985:84, Naidoo 1982:155.
prisoner at some time or other participated in smuggling newspapers. The authorities 
discovered all the methods mentioned in this narrative and put a stop to them, but there 
were many more which they have never found out about, and which must remain 
secret" (154, also see Jenkin 1987:119-22, N. Mandela 1995: especially 492-3). Perhaps 
the most remarkable contribution to the newspaper saga was not the continual and 
pervasive stealing and smuggling but the actual production of a newspaper for a period 
by the white politicals at Local Prison, Pretoria. The newspaper, called 'The Gleek', 
began as a way of packaging and circulating stolen newspaper cuttings but became a 
mixture largely of often frivolous, sometimes slanderous, 'stories', creative writing and a 
diary of events, hastily produced, circulated and destroyed each Christmas.
And I mean that became terribly important... it started because Costa 
Gazides came back from further charges in Jo'burg... with a whole set of 
cuttings of the Strachan case... and was thrown into a cell where there 
were three of us and we had about two hours and we were furiously 
reading the cuttings. Then, I said we've got to put them together so that 
everybody else can read them. So we actually very quickly made up a 
little newspaper, just of cuttings, quickly stuck these things together in a 
sort of A4 form. Which we were then able to smuggle through the 
section and everybody read them... It was totally clandestine and totally 
secret... it was basically... a Christmas thing which we used as a 
celebration and as a form of protest... And it became a sort of rag mag 
really... a very very strong force for cohesion, because it was totally 
illegal... if it had been found... it would have been dreadful... it was a 
total act of defiance... but it was very creative... in some ways a sort of 
creation of genius, it was a marvellous thing... we'd produce it by about 
Christmas and then it would go through the section and... come back to 
me and I'd have to cut it up and flush it. And that was the most terrifying,
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terrible thing... And I mean the funny thing was that we discovered after 
a couple of years that the word gleek, which came from a poor joke that 
somebody told about Costa being a Greek, gleek was actually a 
Shakespearean word, it comes into A Midsummer Nights Dream, and it 
means spoof or tactic, so it was amazing [...] (Lewin interview, also see 
Lewin 1994)
Like the undiscovered methods of smuggling newspapers mentioned by Naidoo, this 
initiative could not be discussed by Lewin when Bandiet was written, "for obvious 
reasons". Autobiographical accounts, like statements, were 'managed' in accordance 
with an evolving political purpose.
While progress was haphazard, contradictory and uncertain, the net result of the 
complex interaction of forces - written and non-written, legal and illegal - that together 
comprised the pressure for change in prison conditions, as prisoners were upgraded and 
subject to new regulations, was a marked improvement.
In prison, Robben Island in particular, the retreat was tangible and could 
be measured in leagues. From one letter per prisoner in six months to 
one letter every month, from cold sea water showers in winter to fresh 
hot water showering in all seasons, from news blackout to uncensored 
newspapers, from indiscriminate physical assaults to hospitalisation of 
deserving cases in mainland hospitals - the list could go on and on.
(Dingake 1987:228: on Robben Island 1966-81)
[Cronin talks of] a well defined space in which prisoners had rolled back 
the regime quite considerably, very noticeable when I arrived... I think 
the difference between prison as I encountered it and what it must have
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been in the 60s and even leading into the early 70s, was that they were 
not trying to change us, or operate on us in a heavy handed way... They 
were trying to manage incarceration... they wanted minimum disruption 
from you, they were in charge and they would assert that... but I think 
that physical conditions - in terms of relative comfort, diet, space - 
generally we managed through the period I was there. Again you would 
get problematic warders... [but] [w]e managed our daily routines... much 
much more than the ordinary prisoner... We placed orders on a monthly 
basis, we drew up/ran work schedules, we decided who would clean at 
what time... we defined what was clean, a little bit more than we might 
have wanted to but a lot less than they wanted... We refused to do 
endless routine work... and that process continued through the seven 
years that I was there... we began to get them running around us a little 
bit in terms of daily routines. (Cronin interview: in prison 1976-83)24
The harsh regime for political prisoners was characterised by both considerable 
improvements and reversals. Prisoners were always caught between the 
immense cathartic importance attached to such improvements and the fact that 
they were, in some cases, illegal, and/or generally subject to the dominant
24
Many improvements in conditions were the result of campaigns originating from and 
consistent pressure by the prisoners themselves. There were also, however, important 
external initiatives to assist prisoners and ease their plight. Three articles published 
in 1965 in the Ranc? D a i l y  M a i l shortly after the release of Jock Strachan who had served 
three years in Local Prison, and largely informed by his experience and evidence, were 
important in exposing conditions in South African prisons {see Cook 1974:33-8,46-7,64- 
71, Merrett 1994:68-9). The role played by released prisoners in exposing conditions and 
publicity in the press continued, over the years, to be important. Other domestic 
support/pressure came from family networks, human rights and anti-apartheid 
organisations, and progressive lawyers (on access to lawyers and legal 
challenges/actions, see Buntman 1996:109-10, Cook 1974:47-50, Jenkin 1987:117-19, Naidoo 
1982:121,195,203-4, Shityuwete 19 90:221-9,245-7. Van Zyl Smit states: "It cannot be
ignored that in the past 25 years prison law in South Africa has been shaped almost 
entirely in the course of challenges directed by 'political detainees'" (1987:158-9)). 
International pressure from a variety of sources gained momentum and significance over 
the years, and lobbying and visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross and 
Helen Suzman are frequently mentioned in prison accounts (see Suzman 1993:137-69). 
External attention was often vital to the success of struggles initiated by the 
prisoners (Buntman 1996:110).
52
characteristics of prison administration, harshness and vindictive arbitrariness.*’5 
Such characteristics applied to the administration of the fledgling oppositional 
power of writing as to all other aspects of prison conditions. The detainee, and to a 
lesser extent the prisoner, therefore, operated from within worlds cordoned off as much 
as possible from outside sanction and control, but they were also the focus of increasing 
levels of both internal and external scrutiny and pressure. Contradictory demands 
produced the ambiguous blend of severity, improvements and reversals that 
characterised conditions.
The struggle to un/remake and rewrite the detainee/prisoner, to enforce and maintain 
the official power of writing, although obviously operating at differing levels of 
intensity, was relentless: "an indefinite discipline: an interrogation without end, an 
investigation that would be extended without limit... a judgement that would at the 
same time be the constitution of a file that was never closed..." (Foucault 1991:227).
In fact... the interrogation never ceased... the first trial with its conviction 
was just one step in the ongoing process of dissecting and undoing the 
psyche and washing the brain. (Breytenbach 1985:180, see 179-85, also 
Dingake 1987:133, Mkalipi/Alexander in Alexander etal. 1992:303-4)26
25
Official study was another form of writing/the written word at the interface between 
opposing powers of writing which, like letters and newspapers, served as an arena of 
contestation. Lewin states that courses taken through the University of South Africa 
(UNISA) became "the pivotal point of our existences" (1976:98, also Niehaus 1994:137-9. 
Hirson, previously a physicist, built the foundation for a new career as a historian: 
1995:119-20,142,161-2,205-9,248,345-7,352,354-5). However, as Dingake claims the study 
privilege "more than all the others needs to be put into proper perspective" (1987:171). 
According to the Robben Island experience, from the start in the 1960s the privilege was 
"entangled with strict conditions" and harassment. There followed a whole string of 
attempts to negate the right to study: the ending of UNISA subsidisation of prisoner
studying in the late 1960s was quickly followed by the prohibition of postgraduate 
studies and the denial of permission to study certain subjects such as history, law and 
political science as an undergraduate; in 1977 it was announced that no prisoner could 
do post-matric studies; and so on. Subsequently, post-matric and postgraduate studies 
were restored but again with extremely tight conditions, notably that masters 
dissertations had to be approved by the Prisons Department. Study privileges were never 
enjoyed by the majority of prisoners, were curtailed continuously and at times simply 
cancelled.
26
On monitoring, supervision and control, by the Security Police in relation to 
political prisoners, see Buntman 1996:122,124,177 footnote 20, Hirson 1995:326-7.
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At the interface between competing powers of writing control was sought by both sides 
over the forms of written word to which detainees and prisoners had access, over the 
ability to write, over what was written, and in particular over what was written about 
the person in question. Radically different conceptions and practices of truth and power 
were locked in conflict. Official control over the written word was significantly, if 
unevenly, compromised. The realm of the written word was variously underpinned by 
violent collaboration, by competing forces that influenced the context and manner of 
writing, but in the war that raged around letters and newspapers, as in many other 
similar conflicts, battles in various innovative ways could be won. Detainees and 
prisoners tried to reconstitute and rewrite the prison experience, and themselves within 
that experience, against the grain of state discourse. In this evolving process they 
regained access to aspects of voice, self and world of which they had been stripped 
during interrogation and became complicit in their own remaking, in the formation of 
an alternative archive and image of the self. This archive contained a form of discursive 
truth, knowledge and power for which the state archive had no equivalent in scope or 
complexity: the autobiography.
Autobiography and the Power of Representation
Elizabeth Hanson has argued that although "the infliction and the representation of 
torture are events of different phenomenological order, their comparison is instructive" 
(1991:61). The same point applies, to varying degrees, to the whole range of 
experiences from detention and imprisonment. Hanson goes on the say: "For the 
practitioners, torture is a violent extension of an insufficient discourse; for the victims, 
its representation is the discursive extension of bodily resistance" (61-2). The dynamics 
of torture can in part be reversed within its narrative representation: the detainee is 
served by silence and obfuscation within interrogation and vocality and truth within its
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representation - thereby providing evidence of torture and interrogational techniques as 
well as modes of resistance - while the reverse is true for the state; the torturer 
appropriates the detainee's voice in interrogation but the detainee appropriates the scene 
of torture within representation thereby making the state speak from within the 
oppositional discursive terrain rather than the reverse. That oppositional attempts to 
reverse, resituate, and remake the experience of incarceration can be most persuasively 
undertaken through representation, and more specifically through autobiography, make 
the latter a form endowed with considerable, if sometimes ambiguous, truth and power.
The crucible of incarceration, with its textures of violence and pain seems universally to 
demand '"factually insistent'" narratives (Young 1987:404, also 1990:67,80). South 
African prison writers testify to the truthfulness of their accounts: Kantor defines his 
memoir as "a factual account" (1967:vii); Pheto claims that the "contents of this 
narrative are true" (1985:8); even Zwelonke's fiction projects "a hard and bitter truth; 
fiction mirroring non-fiction, true episodes and incidents" (1973:3). Hence there is a 
common belief among the writers themselves that prison writing attains authority 
through a narrowly defined conception of what constitutes the truth. The writer seems 
compelled to assume the role of witness.27 The capacity of the state to manufacture its 
own truth, to have it implemented and to a lesser extent believed, was essential to the 
generation of apartheid political power. Similarly, prison writers have felt that their 
power was contingent upon a capacity to generate truth and have their truths believed. 
Truth is seen as linked to power: the reason for the truth imperative becomes clear.
Breytenbach is alone in constructing a more complicated, self-conscious and even 
ironic understanding of the concept of a true confession. He felt it imperative to "get 
rid of the unreality", and states: "This is the true story of what happened"
(1985:27,333, also see 338). And yet he undermines/queries his own quest for truth, for 
it is a concept that he dismisses as "a convention": "there are no finites; just
movements of mind, only processes"; "nothing beyond the organic reality of pattern and 
repetition and illusion and rhyme and rhythm"; "(o]ne mustn't be like those who always 
simplify 'reality' by attempting to understand it" (36,87,151,308). At different stages 
the reader is introduced to his true confession as "also the instantaneous invention of 
what might have happened", the possibility that "the unsaid must be more truthful", the 
certainty that things have been omitted and forgotten and that there may well be 
mistakes, and the tendency for the human memory to remember selectively in an attempt to 
"escape from itself" (17,63,151,271,288,338).
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Within this study, however, the truth imperative will be filtered through the dominant 
theoretical argument of the thesis, and thereby linked to a 'higher' truth. Autobiography 
provides the opposition power of writing with a uniquely definitive form: at once, a 
personal story, an articulation of oppositional writings and readings of imprisonment; a 
form that bridges attempts to create a counter-discourse from within and outside the 
prison; and, to varying degrees, juxtaposes conflicting constructions of truth and power, 
and, situates the violence of state forms of discourse within dominant oppositional 
discursive paradigms. The autobiography is the oppositional power of writing as 
archive, as 'owned' archive.
This chapter argues that to be a political prisoner is to be variously written, to be 
contested through writing. The word is a weapon that both inflicts pain and secures 
power. Everyone becomes a writer. Prisoners are relentlessly and violently rewritten - 
through the confession/statement, the testimony of state witnesses, the law, the political 
trial, and the regulations governing imprisonment - within an alien power of writing.
The prisoner's sense of self and world is undermined, pain is made visible and 
objectified in writing enabling it to be denied as personal pain and read as state power. 
The official power of writing consists of these cumulative written truths. It is a 
collaboration between government, civil service, the judiciary, and even the 
incarcerated themselves: a conspiracy of the state. Where narrative meaning remains 
ambiguous, it is invariably interpreted against the prisoner. Reading and writing, and 
language itself, become subject to the dominant characteristics of the state: absolute 
power, lawlessness, the 'false motive syndrome’, and 'bureaucratic tyranny' render the 
word a duplicitous lie beyond the prisoner's control. The multiple rewritings of the state 
create an archive of the self, a self framed within the official power of writing and 
defined by its subjection to the state. This written self is isolated, destroyed, rewritten to
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serve a political end; it is unrecognisable and unwanted, a testimony to powerlessness, 
violence and repression.
The power of writing, however, is a contested arena; no archive is unpolluted by its 
'other'. The prisoners’ attempts to retain or restore a sense of self and world also has to 
be relentless and lawless. From the start and the 'management' of the statement the state 
power of writing is contested. Rival powers of writing emerge - from the ungrammatical 
tattoo to the writing of autobiographical accounts - which provide a way of salvaging 
the written word, an alternative truth/power and the oppositional self from the 
enveloping state lie. It is at the interface between powers of writing that the violence of 
collaboration is most fierce. The oppositional power of writing also consists of 
cumulative/collaborative written truths but they write towards an alternative archive of 
the self, a self framed within the oppositional power of writing and defined by its 
resistance to the state. It is within autobiographical accounts that these counter­
discourses are most comprehensively articulated.
As has already been outlined, there is no monopoly over the political function of 
writing. Just as official rewritings can be turned against the authorities, used, carefully 
contextualised, to construct the oppositional power of writing, so the written words of 
the incarcerated and oppositional prison writings can be used against their authors, and 
others, in their unmaking. Meaning is unstable, inter-textual, context-bound. The 
dominant intention and purpose of autobiographical writing, however, is to restore 
elemental political ground to the prisoner. The axis of narrative, and ultimately 
political, truth and power is relocated as the incarcerated restore and make visible a 
sense of self and world, and as official prison narratives are eclipsed, contextualised and 
turned against apartheid. These are the contours of the contested arena of the power of 
writing, at stake is the question of on whose terms imprisonment will be both written 
and read, represented and interpreted.
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Many produced, "[a] narrative, answering the comradely demand (not that other 
demand, uttered by those who want to know for other reasons and who use instruments 
of torture to wring the narrative out of one), the comradely demand to know, tell us 
what happened1' (Horn 1992:85). The second part of this chapter will examine the 
implications of the oppositional archive, and specifically the autobiographical text, for 
relations of truth and power.
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ii) Detainees and Prisoners 
Ruth First and the Art of Winning
During the early 1960s, which saw a quickening in the pace of attempts to crush, 
particularly black, political opposition, the government introduced the 90- and 180-day 
detention laws.28 Ruth First was detained on 9 August 1963 and held for 117 days. Her
detention under the 90-day clause came three weeks after the Rivonia arrests. Two 
periods at Marshall Square police station in Johannesburg were interrupted by 28 days 
spent at Central Prison, Pretoria. She was a political activist of long standing, a member 
of the South African Communist Party, who had worked primarily as a journalist. She 
was also a member of a family immersed in political activism. Her detention and 
subsequent account of the experience were informed by this personal-political nexus.
First participated in the unfolding life of a political community whose experiences 
related to her own as preparation and consolation. While alone in detention First could 
sense that she was among others, friends, similarly detained: "We were all serving time" 
(1965:74). On the door in the exercise yard at Marshall Square police station she found 
that other 90-day detainees had scratched a "detainees' register": the exercise yard "had 
become our place of reunion and our archive" (41). The written word served as a means 
of communication and a gesture towards solidarity, a collective meeting place where 
the individualisation of official discourse could be undermined.'9
28
A number of those detained during this period, mostly under the 90-day law, wrote 
about their experiences: First 1965, Kantor 1967, Lewin 1976. Albie Sachs documented his 
detention under both the 90- and 180-day laws, in T h e  J a i l  D i a r y  o f  A l b i e  S a c h s (1990) 
and S t e p h a n i e  o n  T r i a l  (1968).
29
The written word served this function in many ways, particularly for prisoners: 
written communication bolstered morale and solidarity; letters became public property; 
news was learnt, disseminated and endlessly discussed; study was both informal and 
formal, ranging from prisoners teaching others basic literacy skills to assistance with 
official study for degrees.
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An awareness of the experience and lives of others is reflected in First’s prison memoir: 
"she interleaves with her own story a number of other stories of political detainees... 
whose experiences might otherwise have remained untold... it becomes a veritable 
archive of detention texts" (J. U, Jacobs 199 la: 198, also P. Naidoo in Schreiner ed. 
1992:85-121). These italicised inserts, separate from yet inextricably related to her own 
framing narrative, provide an extension of her story, spatially/geographically, 
temporally and politically beyond the confines of detention; of the particular experience 
of a white woman detainee into a more general pattern of political repression affecting 
a political community; and from the fragmentation and partiality that characterises the 
knowledge of the detainee to a greater narrative and political whole that provides its 
context. The prison memoir as collective meeting place breaches those most sacred of 
prison boundaries between self and others, inside and outside.
A more sinister meeting between individual and collective experience took place within 
interrogation. While previously, according to Ruth First, "[j]ail spells had not broken us; 
they had helped to make us", with the introduction of the 90-day law "we were in for 
some disastrous collapses" (1965 :132). During the early stages of detention First's 
interrogation was generally "desultory" and "perfunctory" (51,79). Approaching the end 
of 90 days First was filled with the anticipation of freedom and fear at the possibility of 
being redetained for a further 90-day period. On day 89, First's mother and children 
visited her and brought the news that B was talking. Twenty minutes later, while still 
suffering from a sense of panic and betrayal, First was informed that she was to be 
released. Her release was a day early, taking her by surprise and depriving her of a day 
in which to adjust to what had happened and prepare for possible futures. There 
followed the vicious charade of release and re-detention. It was at this point that First 
was driven to a response that although perhaps uncharacteristic of her was entirely 
characteristic of, indeed intrinsic to, the structure of interrogation/torture: she actively 
participated, became complicit, in her own demise. While at her lowest ebb and
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suffering from an ulcer, First embarked upon a hunger strike as a form of protest and to 
draw attention to her plight. Applying pressure when the victim was emotionally most 
fragile and desperate, at 'cracking point', the interrogators moved in quickly. Feeling 
that B talking had brought about a critical change in her position and a desperate need 
to act, First prepared to make a statement. After the making of this statement, First 
thought that she had in fact lost control and participated in her own rewriting:
though I had decided at the outset that I would play out a small measure 
of rope, it took the slow process of the interview for me to realize fully 
that I was winding it fast around me. There was no time to wriggle, to 
fabricate, to gauge reaction, to probe, to find out anything for myself. I 
was breaking down my own resistance. It was madness for me to think 
that I could protect myself... I had no idea what they knew, what 
contradictory information they had wrenched from someone else. They 
were giving nothing away; they had already become too experienced for 
that. (120, see also 112-13)
The written words of the state enveloped her: "I was caught in a web of statements 
about me that they had taken from other people, statements which were not true" (123). 
She knew the ways in which statements were used, and says of her own that it "had 
probably been cyclostyled by now and placed in other dossiers, and might be brandished 
in front of some other detainees remaining silent. 'What's the good of holding out?
Here's another who has cracked and told us all"' (126). Her reaction to having made a 
statement is worth quoting at length; it represents the most poignant acknowledgement 
of vulnerability and frailty in South African prison literature:
They had beaten me. I had allowed myself to be beaten, I had pulled 
back from the brink just in time, but had it been in time?... above all I
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was fighting to salvage my respect in myself, in the hope that my 
associates in the political movement could still preserve confidence in 
me... I was in a state of collapse... for the gnawing fear that they could 
destroy me among the people whose understanding and succour I most 
needed, and that once they had done that I would have nothing left to 
live for... I was persecuted by the dishonour of having made a statement, 
even the start of a statement... It would be impossible to explain such an 
act, to live it down... I had presided over my collapse with a combination 
of knowingness and utter miscalculation... I had been stupid. Weak. A 
failure. By day and by night I went over this self-exposure... I felt 
unimaginably tired and dispirited. I could not cope any longer... a 
decision was forming in my mind... There was only one way out, before I 
drove myself mad, and as the truest indication to anyone who was 
interested that I had not let the Security Branch have it all their own way.
(125-8)
This period of First's detention culminated in her having a breakdown and attempting to 
commit suicide by taking an overdose of pills.
A suicide note, written on "the flyleaf of the crossword puzzle book, with the pencil that 
was the property of the South African Government" (128), contained references to 
having not given in nor endangered those who remained free; she had kept their secrets. 
First's reaction to having made a statement was that of a political activist who felt she 
had contravened a code of conduct and whose ultimate fear was that the Security 
Branch would publicise fictions about her - fictions in which she was somehow 
implicated - amongst those she needed most; that her political allies would ostracise 
and abandon her because of a supposed betrayal. In her mind the community of which 
she was a part had turned against her because she had turned against herself. The world
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of the apartheid state, its written word and pernicious truth, had expanded to eclipse 
First's own to the extent that she understood her statement and believed it would be 
understood by others as an act of betrayal rather than a cry of pain.
In the aftermath of the failed suicide attempt First began both to analyse generally how 
the Security Branch worked and had refined their techniques, and to unravel the 
campaign against herself: "I can see the instructions in The Grays' order book or 
wherever they keep their collection of texts..." (134: on their mistakes, see 120-1,135). 
The interrogation continued and First began to realise with pleasure that her statement 
had not provided the required information to use either against others or herself. 
Recovery was based on the realisation that she had exercised enough control over the 
process of making a statement, that it was sufficiently collaborative, to render the final 
result useless. Although pain was inflicted and objectified in the form of a statement, it 
could not be converted into power for the apartheid regime. The statement was a 
manifestation of contested pain, truth and power. First was able to reinterpret the 
meaning of her interrogation.
At last I permitted myself my first scent of victory. I determined to shake 
off the all-devouring sense of guilt at my lapse. I had been reeling 
towards a precipice and I had stopped myself at the edge. It had not been 
too late to beat them back. I had undermined my own resistance, yet I 
had not after all succumbed. In the depth of my agony I had won. (135-6)
While one of the ways in which the representation of torture, as opposed to its 
infliction, can be (or provide the illusion of being?) effective, is in transforming a 
complex reality into a simplistic victory, First's account provides a more nuanced 
argument. It does, however, illustrate that official power was not omnipotent, that it 
could be contested, and that there was a way back, even from the precipice of
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(self-)desecration, to a kind of oppositional victory. The political community of activists 
was a weapon in this encounter, that from the perspective of the detainee was a 
potential source of power - of support and inspiration - and pain - in that it could be 
turned into an agent of destruction by being made subject to state manipulation. By 
containing the experience of pain, the loss of control and break-down, largely within the 
subjective realm, directing it inwards, onto herself, rather than projecting it outwards 
onto others, First was able to protect, and secure her status within/reinclusion into, a 
community of political friends. At great personal cost, but in the long term it was 
because of this strategy not in spite of it that First survived and indeed triumphed. To 
win the interrogational encounter with such scant resources and while in such pain, as 
First and many others did, represents an extraordinary manifestation of oppositional 
truth and power.
Albie Sachs and the Freedom Fighter as Soft Hero
There is no document o f civilization which is not at the same time a document of 
barbarism. (Benjamin 1973:258)
Albie Sachs also provides an assessment, followed by a reassessment, of interrogation, 
but in his case it was necessitated by two radically different experiences of detention. 
Under the 90-day provision he was held for 168 days and did not make a statement of 
any kind. Sachs recognised that there had been factors in his favour: the absence of 
physical torture; access, for a period, to writing materials and books.30 As an act of
resistance it was, nevertheless, a triumph over adversity, a triumph consecrated when, 
on being released, he ran six miles and threw himself fully clothed into the sea. There 
were to be fewer factors in his favour when Sachs was detained again two years later
30
An application was brought on Sachs' behalf which resulted, until the court order was 
reversed on appeal, in detainees being allowed access to reading and writing materials. 
The judgement in the case, S a c h s  v R o s s o u w , persuaded him that there was "scope for law, 
even in the midst of tyranny" and did "so much to restore [his] belief in the value of 
law" (1990:155,158).
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under the 180-day law. During the intervening period he wrote The Jail Diary o f Albie 
Sachs and continued to practice as a lawyer. Rumours began to circulate about a special 
team of interrogators relying on prolonged sleep deprivation normally accompanied by 
the 'statue treatment' - enforced standing - to break prisoners: everyone was being 
broken. Then Sachs himself was re-detained. The greatest fear of the ex-detainee/ 
prisoner is the fear of going back inside again.
At Caledon police station the interrogation began almost immediately. The interrogators 
sneered at the methods used against Sachs during his previous detention. Their core 
strategy soon became clear. A team of interrogators worked in shifts alternating violent 
verbal attacks with "attrition by silence" (1968:230). Although allowed to sit 
throughout, he was deprived of sleep. Sachs eventually felt that he would have to 'settle': 
from the experience of previous detainees subjected to no-sleep torture he understood 
that those who held out the longest had broken the hardest, whereas those who had 
broken relatively early had been able to limit the damage, restricting the amount of 
information they had revealed. Against the demoralising effect of this knowledge he 
tried to initiate a kind of counter-interrogation in the hope that he would be able to 
"reduce the extent of their victory" (247-8). After 21 hours of interrogation Sachs made 
a statement. Later he experienced an "overwhelming sense of failure and fatigue" (254) 
and refers to a feeling of having been '"processed"' by the police (260). His release came 
after three months in solitary confinement and he claims that during this period he "had 
never really recovered from" the interrogation (272).
Separated in the history of repression by a single crack of the legislative whip, Sachs' 
encounters with the world of detention were dramatically different. The most 
significant theme traversing the abyss of the self that yawns between these experiences 
is a re-evaluation and rewriting of the role of the detainee/prisoner as hero. After his 
first period in detention Sachs wrote of the "perfect political prisoner" - of the political
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prisoner as hero - as an ideal to be aspired to and a model to follow (1990:90). In 
complicated ways Sachs himself was perhaps inevitably dusted with the brush of 
heroism: by a resistance movement in need of heroes and by his own ambiguous 
attitude that both attempted to distance himself from the ideal while buying into its 
mystique. Sachs was aware that to some he was a hero, conscious of how his 
performance on being redetained would compare, and uneasy in the knowledge that if 
he fell from grace the fall would be precipitous.
Albie Sachs ends his jail diary with the following lines: "I write and I write... I must 
record my story as accurately and honestly as I can. Then should they take me in again I 
will know that there is something of me outside which will continue to exist whatever 
they do to me" (285). But the book was also something that he took with him back into 
detention. In Sachs' second prison narrative, Stephanie on Trial, he describes his 
feelings when redetained having written about his experiences as a 90-day detainee:
As I sat analysing my gains and losses I realised that my unease and self- 
consciousness had been strengthened by the book I had written about my 
previous experience. While working on it I had been compelled to build 
up a complex picture of myself, and to examine precisely how I had 
behaved when under the stress of imprisonment and isolation; now that I 
was back in the sort of situation which I had been describing, I found 
myself repeating the phrases I had used, conscious of their inadequacy, 
yet almost tempted to conduct myself according to them. (1968:210)
The text of The Jail Diary was an unnerving mirror in which Sachs was ultimately 
unable to recognise himself. As an incarcerative episode the first period in detention in 
some ways became a weapon that worked against him: the interrogators were out to
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avenge a perceived defeat while in a process strangely parallel to this his construction 
of an optimal prison self served to undermine him.
After this second detention the task of writing about the experience was of a different 
order altogether. Sachs was forced to question the role of the heroes of imprisonment 
and the standards and expectations for which they were responsible. It was a mystique 
that he himself had helped to create: "in a much smaller way I myself had added to the 
mythology by writing of how I had survived five months of solitary confinement... Yet 
it was only the successes which were publicised; the thousands and millions who had 
succumbed to their torturers were never mentioned, since there was no audience for 
defeat...." (259). It is interesting to note, in this regard, that Stephanie on Trial which 
includes Sachs’ account of his second period of detention is virtually unknown, in sharp 
contrast to his other much lauded autobiographical writings. The continuous refinement 
of the techniques of interrogation within such a fundamentally unequal encounter meant 
that most would emerge compromised and scarred. An ideal that had previously been 
thought vital to motivating the resistance of political detainees/prisoners had proved to 
be a dangerous illusion. Realistic preparation for capture was needed rather than 
idealistic stories of heroism. Sachs' second detention experience can be understood as a 
negotiation between ideal and absolute standards and an evolving (self-)knowledge and 
reality (also see, for example, 94-101,271). Writing about military regimes in South 
America Jean Franco states that such regimes were distinguished by the ambition to go 
beyond mere repression to the extermination of the hero, to create a world without 
exemplary acts or grand gestures, inhabited by the anonymous and the annihilated 
(1992:104-7,109). Sachs, however, provides an alternative vision, with vastly different 
implications for the truth-power equation, that evolves towards a softer, more 
sustainable heroism.
The final twist in this discourse on heroism followed an incident in April 1988, when 
Albie Sachs was the victim of a car bomb attack in Maputo, Mozambique (see Pauw 
1991:170-4). His injuries were massive, and included the loss of his right arm and the 
sight of one eye. But he survived. Again Sachs had to deal with being seen as a hero, a 
symbol of resistance. Having hero status bestowed upon him provoked similar reactions 
to before: it unsettled him - there was no choice or volition involved in his survival; 
some had chosen a more difficult road than his and had received less recognition, and 
yet he became a symbol of courage and indestructibility to them - but it was also a 
source of comfort and pride.
"They" had "tried to kill [him] because of [his] writing" (1991:73). Sachs had to relearn 
how to write - as he had during his first detention when provided with a pencil and 
paper: "I am early man learning to write, a child making its first marks" (1990:161) - but 
this time with his left hand, and again he wrote about his experience of pain and 
healing, in The Soft Vengeance o f a Freedom Fighter (1991). This third poignant 
encounter with heroism and the written word harks back to the first. As a 90-day 
detainee Sachs had contemplated writing about his experience in a form that was 
immediate, direct, interactive:
I will write a play... I feel somehow that circumstance itself shapes for 
the stage the material of our present lives. I will select from the material, 
and an expert can do the trimming and joining necessary for a smooth 
and interest-arousing production... The idea is to make the situation as 
immediate as possible to the audience. It is not just Mr X whose fate is 
being depicted on the stage, it is the man you see before you. Everything 
you see is true. We will recreate our story exactly as it happened... by 
writing this play I combat my isolation and defeat the attempts of my 
jailers to break my mind. (1990:93-9)
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While recovering from the bomb blast, Albie Sachs saw a special benefit performance 
of the play, The Jail Diary o f Albie Sachs, adapted from his autobiographical account 
by David Edgar. Sachs writes: "What I like about the present situation is the idea that 
the young Albie... is coming to the aid of the middle-aged Albie" (1991:181). The 
dream of writing a play operated as a form of resistance and healing in detention, was 
later written/adapted, and a quarter of a century on served the same function in 
performance after an assassination attempt. Such is the truth and power of writing (and 
performance).
With this curtain call a very personal heroic cycle was completed. But more generally, 
an evolving chain of heroic lives, and the ideal(s) they personified, was resurrected, and 
to them Sachs added his definitive contribution: heroism as life lived in preparation for 
a confrontation - or in this case several overlapping encounters - with apartheid power, 
which is then survived and overcome; heroism as a wariness of having every action or 
word judged against the background of this confrontation, and a desire that it be both 
seen and lived through to what lies beyond; heroism in small deeds, in trivial daily 
actions, in simply carrying on, in the taken-for-granted; and, finally, heroism as the 
fulfilment of "deepest longings" and the triumph over the "most intimate uncertainties" 
(36-9,79-80,102,149,152, 186,200-3). Sachs returns on three occasions to heroism and 
the heroic as they have impacted on his life, culminating in a vision of a softer heroism 
entirely compatible with a freedom fighter seeking to exact a soft vengeance.
Sachs' experience illustrates that texts intended to be part of oppositional discourse can 
in fact function in particular circumstances - such as redetention - to reinforce the 
official power of writing. Meaning is inter-textual; autobiographies can be documents 
of both civilization and barbarism. The self and the self-image do not coincide; control 
over the written word and the self within it is inexact and incomplete. After his first
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detention Sachs was able to invest personally in the idea of political prisoner as hero; on 
being redetained he was forced to live the inadequacy of his own written word/self as a 
harsh reality eclipsed constructions of heroism; and, finally, while recovering from an 
assassination attempt he reclaimed a softer heroism - as First had earlier reclaimed a 
sense of victory - for the forces of resistance. Sachs' autobiographical archive is the site 
of a fundamental reassessment and rewriting - of the relationship between self and self- 
image, of the ideal of heroism, and of the oppositional power of writing - culminating in 
a more complex and complete understanding of each.
Breyten Breytenbach: ’I Write: I am the Writer'
By 1967 the South African government had devised a piece of legislation that 
synthesised and refined much of what had gone before: the Terrorism Act. Between 
1967 and 1982 this Act was the central piece of security legislation. Among a number 
of important trials during this period was that involving Breyten Breytenbach, a leading 
Afrikaans writer.31 Breytenbach was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment in November
1975 having been found guilty of various charges after returning to South Africa from 
France on behalf of a white resistance organisation, Okhela. Following his conviction 
Breytenbach spent almost two years in solitary confinement at 'Beverley Hills', Pretoria 
Maximum Security Prison (also known as Central Prison). In a second trial that began 
in May 1977 he was found not guilty of further charges under the Terrorism Act, but 
guilty of a less serious alternative charge, of smuggling out letters and drawings while 
in custody, under the Prisons Act. During this trial publicity was given to the conditions 
in which Breytenbach had been held and in July 1977 he was moved to Pollsmoor 
Prison, Cape Town. At no stage was Breytenbach considered to be a "normal prisoner"
Others who wrote about incarceration under the Terrorism Act include Cronin 1987, 
Jenkin 1987, Kuzwayo 1985:198-218, Makhoere 1988, W. Mandela 1985, Mashinini 1989, and 
Pheto 1985.
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(1985:278). The authorities went to extraordinary lengths to isolate him and he spent 
less than half a day at Pretoria's Local Prison where other white male political prisoners 
were held.32 By the time of his release in December 1982 he had served seven years of 
his sentence. Breytenbach left the country, returning to Paris where he had been in exile 
prior to his imprisonment.
The True Confessions o f an Albino Terrorist, as had already been mentioned, is 
dangerous terrain in which to excavate for truth: "If it can be written about, it doesn't 
exist" (241). Breytenbach simultaneously professed the need to tell the truth while 
writing against any fixed concept of reality.33 These modes of representation are uneasy
cohabitants: the former driven by the political necessity to tell his own story, represent 
his own reality and have an alternative/outside reality and audience available to him; 
the latter driven by the conditions of imprisonment/writing and by a philosophical belief 
in the dissolution/creation of reality in language, in transience and transformation, in 
seeing unity in opposites, complementarity in paradox and contradiction: "Freedom", 
for example, "is accepting unfreedom, denying that they are opposites, reading one in 
the other, and going beyond" (87, also 282-3).
Breytenbach's world-view is inevitably turned back on itself/the self. The T  is 
imagined, invented, projected and hidden behind masks: "There is no T there is no 
name, there is no identity. But there are unchanging manifestations, habits, a hulk, a 
carcass, recognizable" (25, also 13). The story becomes "the reflection of a search for 
what really happened, and for the identity of the narrator" (338); prison, a world where
32
Breytenbach's isolation was not totally due to the dictates of the state. At 
Pollsmoor he was held at his own request in a cell on his own, and so clearly sought a 
kind of privacy (see 198) . It was always, however, only a kind of privacy: "and still no 
privacy to your solitude" (Breytenbach, "prisoner", 1988:31).
33
Breytenbach has written elsewhere of the dual capacity of the act of writing, "giving 
account while inventing itself" (1996:159).
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people extend to one another "the courtesy of accepting their lives as invented" (346). 
Breytenbach left the country after his release clinging to his manuscripts, "to the 
fragmentary scenario of [his] identities" (331). "The mirrored self-images", as J. U. 
Jacobs explains, provide "the privileged view of the voyeur into the complex ' I' that is 
the authorial Breyten Breytenbach" (1986:104).
The audience to whom True Confessions is addressed is similarly complex and 
ambiguous: Mr Investigator, Mr Confessor, Mr Interviewer, Mr Investerrogator, Mr 
Investalligator, Mr I, my dear dead I, Mr Eye, Sir, your Honour... (his interrogators, his 
readers, his wife, his alter ego, a black activist, a judge....). It is, as David Schalkwyk 
wryly notes, "like confessing to God, Christ, and Satan at the same time" (1994:26). "Is 
there really a you? Isn't there, in the final instance, only an amorphous but all- 
encompassing investigator?" (1985:239); "I face I, me against Mr Investigator. I cannot 
lose. I cannot win. I am free" (154).
Identity-construction is further complicated by more overtly political factors. 
Breytenbach's identity is constructed on the fault-line of an Afrikaner heritage that is 
both compulsive and repulsive, which can not be lived with but which equally can not 
be lived without. An often savage critic of apartheid he is also an Afrikaner and much 
lauded Afrikaans writer, and as such was both the ultimate traitor and, in a system 
predicated on race, still one of the chosen. The ambiguities of this position were 
unmasked, their essential nature thrown into relief, in prison, by a series of particularly 
intense relationships - with his interrogators, his warders, with the state more 
generally... - within which he was bound in an intimate death embrace of loathing and 
identification/dependence/complicity: "violator and victim (collaborator! violin!), are 
linked forever perhaps, by the obscenity of what has been revealed to you, by the sad 
knowledge of what people are capable of. We are all guilty" (343, also see 180,337,341- 
4). "Nobody is clean. No heaven exists" (360), Breytenbach writes, and asserts that he
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did not consciously seek revenge: "We are too closely linked for that... [they] are not 
monsters but people like you and me" (339). He urges the need to recognise the 
humanity of the enemy. With his captors he shares everything and nothing. All are 
guilty, all are human.
With such an 'I' - fractious, fragmented, irretrievably implicated, (self-)alienated and 
yearning to belong - the line between self and 'other', oppressed and oppressor, 
confessor and interrogator/audience, becomes blurred. What is the truth and power of 
such a prisoner?
Breytenbach was the artist-exile who would be a revolutionary. In the context of his 
repeated attempts to turn "transgressive speech into transgressive act" (Coetzee 
1991:62), the return to South Africa in 1975 can be interpreted as an acknowledgement 
that he had been unable to achieve such a transformation from outside, and through the 
written word alone. Return, arrest, interrogation and imprisonment were to forge all 
sorts of linkages between inside and outside, between the word and the deed. During his 
trial, Breytenbach apologised for a poem entitled, in translation, "Letter from Foreign 
Parts to Butcher", subtitled "for Balthazar" (the South African Prime Minister at the 
time was Balthazar John Vorster): "'I would specifically like to apologize to the Prime 
Minister for a crass and insulting poem addressed to him. There was no justification for 
it. I am sorry'" (in Coetzee 1991:58, also 61-2,80).34 Breytenbach, it seems, felt that a 
deal had been struck - he does not mention the apology as part of the deal (although it is 
unclear why else he would have made it), and asserts in relation to his statement that 
"[w]ithout being political it was an attempt to explain how I got to be standing where I 
was, without rejecting my convictions" (1985:63) - in which in exchange for various
34
See Breytenbach 1983:4-5. This poem perhaps helps explain Vorster's response to 
Breytenbach1s arrest (see 1993:100).
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concessions on his part (pleading guilty, foregoing making a political statement from 
the dock...) concessions would be made in return and he would receive the minimum 
sentence allowed in the resulting circumstances of five years, and that having fulfilled 
his side of the bargain the state reneged on theirs (see 60-71,314). Betrayal by the 
Afrikaner establishment followed self-abasement; humiliation was heaped on 
humiliation. To add insult to injury, he was disowned by the ANC (see Breytenbach 
1993:123-4). At this moment, feeling multiply betrayed and alienated, Breytenbach 
lived out the paradox of his identity most poignantly. In terms of the sides of the South 
African conflict he was ultimately on both sides and, therefore, on neither.35
Breytenbach refers to shameful and improper conduct, to disgrace - "It is true: I am not 
a hero" (1985:337) - and states that heroism should not be expected either of oneself or 
of others (360, also 378); to a desire to please (62, also 29,48) and to an ambiguous 
foundation for survival and resistance:"resistance... survival, is made up o f a million 
little compromises and humiliations" (258, also 65,360). But alongside submission, 
humiliation and self-loathing, Breytenbach talks of the need to take responsibility for 
remaining aware and choices taken, and of interests that are irreconcilable (337,360). 
There is compromise and complicity, but not total collapse. He refused to be a state 
witness. After the strictures and pressures of the incarcerative world had been removed, 
however, Breytenbach's reflections upon himself within that world are both painfully 
honest and less than candid. While neither uncritical - "But I tried also not to paint 
myself prettier than I am" (337) - nor, in general, seeking to simply omit the regrettable, 
the self-analysis, the blend of fact and fiction, often appears deliberately vague,
35
On further occasions, apart from during his first trial, Breytenbach's actions in 
prison were naive, idiosyncratic, self-serving... It is difficult to find the right 
word. From prison in Pretoria, for example, Breytenbach wrote a letter offering his 
services to the security police: "I thought I was clever... I thought I could still
manoeuvre and try to catch them at their own game. But those were the desperate 
delusions of the trapped animal..." (1985:181-2, also 1983:5-6). The letter was produced 
during his second trial where he denied that it had ever been his intention to work with 
the police (1985:250). How should such an act be interpreted: as an attempt to out­
manoeuvre the security police? as the actions of a blind man walking into a trap? as a 
product of the mental torture of isolation? or, as a genuine offer to collaborate? Also 
on the naive, idiosyncratic and self serving... see 201-3 on the Chris Barnard film; 
234-8,246-9,253 on Lucky the Pimp and the second trial.
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obfuscatory, self-interested. An underlying tension between uncovering and obscuring 
meaning appears conveniently to obscure clarity and detail on occasion: "writing can be 
used as topsoil for burying mistakes. Notwithstanding... that it is at the same time the 
maggots which lay bare the structure[....]" (171: see, for example, 337-40).
While some of the conditions of Breytenbach's imprisonment were harsh, even by the 
standards of political prisoners, he was also granted what Coetzee calls "odd touches of 
indulgence". Significantly, he was granted permission to write; the works he wrote were 
taken into custody on completion but returned to him on release; the censors allowed the 
publication of his works in South Africa. While the 'terrorist' was imprisoned the 
Afrikaans poet remained free (Coetzee 1992:375-81).36 Those who were trying to 
destroy him also granted him a means of survival.
The official rewriting of Breytenbach was achieved to a unique extent by and through his 
own written words (although it should be noted that they also came to, were used in, his 
defence). During the interrogation Breytenbach had simply been told to 'write': as the 
questioning continued he was repeatedly asked to write, repeating an invented story, 
trying to keep track of the layers of invention and deviation. The pages piled up, into 
volumes; words replaced his life. For detainees, this much was not particularly unusual. 
But he was also interrogated about the contents of some of his creative work. Material 
that he attempted to smuggle out of prison was intercepted and used as evidence in the 
second trial to validate the charge that he had used illegal means to communicate with 
the outside world. Both Sachs and Breytenbach were undermined by their own written 
words, but while for Sachs the process was internal to the writer/detainee in the case of 
Breytenbach the interrogators laid claim to his written word, to him being a writer, and
Dingake reports angrily that prisoners on Robben Island were not allowed t: write 
creatively despite the fact that this privilege had been conceded to Breytenbach 
(1987:181-3).
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turned both into weapons to be used against him. His words became traitors and poetry 
"the very noose" (243, also 360).
Coetzee identifies a "hidden contestatory dialogue" as a characteristic of Breytenbach's 
prison poetry, and talks of the "hidden voices against which [he] speaks" (1991:71, see 
70-7). In doing so Coetzee draws on Mikhail Bahktin's discussion of a dialogue in 
which what is visible and present is a response and reaction to, and is profoundly 
structured by, an invisible, implied presence and discourse. The hidden contestatory 
dialogue can be seen as a form of violent collaboration between Breytenbach and the 
state, of writing whilst being written. Writing from within such a context bears the 
multiple traces of its origins. Breytenbach says of his trial statement: "Read it - you will 
also hear the insidious voice of the controller in it" (1985:63). He was allowed to write 
even in detention and the resulting volume, called Voetskrif (Footwriting) was 
dedicated to his principal interrogator, Colonel Broodryk, at his insistence, according to 
Breytenbach: "you dedicate this to me and I allow you to have it published" (156). One 
poem was omitted (also see Breytenbach 1983:5).
In prison Breytenbach was allowed to write on condition that it was not shown to any 
other prisoner or warder, that no attempt be made to smuggle it out, that each piece be 
handed in for safekeeping on completion, and that all notes be destroyed. Therefore, the 
authorities were Breytenbach's censor, literary agent, and the guardian of all his written 
material.
A bizarre situation... when you write knowing that the enemy is reading 
over your shoulder; when you have to write deeply down in yourself as 
you can because you need this to survive; writing in a desperate attempt 
to communicate with the outside, with the world, with the people closest 
to you, knowing beforehand that it cannot reach them and knowing also
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that you are laying bare the most intimate and the most personal nerves 
and pulsebeats in yourself to the barbarians, to the cynical ones who will 
gloat over this. (1985:159)
Breytenbach wrote to outwit and elude his captors; he wrote at night, in the dark; he 
wrote into a void: "Writing took on a pure shape, since it had no echo, no feedback, no 
evaluation, and perhaps ultimately no existence" (161). Writing, imagining and 
forgetting became blurred. In the land of the disappearing text, alone with himself, the 
tendency was to end up "writing in circles, raking over clean soil, coming back to sniff 
again and again at the same old sour vomit" (160).
The contradiction and compromise inherent in this process, its attendant conditions and 
the uses to which such writing could potentially be put, was clear, but for Breytenbach 
writing was a matter of survival. The essential principle was to continue writing, even if 
only with the minimal demands of integrity that the writer places upon him/herself and 
on the "umbilical cord" with the outside world/normality: "It is possible to falsify for 
some time the thrust of one’s words by inserting them in an environment controlled by 
the enemy, but eventually - if what you write is 'true' to yourself at that moment - it will 
become evident and be rectified" (158). While in prison Breytenbach not only wrote but 
had books published and translated. Despite the manuscript being unfinished, and 
censored within South Africa, Breytenbach agreed to the publication of the first, 
Afrikaans, edition of A Season in Paradise (1976), because of the "need to be able to 
contribute something to life outside... the urge to communicate... in order not to have 
my voice cut off entirely..." (157, also 158). The hidden contestatory dialogue extended 
even to material written prior to imprisonment. Breytenbach's writing and publishing 
from within an alien power of writing moved beyond the notion of a contest between 
competing powers of writing, or any dialogue of a contestatory nature, to a relationship
77
where the difference between competition, dependence and collaboration/complicity 
was often blurred.
Writing had still further dimensions. While in prison, Breytenbach's "function in terms 
of his usefulness to the inmate community", was defined in terms of him being their 
"scribe" (163-8). The scribe had to be able to write for all occasions: letters; poems; 
translations; applications for jobs; requests to the authorities of various kinds - for 
mercy, parole, release, transfer; and so on.
So I was continuously inventing their lives too... You name it. I am the 
writer... they were quite convinced that whatever life I could invent for 
them would be far better than the one they had... And some came and 
wanted me to write their life stories... there are as many novels in there 
as there are human beings going to hell. (165-6)37
It was as a writer that Breytenbach found his most significant point of self-definition: "I 
write: I am the writer" (154). He used his talent as a writer as a saleable skill and a 
consciously double-edged weapon in his struggle for survival:
Writing becomes for me a means, a way of survival. I have to cut up my 
environment in digestible chunks. Writing is an extension of my senses.
It is itself a sense which permits me to grasp, to understand, and to some 
extent to integrate that which is happening to me... But at the same time I 
realize that it becomes the exteriorization of my imprisonment. My 
writing bounces off the walls. The maze of words... these themselves 
constitute the walls of my confinement. I write my own castle and it
37
Breytenbach was also a scribe for members of the prison authorities (168-71).
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becomes a frightening discovery: it is unbalancing something very deeply 
embedded in yourself when you in reality construct, through your 
scribblings, your own mirror. Because in this mirror you write hair by 
hair and pore by pore your own face, and you don't like what you see.
You don’t even recognise it. It won't let you out again[....] Who am I?
Where and who was I before this time?" (155-6)
The word was the source of survival and of (self-)destruction; it was a means of escape 
and of confinement; it could represent, replace, maintain and transcend reality; it was 
his reality.
In True Confessions Breytenbach stresses the need to purge himself of his prison 
experiences - to bum, vomit - to tell everything in the hope that this would allow him to 
put events out of his mind forever: "You write on in an attempt to erase" (155). The 
outcome was the word and text as an "interstice of freedom" (337). But it is an 
ambiguous freedom. Writing about prison after his release, Breytenbach conjures a 
figure on the page, in the image of the mirror, on the page as mirror, which confounds 
and mocks his attempts to see himself clearly - as Sachs found the self is not the self- 
image - and tells him, as the interrogator had previously told him, to try again. This 
process begins with True Confessions, a book which Breytenbach dictated:
And then, this same process is an open-ended one... this jumbletalk, this 
trial... Here I am. Here the truth is also. I hope, Mr Investigator, that that 
is what you expect of me. Because, you know, you could force me to 
deny whatever I say immediately after having said it; and you could 
probably force me to start all over again. I can tell you in advance that if 
I were to do that it would come out differently; it would be different; I'd 
no longer be there; I'd be somebody else - as sincere, as keen to help, as
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obsessed by the necessity to confess... Listen to me. I shall confess. (13-
14)
The writer before the page/mirror and the co-operative detainee/prisoner under 
interrogation have become one. In the dialogue/interrogation/trial between self and 
page/mirror the truth, a different truth, will emerge. Breytenbach attempts to bring 
together the often mutually antagonistic doubles and paradoxes of his identity and life 
in the page/mirror. Coetzee argues that the attempt, which takes place in Mouroir, to 
merge the self and the mirror-self, to achieve reconciliation, is unsuccessful. "Instead, a 
new surface recurs at every turn, becoming a point of entry into yet another branch of 
the labyrinth... he has deferred the confrontation with his twin, and further has turned 
this deferring into a model of textual production" (1991:80). The central images are the 
mirror and the labyrinth. Wherever Breytenbach looks he sees reflections of himself; 
the search for the self is endless. On the basis of the interrogational encounter, when the 
life story was returned and repeated, Breytenbach has constructed the written 
confession as a creative strategy without end. Almost a decade later, frustrated by 
phantoms from his dreams and past, he was to write: "My journeys have become 
embarrassing confessions" (1993 :189). Breytenbach has tried to incorporate the censor/ 
persecutor/policeman into himself, into the process of composition - as the figure in the 
page/mirror - and 'manage' them in that way, and, in so doing, to turn the confrontation 
into atextually productive dialogue (see Coetzee 1991:77-84).38
Breytenbach, having been a prisoner, "would remain one in [his] mind" (1985:304, also 
283), and as a result continues to return to the "same old sour vomit" of imprisonment.
It has become a motif in his writing, a part of his world view, a universal condition, 
something he will carry with him always: "all these walled cities of incarceration
38
On bringing an end to confession, see Coetzee 1992:251-93,
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became blurred and concentrated in my mind as The Place. The Place also grew on the 
page. Not as if there were any such thing as exorcism" (1996:161). One of 
Breytenbach's characters, Mano, writes from prison in South Africa:
I am an integral part of a self-repeating whole. I am in prison, I have 
always been here, I shall always be here, even beyond my death. The 
story, the play, will continue. At most I could say that had I not been here 
it would have been slightly different. And since no real change can take 
place, everything becomes conceivable. (1989:257-8)
Breytenbach is inescapably part of an ongoing imprisonment narrative, and in the 
chapters he inhabits while no real change takes place, everything becomes conceivable.
In large part this is because the self becomes variously, or what Coetzee describes as 
"multiply", double (1991:79); the self and/as 'other'; detainee-terrorist and interrogator, 
oppressed and oppressor. The writer/written embraces interrogator/censor/audience and 
detainee-confessor/writer, confession/confessor and autobiography/autobiographer, the 
written word as a means of salvation and destruction, and various powers of writing. An 
entire world view is constructed in this way. In the overlapping networks of writing 
Breytenbach rewrites the conceptual framework within which imprisonment is 
conceived. Deny oppositions, read one in the other, and go beyond. Relevant 
oppositions include freedom and captivity, survival and death, resistance and 
submission, heroism and betrayal, truth and fiction. Deprived of clear boundaries and 
familiar certainties upon which to base control the state is deprived of power and the 
prisoner, or at least this prisoner, is empowered, to locate 'interstices of freedom' and by 
the horizon of that which lies beyond.
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However, such a process also has its dangers because the prisoner-writer is also deprived 
of clear boundaries and familiar certainties upon which to base resistance. The danger of 
attempting to incorporate and 'manage* all things - including diverse powers of writing - 
within the self, of dialogue and the elision of difference, are of an excess of identification, 
however ironic this may sometimes seek to be, of understanding too much and seeking to 
speak from inside too many things. The confessor and interrogator in True Confessions 
are equally fragmented, mirror-images, even, apparently, the same. Such a fluidity and 
indeterminacy is incapacitating with reference to the choices required for political action. 
In this context the question must be: who is getting inside the head of, taking possession 
of, whom? Breytenbach's dialogue is increasingly with and within himself, a self­
interrogation in which the hidden voices against which he speaks are his own demons. It 
is a dialogue of questionable value, both politically and creatively, which takes place at 
an ever growing distance from the reality he seeks to engage. Breytenbach has exhausted 
the confession of its capacity for illumination and release.
Being able to write in prison, Breytenbach wrote with, against and through the official 
text. Official control and power was open to tremendous manipulation. Opposing powers 
of writing were locked together in a relationship of antagonism, dependence, and 
complicity/collaboration, within a fraught and contested process that spanned 
interrogation; the conditions in which Breytenbach wrote; what he wrote about and the 
way he wrote about it; the fate of his work both inside and outside the prison walls; and 
his role as a scribe for both prison inmates and prison authorities. All of Breytenbach's 
writing in and about prison is in a way violently collaborative, haunted by the shadow of 
the 'other* and/as self.
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Hugh Lewin and 'The Kommies'
It is as though delimitation itself were the bridge that opens the inside to its other, (de
Certeau 1984:129)
While the task of retaining or recreating something of one's own world in enemy 
territory was immeasurably difficult for the detainee or prisoner in isolation there was, 
predictably, greater safety in numbers. Breytenbach's move from Pretoria Maximum 
Security Prison to Pollsmoor Prison heralded a significant improvement in his prison 
conditions, perhaps most importantly including interaction with other prisoners. But he 
was never considered 'normal'. Normal white and black male prisoners went to Local/ 
Pretoria Prison and Robben Island respectively, where they were held in groups and 
consequently had a very different experience of imprisonment.39
Hugh Lewin was held for 84 days as a 90-day detainee before being charged under the 
Sabotage Act. He was subjected to two interrogations. Initially he was made to stand 
and deprived of sleep and eventually made a 'managed' statement. In its aftermath he 
felt like "debris" (1976:31). A second interrogation followed the bombing of 
Johannesburg railway station by a fellow member of the African Resistance Movement 
(ARM). This time the tone was different, there were threats to kill him and he and 
others were assaulted. He divulged further information in an attempt to stop the beating. 
Lewin was sentenced to seven years' imprisomnent in December 1964, most of which 
he spent at Local Prison, latterly in a new section built especially for white political 
prisoners. However, nearly 18 months into his sentence, he and the other white 
politicals were moved to Central Prison, also in Pretoria, for a period of eight months. 
While at Local Prison they had been isolated as a group of white politicals in an
39
Women political prisoners were also segregated by race, and over the time period 
under consideration were held at a variety of different prisons.
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otherwise black jail, for this brief period they entered the cauldron of Central Prison 
where they had to establish a niche among the diversity of convicted white criminals. 
The crucial components of Lewin's prison experience and identity were being among a 
peer group of white political prisoners and the period at Central Prison when this group 
were initiated into prison society and, in a sense, into South African society. He was 
released in November 1971 after serving his sentence in full. Four days after his release 
he left the country for England.
The composition of the group of white political prisoners changed over time: Lewin met 
26 fellow-prisoners in all, the group never at any time exceeded 21 and by the time he 
was released had declined to nine. Among them were some of South Africa's most 
prominent white political prisoners (Bram Fischer, Denis Goldberg). The symbolic 
importance of this community of prisoners for apartheid, for the non-racial credentials 
of the ANC and for the future of whites in/and South Africa, outweighed its numerical 
strength: "and the authorities knew this. The fact that there were whites in prison for 
political offences... actually undermined their whole philosophy" (Schoon interview). It 
also played a significant role in the struggles of the wider community of (political) 
prisoners. By facilitating participation in a community the transition from detainee to 
convicted political prisoner helped to restore ties to a past life and world. As a partial 
counter to the terrible isolation and loneliness of imprisonment, Marius Schoon talks of
the incredible support... from comrades in prison... [they] are actually 
one of my major reference groups, also one of my major support groups.
Even people that I have some sort of political difference with, 1 know 
that if I'm in trouble and I pick up the phone and I speak to them, 
something will be done; and it will be big things if necessary... I mean 
that was one of the really positive things about prison which will stay 
with me all my life, (interview)
Lewin describes the group as "united in their opposition to the outside regime... yet 
often fiercely combative of their own personal or political perspectives" and as the 
"South African Left in a nutshell... a basketfull of itching hedgehogs" (1994:5). There 
was, therefore, an often precarious balance between the solidarity among prisoners 
united in their opposition to the authorities, both inside and outside, and various forms 
of friction - "We disagreed about almost everything except for our hatred of the existing 
regime" (Hirson 1995:2, also 139,141,247) - as the following quotations illustrate:
Very early on we formed... a committee called recce, came from 
Recreation Committee... which was basically the sort of executive... 
people were elected and each one had a constituency... it grew... as... the 
society grew... and... started organising itself. And it was absolutely... 
key. And it had to do with, obviously with prison conditions... with the 
sort of submissions that we prepared... a running list of key things... big 
issues in terms of our daily lives, in terms of improvement... our 
treatment... but at the same time it became a way of not controlling, but 
certainly... sort of keeping at an even keel, the considerable differences 
that were within the group... there was a huge and very intense political, 
ideological battle between say Moscow and Peking... To a certain, much 
lesser extent, there were the sort of old liberal ideologues, who were 
outside the group. But the main intensity was between the party people...
And recce actually functioned very well in terms of maintaining some 
sort of semblance of unanimity within the group... it was a stop gap... a 
sort of valve for expressions. (Lewin interview)
There was a kind of political committee... people's morale was observed, 
and steps were taken in very self-conscious ways often to ensure that an 
individual didn't get lost to the group, or become isolated... [it was] part
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of... making our own space more liberated... in prison I read... Colin 
Turnbull's The Forest People... [about a] Pygmy band in the Congo rain 
forests... and he describes the micro behaviour of a hunter-gatherer band. 
We’d evolved in Pretoria prison almost an identical code... for the same 
reasons... And he describes what happens when quarrels break out, even 
if one person is clearly wrong... they don't all side with the one that's 
right, they split almost evenly... and talk it through with them and 
reassure them, and re-establish stability and so on. They're all sort of 
things that had evolved within the prison... we would always have people 
that were more problematic, politically or psychologically... that would 
require special attention... lots of its [the committee's] time was occupied 
on behaviour... someone would launch a one person hunger strike... that 
would then disrupt a carefully laid campaign around some issue where 
trying to isolate a particular warder... Tensions would develop, and it 
was very very important to manage those... we could do grievous damage 
to each other... Before I got there there was one person who... came into 
prison very demoralised, personality complexities, and was then 
persuaded to report to the authorities on what was going on... and the guy 
eventually... took a lighted cigarette or a match to his eyes, Thoms, a 
really tragic case. When I got there that was a strong part of oral 
tradition... it was very hard to handle that one because he was actually... 
reporting... to the cops. Realised retrospectively that they had done the 
wrong thing, they had isolated him and that made him a constant running 
sore for the group, because he was a part of them but they didn't include 
him... We had a very integrationist approach, very strong integrationist 
approach. (Cronin interview)40
40
Also see Hirson 1995:141,248,348-9, Jenkin 1987:95-6.
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So the group sought social cohesion and organisation to fight loneliness and provide 
mutual support, to manage internal tensions, to present a united front to the authorities 
and fight for improvements in conditions.
Needless to say, over the years this community evolved and changed, and internal 
fractures were, on occasion, too deep for the established mechanisms to contain. 
Examples of periods of heightened tension included the above-mentioned occasion 
when a member of the group, Raymond Thoms, worked with the regime (Lewin 
1976:99-101, Hirson 1995:4-6,73-4,141,265,267-8, Jenkin 1987:82); signs of group 
disintegration towards the end of the period at Central Prison (Lewin interview, also see 
Hirson 1995:95,343-4); divisions caused by the successful escape in 1979 of Tim 
Jenkin, Alex Moumbaris and Stephen Lee (Jenkin 1987);4' and, the rift over how to
respond to President Botha's 1985 offer of release, conditional upon the renunciation of 
violence (Niehaus 1994:133-7).
Another manifestation of the pattern of division/fragmentation and community/linkage 
was that prison, according to Lewin, was a "complete world, a life complete in itself, 
without reference to anything outside itself' (1976:50); but later he notes that it was 
also a mirror of society, particularly with reference to its inherent corruption, violence 
and inhumanity (152-3,176-7).4* Many facets of this fascinating continuity and change
In addition to the frictions generated by planning and preparing for an escape 
attempt, the aftermath, even if and perhaps particularly if the attempt was successful, 
was also profoundly ambiguous. While the successful escape struck a blow for the forces 
of resistance, it also had negative implications for political prisoners, those who 
assisted both inside and outside, and family and friends (Jenkin 1987:131,154,173- 
4,200,211-12,221,223,225-6,231-40, Levitan in Bernstein 1994:271-8, Wolpe 1994). In the 
aftermath of the escape by Jenkin, Moumbaris and Lee, for example, the harassment of the 
remaining white politicals included their removal from Pretoria Prison to 'Beverley 
Hills' (Central Prison), where they spent a harrowing period as neighbours to those on 
death row. Meanwhile Pretoria Prison was refurbished and its security improved. They 
returned to a harsher, more barren environment. The white political prisoners were 
divided into smaller groups, relationships and the community were shattered, isolation 
increased and the intensities of small group living were exacerbated (Jenkin 1987:231, 
Niehaus 1994:12 6-8,134).
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at the interface between prison and wider society were a new experience for the white 
political prisoner. In this regard, the period spent at Central Prison was crucial.
On arrival at Central Prison, Lewin describes the politicals as being "absolute 
innocents" and "softies, lost in a society such as Central" (106,129)45 The "kommies"
(129), as they were known at Central Prison, gained cohesion through their previous 
isolation as a group, but also due to the group's distinctive profile. This included the 
reasons for their imprisonment, a firm belief in their collective innocence and a pride in 
themselves and their actions, particular and harsh conditions of imprisonment, and the 
social and political ways in which they stood out from the rest of the prison population. 
Particularly in Central Prison, where a person's crime was their key to the society, a 
sense of community served as a life support system for these chronically atypical 
prisoners. To be a member of a recognised group was important for a number of 
reasons, perhaps most importantly, for protection. From his eight months in Central 
Prison, Lewin was able to construct a sense of the mechanics and practices of prison 
society. It was dangerous to trust anyone and nothing was of value unless it could be 
traded: tobacco, dagga, bodies, friendships, information - all were commodities. The 
authorities tolerated, indeed often encouraged and participated in, such activities. This 
society was to a large extent structured around smuggling (tobacco, dagga), sex, 'narks' 
(informers), and so on.44 In Central Prison the 'softies' lost their innocence.
Breytenbach also depicts prison as a coherent entity in itself - "a world with its 
own culture - language, customs, laws, myths, structures" (1985:346), "a world apart 
with its particular castes and culture and language, its own reality, in fact" (272, 
also 1996:161) - and a world that in a variety of ways reflects South African society 
(see "A Note on South African Prisons", 1985:345-8). In a way that perhaps links 
continuity and change, Hirson indicates that for the political prisoner imprisonment 
concentrated, intensified, and exaggerated the societal, political and the personal 
(1995:160-1,24 6-8,349). According to Schoon these processes encompassed both positive 
and negative elements: "To me prison was a microcosm both of the worst and the best in 
South Africa" (interview).
43
For another interpretation of this period at Central Prison, see Hirson 1995:95- 
6,328,341-4.
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Breytenbach had a not dissimilar experience at Pollsmoor Prison, where for the first 
time he was "inserted in a prison community" (1985:263), "plunged... into the complete 
prison universe" (276). The chapter entitled "I Was in Pollsmoor" (261-309) contains
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As a part of the process of initiation into the corrupt and corrupting atmosphere of 
Central Prison, oppression had to be lived in totally unfamiliar ways. At Local Prison 
they had always been aware of the privileged treatment granted to them as whites 
within a largely black prison. In Central, with its predominantly white inmate 
population, the political prisoners formed an unlikely alliance with the roughest 
prisoners of all, hardened criminals and murderers, the old-timers who had rebelled 
against the corruption of prison society and often had extremely tarnished records (129- 
33, also Breytenbach 1985:292). The latter group, with whom the politicals shared an 
antipathy towards authority and government, provided protection for the politicals and 
together they were the lowest, least privileged members of prison society, the resident 
'blacks'. Lewin writes about his prison experience:
I am also glad that I have been through it... I cannot regret that this has 
happened to me... it was only as a prisoner - as a bandiet in a South 
African jail - that I could begin to realize what life is like for most South 
Africans. I am white. I had to go inside to know what it's like to be black. 
(1976:14, also 129-31,137-8)
What does Lewin mean by this? Political prisoners constituted the section of a 
particular society who were both the least privileged and had the least chance of 
advancement. They were inherently guilty with all that that entailed in terms of 
victimisation and oppression. Prison provided an insight, through participation, into a 
criminalised society that oppressed people for what they were rather than for what they 
had done and in which to survive it was necessary to fight and cheat the system, to find 
ways of beating it, to become a criminal: "You must, to survive prison, become a
many descriptions of the prison inmates and Breytenbach's relationships with them, and a 
dissection of the constituent components of the prison (271-8).
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successful criminal. Only as a practising crook can you gain any comfort for yourself or 
retain any sense of personal dignity. It is this complete denial of normal social 
behaviour and accepted morality which makes prison so different from Outside..." (50). 
The criminalised and imprisoned prison society was a microcosm of the criminalised 
and imprisoned South African society. Lewin came to understand that the logical 
outcome of an underclass status was a solidarity forged through common suffering, but 
also frustration, resentment, desperation and anger.
While there is considerable irony in this scenario, it remains valid: that it was in a white 
environment, by learning about and living through the implications of being at the 
wrong end of its heterogeneity, categorisations, hierarchies, discriminations, and 
arbitrary violence, that Lewin came to acquire an understanding of what it meant to be 
'black'45
This sense of experiential solidarity translated into an authentic position from which to 
write, and even into a feeling of creative liberation, for a number of white political 
prisoners 46 Cronin claims that his lyrical leanings, that had been silenced as his 
political involvement grew outside, found expression inside prison: "But my love / to be 
removed / jailed, endorsed out, banished / man from woman is / After all / nothing 
unusual in this / Our country, in these times..." ("Itchy with its...", 1987:75, also 73):
45
Other white political prisoners describe similar sentiments. Breytenbach states: "I
know. I know what it is like to be black in a white country" (1985:27) . And again: "I
feel I can identify from within with all the poor bastards of that ravaged country. . . 
Prison has destroyed the barriers and broken the stays... I am the syntax of the people. 
The tense and the tenseness (1986:208-9, also see Blumberg 1962:148-9, Stephanie Kemp in 
Sachs 1968:182, and Jenkin 1987:175). Clearly imprisonment was not the only experience 
that enabled whites to feel this paradoxical sense of outcast solidarity, but equally 
clearly no other experience forged the solidarity so comprehensively.
46
This is Marius schoon: "I actually found that I was being remarkably creative... I... 
feel I did some of my best writing in prison. . . something else that prison did for me, 
which was a very liberating thing... partly because of the contact that we had on a day 
to day basis with Bram Fischer, partly because of seeing the thinking of other comrades 
that I was in prison with, for the first time since I'd been at university, I felt 
emotionally liberated enough to be writing in Afrikaans again, which I had deliberately 
not done. So, for me, from a creative point of view, prison was actually a very 
liberating experience", (interview)
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my lyrical voice... was very contorted before getting into prison... but I 
think being a voice on the wrong side... on the under-privileged side of 
the apartheid spatial arrangements, which I hadn't had before as a white, 
outside, sort of gave me a confidence, a lyrical voice... Gave me what I 
felt was an authentic position to speak from, where the lyrical feeling, 
love, sexuality, whatever, was connected to a majority position, albeit at 
the time I was a minority of a minority of a minority where I was [laughs].
But somehow that minority of a minority connected to a broader 
solidarity, and gained quite a lot of confidence [...] of writing from that 
position... I felt I could speak... as a victim of apartheid with 
authenticity... I didn't... before then, I just felt that it was an indulgence...
Neruda's got a lovely phrase about poetry, lyrical poetry's about sort of 
finding solidarity in solitude... (interview)
Cronin wrote in part at least, as an act of faith, for performance, for a black audience, in 
a South African English and in an attempt to participate in forging a shared national 
culture.47 The political imprisonment of whites, in a context where their incarceration 
was to use Cronin's words both exceptional and exemplary, facilitated a solidarity and 
participation that went beyond ideological or theoretical sympathies to a form of political 
and creative authority and liberation. As Gordimer writes, "There is no moral authority 
like that of sacrifice" (1989:294, also Lazarus 1986-87: especially 146). The state can 
also, therefore, be said to have contributed to rewriting white political prisoners, by the 
very act of imprisonment, in unexpected and unintended ways, as 'blacks', and in ways 
that were politically and creatively empowering.
47
Cronin 1986:15-17, also see 14,18-19,23.
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A further manifestation of becoming black' was the presence of death at Central Prison 
due to its function as South Africa's hanging jail. Rose Moss writes the following about 
the character David Miller in her novel The Schoolmaster.
The prison began to sing for him... The harmonies sweeping round him 
eroding his separateness. They were singing for him as though he would 
die the death of an African convict. They were singing as though he lived 
his last days now with them, in their prison, their condition, their 
endurance... Hour after hour their song held him and comforted him, and 
protected him... It was death, but they knew death. It was loneliness, but 
they knew... It was fear, but they knew... They knew... But, they assured 
him, the power was theirs. Nagawethu, They welcomed him. The power 
was his also. Their power was his power... He was white in South Africa, 
and the Africans were singing for him. They made him himself and more 
than himself. They included him in their history. They found an echo of 
their lives in his life. Under one law. (198T.236-7)48
Those condemned to death were disproportionately black, the only blacks in an 
otherwise all-white jail. Blacks were only allowed to enter this white prison society to 
die, but the presence of black death, of black death at the hands of the white state, was 
pervasive, enveloping. Its most enduring symbol was the singing of the condemned: 
"They were there, the inescapable chanting centre of the prison, usually unseen, always 
present" (Lewin 1976:148). Death was something that had to be lived with. "It was like 
living with a murdered man permanently in the front room of your home... You cannot
48
For Lewin to live amidst the procedures and atmosphere of official killing took on 
added poignancy because his friend, and fellow member of the ARM, John Harris, had been 
hanged there in 1965. While a work of fiction, Moss’ novel draws on certain aspects of 
the Harris story.
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get away from it... This was the most terrifying thing about Central... Not that it was 
difficult to live there, but that it was so easy..." (148, also 153). Only after being held at 
Central did Lewin "realize, fully, the utter horror of capital punishment" (152). Capital 
punishment provides a return to the linkages between prison and wider society. As a site 
of criminalisation and violence, Central Prison distilled the essence of apartheid: "the 
violence inherent in the laws of apartheid... this violence has its natural counterpart at 
Central in the gallows, the essential symbols of official violence" (153).
As noted in the earlier discussion of'The Gleek', Lewin left a great deal out of his 
original prison account. The calculated omissions included strengths, such as the forms 
and degree of organisation, support and solidarity - "Hugh wrote his book very 
carefully, those strengthening things didn't come out, he didn't want the authorities to be 
able to try to break them" (Schoon interview) - and weaknesses, such as an analysis of 
personalities and differences within the group. An important implicit acknowledgement 
in this strategy is how easy it would have been for weaknesses to be exploited and for 
strengths, such as 'The Gleek' or forms of smuggling, to be turned against the prisoner 
community. Prisoners were still inside, the community was still in existence, and 
Lewin's prison narrative, like many others, was written very carefully, 'managed' in 
accordance with a time- and place-specific political purpose. It was a 'half-told' 
narrative, and consequently a 'half-known' story. With the fall of apartheid, the context 
of writing and reception has changed: "what I'm trying to do... is to put it in novel form 
so it's not identified with any particular character... [a]nd at the same time raise the sort 
of issues that were there: the weaknesses, the irritations...", and also to address other 
omissions in Bandiet such as the possibilities for co-operation suggested by the 
sometimes surprising alliances forged within prison (Lewin interview). These writings 
and rewritings of the prison experience suggest a concern less with self-interrogation 
than with forging alliances and community building - between black and white, factions
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of the left, criminals and politicals - within prison, within South Africa as a whole, and in 
ways that linked the two.
Despite their political commitment white political activists remained privileged within 
South African society. While this sense of privilege was maintained in some prison 
contexts it was removed and reversed in others. This, in conjunction with the still 
pervasive ideology of apartheid, contributed to the layered experience of continuity and 
change. Imprisonment provided Lewin with an insight into new dimensions of what it 
meant to be a South African, into what South Africa was like for the majority of its 
inhabitants, as he lived some of the discriminations of an oppressive order. It forced him 
to become a member of an underclass.49 And Lewin used his reformulated identity, the 
experience of being 'black' in a society ravaged by official violence, to ask uncomfortable 
questions - if the opponents of the regime or of authority could work together inside why 
couldn't they do so outside? - and to contest official discourse, notably on the 
relationship between prisoners, between prison and societal context and, most 
importantly, on the prevailing social and political order.50 Lewin sang for the disinherited 
and the outsiders with a particular kind of insight and intensity: the insight and intensity 
of having had to live that which previously had only been imaginatively shared in a more 
abstract manner.51 In the process he explored the possibility of a more encompassing 
sense of solidarity and belonging, of being South African.
Lewin appears to advocate imprisonment: for others to go to prison and to learn what
life was like for the majority of South Africans would be "good”; while he believed that 
"any person, in anv society, should know what it is like to live in a hanging jail" 
(14).
50
Barbara Harlow has argued - particularly but not exclusively in relation to women's 
prison writing - that autobiographical prison accounts rewrite the social order and the 
categorisations and discriminations on which it is based, in the light of a broader 
political vision and struggle (1987:117-53).
51 . ,  .In a portrait of a white American jazz singer, Sheila Jordan, Lewis Nkosi claims that
her musical power in part derived from "the fact that though white Sheila is really 'a 
Negro'.,. I cannot tell whether she is Negro by choice or through circumstance, but I 
have been a Negro long enough to recognise another Negro when I see one - even under a 
white skin. She sings ultimately for the disinherited, the outsiders..." (1965:76).
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On the basis of the preceding readings of prison autobiographies it becomes possible to 
contemplate the most dramatic exchange at the interface of prison and society, one that 
goes beyond a shared oppression to a shared humanisation and liberation. What kind of 
prison community, what kind of societal transition and transformation, was required for 
the (re)vision of a South Africa articulated through and from the experience of 
imprisonment to achieve a material reality in a changing society? To begin to answer 
this question it is instructive to turn to the Robben Island phenomenon.
Robben Island
State repression designed to destroy individuals paradoxically forged collectivity. The prison is to 
state repression what the factory was to capitalist exploitation - it aggregates, homogenizes, and 
fosters communication. (Abel 1995:254)
Imprisonment presents political activists and movements with the ultimate 
transformative challenge: the site of the worst extremes of oppression can be 
transformed into a symbol of political resistance; into a symbol of an alternative 
societal vision. The essential meaning of Robben Island, which must inform an 
understanding of its uneven evolution from 'hell-hole' to 'university', resides in the 
extraordinary power of one such symbol. Transformation depended upon the collective 
power of prisoners. This transformation was in part achieved and disseminated within 
and through the power of writing, and is comprehensively articulated in 
autobiographical accounts. These accounts communicate the sense of a community at 
once oppressed and destined to assume power.52
Political prisoners held on Robben Island between about 1962 and 1966 experienced
52
This message is a recurrent theme despite the fact that autobiographical accounts 
from Robben Island cover a range of perspectives: short and long term prisoners serving 
time during different eras on the island; varying political affiliations; and experience 
in different sections of the prison.
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the most barbaric prison conditions perpetrated under apartheid. A number of factors 
coincided to facilitate Robben Island as 'hell-hole', including the often arbitrary 
hostility, racism and brutality of white warders - "The racial divide on Robben Island 
was absolute: there were no black warders, and no white prisoners" (N. Mandela 
1995:459) - the race and class conflicts implicit in their encounter with a new type of 
black prisoner; the deliberate use of common-law prisoners and gangs as intermediaries 
of control; racially discriminatory and inadequate food and clothing; and hard labour, 
perhaps most notoriously associated with work in the quarries. Autobiographical 
accounts document numerous examples of ill-treatment, inadequate medical attention, 
and unnecessary/violent deaths. Extreme violence was the essential characteristic of 
Robben Island during this period. One incident of violence is given prominence by a 
number of the prison accounts, including that by Zwelonke:
Mr Mlambo, a twenty-year-stretch man, a short man, was made to dig a 
pit big enough to fit him. Unaware of what was to follow, he was still 
digging when he was suddenly overwhelmed by a group of convicts.
They shoved him into the pit and started filling it up... When they had 
finished, only Mlambo's head appeared above the ground. A white 
warder who had directed the whole business, urinated into Mlambo's 
mouth. The convicts tried to open his tight-locked jaws, but could not...
When the warders had finished, his face was covered with piss. Then 
vicious blows of fists and boots rained around the defenceless head 
sticking out of the ground... When they were tired of the fun, they left 
him to help himself out of his grave. (1973:14)53
53
Also see Dlamini 1984:26,59,65, Naidoo 1982:82-3.
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Buntman has argued that combating the physical conditions that threatened the very 
survival of prisoners on Robben Island was the primary form of resistance in which 
prisoners had to engage before they were able to extend their struggle to the 
advancement/development/renewal of individuals and organisations. The improvement of 
conditions was a fundamental precondition for, and allowed prisoners to concentrate on, 
using their imprisonment as productively as possible (see Buntman 1996:93-111).
A second era on Robben Island lasted from roughly 1966 until 1976-77. In the words of 
Naidoo the change was from a situation of "the chains bound" to one where "the chains 
loosened". Various improvements in facilities and conditions took place: work conditions 
became less unpleasant, medical facilities were upgraded, and common-law prisoners, a 
privileged class, were gradually removed from the island. Political prisoners were able to 
occupy vacated intermediate positions of power and control which could be used to 
enhance their well-being and unity rather than to destabilise and undermine. While the 
food remained both inadequate and of a poor standard, and racially discriminatory 
provision was a major point of contention, Dingake notes that when the kitchen was 
taken over by political prisoners food preparation improved (1987:211, also N. Mandela 
1995:598-9). A further characteristic of this period was that the balance of power among 
the political prisoner population shifted. Many short-term prisoners were released or 
moved to other prisons and relatively few new inmates arrived on the island. The result 
was a much more stable prison community increasingly dominated by the ANC.
The reason for the change that took place at the end of the 1960s is difficult to identify 
categorically. The authorities may have felt that the previous brutal regime had failed to 
break the political prisoners, feared the politicisation and even recruitment of the 
criminals - there is evidence of political prisoners influencing the broader prison 
population both during the early period on Robben Island and when the group of white
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politicals moved to Central Prison54 - and/or they may have been wary of adverse, 
particularly international, publicity. In conjunction with external developments and 
initiatives a political space was gradually being created from within the prison itself, 
with the result that prisoners were able to begin to mobilise more organised resistance 
themselves. In this context the 1966 hunger strike was a turning point. According to 
Dlamini it was organised with the aims of addressing grievances including food, 
clothing and shoes, work conditions and inhuman and brutal treatment. Significant 
concessions were made and although some were later retracted and the supposed 
ringleaders were severely punished, things on the island had changed: "whatever the 
authorities did to us, they could never take away our sense of victory, or our sense of 
power... somehow the atmosphere on the island was never exactly the same as it had 
been before" (Naidoo 1982:174-5).55
While progress overall was uneven, for example in relation to studying, and some 
grievances, such as access to news, had not been addressed, in general the enemy had 
changed: "Before, our enemy had been physical cruelty, now it was boredom, isolation, 
the psychological decay of an endlessly unproductive and confined existence" (Naidoo 
1982:248). When Dingake arrived on Robben Island in 1966 facilities and provisions 
that might have eased boredom and isolation for political prisoners remained "grim": 
"Officially, prisoners were entitled to one letter in six months, one visit in six months, 
no photos, no games, no sport and no other things" (Dingake 1987:191), However, as 
conditions eased sporting/recreational activities expanded and a cultural renaissance
54
On the politicisation/education of common-law prisoners by female political 
prisoners, see Makhoere 1988:99,101-4,111-15; also see La Guma 1967.
55
Also on the hunger strike see Dingake 1987:140-1, Dlamini 1984:181-93, Naidoo 
1982:164-75, Zwelonke 1973:12 9-43. Through the inadequacy and inequality of its 
provision, its withdrawal as a means of punishment, and its voluntary refusal as a means 
of protest, food became a weapon that could be used by both the authorities and 
prisoners (Buntman 1996:101-2). On the ambiguity of the hunger strike as a weapon for 
political prisoners, see N. Mandela 1995:502-3. Generally on the reasons for improved 
conditions on Robben Island, see Buntman 1996:106-11, 181 footnote 13.
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took place. Among the emerging cultural forms were vocal groups and choirs, plays 
(see Fugard et al. 1974), and bands, often organised in concerts.56 Later, however, all
choirs were allegedly banned without explanation. Naidoo provides a particularly rich 
insight into the activities in which he played an organisational role. He was Secretary of 
the Makana Football Association (or Mr. Assoc, as he reputedly became known) and 
describes the development of football until 26 sides played in three divisions. Football 
was followed by a whole range of other games and sporting activities. Once films began 
to be shown he became secretary of the Film Society. There is evidence both of prisoner 
ingenuity and increased organisation in the field of recreation and culture and the 
familiar arbitrariness in the way such activities were facilitated and obstructed by the 
authorities.57 Although over time it proved difficult to maintain standards and interest, 
these activities played a vital role in sustaining mental/physical alertness and morale, as 
a source of release and escape, and as a unifying agent. Robben Island was a poignant 
example of a prisoner community displaying determination and inventiveness when 
reduced, often repeatedly, to nothing, individually and collectively, by continually 
reinventing a meaningful life and world; by (re)creating forms of contact, comfort, 
stimulation, and recreation.
56
The cultural and political role of song for black prisoners on Robben Island, on 
death row and elsewhere, is worthy of particular note. Songs appear to have performed a 
variety of functions on the island from entertainment, to the regulation of work and the 
boosting of morale.
57
On the above mentioned examples/recreation see Dingake 1987:208-10, Dlamini 1984:170- 
6, N. Mandela 1995:535,539-41,581-4,596-8, also 614-15,625, and Naidoo 1982:176-7,182- 
3,204-7,219-23,229-33,247-9; also on sport and recreation, see Buntman 1996:115-20. 
White male prisoners displayed a similar degree of innovation and creativity in devising 
activities in the face of arbitrary interference: see Lewin 1976:98,183,186-7,191-
201,220-1, also Hirson 1995:3,266-7,348, and Jenkin 1987:140-5. As has already been 
mentioned, improvements in prison conditions were uneven, liberalisation non-linear, 
characterised by arbitrary and destabilising regression and permanent struggle. 
Conditions on the island were influenced, among other things, by personal caprice, 
successive prison regimes, by the turnover and humanising of warders, and there is 
evidence that improvements coincided with the appointment of better educated and more 
humane warders. One period of regression took place during the Colonel Badenhorst regime 
in the early 1970s, while another accompanied the transition to his namesake, Major 
Badenhorst who arrived in 1981, from the relatively liberal four year reign of Colonel 
Harding (Buntman 1996:98-9,111,139; also on change and its unevenness on Robben Island, 
see N. Mandela 19 95:512-3,535-6,543-51,568-9,581-2,593,596-9,602).
Any attempt to define the meaning and significance of this period on the island needs to 
recognise that many of the changes, especially in the areas of culture and sport, may 
have been 'allowed' and even encouraged in order to pre-empt and diffuse more 
threatening forms of resistance. From this perspective reform can be seen as an attempt 
to co-opt and provide reassurance to inmates while providing a superficial veneer of 
reasonableness to the outside world (see Young 1987:417-18). On the island, however, 
the picture was complicated by the fact that both sides sought to influence and 
manipulate this complex process. Dingake's perceptive account gives some insight to 
the ways in which the prisoners sought to deal with, and indeed participate in and use to 
their own advantage, the acknowledged dilemma of carefully managed reform. For 
example, he describes the controversy among prisoners about whether to accept football 
facilities caused by the fact that this was one of their lesser priorities. However, while 
seeing it as "cheap propaganda to disguise the quintessential conditions on Robben 
Island", the offer was accepted and used as a lever for further improvements (Dingake 
1987:209-10).
Dingake refers to Robben Island as "a laboratory of a major political experiment": a 
range of variables were manipulated by the authorities, initially mainly physical and 
violent in nature and then in this period more subtle and psychological. The evolution 
of conditions was bound up in a fluid balance of power involving the government, 
prison inmates and the outside world. But as Dingake notes, by the time of his release 
the experiment was not yet over (203).
Academic and political education had taken place from the early years on Robben 
Island - there were, for example, literacy campaigns during the 1960s (see Buntman 
1996:112-14,126-8,157) - but the period after 1976-77 has gained notoriety as the era 
when Robben Island became "the site of an extraordinary programme of political 
education" (Bundy in Mbeki 1991;xix). The prison writings of Govan Mbeki
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illuminatingly reflect this development. They are a collection of some of his 
contributions to the political education programme, written, circulated and preserved in 
prison. The writings formed part of debates on the island and were intended to be read 
by prisoners. They reflect Mbeki's life, experience and beliefs, and are therefore of 
considerable autobiographical and historical importance.sS
From the late 1970s the balance within the prison population on the island was severely 
disrupted, firstly, by the arrival of Black Consciousness supporters after the Soweto 
uprising, and then by an influx of MK members. Competition for recruitment and the 
relatively unsophisticated political understanding of many of these newcomers made a 
formalisation of political education necessary for the ANC. Its sympathisers needed a 
knowledge of their own history and the struggle against apartheid, not least so that they 
could counter the claims of rival political groups on the island. Many of the new 
prisoners exemplified the condition summed up earlier by Zwelonke: "As soon as I 
awoke from my political sleep I found I was in the struggle, and as soon as I began to 
understand the nature of the struggle I was in prison" (1973 :9).59
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The introduction to this collection, by Colin Bundy, provides background to the 
political education programme and is drawn on extensively below.
59
Buntman states, in relation to the period between 1977 and 1980, that most of the 
post-1976 arrivals identified with or were members of Black Consciousness groupings, 
although their political identification was often not very strong. These militant youths 
joined a prison community that was stable and ageing, and to some degree resigned, bored 
and self-saturated, deflated by the attrition of prison life and the extended lull in 
the struggle against apartheid. The result was a period of conflict - ideological, 
organisational, generational - during which there were sometimes violent tensions over 
such issues as recruitment, leadership and resistance strategies. Buntman differentiates 
between the incoming generation's categorical resistance - resistance as a matter of 
political principle, resistance as public, everywhere and always, resistance as a state 
of constant revolt - and the older prisoners' preference for strategic resistance, which 
entailed a pragmatic understanding that to withstand and make productive use of 
imprisonment it was counterproductive to expend energy on constant revolt and instead 
concentrated on creating/maintaining a space within which to develop organisations and 
members in a way that would influence the political terrain both inside and outside. By 
1980, Buntman argues, a large degree of convergence had been reached on the rules 
governing prisoner society and how best to conduct the struggle in prison and on 
release. While the younger generation came to embrace the perspective of the older men - 
significantly, by early 1980s the ANC had re-established its dominance on the island as 
a result of recruitment and the arrival of MK cadres - they nevertheless revitalised and 
rejuvenated prison life (Buntman 1996:137-66. For Nelson Mandela's reflections on this 
period, see 1995:576-81, also 597-8; on his own attitudes to resistance and facilitating 
change, also see 496-8,519).
A  similar, if less pronounced, sense of generational difference can be gleaned from 
Jenkin, who on arrival at Pretoria Prison entered a prison environment in which 
conditions had eased considerably (1987:145,177-82) and relations with the warders were 
characterised by mutual accommodation (72,104-9,180,237), and perceived it to be a
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Among the factors which made it possible to implement political education on a 
considerable scale by the early 1980s were improved communication between the 
sections of the prison, regular access to newspapers, and the official study programme 
through UNIS A which provided both content and cover for political education. 
Therefore the perceived need for a coherent programme of political education coincided 
with factors facilitating its development. Complex procedures were devised to produce, 
copy, distribute, discuss, and conceal the documentation and courses of study, as well as 
to set up and run study groups. Prisoners facilitated an educational revolution, from 
relatively greater dependence on the unpredictability of official study to the greater 
control of educational facilities created from within, while maintaining the essential 
coexistence of the two.
The balance of influence and power in the Robben Island transformation remain 
unclear. The arsenal of tactics available to the prisoners were limited - deputations, 
memoranda, representations to visitors sympathetic or hostile, hunger strikes, go-slow 
strikes, sideline-sniping, attempts to humanise individuals through normal conversation 
- but they were used consistently (Dingake 1987:150). As Dingake goes on to 
acknowledge: "The odds are always against prisoners in any contest with the 
authorities... Where they are determined to have a showdown, there is very little the 
prisoners can do except protest and continue to exert pressure for restoration of lost 
privilege" (171). What is extraordinary about Robben Island is that the authorities were 
forced to concede so much to those perceived to be so dangerous. By the 1980s Robben 
Island was a political experiment over which the government had been forced to 
relinquish control. As the political significance of Robben Island increased, the 
authorities were caught between an organised inmate community and increasingly
becalmed zone devoid of meaning and purpose (173, 176-7,181). The single minded .intent of 
newcomers - in Jenkin's case to escape - created frustration and unease for all 
concerned.
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hostile external public opinion. Central to the transformation of Robben Island was the 
collective power exercised by the prisoners themselves.
Autobiographical writing about Robben Island reflects both the fact that prisoners often 
brought to and took from the island a political agenda and an organisational affinity, 
and the increasingly collective way in which prison life was structured by the prisoners 
themselves in ways that simultaneously reinforced and cut across political/ 
organisational differences. The official policy was that of "each-prisoner-for-himself 
designed specifically to isolate, divide and impose an official hierarchy of relations.
This was challenged by the inmates: "every warder and officer would tell us that prison 
regulations forbade us to use the word 'we', that we were in prison as individuals and 
not as a group, but we would persist in saying 'we' and 'us' when speaking to those in 
charge, however high their rank" (Naidoo 1982:241, also N. Mandela 1995:470,488). In 
Weschler's terms, the battle on Robben Island between state and opposition was over 
the right to say 'We'. While the official power of writing and organisation sought to 
individualise, the prisoner population's collective forms of self-representation were 
duplicated in similarly collective forms of self-organisation, such as committees:
From the inception of the prisoners' committee real pressure against 
harsh jail conditions started building up... Whereas, de jure, we could not 
act in concert as prisoners, when it came to representation to prison 
authorities, a de facto recognition of our communal grievances and 
interests soon became the order of relations with the authorities.
(Dingake 1987T50)60
60
Buntman states: "Over time, an extensive committee structure evolved... to regulate
the relations and activities, between and within organisations, that formed the 
substance of prison life" (1996:100). A complex network of sports and recreation 
committees was established, for example, with detailed constitutions governing rules and 
organisation.
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However exaggerated some portrayals of the collectivisation of life on Robben Island 
may be - some writers, for example, describe lines of dissent and division between 
competing political organisations, while others minimise the extent of differences61 - as 
a process it represented a significant attempt by the prisoners to regain control of their 
own lives. The forbidden use of the collective ’We' facilitated a challenge to, and a 
rewriting of, prison regulations, the official power of writing, and the text of 
imprisonment. The content and form of education, for example, were significantly 
rewritten by the power of the collective. Furthermore, extending beyond the 
organisation of life in prison, and in a manner both more marked and more consisted 
than that of white political prisoners, the forbidden use of the collective ’We' served the 
same function with reference to the conventions of autobiographical narratives (see 
Harlow 1987:148-53). Language, both in its oral and written forms became a collective 
meeting place; and, in part as a result, modes of self-representation helped forge new 
realities.
The purpose of this reconstruction of the Robben Island story through an 
autobiographical collage, compounding the agency of the collective ’We’, lies in the 
incredible, if uneven, transformation it records, over three decades, of Robben Island as 
a place of imprisonment. The role of the word was crucial to the process of change and
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Dlamini and Dingake, for example, play down differences while Naidoo is very critical 
of the PAG (1982:88,145,165,167-8,180-1,226-33,236-9). Buntman states that according to 
one of her interviewees the security police used Naidoo1s discussions of tensions within 
the PAC as a basis of interrogation (1996:180, footnote 112). Exploiting organisational 
differences was just one of the ways in which the authorities sought to pursue a policy 
of divide and rule: others included the separation of prisoners into different sections 
within the prison and the playing off of one section against another, discriminatory 
provision of food and clothing, attempts to exploit differences of ethnicity, region of 
origin, and/or generation, the negotiation tactics of the state and its definition and 
use of leadership. In a variety of ways, therefore, the state sought to structure prison 
life on its own terms. While there were, of course, inter- and intra-organisational 
divisions, individual disagreements and informers, and divisions in relation to 
strategies of resistance, the level of solidarity and co-operation achieved was a 
remarkable achievement, especially with regards to the unity in attitude towards the 
state/authorities and in establishing a shared set of mores and rules to govern life on 
the island. As in Pretoria Local, differences and tensions were carefully managed (see 
Buntman 1996:120-5,128-30,132,143). On unity, and various forms of division/difference, 
from the perspective of a leader, see N. Mandela 1995: in addition to references already 
mentioned: 494,501,523-7,547,551-2,557,605-7,625-7,636-9,653,662-3; also Neville
Alexander, Fikile Bam and Kwedi Mkalipi 1992, particularly on the multiple and enduring 
benefits of unity, solidarity and organisation (personal growth/development/education, 
the ability to disagree with but still respect others, discipline, and more).
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again it is within the autobiographical archive that the rewriting of the island is most 
comprehensively documented. The Robben Island story has taken on a life of its own: 
the accounts of prisoners have created a legend; prisoners narrate their felt experience 
and the legend bom of that experience; the narrative of the legend creates the prisoners 
and their recollections and representations. The danger of the Robben Island story is 
that the narrative of positive and multiple transformation will become, perhaps has 
already become, a template that is self-censoring and excludes and silences other 
versions, the broken and disenchanted, the conflicts and errors. The strength of the story 
lies in the manner in which it fulfilled its strategic political purpose within a clearly 
identified political terrain, in the manner in which it not only drew on but also fed back 
into experience, life and action.62
As Buntman notes, political prisoners played an important role in keeping resistance 
and banned political organisations alive inside South Africa: "For nearly thirty years, the 
only place in South Africa where the ANC and PAC could remain intact was on Robben 
Island" (1996:132). Imprisonment on Robben Island contributed to the growth and 
sophistication of people, organisations and resistance. The complex society and culture 
enabled the prisoners to leam about and share organisational and administrative skills, 
and provided an education in tolerance, mediation/negotiation, mutual support, political 
and organisational development, and dealing with the enemy. Prisoners took these skills 
and insights into the liberation struggle on their release (see Buntman 1996:130-5,165- 
6). There is a long history in South Africa of detention, trials, and imprisonment 
functioning as a collective meeting place and locus of organisation and mobilisation, 
but it was Robben Island which fed most immediately into popular political folklore, 
wider political resistance to apartheid, oppositional ideological debates and ultimately
62
Examples of narratives which unsettle the trope of transformation include T h e  I s l a n d  
(1974), by Fugard et al.
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positions of power. The Robben Island autobiographies are increasingly self-conscious 
constructions of a collective political self, world and oppositional power of writing, 
reflecting and participating in the transformation of the island from 'hell-hole' to 
'university1. Ultimately they write towards the assumption of political power, towards the 
transformation not only of the prison and the interface between prison and society, but 
also of the country itself; the act of imprisonment contributed to rewriting not only 
prisoners, but also the nation, in unexpected and unintended ways. Articulations of the 
imprisoned self - the 'I', but more particularly the 'We'- have fed into and helped to 
construct aspects of contemporary South Africa. An ex-Robben Island prisoner is its first 
democratically elected President; the state is peopled with fellow ex-prisoners; it is 
mobilised by a societal vision forged, in part, in the struggles and transformation of 
imprisonment, and in particular of this island prison.
Conclusion
Scarry argues that everything becomes incorporated into the torturer's arsenal of 
weapons during interrogation, weapons that refer equally to pain and power. Such an 
argument can be extended in a society built upon violence and pain, though in diluted 
form, beyond the moment of interrogation to imprisonment and even to the aftermath of 
release. The written word and the life story are weapons in this prolonged encounter; 
weapons that can inflict pain and confer power; weapons, like all others, available not 
only to the torturer but also to the detainee/prisoner. Autobiography is one of a series of 
weapons which although potentially available for use to undermine the detainee/ 
prisoner, as in the case of Sachs, is primarily a weapon of redress, a means of reducing 
pain and returning power to the incarcerated. In these accounts pain is made visible from 
the viewpoint of the detainee/prisoner thereby enabling it to be acknowledged for what it 
is. The world of the incarcerated is brought into the light - from resistance and fortitude 
to, admittedly less frequently, compromise and submission; from complicity in
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unmaking to complicity in remaking - thereby providing a narrative within which pain 
can be laid bare. As the detainee/prisoner reclaims a voice, a sense of self and world, 
gains a restoration of worldly self-extension, the equivalents of the captor contract as 
they are given a defining context. In the process the latter are seen for the barbarously 
narrow, partial and depraved illusions that they are and some of the destruction of 
detention and imprisonment can be repaired. Scarry writes:
As torture consists of acts that magnify the way in which pain destroys a 
person's world, self and voice, so these other acts [such as 
autobiography] that restore the voice become not only a denunciation of 
the pain but almost a diminution of the pain, a partial reversal of the 
process of torture itself. (1985:50; [] bracketed comment my own)
Detention and imprisonment are variously written, indeed must be continuously 
rewritten, even within the oppositional archive of the self. The momentum of the 
counter-discourse of truth and power finally became irresistible: from the detainee 
and/or prisoner as winner to the possibility of a more sustained and collective victory 
through the agency of a softer, but more enduring and human, heroism; from the 
appropriation of power implicit in an, albeit idiosyncratic, rewriting of the framework 
within which imprisonment is usually conceptualised - deny oppositions, read one in the 
other, and go beyond - to a reworking of the relationships between prisoners and prison 
and society, and more generally of the South African political and social order and, 
finally, to the transformative truth and power of the collective, notably within and 
through the (written) word, to the extent that the world of the prison could participate in 
the actual restructuring and transformation of a nation. A narrative archive has been 
created which serves as a place of reunion, healing and transformation. This is its 
'higher' truth and power.
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This extraordinary process of transformation, however, was multifaceted and remains 
variously incomplete. Parallel to the un/remaking of voice, self and world within 
incarceration outlined in this chapter, and the contested textual representation of this 
process, a similar and irretrievably linked un/remaking and representation was taking 
place in the somatic domain, on the surfaces and depths of the body. It is the body in 
pain and in death that the next chapter will address.
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Chapter 2: From the ’Space of Death1: Discourses on Torture and Custodial Death
i) The Body and/in Space
'I didn't think I'd come out alive; in fact, I was seeing death. But I was prepared to die as 
long as I died for the truth...'(Mofokeng in Russell 1991:45)
In the lexicon of Michael Taussig, detention without trial is an expansive 'space of 
death'. Passage through this space, where 'reality is up for grabs', can, however, be 
variously transformative and provide a range of counter-discourses. This, in one form or 
another, is the truth and power of the prison writing discussed in the previous chapter: 
that its authors moved through the 'space of death' to create a counter discourse, an 
alternative vision of reality and society to that advocated by apartheid. But death never 
lost its sting.
To be detained/imprisoned is to be buried alive, entombed. Death is multiple, layered, 
continuous, totally separate from life and yet continuous with it. To be a detainee/ 
tortured is to anticipate death (Foster et al. 1987:152), to be on the verge of death - "I 
was growing worn out with pain... feeling myself on the edge of life, near to death" 
(Naidoo 1982:23): Weschler speaks of "edge-of-death tortures, such as drowning" 
(1990:53) - to move in and out of death, to cross the threshold of death many times and 
in many different ways - "I died many deaths that night" (Pheto 1985:95, awaiting an 
announced intensification of his interrogation; also Gordimer 1988:366). It is to not 
know if one is alive or dead, to feel oneself actually dying and to think oneself actually 
dead: "After a while I wasn’t even sure that I was still alive... I had become a thing. I 
even thought that I was dead" (Mofokeng in Russell 1991:51). Breytenbach writes: "The 
Place taught me the cold and splendid lesson that survival comes at the price of feeding 
small morsels of oneself to death" (1996:161). It is, finally, to wish to die, to embrace 
death.
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Forms of secondary or simulated death under apartheid included solitary confinement, 
the making of a statement/confession, and the decision to become a state witness. In 
addition, there was the experience of actual physical pain - "[pjhysical pain always 
mimes death and the infliction of pain is always a mock execution" - and many were 
subjected to actual mock executions (Scarry 1985:31, also 49,61, see Pheto 1985:127-8, 
Issel in Russell 1991:76). Detainees were told they or others close to them were going 
to die. A sense of having been irrevocably changed by detention and imprisonment was 
often bound up with death: "I feel that there are areas that will never be alive in me 
again" (Breytenbach 1985:337, also 130,318,339,341-4).1 Among opponents of the 
regime, everyone knew someone who had been tortured. Comrades, friends, had 
perhaps died in custody. Symbolically, and in ways that were very real, enemies of the 
state were shown, and became, the tortured, dead body.
But death was a weapon within the interrogational encounter and as such was the 
subject of contestation. As the final, and decisive, victory/defeat, death was 
simultaneously imposed, resisted, embraced and subject to manipulation by both sides 
in the encounter. Like a chameleon the detainee learnt to "wear / [his/her] own death / 
like another disguise" (Cronin, "Chameleon", 1987:305). This chapter will focus on 
custodial death at its most material and physical, because it was from this origin that all 
other forms of custodial death gained their meaning and towards which they all 
gestured. In the institutionalised space of detention without trial, Ahmed Timol 'fell' to 
his death while trying to 'escape' from the 10th floor of John Yorster Square in 
Johannesburg; Steve Biko was beaten into a semi-coma and then transported 750 miles 
to a prison hospital in Pretoria, naked, in the back of a landrover; Neil Aggett was under 
interrogation for 62 hours prior to his suicide by hanging. In this arena of brutality and
 ^Also see Lelyveld 1987:186-7, Kuzwayo 1985:218,232, W. Mandela 1985:126, Mashinini 
1989:100,105-6.
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terror can there be illumination through extinction; can death provide a more vivid 
sense of life; what kind of reality is 'up for grabs'?
The Body and the State
This is a place where bodies are their own signs. (Coetzee 1987:157)
The physical body was located within the oppressive and pervasive body politic of 
apartheid. Torture was part of a process whereby the state violently registered its power 
on-in-through the bodies, both alive and dead, of its subjects: on-in-through their 
identification and categorisation, their location, mobility and removal, poverty and 
productive 'use', their punishment, suffering and pain: "the body is... directly involved in 
a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, 
train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs" 
(Foucault 1991:25, see 24-31).4 Within this complex of power and knowledge what is 
the meaning of torture?
Elaine Scarry argues that the pain of interrogation and torture leads to the annihilation 
of self, voice and world, and that this destruction is "experienced spatially as either the 
contraction of the universe down to the immediate vicinity of the body or as the body 
swelling to fill the entire universe" (1985:35): "and the world grew smaller. It shrank 
into the room and to the circle where he was standing. It shrank to his head and his head 
filled everything. Throbbing" (Moss 1981:13). Body and world merge in this pain- 
induced process of contraction and expansion. The detainee is consumed, "swallowed
2 Other ways in which the South African state violently registered its power on-in-
through the bodies of its subjects included the use of parcel bombs: "ever since I've 
never worn a bathing costume, because my back has got holes in it... backside, my bum 
quarters, the whole... I lost all my teeth. So daily I'm reminded, I've got to take off 
my bloody teeth" (P. Naidoo interview).
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alive", by the physical, sentient body in pain (see Scarry 1985:50, also 46,49,57). "Pain... 
had usurped his body... It was his body... His whole body was held together on a 
framework of pain..."(La Guma 1972:169):
The pain has no beginning, nor has it an end. It is an endless, infinite 
presence, an even flow across time and space, a cool surface that reaches 
into the comers of my numbness, drives out the comfort that the 
numbness brought. (S. Jacobs 1986:99)
Torture forges the parameters of a world as the one-dimensional reality of the body, the 
body as universe colonised by pain.3 What is created, in essence, is the total body :
"What I am made to undergo is subjection to the most rudimentary needs of my body: to 
drink, to relieve itself, to find a posture in which it is least sore... They [the torturers] 
were interested only in demonstrating to me what it meant to live in a body, as a 
body..." (Coetzee 1982:115).^
3
The body in pain comes to constitute and determine all meaning: see Bernstein 
1986:216. In contrast to the physical!ty of the detainee as body, S. Jacobs describes 
the eyes of the interrogator Human as windows into "the infinite space contained within 
the shell of his body... an empty cell" (1986:96); the interrogator is hollow, with, in 
the words of Breytenbach, a "dead hole in his centre" (1985:56, also see Scarry 
1985:46, 57) .
4
Jean Franco argues that one of the ways in which men are forced to live in 
detention/prison as if they were women - the dichotomy between masculine and feminine, 
active and passive, resistance and submission, is often shared by both state and its 
opposition, and is epitomised by the challenge to the tortured male "to behave like a 
man and die or to become like a woman to survive" - is by coming to understand what it 
means to be constantly aware of their bodies, of every bodily function (1992:109,111). 
Pursuing a different but related argument, Weschler states that torture attempts to 
accomplish its aim "by situating its discourse at the intersection of two of the most 
primordial mysteries of human being: incarnation and solitude". He continues by 
postulating a violent collaboration between the body and death within the structure of 
torture:
To people who have been attempting to behave in a lofty, selfless manner, 
it elaborates the incarnation of lofty ideals (of the soul) in a body. It 
subverts the soul through the vulnerability of the body in which it 
inheres, teaching that one c a n be reduced to one's own body and nothing 
else - the horizon of the wide, wide world with all its wide, wide hopes 
can become constricted to the point that it becomes entirely effaced.
Likewise, torture impresses on the individual - and again, particularly 
individuals who’ve been living for others, among others - the fact of the 
absolute solitude of human existence, which is finally, in its most 
extreme expression, solitude b e f o r e  d e a t h .  That sort of knowledge, which 
ordinary people can ordinarily sustain for at most a few moments at a 
time, once in a long, long while, torture forces its victim to withstand 
for hours, days, weeks at a time. It is a harrowing knowledge, and is 
intended to harrow. The scream that comes welling out of the torture
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The total body is rendered multiply naked. The process of stripping away, stripping 
bare, is particularly pronounced in solitary confinement and interrogation, and the 
passage through the various gateways into and within the prison domain, but it also 
penetrates to the very core of state power and individual powerlessness in detention and 
prison more generally.
Prison, for me, is the absolute stripping away of all protective layers: 
sounds are raw, sights are harsh, smells are foul. The scars are there, like 
tattoos on the mind... Setbacks are experienced with a body- 
consciousness. (Breytenbach 1985:258-9, see 21-3,119,305, also Foster 
etal. 1987:123)
You are stripped bare and given back only what they think is necessary.
They strip you at the beginning and they go on stripping you, endlessly ...
You are stripped bare of everything that you can call your own, 
constantly stripped bare of anything that you make your own; you are 
stripped bare in an endless process of peeling off your protective 
covering and leaving you naked. (Lewin 1976:41, also 42-3,50,54-5,75- 
7>
The incarcerated body as world is exposed, pure and complete in its naked 
vulnerability. In part this is because the oppositional body is perceived by the state to be
chamber is thus double - the body calling out to the soul, the self 
calling out to others... (1990:238, note omitted)
® Also see Foster et al. 1987:123,142,151, Hirson 1995:224. Foucault argues that the 
penal system is the form in which power is most obviously seen as power. Imprisonment 
"is certainly the most frenzied manifestation of power imaginable... Prison is the only 
place where power is manifested in its naked state, in its most excessive form... for 
once, power doesn't hide or mask itself; it is cynical and at the same time pure and 
entirely 'justified1, because its practice can be totally formulated within the 
framework of morality. Its brutal tyranny consequently appears as the serene domination 
of Good over Evil, of order over disorder" (1977:210).
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an object of knowledge, the site or location of truth. This ideology of truth, which 
locates the truth as hidden, buried, within the body, sanctions torture as the means of its 
extraction, production and reproduction.6 The validity and authenticity of truth is 
correlated to the degree of violence and pain inflicted, to the difficulty of its excavation/ 
creation. In its naked vulnerability the body is also made to manifest a form of 
blankness, it is reduced to a template, an empty page, to be inscribed. The self as body 
is seen to harbour the truth in its depths and surfaces. Torture facilitates a somatic 
transformation in which excavation becomes inscription and depth becomes surface: the 
truth is brought to the surface of the body and made manifest (see du Bois 1991, also 
Folena 1989:228).
In South Africa the tortured body was subjected to violent beating and assault, to being 
bound and suspended in what was called 'the parachute' or 'the helicopter', it was 
subjected to electric shocks and cigarette bums, drowning, strangulation, suffocation, it 
underwent forced exercise and was made to stand or assume unnatural positions, such 
as the 'chair', for hours on end, it was shackled and chained, kept naked, deprived of 
sleep and sexually abused.?
c
A  note of Weschler's is apposite here: "In this context, the metaphor of the d e n t i s t ' s  
d r i l l  is particularly apt (its actual use is based on a profound intuition) in that the 
dentist's drill both drills in, burrowing and depositing a terrible knowledge, and 
e x p o s e s , bringing to light and rendering raw a terrible knowledge and susceptibility 
that is always already there, just beneath the surface" (1990:269). Marguerite Duras' 
novel, T h e  W a r:  a  M e m o i r , gives fictional life to this model of torture when the torture 
of an informer is directed by a female member of the French Resistance. During the 
course of the interrogation/assault Therese "realizes for the first time that in a man’s 
body there are layers almost impossible to pierce. Tier upon tier of deep truths 
difficult to reach". The body is a site of excavation, the truth the subject of 
exhumation and production/reproduction: "You have to strike. Smash. Shatter the lie. The 
vile silence. Flood everything with light. Extract the truth this swine has in his 
gullet... Beat him till he ejaculates his truth, his shame, his fear... Demolition work. 
Blow by blow. You have to hold out, stick it out. And then, soon, there will emerge, 
quite small, hard as a seed, the truth" (1986:134-5; also see Moss 1994:13).
^ Some of the names given to torture methods suggest a passage through the 'space of 
death'. For example, a former policeman testified in court that as a policeman he had 
covered suspects' heads with two bags, one of them plastic, in order to make them talk, 
a technique he said was known as 'showing suspects the ghost'. Although this did not 
relate to a security law case it is safe to assume that similar techniques were used on 
political detainees (Riekert 1985:145).
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It is important to underline the sheer sensate physicality of many of these torture 
techniques. Electric shocks, for example, were experienced as explosion, needle, 
burning; in a raking and tearing of flesh, in spasms following one another so fast that 
they became "one fearful stiffening of all [the] muscles", muscles as "iron transmitting 
fire..."; in uncontrolled shaking and convulsions - "like a broken puppet... his limbs... 
fell away from him, jolting and leaping in some fantastic dance which only horror 
linked to him" - in a "thousand worms" writhing under the skin, breaking "through the 
surface...".8
Standing - within a circle/square drawn on the ground, while balancing on bricks, or 
simply standing in itself, for long periods of time - while less overtly violent and 
wounding was nevertheless a profoundly bodily experience, an experience of pain- 
induced bodily concentration:
Only the long intense concentration on muscles in legs and ankles, 
straining, wanting to burst and crack, and a tense ache beginning in the 
ankles and creeping up the legs, thighs, digging into my back and 
shoulders. If only I could lean forward... release the ache, stop the pain... 
trying to think the pain away... I was no longer standing... my legs were 
fixed into a solid mass of concrete... holding me up, pressing up into my 
back and forcing my shoulders forward, forcing my head to burst open 
burst open, under the weight of a huge sheet driving the ceiling down... 
holding out and feeling too tired to hold out any longer... in a daze of 
pain stretching across my back and shoulders... wanting food wanting 
sleep wanting to drink wanting to stop. Wanting to talk... Nothing 
mattered any more... 'OK I'll talk'. And I sat down. (Lewin 1976:25-30)
o
This paragraph is a compilation from Bernstein 1986:348-53 and La Guma 1972:173; also 
see Foster et al. 1987:134,151.
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For two nights and three days... I had stood still... I was reminded several 
times to stare ahead and to remain still... My legs were clearly swollen.
They had grown very hard to the touch, as hard as new lemons... My legs 
were shapeless, straight and stiff as poles, and thick. The canvas jogging 
shoes... stretched beyond their capacity... Now and then, whether I liked 
it or not, I had to bend down... to find some relief, as if the upper body 
was weighing too much on my legs, causing them to shoot the numerous 
pains... As soon as I had raised my trunk to an upright position again, the 
armies of pain would rush back in a flash. At times I thought that the 
pain was in my mind, that it would soon be over. (Pheto 1985:127-9, also 
see 121).9
The 'statue treatment’ illustrates the way in which the deconstruction of the body - like 
that of the mind/self and world - is a process in which the detainee is made complicit. 
The body is turned against itself, it becomes not only the object but also the agent of 
pain, a weapon in its own unmaking. Scarry writes, "what atrocities one's own body, 
muscle, and bone structure can inflict on oneself', and she continues: "The prisoner's 
body - in its physical strengths, in its sensory powers, in its needs and wants, in its ways 
of self-delight, and finally even... in its small and moving gestures of friendship towards 
itself - is, like the prisoner's voice, made a weapon against him, made to betray him on 
behalf of the enemy, made to be the enemy" (1985:48, also see 47,53-5).
Ultimately, the framework of torture encompasses a collaboration of the physical and 
the psychological, the body and mind, working together and against one another in a 
complex symbiotic interaction and complicity that the detainee both resists and in
Q
Also see Bernstein: "In twelve hours they had reduced his physical activity to that of 
a very old, very arthritic man...",* and: "Exhaustion and pain became a great cloud 
filling his head, swelling it to an enormous size, a head made of grey mist, a living 
sponge" (1986:197,332-3, see 330-6).
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which s/he participates. Again it can be seen to unsettle and manipulate thresholds and 
boundaries. This, for example, is John Schlapobersky describing the combined effects 
of prolonged standing and sleep deprivation, for a period of five days from Friday to 
Wednesday broken only by one period of rest on Monday night:
it was a very strange state of wakefulness, because by Sunday I was 
hallucinating and I didn't really know where I was... who they were. I 
didn’t know the time of day... I didn't have a sense of place... I think my 
own sense of fighting them became much less obvious by Saturday night. 
Sunday, my feet swelled up... I was in a lot of pain... On the Monday, I 
can remember walking into walls. I would start walking in this tiny 
room, dashing into the wall and wake up with a terrible fright and hurt 
my face. And I can remember them[...] little clusters of them standing at 
the door... laughing at my confusion. On the Monday night, not only my 
feet were swollen but also I was very oedematose in my thighs... I think 
it was Tuesday morning that they woke me. I was more confused than at 
any other point. I wasn't sure if I was dreaming or awake... I was slightly 
crazy, (in Bernstein 1994:83-5, also 1972:40-1, 1986:221)
Further examples of the collaborative physical-psychological nature of torture, that 
traverse detention and imprisonment, are the sexual and gender-based torture and ill- 
treatment of women, sensory torture, and incarcerative conditions.
In South Africa, the sexual and gender-based torture of women ranged through and 
beyond the following: attempted rape, actual rape, sexual and sadistic harassment and 
torture (see Ebersohn 1990:186-200)10; verbal and physical denigration of the female
On the relationship between gender and torture/resistance in South America in the 
1960s and 1970s, see Franco 1992. Franco states that the treatment of women prisoners 
was "rooted in sadistic fantasies" (109).
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body; innuendo and covert suggestion; humiliating and gratuitous body searches and 
vaginal examinations; a refusal to provide or dispose of sanitary towels; the absence of 
certain types of clothing, such as underwear; incarceration while pregnant and/or with 
small children, miscarriages and childbirth; separation from and threats to children and 
other family members; and more. Such torture and the combination of physical and 
psychological elements, could be terrifying.
I burst into tears when a security policeman said to me, ’I really enjoy 
interrogating women. I can get things out of them and do things to them 
that I can't do to a man.' I was terrified by this statement. (Mohamed in 
Russell 1991:37)
He asked me, ’What have you got on?' I said, 'I've got on a dress.' He said,
'I want to know what you have got on underneath.' I replied, Tve got 
underwear on.' Then he wanted to know the color of my underwear. I 
said, 'I've got black panties on.' Then he said, 'That is not all I want to 
know. I want to know what is inside your panties'... I said, 'Look, this is 
my personal affair. It has got nothing to do with you.' Then he walked 
over to me, pulled at my dress, and started unbuttoning it while he said,
'Well, if you won't tell me, I'll have to find out for myself... I was 
completely devastated... I couldn't even scream... He said, 'I am Frans 
Mostert. That is normally how I introduce myself,' and he shook my 
hand. (Issel in Russell 1991:74-5)
During the unending months of incommunicado isolation, my life was 
peopled, crowded, with my dear ones... now I am outside, yet I cannot 
reach them... My children, please come back... My womb, my womb, 
they've tom it out. Not all at once... little by little, day by day, and when
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the wounds healed they tore off the scabs, little by little, day by day, and 
it hasn't ended... In the end... I had become unbreakable... Beyond some 
terrible limit. That was, my children, when you retreated into the mist... I 
discovered the mist in the psychiatric ward and I lay there, listlessly, 
beyond reach... That's when insanity attacked, when straight from 
hospital they had me put back in my special cell. Like still now in my 
dreams, it came disguised as a child, as a baby... my daughter... your 
baby... you'd called me... And I wasn't there... only a child yourself... Had 
I at last answered your cries? Later, in the clean, spiteful prison... they 
consolidated their victory... they slowly tore at the womb and at the four 
navel strings... We finally kissed, my children, but I'd been too far... there 
is always the mist. And so I walk on, alone... Why this endless sentence? 
Set me free, let me run, let me hug, touch, kiss... and teach me how to 
love again. (Pastoors in Schreiner 1992:14-19)u
Sensory deprivation and monotony - "Cement-grey floors and walls / cement-grey days / 
cement-grey time..." (Brutus, "On the Island", 1973:71, also First 1965:7) - unusual 
sensory variation, sensory excess, over-exposure, and assault - the latter most overtly 
through the perforation of ear drums - also took place at the intersection of physical and 
psychological torture. Detention in particular was a world where the tastes were those
11 The whole of Part 1 of Russell's {1991) book provides powerful testimony in relation 
to this discussion {see especially 37-43,52,61,71,74-5; also see CIIR 1988:17-23, Foster 
et al. 1987:135, W. Mandela 1985:99-100, and Zoleka Dilimeni and Gloria Meek in 
Bernstein 1994:75,157). Sexual torture was also inflicted in different forms and to a 
lesser degree on men. One example being the often violent homosexuality amongst the 
criminal population on Robben Island in the early 1960s into which political prisoners 
were deliberately introduced.
On various aspects of family, children, and separation see Baard 1986:72,78,84-5,87, 
First 1965:48,54-6,81-3,103-4,122-3,141, Lekota 1991:i-v, Makhoere 1988:27,120-1, 
Mashinini 1989:85-7, Sachs 1990:122, 1968:137, J. Slovo 1996:110-11,120-1,140-2. Also 
see Bernstein 1972:39, and in general, Blumberg 1962, Clayton 1992, Kuzwayo 1985, W. 
Mandela 1985, Russell 1991, Schreiner 1992, and Wolpe 1994. In times of incarceration 
and oppression more generally, families, and particularly women/mothers, were drawn into 
the public sphere and became a major source of resistance; as oppression enveloped their 
immediate and extended lives so they sought to resist, and thereby became participants 
in the process of un/remaking (see Franco 1985: especially 414,416,419-20, and 1992:112- 
16). The main organisational manifestation of this phenomenon in South Africa was the 
Detainee Parents' Support Committee {see Coleman in Russell 1991:80-90; on the 
opposition of mothers to obligatory military service for whites, see CIIR 1989:77-8; 
also CIIR 1988:46-9).
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of blandness, blood and fear, and the smells of burning flesh, excrement and the 
accumulated filth of oneself and others. Pheto suggests 'Smells' as a possible nickname 
for himself, which can be juxtaposed against the cleansing metaphors of interrogation: 
'"Has he been dry-cleaned yet?'" (Pheto 1985:41,115). It was a world of layered 
blindness and limited horizons, where sunlight rarely penetrated the darkness or fought 
back the artificial light. Voice and words were appropriated not only during 
interrogation but through the imposition of solitary confinement and silence. So few 
words were spoken in a day that they could be counted. Seen in isolation they became 
precious (see Breytenbach 1985:26,177-8,280). The sounds of silence echoed to the 
aural backdrop - sharp and piercing noises, screams and cries of pain, tape recordings of 
family members being abused12 - of terror and death.
Human touch lost all sense of warmth and compassion. Lewin writes about the
aftermath of his imprisonment: "When I get out / I'm going to ask someone / to touch
me / very gently please / and slowly, / touch me / 1 want / to learn again / how life feels".
He talks of seven years of being "untouched", "out of touch", "untouchable" and/or
touched only through the mediums of "fists" - "beating beating... screaming / don't touch
me / please don't touch me" - and "paws" - "patting... searching... prodding... systematic
/ heavy, indifferent / probing away at privacy". "I don't want fists and paws / 1 want / to
want to be touched / again / and to touch. / 1 want to feel alive / again / 1 want to say /
when I get out / Here I am / please touch me" ("Touch", in Feinberg ed. 1980:84-5).
Elaine Mohamed makes very similar observations about the aftermath of her detention:
"I needed a very strong acknowledgement of my body... I needed reassurance that my
body was fine because it had been hurt so much, or my conception of it had been.
Whenever I'd been touched during my seven months in solitary, it had been to degrade
or to physically hurt me" (in Russell 1991:44, also 42).^
1? See Human Rights Commission 1990:417, Issel in Russell 1991:75-6; also Lelyveld 
1987:198, Niehaus 1994:110.
13 On the extraordinary significance of nurturing physical contact also see Alexander in 
Alexander et al. 1992:309, Mashinini 1989:83. The lack of such contact while
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The senses, therefore, were reformulated in the confrontation with state authority within 
the sensorium of pain, fear and state power. What was the nature of this sensorium?
This death world is filled with sounds you never imagined, steel on steel, fear 
and rage; with the pervasive smells of not very clean men (with no joy) cooped 
up in a restricted area, of evacuation and badly cooked food, of clothes worn for 
too long by too many different bodies; with the sights of nearness - grey, brown, 
grey-green, brown-green. (Breytenbach 1985:125)
The feel of liquid. The smell of urine. The feel of mucus and tears on his 
cheeks and nose and mouth and face. The smell of blood. The weak 
limbs. The sight of people standing over him without jackets, their ties 
loose, their shirts unbuttoned, their shirt sleeves folded back. All these 
crowded Oupa. (Serote 1983:175, also see 37-8,52-5,57-8,61-2,67)^
A final illustration of this body-mind matrix is the contribution of the various facets of 
incarcerative conditions, of which the two former examples form a component, to 
mental and physical torture: for example, exposure to the elements; insufficient and/or 
inedible food; appalling levels of hygiene (filthy cells, inadequate, ill-fitting and dirty 
clothing and similarly unclean blankets - "The stale blankets, that were never washed,
incarcerated was the product of many factors, including isolation, the absence, and/or 
even in later years the rarity, of contact visits for prisoners and, paradoxically, a 
puritanical attitude towards physical tenderness/compassion/contact, and particularly 
homosexuality, in many prisoner communities.
^  An earlier description by Serote of a police station is also worth quoting at length: 
"A mixture of deodorant smells and paper, tobacco, old furniture, turned into a single 
smell, which characterises all the places whose functions are proclaimed by notices, 
where warnings burden walls, counters and filing cabinets, where the sweat, tears, vomit 
and blood of many many people, who came and went, who never made it out of the doors, 
leave their spirits hanging in the air, which can never ever be cleaned. All these 
seemed to sing, seemed to whisper, seemed to warn us about where we were, and said 
something about our fate. The fluorescent lights seemed dim, and in rhythm with the 
voices they seemed determined to penetrate, destroy, and hung over our head so 
delicately, it was our lives hanging on them. There was going to be a display of power. 
All the eyes, the movements, the faces, the silence in the room, even the way those 
lights issued their light, everything was about power" (53).
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puffed a persistent, but mild, nauseating stench..." (Zwelonke 1973:72) - irregular 
access to or non-existent washing facilities, bucket lavatories in the cell, no toilet 
paper); and innumerable physical humiliations (nakedness, body searches). For many 
these conditions contributed to the development or exacerbation of distress and illness. 
Ruth First's ulcer functioned as a kind of barometer of her increasing anxiety and stress 
which culminated in her mental collapse and suicide attempt. Emma Mashinini lost 
weight, suffered from hypertension, back ache and a range of indicators of physical 
degeneration such as the loss of teeth and splitting of nails, as well as long term 
physical and mental effects. Breytenbach writes "I started having trouble with my hair 
and my skin and my eyes. Suddenly I developed boils and cold sores", and notes a 
deterioration in his eyesight.^ Damage was done to the eyesight of many Robben Island 
prisoners by the years of quarry work.16
The examples of the (female) sexual and sensory based torture and ill-treatment, and 
the conditions of incarceration, provide further illustrations of the ways in which torture 
operates, cumulatively, through the wounding and death of body and mind, through 
repressive violence and self-destruction, and through a conscious and unconscious 
combination of its components, towards a whole that is greater and more terrifying, 
because unknown and unpredictable, than the sum of its parts; but a whole that is also, 
in a way that can potentially be utilised by resistance, out of its author's control.
The body becomes devoid of taken-for-granted certainties, like the voice, something of 
which the detainee is constantly and acutely aware but over which s/he has little or no 
control. After interrogation Breytenbach claims, "I couldn't sleep... Everything came 
tumbling back. I couldn't control my body. I was shivering, my legs were shaking; I
15 See First 1965:73,79,111,126,130, Mashinini 1989:64,69-70,72,7 6,85,88,90-9,100,105- 
6,108-14,132, Breytenbach 1985:14 6,255. Also see Dlomo in Cook 1974:73, Kuzwayo 
1985:207-9,218, W. Mandela 1985:104, Thuso Mashaba in Bernstein 1994:69-70.
16 See Gregory 1995:108,206, N. Mandela 1995:482, Shityuwete 1990:194, also Cook 
1974:53,73.
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couldn't even quieten my lips..." (1985:31).^ The loss of control, before, during and 
after torture, is caused by tension, fear, pain, and relief. Inhabited in new ways, the 
body/self becomes unfamiliar and unrecognisable. But is also more than an inability to 
recognise oneself, it is, as Emma Mashinini testifies, an inability to know how to 
recognise oneself, such has been the nature of the experience and the extent of the 
change undergone (1989:87).
The body, like the statement/confession, is a product of state violence. It is reassembled 
by the state in its image, as a text within its archive. The body is appropriated as a 
hostile territory, occupied and colonised; it belongs to another:
For the promise of his body, he said, he would / tell them anything they 
wished to know. / But slowly and methodically, piece by piece, they / 
removed it from him. And when they had finished / he could no longer 
recognize [himself]... / It seemed as if everything belonged to another. /
And for eight years he would search everywhere / and not find it, and 
would go on living a life / as someone else, someone who walked with a 
limp / and who was deaf, and who could not speak. (Reid Skinner, "The 
Body is a Country of Joy and of Pain", in Bunn et al. eds. 1988:466-7, 
also Sepamla 1981:170,216)
The body is isolated, naked and vulnerable, disorientated and confined, dehumanised 
and humiliated, in discomfort and in pain, exhausted, assaulted, violated, scarred, 
broken, punctured, penetrated, probed, dismembered, misshapen, turned inside out. The 
somatic cartography of the state finds its contours in never-ending pain, unhealed 
wounds and scars, deformed posture, awkward movement, and immobility, in damaged
1 7 A 1 s o  Ebersohn 1984:103, Foster et al. 1987:128, Pheto 1985:103,133.
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senses, in physical and mental degeneration and illness, and more.lS Ariel Dorfman (in 
Taussig 1987:4) tells an old Chilean story about a child abducted by witches. To break 
its will the child's bones are broken and sown back together abnormally. The eyes, ears 
and mouth are sealed, the head is the wrong way round so the child walks backwards. 
This creature is called an Imbunche, and Dorfman accuses the Pinochet regime in Chile 
of attempting to make every Chilean and Chile itself into an Imbunche. Much the same 
could be argued for South Africans and South Africa under apartheid. The body of the 
detainee/prisoner embodied the layered violence of incarceration and apartheid. The 
manifestation of truth and power embodied on-in-through the detainee's/prisoner's body 
represented the state's power of writing in its purest form:
It [torture] assured the articulation of the written on the oral, the secret 
on the public, the procedure of the investigation on the operation of the 
confession; it made it possible to reproduce the crime on the visible body 
of the criminal; in the same horror, the crime had to be manifested and 
annulled. It also made the body... the anchoring point for a manifestation 
of power, an opportunity of affirming the dissymmetry of forces.
(Foucault 1991:55, also 41-4,56,66)19
18
Predictably, the state acquired the ability to maim and hill without physically 
wounding, to leave no physical trace, no mark, no scar on the damaged body of the 
detainee who had been forced to stand for hours on end or deprived of sleep, struck with 
an open hand, strangled with a wet towel or subjected to other forms of suffocation.
But, of course, even the smooth surfaces of apparent silence have a story to tell.
19
Foucault also writes, "The body, several times tortured, provides the synthesis of 
the reality of the deeds and the truth of the investigation, of the documents of the 
case and the statements of the criminal, of the crime and the punishment" (47). Nowhere 
is the process of inscription more powerfully captured than in Kafka's story, "In the 
Penal Colony" (1988:14 0-67). Here punishment takes the form of a device which literally 
writes with needles on the body the law that has been disobeyed, and it is through this 
agonising process of wounding that the body's owner comes to know their guilt, crime and 
sentence.
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The Body and Resistance
Bodies have an effect and a meaning. They are practical weapons; they challenge the 
system. They resist the system; they fight the system. It is an absolute message: death or 
country. My death or my country... Bodies are obstinate signs... (Desnoes 1985:40)
The body, however, is not simply an inert mass to be excavated or a blank surface to be 
inscribed by an all-pervasive state power and knowledge. Both Foucault and Scarry 
abandon the passive body to the monopoly of the state.20 For Allen Feldman, in contrast, 
while the power of the state remains significant - "The surface o f  the body is the stage 
where the state is made to appear as an effective material force" - the interrogatee 
learns "to manage the interrogation through his management of his body and other 
techniques that subvert domination effects... turning the interrogator’s violence against 
their ostensible objectives" (Feldman 1991:115,138: italics in the original). The 
"specialized techniques" and "adaptive technologies" (201) of the body provide access 
to the ways in which it retains and regains agency and power. The body, adopting 
various strategies and masks, becomes a site on-in-through which the struggle for 
political power takes place; like the word, the body is a double-edged weapon, like the 
statement/confession, the body is 'managed' and violently collaborative. The truth and 
power of resistance, as well as that of the state, is registered on-in-through the body, its 
depths and surfaces.
One example of a self-defence mechanism learnt or instinctively practised by the body 
to manage pain is that of self-detachment or -distancing. Here the body and mind are 
complicit in the process of survival and/or remaking rather than unmaking. As a 
conscious and/or unconscious act the self, variously defined, stands outside the body, 
establishes a distance from it and, thereby, from pain and fear. Through this almost 
mystical/religious disembodiment the body is sacrificed in the hope of maintaining and
preserving something else (see Desai and Mamey 1978:126). The self-distancing of
20 On this aspect of Foucault’s work, see Lash 1991.
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mind/soul from body is clearly illustrated by/in the following quotations: "'The only 
thing they can do is kill my body. They are not going to get my mind, and my soul will 
live on in my children and in other people"’ (Issel in Russell 1991:65,75); "They tried to 
kill my mind... but had to go through my body to reach it... my body didn't let them in... 
[it] stood in their way and so they took that also away from me. There was only the 
mind left" (Pastoors in Schreiner ed. 1992:15,17, also Foster et al. 1987:147-8). As part 
of the same transaction the body is surrendered to pain in exchange for silence.
The most powerful literary image of this silence is the mouth as healed and therefore 
sealed wound; another is that of the mouth, throat and words turned to stone. It is a 
small step from the difficulties and reluctance associated with confessional speech - 
"The mouth is thick, the tongue is a rock, the lips are weights... The words are as heavy 
as stones... Two stones... fell, cracked, split open... fragments embedded in my 
conscience; how many more must I attempt to prise out?" (S. Jacobs 1986:100-1; also 
see Breytenbach 1985:239) - to the mouth as healing/healed wound. Sam Bhengu in 
Wessel Ebersohn's novel, Store Up The Anger, reflects upon a mouth that is both 
parched and injured:
the same organ, the point of contact between tongue and cheeks feeling 
like a place where a wound was healing. Once the healing process was 
over his tongue and cheeks would all be joined together. The cavity that 
was now in his mouth would be closed permanently. (1984:117-18, also 
see Bernstein 1986:350,352)
Detachment from the body exposed to violence - the body divested of any sense of self 
and voice, the body divorced from mind - is, however, both involuntary and voluntary.
It is involuntary in the sense that the state attempts to double its voice at the expense of 
and through the body in pain (see Scarry 1985:48-9). It is voluntary in the sense, any
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sense, that the reverse - the body in pain eclipsing the multi-tongued state - can become 
a meaningful reality. In the following example self-detachment and forcible 
detachment are taking place simultaneously.
Nothing they could shout at me was real... It wasn't me they were 
shouting at. It wasn't me at all... 'You’re going to talk, you're going to die, 
tonight we'll kill you'... He... began hitting me: hard cupped fists, hissing 
through his teeth, hard fists to the head and face... beating beating while I 
screamed and pleaded... facing a tunnel full of fists and screams and 
hissing... I cannot say how long it lasted... But long enough to feel it 
would be the end, thinking: This is it and this is what it’ll be like and I 
wonder if I'll actually know when it's over. Detached, never fully able to 
fix the body on the floor as me, not feeling hurt by the blows because it 
wasn't me they were hitting; somebody else... But me screaming 
screaming... offering two scraps of information that I'd withheld before 
and which I hoped might stop the beating... (Lewin 1976:34-5)
Lewin is self-detached, a spectator to his body's brutalisation, and up to a point the body 
in pain is surrendered to silence. But he also has a form of detachment imposed upon 
him because he is in pain and because his pain is objectified in a statement: his voice in 
the moment of its mutual recognition - "me screaming screaming" - his and theirs; but 
increasingly theirs. The statement, however, does not symbolise his complete 
annihilation because it is partial, 'managed', two scraps of information.21
21
Also see Grace Cele in Bernstein 1994:203, Shityuwete 1990:139-40,142, Wolpe 
1994:190. The protagonist in Steve Jacobs', D i a r y  o f  a n  E x i l e ,  initially resists 
detachment - "Stubbornly, I cling to consciousness. Why? Would it not be easier to lapse 
into darkness, to let the blows transport me into a region where I can feel nothing?... 
No. I want to be aware of the things they are doing to my body" - and then embraces it - 
"My consciousness floats away, beyond the walls of my body, beyond the limits of this 
building... my consciousness soars" (1986:98,99-100). For fictional depictions of (self- 
)distancing see La Guma 1972:171-3, and Ebersohn 1984, for example, 96-7, in which the 
body is described as a prison and detachment from it as freedom (also 103).
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The (self-)distancing process - the fragmentation of the complete self - is a particularly 
difficult one to control. This is perhaps best illustrated by those individuals who start to 
show symptoms of a split-personality and schizophrenia, which takes place at the 
interface between self-preservation and madness (Mohammed in Russell 1991:39-41,44, 
also Sachs 1990:252-60). As such examples indicate, there is also the possibility of the 
annihilation of both body and mind, or of the body rather than the mind being preserved; 
the sacrifice and destruction of the latter rather than the former, consciously or 
unconsciously, by the detainee and/or the interrogator. The precarious, fragile and multi­
faceted 'management' of body and mind during the infliction of violence and pain can 
occur in the context of partial destruction - of body and/or mind - as merely a stage on 
the way to total destruction, of partial preservation/resistance as a stepping stone to an 
eventual complete preservation and resistance, or any number of complex and 
contradictory variants in between.
(Self-)distancing is one example, albeit like all others an ambiguous one, of the many 
ways in which the body retains a capacity for resistance, self-nurturing and healing, in 
which it seeks to complement its self-awareness with greater self-control. Some of these 
mechanisms relate to a broader framework of pain, its reception, mediation and negation. 
Protective mechanisms are both instinctive - "my hands raise themselves (I have no 
control over their movements) with a knowledge of their own that the head must be 
protected at all costs" (S. Jacobs 1986:97) - and learned. The body can to a degree be 
prepared for torture. Pheto writes: "I rehearsed... defences, blocks to ward off their 
blows, falling positions and breakfalls to protect... vulnerable parts of the body... I made 
a point also not to forget to put on a lot of clothes for padding" (1985:95). It can 
mediate the infliction of pain through verbal interjections, provocation, cushioning, 
deflection, evasion, and/or a complete lack of resistance. In the aftermath of torture the
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body can be nursed and in time will at least partially heal itself. In short, the body 
'manages' both the reception and consequences of pain.22
Numerous other techniques and technologies of the body reformulate it as friend rather 
than enemy and/or challenge official control over the body. This somatic remaking can be 
achieved through the body - its care, functions, exercise - as obsession and as self; 
through the body as carer ("the incalculable freedom of caring for someone or something 
else!" (Breytenbach 1985:207)); through the body known anew, as hiding place and safe 
place ("Nearly any part of the body of man or beast can be used for hiding and 
transporting illicit articles" (Breytenbach 1985:227, also see 228)), as commodity 
("Nothing was of value unless it could be traded: tobacco, boom, bodies, friendships - 
they were all commodities" (Lewin 1976:166)), as personalised and politicised; through 
the body as remembered or imagined, in love and/or in resistance.23 Other more dramatic 
challenges to official control over the body included hunger strikes, suicide attempts, 
escapes, and assaults on, rather than by, state personnel.24
22
While it is a misrepresentation to abandon the body to the will of the state it is 
equally dangerous to overstate the agency of the body in pain, given the huge imbalance 
with regard to agency and power. To overstate the detainee's agency runs the danger of 
making the detainee preside over his/her own destruction. Pushed to its limit such an 
argument potentially rationalises and even legalises state violence as necessary in 
order to suppress the inherent and presumed violence in the detained body (Feldman 
1994:412-13).
Breytenbach provides insights into what he calls the rhythms of the body (1985:150), 
and the incorporation of the body and bodily actions into prison language (177-8,211).
On the body as obsession see Breytenbach 1985:282,300,304, First 1965:71, Lewin 1976:58- 
61,191-201,216-21, Mohamed in Russell 1991:41-2, Pheto 1985:162,166-7, Sachs 1990:40- 
3,166-8,221,252-60, Zwelonke 1973:65-7,131. On the body as carer and cared for, see 
Breytenbach 1985:139-40,176-7,207-8,280,309, N- Mandela 1995:581-3,614-15,625, W.
Mandela 1985:85-6,142, also 99; as hiding place and safe place see Brutus, "Letters to 
Martha", 1973:54-5, Jenkin 1987:4 9-50,65-6,68-70,81-2, Lewin 1994 and 1976:52-3,120-1; 
and on the remembered and/or imagined body see Cronin's love poems (1987:73-88, also 97- 
8) .
24
On Sachs' decision not to go on hunger strike or attempt to escape see, 1990:91,266; 
while in the case of Ruth First a hunger strike helped to precipitate a suicide attempt 
(1965:111,122,128-30,135: also on suicide see Niehaus 1994). Hunger strikes were a 
frequent weapon used by detainees/prisoners. They were used to powerful effect to 
challenge conditions on Robben Island, particularly during the early years, and to 
secure the release of hundreds of detainees in the late 1980s (Human Rights Commission 
1990:412,424,428). There were two notorious escapes: the first involved Harold Wolpe, 
Arthur Goldreich, and Jassat and Mosie Moolla (Kantor 1967, First 1965:18-22, Wolpe 
1994), and the second, Tim Jenkin, Alex Moumbaris and Stephen Lee (Jenkin 1987). 
Breytenbach was charged with and acquitted of attempted escape at his second trial 
(1985:236-42,24 7; on the many escape plots at Pollsmoor and his involvement in them see 
284,286-8,2 92-6,301; also 137,274,324). The assault of state officials was rare and 
obviously extremely dangerous (Bookholane in Russell 1991:61). From hunger strikes to 
fights, Makhoere's resistance was extraordinarily physical: her captors were made to 
serve the sentence with her (see 1988:76-7, also 45-6, and Makhoere in Bernstein
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The detainee, therefore, can reconfigure and subvert the state’s bodily design, becoming 
a participant in the process of somatic de/reconstructed, thereby helping to reassemble 
the body in an image other than that of the s ta te d  One such image is provided by Pitika 
Ntuli’s sculpted figures - from bread that was then eaten; from soap that was then used 
to wash; from wet toilet paper that was then used for its intended purpose - that can be 
seen as a continual, inventive un/remaking and resurrection of the body (Ntuli 1980:34, 
also Breytenbach 1985:209). Through such processes the body retains/regains agency 
and power, a capacity for self-defence, regeneration, and self-recognition. The evidence 
of the body can also, therefore, be understood as an indictment of the state and 
testimony to resistance and survival; in short, as the power of writing in its purest form, 
as embodied truth, by those in opposition to the repressive state:
The body with its pain becomes a counter to the endless trials of doubt... 
in South Africa it is not possible to deny the authority of suffering and 
therefore of the body. It is not possible... for political reasons, for reasons 
of power... it is not that one grants the authority of the suffering body: 
the suffering body takes this authority: that is its power. To use other 
words: its power is undeniable. (Coetzee 1992:248)
Now he had to believe it. Now he had seen it with his own eyes. But it 
remained ungraspable. He had to force himself, even as he stood there
1994:122-5). On the powerful sensory/bodily response to release/freedom see Breytenbach 
1983:3, 1985:322-34 and Sachs 1990:276-81.
or
See Feldman 1991:198-217, especially 201,203-4,209. Similar processes were also at 
work in other contexts. For Albie Sachs, recovery after the bomb blast was "as total an 
experience as being in jail... only completely the other way round, as fully dedicated 
towards my recuperation as prison was to my destruction" (1991:48). In a strange way the 
bomb gave him back his innocence, set him free: "I have something that comeg to few 
people, a chance to reconstruct my life right from scratch. Having lost everything 
becomes an advantage... The bomb shattered my scheme of things and now I am free" (147, 
also see 201). What an extraordinarily powerful image this is: having lost everything, 
he is free, it is a kind of magical realism employed in the service of recovery: "It is 
realism that tells me that the only way I can solve my practical difficulties is through 
a magical feeling, a free spirit..." (146).
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looking down into the coffin, to accept that this was indeed Gordon... the 
memory of Gordon, small and maimed in his coffin in the cool bare 
room, his grey claws folded on his narrow chest. The rest seemed 
interchangeable, transferable, unessential: but that remained. (Brink 
1984:91,99)
The body, therefore, is a weapon available to both sides in the incarcerative encounter. 
A terrain where opposing powers of writing meet, it is variously written, the subject of 
contestation, a violently collaborative text. The body operates within the arsenal of the 
detainee/prisoner in a way that is interactive, that marshals other weapons to its 
assistance. An important complementary weapon, of which the body forms a 
component, is space.
Transgressing Spatial Boundaries
One of the layers of interaction between inside and outside - to add to the already 
discussed interface between prison and society - is that between the body and space. 
Torture, interrogation, and in fact detention/imprisonment as a whole, can be seen as a 
process of turning and being turned inside out (violent somatic deconstruction, the 
evacuation of the truth, body searches (Breytenbach 1985:131,157)), of internalising 
and being internalised ("The fan blade turns inside my head... Is the screaming internal 
or external?..." (S. Jacobs 1986:99)), of passing through the inner workings of the state 
and internalising the state ("The State lives inside you. You are its condition" 
(Breytenbach 1985:215)). Cronin outlines some broader parameters of the inside- 
outside interaction in a piece entitled "Inside out":
I write now from the outside... I have not stayed at home for many 
months. Last August... the security police banged at the front door... The
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pounding on the front door and the pounding in my suddenly dry throat... 
were all scrambled up in my mind. Several weeks later they missed me 
again... As I write... from this outside, there are 5,000 fellow South 
Africans... who have disappeared in the last few days... dead... alive... 
inside... To write now is to be on the edge of that... South Africa is a 
society of these insides, beyond high walls... [the] prison regime is 
merely one facet of a countrywide grid of spatial controls... There are 
endless spaces inside other spaces... Inside, outside, inside. The spatial 
engineering extends to the very micro-places of our segregated land - the 
park, toilet and bus-shelter. The poems in this collection were all written 
inside (I mean inside prison)... I kept losing poems in cell searches and 
body frisks. The surviving poems in this book I finally managed to 
smuggle out in what, I decided, was the safest place - here behind my 
eyebrows, in memory, this other inside. I kept losing scraps of paper. I 
would not, I hoped, entirely lose my head. (1987:9-10, also see 87)
The interaction between body and space invokes not only a sense of multiple insides 
and outsides but also of layered bodily, architectural, geographical and political space. 
Something of this exfoliative reality is suggested by Naidoo when he refers to prisons 
within prisons (1982:8,121,277); apartheid inside apartheid (87); isolation within 
isolation (134); punishment within a punishment within a punishment (136). Layered 
confinement and oppression coexisted alongside a naked vulnerability as state 
manufactured space, like the body, was moulded into a blank incarcerative surface. But 
the surfaces, depths and spaces were variously inscribed and inhabited. The body-space 
relationship is also not solely repressive.
Internal space (the body) and external space (the cell, the prison, and beyond) can be 
mobilised to transgress the repressive spatial design and its central components,
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isolation, immobilisation, surveillance. The skin and the wall are limits which 
guarantee both separation and continuity/contact between the inside and the outside. In 
the process of spatial transgression not only is the official spatial regime challenged but 
the body as self regains extension from the total body, in which corporeal and spatial 
horizons collapse and coincide, to aspects of the self and world previously destroyed by 
violence and pain. One such mode of transgression, which represents the most 
important challenge to the spatial confinement of incarceration, is communication, 
between the incarcerated or linking the prison and outside world.
Between the detainee and the interrogator, and to a lesser degree between the prisoner 
and prison warder, communication is reduced to the giving and receiving, the infliction 
and mediation, of violence. Violence on-in-through the body is used as a means of 
generating knowledge and power. '"There's nothing we don't know about you. We know 
about every part of your body and every part of your life. And what we don't know we 
are going to find out'"; "He had known them more intimately... He had felt their hands 
upon his body and had struggled with them, his body making brutal merciless contact 
with theirs" (Ebersohn 1984:37,96). Not only has this link between communication and 
violence to be overcome, but the detainee/prisoner has to re-leam previously taken-for- 
granted communication skills - "I couldn't actually speak. I had become very withdrawn, 
incoherent, I couldn't express myself and I couldn't relate at all" (Schlapobersky in 
Bernstein 1994:86) - and invent new ones in a deliberately obstructive environment.
The engagement of the body and senses is central to the communicative drive, whether 
through something as apparently straight-forward as talking or shouting to other 
detainees - "To talk to friends, however briefly, was to feel alive. The whole day...
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became focused on those brief minutes in the evening when there might be a chance to 
talk to the others" (Lewin 1976:48)26 - or as complicated as a system of signs.
By holding my mirror out of the window I see... the fingertips of his free 
hand / Bunch together, as if to make / An object the size of a badge /
Which travels up to his forehead / The place of an imaginary cap. / (This 
means: A warder.) / Two fingers are extended in a vee / And wiggled like 
two antennae. / (He's being watched.) / A finger of his free hand makes a 
watch-hand’s arc / On the wrist of his polishing arm without / Disrupting 
the slow-slow rhythm of his work. / {Later. Maybe, later we can speak.)
... He turns his back to me, now watch / His free hand, the talkative one, / 
slips quietly behind / - Strength brother, it says, / In my mirror, / A black 
fist. (Cronin, "Motho Ke Motho Ka Batho Babang (A Person is a Person 
Because of Other People)", 1987:26, also see Breytenbach 
1985:137,141,226-7,233,275)
The body can also be read in other contexts, to forge a link with the outside world. 
Deprived of news for much of the apartheid era, political prisoners became "experts at 
constructing elaborate (and often entirely inaccurate) versions" of what was happening 
outside (Cronin 1987:28). Events outside would register on the faces of the captors, in 
their actions and behaviour. Readings varied from general correlations between hostile 
behaviour and good news for the incarcerated, while overly-friendly, smug or arrogant 
actions carried the opposite message, to more precise readings of the Soweto uprisings 
or the progress of a rugby tour.2? Visitors could also contributed, consciously and 
unconsciously, to the construction of greater, if incomplete, knowledge and 
understanding.
oe
There are, of course, many other incarcerative communication devices based on sound: 
tapping messages on/through walls, whistling (Sachs 1990:18-26,284 and 1991:183,187-8), 
and singing, to detail just three.
27 See Breytenbach 1985:160-1, Cronin 1987:28-30, Lewin 1976:223, Zwelonke 1973:63,65.
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The body as message also moved from inside to outside, in its component parts and as a 
whole, thereby escaping spatial confinement.28 More usually, however, escape, was 
imaginative, as in the following example, in which it takes the form of the flesh made 
word:
Tonight is an envelope / Into which I climb, sliding between the folds /
The letter I, flesh made paper /... formed on my tongue / My tongue 
turned into paper - tonight perhaps /... it’s just / Possible to consider me 
as flying at last / As three-week-old words, behind the inside flap’s /
Gummed I Touch to reach you. (Cronin, "Tonight is an Envelope...”,
1987:76, also 1 3 ) .29
In terms of knowledge, information and news, communication for the detainee/prisoner 
accumulates and arranges fragments into and within a more comprehensive whole. It 
floods the narrow and sterile container of inside with draughts from the vast, 
simultaneously evolving outside; it injects absence with a vital and life sustaining 
presence, provides the present with a past and a future, and enables self-extension into 
the outside world. In terms of space and time, it suppresses distance. Finally, it provides 
the outside with valuable information about the normally sealed-off and unknown world 
of incarceration. Implicit in the transgression of space lies the more radical proposition 
of redrawing space and remaking the body/self within a variety of spatial terrains.
28 Teeth and blood, as evidence of assault, were in/on clothes returned to the family of 
Gordon Ngubene to wash in Brink's novel A D r y  W h i t e  S e a s o n  (1984:68); also see Bernstein 
1989:94-6. The bodies of those who died in custody sometimes returned to the outside 
bearing a similar message. Released detainees/prisoners and escapees, as living 
messengers, also breached the divisions between inside and outside.
29 "How could I be with my people [at Christmas]?", writes Breytenbach, "I put myself in 
a letter[....]" (1985:305). For detachment from the body in prison as a means of 
imaginative escape and in anticipation of actual escape, see Jenkin 1987:175-6,192-3.
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Redrawing Space
The above discussion of communication and space lays the foundation for a redrawing 
of space within and beyond the boundaries of physical confinement. In relation to 
incarcerative time the need is to delimit, to continually establish and erase, horizons and 
points of reference: "They removed all of his days and left him with / hours. Then they 
removed all of his hours / and left him with minutes. Then they removed / all of his 
minutes and left him with silence / that had no line or horizon, and time vanished / into 
the walls around him" (Reid Skinner, "The Body is a Country of Joy and of Pain", in 
Bunn et al. eds. 1988:465-6). The indefinite time of detention or the usually finite but 
often long term time of political imprisonment has to be un/remade in order not to make 
its passing the focus of life itself. Similarly, the detainee/prisoner is constantly seeking 
to un/remake spatial boundaries and horizons.
The layered spatial straitjacket of confinement - the body, the cell, the prison - is 
contested by the fragile counter-inscriptions and re-writings of the incarcerated. Space 
is another of the continually re-written, never completed texts at the interface between 
opposing powers of writing. What is being contested is the geography of power and 
knowledge and the political nature of the un/re-making of space; what is being 
established is the possibility, within a massively unequal terrain, of an oppressive and 
an emancipatory spatial praxis.^0
Crucial to the notion of an emancipatory spatial praxis is the elasticity and flexibility of 
sensate space, within the context of sensory deprivation, over-exposure, and assault. 
Davies writes of "the interstitial nature of a territoriality which is at once biological, 
material and political":
30 This analysis of space and geography owes a debt to the following sources: Davies 
1990:59-68, Foucault 1980, 1986, 1991a, and Soja 1989.
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We do not only inherit space, but we live through a space which brings with it 
its own structuring of use into which we inject our own kinetic sense. To study 
space is initially to study the eye, the voice, and the hand, and at the same time 
to conceive of other voices, eyes, hands reworking the space... The language of 
prison space is therefore one in which eyes, voices, limbs interact in a moving 
out from the cell with its definite physical contours and back into the cell from 
the mere obvious dimensions of the power/ideology that attempts to control. 
(1990:59-60)
The harsh music of jangling keys was the most ubiquitous of sounds: "Always and 
always it was the noise of those keys that you heard while washing, while eating, and 
sometimes while sleeping. You were awakened with those keys, you were locked in 
with those keys... Keys, keys, keys" (P. Naidoo in Schreiner ed. 1992:86). The 
gratuitous and jarring violence of the aural regime - of keys, of doors slamming, of 
instructions shouted - was both hated and feared (see Lewin 1976:57). Awaiting 
collection for further interrogation, Pheto recalls listening to "voices which ate into my 
aching flesh and hurt pride... the key's rattling noise gouging my soul" (1985:103,105). 
But the ears could also be used to steal what was otherwise forbidden, to know people 
who and things that were otherwise unknowable:
It is your ears, and to a lesser extent your nose, that become sovereign...
[to which] you increasingly turn for a sense of place... ribbons of sound... 
slowly, on the basis of these sounds, you begin to build up an aural 
picture of this place, its routines, rhythms, personalities and layout. As 
the picture clarifies, a terrible awareness begins to dawn. You start to 
hate your ears... they are hanging people in this place... singing...
singing... A short silence[...] followed by the slap of trapdoors. 
Falling[...] falling, down the tunnels of your ears. (Cronin 1987:33-4)
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The ears become the most important sense organs. You use your ears the 
way a bat employs its radar - to situate yourself, to detect danger, to find 
some security in this environment you cannot escape from. You learn to 
interpret the sounds and the sudden silences, the banging and the 
rustling; by listening you unravel the rhythm of daily activity. Voices you 
hear repeatedly take on shape and colour, become personalities. There 
are some people, like the ’condemns’, whom I never saw - and yet I still 
have the impression that I knew them intimately. (Breytenbach 
1985:220)3*
The apparently hostile noise regime, therefore, in conjunction with neutral and more 
supportive sounds, inside and out, enabled the body to orientate and situate itself in 
time and space - "I tried to translate noises into police station geography1' (First 
1965:16) - facilitating a kind of sensory, or aural, mapping. Again fragments were used 
to generate a greater whole. From within this cartography it became possible to 
anticipate, to be prepared, to reduce the likelihood of being taken by surprise. "We lived 
in a universe of sounds which became our allies", writes Breytenbach (1985:264).
Sensate space extends to the limits of audible sound, detectable smell and a range of 
visual horizons, as well as stretching to the outer perimeters of touch and taste. While 
sight can be confined behind and within walls, other senses overflow beyond physical
31 Also see Breytenbach 1985:145,232,282; Lewin 1975:56-7; First 1965:28-30.
Significantly Breytenbach goes on to say: "(But at other times you wake, you listen, and 
the rumours you hear are indecipherable. Your ears lead you up blind alleys - they do 
not interpret. The noises confuse you. They are the exteriorization of your confusion. 
You want to shout to identify yourself, to pin yourself down... Your silence is sucked 
through the bars. You fight for sense..)” (1985:220). Weapons never lose their ambiguous 
double-edged nature, their availability to both sides in the contest.
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barriers.53 The traditional hierarchy of the senses is revised in favour of the alternative 
sovereignty of sound - "I saw so much. With my ears only, since the eyes are confined 
behind bars and walls and steel partitions never more than seven yards away" 
(Breytenbach 1985:31) - in a sensory collaboration at once curiously partial, sounds 
linking together those who can not be seen and gesture those who are never heard, but 
also endlessly creative.
Not only is the sensory hierarchy reordered within the framework of state violence and 
incarcerative creativity, but the senses are also subject to accentuation through a kind of 
learned or perhaps compensatory clarity and extension, an unpredictable 
overstimulation and hyperalertness. After a brutal assault during interrogation, the 
senses of Sam Bhengu, in Ebersohn's novel Store Up the Anger, take on a "terrible 
clarity"; senses which like/with the body had expanded to fill the felt universe: "[his] 
senses seemed to have expanded until they reached every comer of the room making 
him aware of every sound or movement... even picking up the mood and intentions of 
each of the five men in the room with him" (1984:8,37, also Wolpe 1994:162,211). The 
final component of this sensory revolution is the development of what might be called 
new senses. "My hearing and other responses I did not know I possessed had developed 
beyond my expectations", writes Pheto (1985:106). Breytenbach describes developing 
"an intense awareness, like a hitherto unexplored sense in yourself, for knowing exactly 
when the sun rises and when it sets without ever seeing it" (1985:124). Not surprisingly, 
it is writing which most significantly became an extension of other senses and, indeed, a 
sense in its own right: "Writing for me is an extension of my senses. It is itself a sense
32 Sight comes into its own when its confinement can be breached. The huge significance 
of the cell window as an eye to the world testifies to this: "every now and then, as I 
hung from this observation post, part of my world came into view, and then my spirits 
soared" (First 1965:74); and from Pretoria Central, "the old and the new: / a photo of 
history sliced up by barred strip windows." (J. Schreiner, "My Second Night in Pretoria 
Central", in B. Schreiner ed. 1992:20; also, in the same text, Hogan 43, and see 
Breytenbach 1985:261-4, Lewin, "Behind a Barred Window", in Feinberg ed. 1980:82, 
Makhoere 1988:83, also 75).
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which permits me to grasp, to understand, and to some extent to integrate that which is 
happening to me" (155).55
Ultimately, to transgress, traverse, appropriate, and redraw space, to transcend barriers 
and redefine boundaries, entails a co-operative collaboration between the body, the 
senses and the imagination; but it is no less real, no less tangibly inhabited, for being so 
constructed.
The Space of Breytenbach and Cronin
Two writers in particular, Breyten Breytenbach and Jeremy Cronin, developed spatial 
frameworks which provide both a summation of and conclusion to the discussion about 
the transgression and redrawing of incarcerative space. Outlining the parameters of an 
(auto)biographical arena that is at once a void and dense with voices, Breytenbach 
describes himself during interrogation as precariously hanging over an abyss, an 
"opening-up of completely empty space, a space which is at the same time crowded with 
voices singing their death, intermingled with voices whispering, 'Write'" (1985:37).
From room to room. Dying so as to be reborn. To die. To be reborn from 
room to room. From womb to space. From space to room. From room to 
coffin. From coffin to the density of space. From space to nothingness.
From nothingness to seed. From seed to womb. From womb to pain.
From pain to roomwomb. To wombroom. To another tomb... To another 
room. Into the car. Up the street. Screaming down the corridors of 
darkness. Through the door. Beyond the grills. Careening down the 
passages. Feeling the cement. Touching the steel. Hearing the doors
33
With reference to the rejection of his request to paint, Breytenbach comments:
"(Perhaps also because someone, somewhere, had realized that to paint is truly to
escape: it is a healing of the hands and the eye.)" (159).
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closing. Tasting the salt. Experiencing the shivering. Listening to the 
chants. Lifting the darkness. Mumbling. Writing. Writing with eyes 
closed... Waking not knowing whether you're awake or whether you're 
still a dream feeling the ache of the mind. From room to passage, to 
bathroom, to corridor, through the grills, through the gate, by car 
careening down the narrow lanes of darkness... From room. To room. To 
room. To room[,...] (34, also 40,45)
This quotation powerfully evokes the way in which space becomes a weapon in the 
interrogational encounter, an agent of pain, and of the officially inscribed world of 
disorientation against which any attempt at self-orientation must take place. It also 
captures the interpenetration of bodily and architectural spaces, of an exfoliative 
geography and the senses, in the passage through the space of life and death.
Writing and the word are a space of confinement but also a space of freedom: "The 
word is a narrow; a slip of land between two dark oceans; a tongue. The word is also a 
confinement. Yet it is the only way that I know, the only space. I realize now that the 
preceding document is in itself for me an interstice of freedom" (337). Similarly, while 
time and space are the primary co-ordinates of incarceration they also collaborate to 
secure forms of liberation: "I built time itself into my system... by escaping through the 
walls and walking up the mountain to smell spring..." (304). In this world both the mind 
and the body roam free. True Confessions is laden with imagery relating to birds, flight 
and escape, and in the imagination at least the walls become porous, the walls come 
tumbling down. The prison world is so small that it has no limits (237). Breytenbach 
states that it is important to "search without ever stopping... for the hairline cracks, for 
the gaps... for that space which is created by alleys and by walls... To realize that you 
are marginal is of itself a way of making distance your own... It is to come upon an 
interstice of freedom" (309). The doctrine - deny oppositions, read one in the other, and
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go beyond - applies in the spatial domain as in all others. And since no real change 
takes place, everything becomes conceivable.
Breytenbach's space is composed of mirrors, mazes, rooms, corridors, colours, 
noises, rhythms, zoos, General Stores, smells, bodies; it has entrances and exits, 
it is populated by guards, left- and right-wing terrorists, thieves, murderers, 
pimps, coloureds, whites, blacks, drifters, cockroaches, priests, who speak in 
many voices or none... the prison is embodied, materialized, sensed, 
negotiated... Thus [it] is deterritorialized... so that it ceases to have effective 
power. (Davies 1990:73)
Predictably, Breytenbach's reflections on space on/from the outside, after his release, 
are equally unconventional and complex. "I have learnt that a wall is a point (and a 
joint) of relativity. There is no more freedom outside than inside. Mine is total"
(1985:118, also see 26).
By contrast, Cronin's concern with space is less a means of individual transcendence or 
escape than a dimension of engagement. The poems collected in the section entitled 
"Venture into the Interior" create a geography of/in the mouth. Under the heading 
"Geography of the Mouth", Cronin writes:
South Africa is a multilingual country; even the English we speak is 
many Englishes, layered with occupation, defiance and conquest. To 
speak South African is to disturb history, the tongue bumping against 
repressed parts... Perhaps my original prison poem was a prayer, the 
simple litany of place names... Thrust in the loneliness of solitary 
confinement, bounded by four uncooperative walls, I began to recite over 
and over that laconic list of place names, repeating the standard SABC
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weather forecast. '[...] Port Shepstone to the Tugela Mouth[...] the Tugela 
Mouth to Kosi Bay.'... How reassuring it was to be able to gather a sense 
of space with the bare resources of tongue, bone, gum, breath, word.
Each one was a shrine. Cooped up, I was able to make geography in the 
small theatre of my mouth. (1987:51)
What is striking about this quotation and the subsequent poems is the way in which the 
geography of the body, and specifically the mouth, is joined through the word to the 
geography of the land. This is a very different kind of turning, and being turned, inside 
out. The interior is multiple and layered, the struggle to liberate "is a struggle for every 
square inch of terrain, the wide-open veld, and the spaces inside" (73). The mouth, and 
body, have their own contours and terrain. They are the machinery or engine of sound 
and linguistic production. The tongue is the ark of language ("Litany", 54), the mouth 
(and prison?) the cave-site of sedimented word, "shells of meaning / left in our mouths 
[and prisons?] / by thousands of years of / human occupation" ("Cave-Site", 53:[] 
bracket my own). The language is a South Africanised English, which itself journeys 
through the mouth/body, generations, and space: it is the river that flows through the 
land and "carries many tongues in its mouth" ("The River that Flows through our Land", 
63). Language enables the recovery of places, and a sense of the space and the reality of 
South Africa, outside, through naming and invoking (Cronin 1986:20). From inside, to 
imagine, remember, and recreate the outside, requires a collaboration of the body, the 
senses, and language. Flesh made word and the word made flesh. The difference 
between inside and outside, shadowy darkness and daylight, is also the difference 
between sounds and the possibility that sounds may grow into words. When words 
overcome the barriers to their articulation - a land so parched that words, struggling to 
be bom, stick in the back of the throat ("Karroo I", 1987:59) - it is hoped they will 
germinate in the earth, land, landscape, and the reciprocal struggles they contain. To 
attempt to speak/write from prison, in this way, is an act of personal and political
143
faith/belief, not least in the assertion of a profound connection and continuity between 
inside and outside. Through this process of multiple mapping - of voices/words/ 
languages of a diversely peopled land, of the mouth and body, and of the land itself - 
Cronin finds his own interstice of freedom, a space in which to locate and authenticate 
himself, his experiences and his beliefs.
To learn how to speak / With the voices of the land, / To parse the 
speech in its rivers, / To catch in the inarticulate grunt, / Stammer, call, 
cry, babble, tongue's knot / A sense of the stoneness of these stones /
From which all words are cut. / To trace with the tongue wagon-trails /
Saying the suffix of their aches in -kuil, -pan, -fontein, I In watery names 
that confirm / The dryness of their ways. / To visit the places of 
occlusion, or the lick / in a vlei-bank dawn. / To bury my mouth in the 
pit of your arm, / In that planetarium, / Pectoral beginning to the nub of 
time / Down there close to the water-table, to feel / The full moon as it 
drums / At the back of my throat / Its cow-skinned vowel. / To write a 
poem with words like: /... Stompie... Songololo... To understand the least 
inflections, / To voice without swallowing / Syllables bom in tin shacks, 
or catch / the 5.15 ikwata bust fife / Chwannisberg train, to reach / The 
low chant of the mine gang's / Mineral glow of our people's unbreakable 
resolve. / To leam how to speak / With the voices of this land. ("To 
Learn How to Speak...", 64)
What Cronin illustrates, by way of conclusion to this section on the body and/in space, 
is a potentially liberatory interdependence of the landscapes/spaces of language, body 
and country.
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The contested un/remaking of the body and/in space, within the incarcerative 'space of 
death', contributed various textual representations or discourses to the record of 
detention/imprisonment. The second part of this chapter will analyse two such 
representations/discourses that return the focus of attention to the issues of torture and 
in particular custodial death: these being the legal inquest and the fictional narrative. 
How, then, was the story of the tortured body told through the institutional discourses of 
the state, law and medicine at the inquest and in the pages of literature?
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ii) Legal and Literary Discourses 
The Inquest
Justice pursues the body beyond all possible pain. (Foucault 1991:34)
there is a difference between arbitrary power and the rule of law. We ought to expose 
the shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath this law. But the rule o f law 
itself... seems to me to be an unqualified human good... we feel contempt not because 
we are contemptuous o f the notion o f a just and equitable law but because this notion 
has been betrayed by its own professors. (Thompson 1975:266-8)
The coexistence of the torture chamber and the court room placed the perpetrators of 
custodial violence in the seemingly paradoxical position of being both above the law, 
indeed the personification of absolute power and state lawlessness, and, at least in 
theory, susceptible to the sanction of law and justice. In the case of custodial death - 
which signified that under the guise of an investigation the ultimate punishment had 
been inflicted on the basis of inherent and assumed guilt - the judicial process that had 
been collapsed into, or perhaps to be more accurate had been eliminated by, brutal 
extra-judicial violence, was then resurrected at the inquest to preside over its ultimate 
consequence.
The torture chamber and the court room, the administrative world of non-law and the 
judicial world of law, are what Adam Ashforth calls "theatres of power", "symbolic 
rituals aiding in establishing and reproducing the power of modem states" (1990:7).34 
Ashforth continues: "Dialogue and silence are both essential parts of the power of 
states", and makes the distinction between realms that "both signify and in part establish 
a possibility of a dialogue based on reason" - commissions of inquiry are the specific 
example, but political trials and inquests map out a similar terrain - and realms of 
"silence based on fear" - of which the torture chamber is the obvious example. Such
On the political trial as ritual see M o s s 1981:203-4,208.
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realms coexisted, however, not only within the apartheid regime but also within its 
individual mechanisms and institutions, and they did so in ways that both reinforced 
and undermined assertions that the court room and the torture chamber could be 
distinguished by an essential and qualitative d i f f e r e n c e s  Dialogue and silence, reason 
and fear/violence, truth/knowledge and fiction/ideology, life and death, un/remaking, 
operated, albeit in different ways, across judicial and non-judicial spheres, thereby 
facilitating the court room and torture chamber, justice and terror, good guy/bad guy, as 
both divergent and the same, facets of a two-faced regime.
On the one hand the court room and the torture chamber were moments in the same 
encounter, locations within the same institutional space, mutually dependent: the 
system. For example: the law and judicial system were profoundly alienating, marked 
by exclusion, white (Dingake 1987:130-3,220, Pheto 1985:176-7,199), while legal 
proceedings provided another example of Scarry's 'false motive syndrome'.^6 The court 
room was able to complement the designs of torture and fulfil the aims of the state 
when it reproduced the procedures, techniques and discourses of the torture chamber in 
its production and verification of truth. In other words when it operated within the same 
regime of truth and power, when the rule of law was a facade resting on the shifting 
sands of absolute power and lawlessness. This situation could be variously 
manufactured, for example, through the manipulation and loading of rules and
35 It is also important to acknowledge, if only in passing, that this pattern of 
significant, if sometimes subtle and often inconsistent, difference and continuity, 
permeated a range of sub-worlds occupied by the detainee, the awaiting-trial prisoner 
and the prisoner, and presided over by the Security Police, the conventional police and 
the Prisons Department, and by different components of the judiciary.
36 The stated aims of legal proceedings rarely coincided with the real aims, which were 
usually fourfold: to repress/silence, reconstruct, legitimise and to secure complicity. 
While the opposition was served by vocality and publicity, the state was often best 
served by the shadow of silence. The repression of information both superseded and 
complemented the aim of reconstruction. The state sought to reconstruct and rewrite 
events as they were perceived by the government. It reproduced for the public the image 
of a just society threatened by people and organisations seeking its violent destruction 
and the person/act abstracted from broader context or motive. By providing a symbolic 
reassertion of the values/vision of officialdom and its support base, the state sought 
to achieve its third aim, that of legitimising its own version of truth and power, 
thereby also legitimising the exercise and preservation of that truth and power through 
various mechanisms of repression. And, finally, the ritual of the court room sought the 
complicity of others, thereby creating a situation in which everyone and no-one was 
culpable and responsible (Davis 1985, Suttner 1984).
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procedures: in political trials these included the appointment of conservative presiding 
magistrates/judges, incommunicado pre-trial detention for both the accused and state 
witnesses, summary proceedings, offences that were broadly and vaguely defined, 
prescribed minimum sentences, and other procedural advantages for the prosecution 
such as presumptions, including the presumption of guilt, in their favour. As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, the political trial was a site where (auto)biographical narratives 
converged: a locus of rewriting, of manipulated truth and lies, and of the conversion of 
individual pain into state power. Iain Edwards writes the following in relation to the 
sabotage and treason trials of the early 1960s:
The trials were often absurdist events packed full of rituals, drama and power 
struggles... even the strong struggle amidst the shifting sands of judicial power. 
There were multiple accused and multiple charges, all requiring devious legal 
arrangements and strategies. There were discordant layers of remembered and 
created spoken evidence from both accused and the state. These could clash 
with submitted documents which often, despite their obvious falsity could 
acquire a primary legal status. In their spoken cross examination of accused, 
state lawyers could use documents to deadly effect. Although guilt can be 
privately accepted, court room scenes where lies and truths intermingle and 
where lies can convict and true human agency go unrecognised lead to 
considerable mental confusion. Fact, fantasy, oral examination and the 
seemingly clear writing of a legal code intermingled constantly in almost 
uncontrollable and perverse fashions. The court room was a warped place. 
(Edwards in Babenia 1995:xx-xxi, footnote omitted)*?
37 For one perspective on the truth in the context of a (political) trial, see Hirson 
1 9 9 5 : 3 3 2 , 3 3 4 .
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Apartheid justice, therefore, was a very overt form of political justice, political justice 
being "the utilization of judicial proceedings for political ends" (Kirchheimer 1969:408); 
politics by other means (Abel 1995) 38
While the influence of the judiciary in South Africa was diminished by parliamentary 
sovereignty - what does the rule of law mean when the government can change the law 
at will? - and by the erosion of its authority and jurisdiction during the apartheid era, it 
stands accused of complicity in apartheid due to the way in which that discretion which it 
retained - "there is almost always some residue of jurisdiction which the courts can 
exercise" (Mathews 1985:201) - was exercised, invariably, in the interests of the state.
In the field of custodial pain and death, the 'residue of jurisdiction' could have been used 
to comment on the zone of judicial exclusion, to withdraw its implicit approval of such a 
zone and the purposes it served. It was not. The courts failed to intervene effectively on 
a whole range of issues from the conditions of detention to shortcomings in the basic 
needs of procedural justice. An enormously significant failure was that by generally 
accepting the reliability of detainee evidence the judiciary condoned, and may even 
have induced, both mental and physical torture.39 The reasons behind judicial 
complicity were complex. Personality, background, and an ideological sympathy with 
apartheid combined with executive-mindedness, an often uncritical trust of figures in 
authority, and a failure to understand the nature of the repressive regime, especially 
solitary confinement. Many rationalised their actions - for example, by hiding behind
38
Joe Slovo, as lawyer, trialist and detainee, captures a sense cf a legal system and 
profession being remoulded in the image of apartheid (1996: especially 53,58,104,122-3).
39
One of the most extraordinary examples of judicial complicity was the Rabie 
Commission. It was initiated due largely to the public outcry after the inquest into the 
death of Steve Biko and was published two days before the death cf Neil Aggett. The aims 
of the commission, which comprised lawyers and academics and was presided over by a 
Judge of Appeal, Mr Justice P. J. Rabie, were "to enquire into and report and make 
recommendations on, the necessity, adequacy, fairness and efficacy of legislation 
pertaining to the internal security of the Republic of South Africa". Its catalogue of 
shortcomings - which included the failure to hear evidence from former detainees or to 
investigate methods of interrogation - were remarkable. The commission's recommendations 
led to the enactment of the Internal Security Act, No 74 of 1982. At the hands of a 
judicial commission the security laws were rationalised and judicial exclusion approved.
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the mask of legal positivism (see Richards 1983) - sought professional and/or financial 
rewards, and/or, in time, simply became accustomed to their politicised role.
This process of legal manipulation and capitulation, however, was not, nor could it ever 
be, complete and absolute. The scenario of the judicial apparatus as a weapon of state 
power raises the following question: if the law was exclusively and blatantly an agent of 
repression, what advantages would it provide for the state that could not be obtained 
through extra-judicial terror? Why not simply dispense with the pretence of the rule of 
law altogether? The answer is that the law, while in many ways complementing extra­
judicial violence, also served the different but not unrelated aim of a more embracing 
legitimation. If the state totally excluded the judicial system or used it simply as an 
adjunct to its domain of naked repression it surrendered the battle for a broader 
legitimacy that lies at the heart of political justice. The judicial system provided a 
bridge, albeit a retractable draw-bridge, to greater acceptability both inside and outside 
South Africa.
Ideally, from the viewpoint of the state, a difficult and precarious balance had to be 
maintained as it sought to manage an institution and a process that, if it was to serve its 
encompassing legitimising function, was intrinsically beyond total control. The 
judiciary needed to be independent enough to retain its credibility but not so 
independent that it significantly hampered or interfered with the repressive designs of 
the state. The law had to at least offer some possibility of being fair and just, and on 
occasions had to actually be fair and just. The legitimacy of the courts and the 
legitimacy of the state were irrevocably intertwined.^0 Having availed itself of pain and 
terror, the regime took a risk by allowing space for and making itself vulnerable to the
For example: the extent to which successive National Party governments sought 
credibility and legitimacy, as opposed to or in conjunction with a variety of other 
goals, can be traced through the balance and evolution between ordinary legal/criminal 
proceedings, and emergency and extraordinary legal measures, as ways of dealing with 
political opposition (Davis 1990). The former predominated in eras of supposed 'reform’, 
the latter in times of emergency or crisis. Another facet of a two-faced regime. On the 
balance/evolution between common law and statutory charges, also see Rayner 1986. On 
state "'reckoning schemes of legitimation'", see Ashforth 1990:8-9,252-4.
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reinclusion of the judiciary - and with it the outside world - and empowering it to 
preside over a network of institutional violence. One side of the coin of risk was the 
potential benefits of heightened legitimacy for the apartheid regime, the other side was 
that for this desired benefit there was, on occasion, a price to pay.
As a result of this calculated gamble the court room and the torture chamber were 
characterised not only by similarity but also by difference. Among the sources of 
difference were that the court room was usually a public forum that, while 
compromised, nevertheless procedurally ran to a minimum set of rules and regulations. 
At the Biko inquest, Kentridge, lead counsel for the Biko family, stated that there were 
few countries in the world where members of the security police would appear in court 
and be subjected to what amounted to hostile cross examination and that South Africa 
had every right to be proud of that possibility (Woods 1979:359). Furthermore, the 
judicial forum could be exploited by the opposition as a platform for alternative views 
and visions of society, notably through the use of defence witnesses and political 
statements from the dock by the accused.-*1 Inevitably, over time, testimony and 
information about the operation of the apartheid system and resistance entered the 
public realm. A small band of lawyers used the ambiguities, inconsistencies, loopholes, 
and lacunae within the law to resist the state and empower the oppressed. While 
acknowledging the dominant structural characteristics of the judicial system it is 
imperative to acknowledge, therefore, those positive moments and judgements the 
system enabled: there were extraordinary disclosures, lawyers and decisions.-*2 The
41 Steve Biko, for example, appeared as a defence witness in the 1975-6 trial of the 
South African Students' Organisation (SASO) Nine (see Arnold 1979, Woods 1979:161-225, 
also Buntman 1996:151). For statements by the accused in this and other trials, see 
Benson 1981, and mention of statements are contained in, among others, the following 
autobiographical accounts: Hirson 1995:333-4, Jenkin 1987:62-3, Lewin 1976:11-13, 
Shityuwete 1990:173-6; also see Niehaus 1994:113-16.
42 There is obviously a significant difference between a legal system that on occasion 
allowed individual access to justice and a system that is itself equitable and fair. 
Lawyers prepared to take on cases for the opposition, often prominent advocates, and the 
decisions they facilitated, may have been a crucial legitimising factor for the 
politico-legal system in a situation where, in most cases, no legal defence was ever 
going to be good enough. Such occasions may have served to bring power further under the 
control of the law, but also "paradoxically, to consolidate power, to enhance
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highest price exacted from the state's judicial gamble was that of judicial defeat 
inflicted upon the government. "We owned the court", Pheto states in relation to the 
celebrations that followed his acquittal (1985:201). While within the inter-related 
framework of repression and legitimacy the state, arguably, was vindicated whether it 
won or lost in court - in relation to allegations of torture, for example, when the state 
was defeated the system could be depicted as denouncing malpractice, whereas when it 
was victorious it could claim to have been unjustly accused (Lelyveld 1987:201) - the 
court room, nevertheless, harboured the potential to serve a different, sometimes 
radically contradictory, 'regime of truth’ to that of the torture c h a m b e r s
In summary, the courts were another weapon in the profoundly unequal struggle 
between state and opposition, a weapon characterised by an uncertainty and complexity 
of meaning, a weapon available to both sides. The judicial system was an unpredictable 
agent that resisted, and indeed whose purpose was negated by, absolute control by the 
state. While some within the anti-apartheid movement forthrightly challenged/rejected 
the jurisdiction, independence and legitimacy of the courts, and the legal apparatus was 
treated with suspicion, contempt and heavily criticised by both state and opposition, 
neither abandoned the legal arena altogether.
legitimacy, and to inhibit revolutionary movements" (Thompson 1975:265, also J. Slovo 
1996:58: for a differently nuanced argument, see Abel 1995:549). What, however, was the 
alternative for the lawyer when people wanted to be defended, so as to be released or 
get the minimum possible sentence? (see Kentridge in Davis 1985:45, Bizos 
unpublished:10). There are a number of relevant literary representations of the dilemma 
facing the lawyer in such a context: they include Coetzee 1982, Gordimer 1988 - Joe, a 
lawyer, is challenged at one point by his wife: "What will you be at our Nuremburg?... 
The one who tried to serve justice through the rule of law, or the one who betrayed 
justice by trying to serve it through the rule of unjust laws?" (83) - and in the 
international arena, Klima 1992.
For a disaggregated perspective on the nature/role of the legal profession and political 
trial, the record of the South African courts and judiciary, and the force of law as a 
constraint on and form of resistance/challenge to state power, as well as references 
already detailed, see Abel 1995, Dugard 1978, Ellmann 1992, Foster et al. 1987:BO­
SS, 165-7, Lawyers for Human Rights 1983, Lobban 1996, Mathews 1985, Mathews and Albino 
1966, Merrett 1994, Riekert 1985, 1985a, Rudolph 1984, and West 1985.
The complex and ambiguous interplay between the torture chamber and the court room is 
illuminatingly discussed in Lelyveld 1987:185-216.
Torture and the law were bound together by the interpenetration of institutions, 
personnel, procedures and discourses, by an organic circulation of information and 
ideology, knowledge and power. Techniques for the production, verification and 
contestation of truth were both complementary and contradictory. As a result the torture 
chamber and the court room spoke with one and with discordant voices, articulating a 
single regime and irreconcilable regimes of truth and power. Of paramount importance 
in this process was the fact that they were traversed and united by the primary products 
of interrogation. The extra-legal permeated the court room (see Foster et al. 1987:44); 
but in doing so it enabled the extension of influence, at least on some occasions and to 
some degree, to operate in the reverse direction. At the inquest the primary products of 
interrogation consisted of the tortured body and/as interrogational text(s). They were 
supplemented by the documents of the police investigation. Overlapping layers of 
similarity and difference were un/remade on-in-through these texts in the process of 
their production, transmission and interpretation/reception, in the process of converting 
pain into power. Again, lives/deaths were variously and irreconcilably told, circulated 
and superimposed, violently collaborative; again both sides were seeking to inscribe 
lives/deaths in writing and there was no monopoly over the function of texts, somatic or 
written. It was, in part, the textual and discursive congregation at the inquest that 
provided this legal arena with its particular set of limitations and possibilities.
As conceived by the Inquest Act 58 of 1959, the inquest was not a trial but an official 
investigation into deaths arising from unnatural causes where there was insufficient 
evidence to go straight to a criminal prosecution. Section 16 (2)(d) of the Inquest Act 
provided the inquest with its most important task, to determine "[a]s to whether the 
death was brought about by any act or omission involving or amounting to an offence 
on the part of any person". Crucially, the inquest took two forms. The formal inquest 
was a public inquiry and in addition to written submissions, witnesses could be called 
and cross examined. Evidence, therefore, was both oral and written. Section 13(1) of
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the Act, however, permitted the presiding officer to forsake oral evidence in limited 
circumstances. The informal inquest, which was not held in open court, could make a 
finding based solely upon documentary evidence/affidavits, and necessarily resulted in a 
more cursory and superficial investigation, owed its existence to this provision.
The inquest could have preserved/restored confidence in the state and judicial system 
and clearly demarcated the boundary between torture and the law, by investigating/ 
documenting allegations of torture, identifying those deemed responsible, and 
suggesting preventive measures. It could have reconstructed and reclaimed the voice, 
self and world of the deceased from the writings and readings of/on/in/about the body, 
thereby liberating them from the torturer/state and restored them to the body enveloped 
in silence; it could have given voice to the body's cry of pain, transforming the body in 
pain into the voice of a subversive power; it could have become part of the multi­
dimensional process of anti-repressive, liberatory remaking. Again, the dynamics of 
torture and interrogation could have been reversed within its representation. Through a 
number of possible reversals, of body into voice, silence into speech, passivity into 
agency, private into public, death into life, the inquest, by making audible/visible the 
body in pain eclipsing the multi-tongued state, could have facilitated a reversal of the 
structure of torture - extending to the security police answering rather than asking the 
questions, their conduct and lives being the subject of inquiiy, and parallels between the 
discursive techniques of interrogation and cross-examination - and a kind of state 
confession. Through the appropriation of the scene and circumstances of torture in 
representation, the state could have been forced to speak from within discourses that 
were not entirely its own. Had this been achieved the dynamics of torture would have 
been both reversed and unmasked by the law.
That the inquest rarely achieved even a portion of this potential was due to the fact that 
it operated as an extremely overt form of political justice. Political manipulation took
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many forms. Whether an inquest took place at all was the subject of contestation as it 
was by no means the state's first or preferred line of defence in the event of a custodial 
death. The institutionalised culture of (dis)information ensured that the initial reaction 
to reports or rumours was often characterised by secrecy and/or silence, lies, denials 
and/or obfuscation. Frequently the body was absent or had disappeared having been 
hurriedly buried or otherwise disposed of.44 If a custodial death became public 
knowledge the easiest response was to ascribe it to natural causes or suicide. More state 
manufactured magical realism:
He fell from the ninth floor 
He hanged himself
He slipped on a piece of soap while washing 
He hanged himself
He slipped on a piece of soap while washing
He fell from the ninth floor
He hanged himself while washing
He slipped from the ninth floor
He hung from the ninth floor
He slipped on the ninth floor while washing
He fell on a piece of soap while slipping
He hung from the ninth floor
He washed from the ninth floor while slipping
He hung from a piece of soap while washing
(van Wyk, "In Detention", 1979:45)45
44 On the importance of the body/burial see Kuzwayo 1985:46, Mashinini 1989:133-4, also 
Brink 1984:46-51,56,227, Desai and Marney 1978:126-7, Gottschalk, "For Ashley Kriel whom 
they Killed by Hazendal", in Oliphant ed. 1992:446-7, Serote, "Time has Run Out", 
1982:126-7. On the significance of the body/funeral in a different context of political 
repression, that of Guatemala, see Zur 1995.
45 Also see Breytenbach, "Letter from Foreign Parts to Butcher" (a version of which 
appears in Cronyn et al. eds. 1995:198-200), Cronin, "Lullaby", 1987:102, Gottschalk 
("Petition to my Interrogators") and Siphiwe Ka Ngwenya ("To Celebrate is a Must") in 
Oliphant ed. 1992:456-8,543-70 (see 556-7). What J.M. Coetzee has written about
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When an inquest took place, two central figures in the translation of body into word and 
pain into power, as writers and interpreters of texts within the network of official 
(re)writing, were the doctor and the magistrate. Their roles within and traversing the 
torture chamber and court room were central to the resulting patterns of similarity and 
difference that characterised the relationship between the two.
The Doctor and the Magistrate
Scarry argues that it is in the nature of torture that the two institutions "ubiquitously 
present should be medicine and law, health and justice, for they are the institutional 
elaborations of body and state" (1985:42, also see 41,44). They are constantly alluded to 
during torture, made agents of pain, unmade by being made weapons, present by 
inversion. Scarry argues: "In its basic outlines, torture is the inversion of the trial, a 
reversal of cause and effect. While the one studies evidence that may lead to 
punishment, the other uses punishment to generate the evidence" (41). Medicine is also 
inverted by being made complicit in pain and wounding rather than healing. Kate 
Millett talks of torture as "becoming more and more a branch of medicine'" and of the 
"medicalization of torture" (1995:312). Torturers become the "doctors of interrogation", 
the "doctors of pain" (Coetzee 1982:9,47), and perhaps, within the legal paradigm, the 
advocates of a particular kind of justice.
Under apartheid, the bearers of the body as it passed from the torture chamber to the 
court room were representatives from the institutions of health and justice, the district
Breytenbach's "Letter from Foreign Parts to Butcher" applies to all these poems. They 
appropriate the language of the state "at its most shameless and cynical when it 
presents lies as lies in arrogant certainty that, while no one will believe them, no one 
dare repudiate them". Coetzee continues: "It is one of the linguistic practices of 
totalitarianism to send out coded messages whose meaning is known to all parties, but to 
enforce... a literal interpretation of them, at least in the public arena" (1991:59-60). 
Through the writer's linguistic and rhetorical superiority, the poem becomes an arena in 
which the codes can be unmasked, parodied, denounced.
surgeon - a general practitioner employed by the Department of Health (and Welfare) 
whose duties could include providing medical care for detainees and prisoners - and the 
executive magistrate. Doctors and magistrates - latterly alongside inspectors of 
detainees - presided over the complaints and safeguard mechanisms for detainees.-*6 
Both the magistrate and the doctor were in an unenviable position. On the one hand, as 
employees of the state, they were treated with suspicion and distrust by detainees who 
were reluctant to impart information or register complaints due to concerns about 
confidentiality - inquiries and examinations were carried out in the presence of the 
security police and other state personnel (see Rayner 1987:49,51) or complaints were 
transmitted back to them - and fears of reprisals. Abel writes: "[Dr. Wendy Orr] was 
troubled from the outset that prisoners regarded her as 'a government employee,' 'on the 
other side,' 'not as a doctor dealing with her patients.'" (1995:219). Detainees were 
threatened and intimidated into silence, into retracting complaints, and revealing what 
had been disclosed to the magistrate/doctor, and/or suffered the feared reprisals for 
registering a complaint. Most believed that the mechanisms for complaints and 
safeguards were, at best, an irrelevance to their conditions and prospects. Those that did 
register complaints or lay charges did so in an attempt to reclaim a sense of agency and 
empowerment.
Doctors and magistrates also operated under the intimidatory shadow of the state and its 
agents for whom the visits/procedures were both an inconvenience and a cover or 
insurance policy that sanctioned their behaviour. Both professions found themselves 
ignored and treated with contempt, out of their depth professionally and politically, 
lacking complete autonomy. Doctors lacked control over the context of treatment and 
the conditions of detention/imprisonment from which complaints originated and to 
which the person concerned would return. Medical professionals sympathetic and co-
On the nature and shortcomings of the various systems of safeguards, see Abel 
1995:231-8,242,257-8, Foster et al. 1987:24-5,36-41,189, Lawyers' Committee for Civil 
Rights Under Law 1983:17-18,20-3,181, Lawyers for Human Rights 1983, Motala 1987:2,4- 
10,11-16,85-7, Rudolph 1984:36-52, Strauss 1985, Tucker 1985; also Lelyveld 1987:204.
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operative in relation to the state were specifically selected; access to a doctor was used 
as a bargaining chip within interrogation; proposed medical treatment could be over­
ruled, ignored, delayed or selectively implemented. Furthermore, neither doctors nor 
magistrates enjoyed the right of access. The security police could, and frequently did as 
for example in the Neil Aggett case, simply reject and/or obstruct detainee requests for 
medical care (Rayner 1987:49-5\) .v  Similarly access to magistrates could be thwarted 
and/or manipulated (see Lewin 1976:63). Magisterial and medical visits also imposed 
their own structure on interrogation - a visit would be followed by an intensification of 
interrogation, including possibly torture, with a period then allowed for recovery before 
the next visit - and a routine, which like all routines, could be disrupted to unsettle the 
detainee (see Desai and Mamey 1978: especially 102-3).
Conscientious doctors and magistrates were, therefore, confronted with starkly 
conflicting loyalties to their employer, the state, and to those they were intended, in 
theory at least, to serve. Caught in-between, they faced the danger of being ostracised 
by both, isolated and vulnerable. The task of the doctor was inherently ambiguous : did 
the provision of treatment automatically imply co-operation with and approval for the 
system? what were the implications of not providing treatment? what if the detainee or 
prisoner him/herself desperately wanted medical care?-*8 Similar questions could be 
asked with regard to magistrates. However, these arguments should not obscure the 
essential fact that it was the detainee/prisoner who was in the most invidious position: 
would a complaint lead to positive action or violent reprisals? would it simply provide
^  Wessel Ebersohn, in his novel S t o r e  u p  t h e  A n g e r , captures the dynamic. The doctor:
"He was one small weak man who doubted his own authority among five strong ones who were 
sure of theirs" (1984:36). The interrogator: "’Patient? He ’s not a patient. He’s my 
prisoner, not your patient'" (105). The interaction between the two: "'It sounds like 
you have already decided what my diagnosis is to b e " ’ (101, also 159,179). And, finally, 
the detainee: "Their dealings were with each other. They had no dealings with him"
( 1 0 2 ) .
48 The clinical and ethical issues facing mental health workers in the treatment of 
detainees are discussed in Levin 1986. He states that: "The ethical position of the 
mental health professional working within the context of detention is hopelessly 
compromised" (183) .
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the authorities with a record in advance of allegations that might later be made in court 
(Sachs 1968:258)? would the absence of a complaint imply a level of content which 
might weaken any court case relating to assault or claims that a statement/confession was 
illegally extracted? In this state of radical uncertainty, the potential benefits of this system 
often seemed negligible, remote and/or irrelevant while the risks were substantial and 
immediate. The complaints and safeguard mechanisms for detainees were another 
weapon that could operate both for or against the detainee. The doctor and the 
magistrate were more often part of the problem than part of the solution.
The difficulties inherent in the monitoring function were not sufficient to explain the 
rampant misconduct, negligence and incompetence of which both doctors and 
magistrates were guilty.49 This was illustrated by the few notable exceptions to the norm. 
One such exception was the action taken by Dr. Wendy Orr, a district surgeon, who, 
several months after the government declared a State of Emergency in July 1985,
49
The medical community in South Africa, for example, stands accused of participating in 
a range of abuses of their professional and ethical responsibilities. There are many 
ways in which doctors can inflict, collaborate with, or otherwise condone, torture (see 
Bernstein 1972:2-3, British Medical Association 1992, and Stover and Nightingale eds. 
1985). Sub-standard medical treatment for detainees and prisoners was the rule (see 
Rayner 1987:48-54,64-6, also the Human Rights Commission 1990:419-20,430, and Motala 
1987:73-4, also 88: specifically in relation to women, see CIIR 1988:11-23) and, 
predictably, provision was consistently and deliberately worse for blacks than for 
whites. Overt participation in torture and harassment did take place - examples included 
sexual harassment: "I found this traumatic because a doctor is someone I normally trust" 
(Mohamed in Russell 1991:39) - but more usually medical misconduct was characterised by 
supervisory and regulatory malpractices. These ranged from the exercise of corporal 
punishment and the death penalty in the presence of a medical official to dietary/ 
medical officials reputedly devising inadequate and racially differentiated diets as 
well as 'spare diet1 (enforced semi-starvation as a form of punishment), and the 
provision of the formality of a medical examination to declare a prisoner fit for such 
punishment (Breytenbach 1985:146-7,281-2, Dingake 1987:152, Jenkin 1987:46,177-8, 
Makhoere 1988:29, Naidoo 1982:123-5). Drug related abuse and poisoning would also 
presumably have required medical expertise (see Ames 1985:87, Foster et al. 1987:105- 
6,126, Appendix I, Jenkin 1987:237, Kasrils 1993:203-4, Pauw 1991:51,56-7,118-20).
Breytenbach is particularly dismissive of psychologists: "the parasites living off our 
twisted souls", ” [t]heir task, very clearly, is to be the psychological component of the 
general strategy of unbalancing and disorientating the political prisoner. Their 
learning is at the disposal of the investigators and the interrogators" (1985:188,190, 
see 188-92; also Sachs 1968:233-5, Shityuwete 1990:239-40, and see Ebersohn 1990:95).
The process of observation/classification that followed conviction and preceded normal 
imprisonment was sometimes supervised by psychologists (Niehaus 1994:119-21). It is 
likely that, as elsewhere, behavioural psychology played an important role within the 
regime of imprisonment: specifically, the careful management of prisoner classification, 
privileges and conditions in general, to reward and punish, to manipulate, behaviour, 
and to break the prisoner, through rules and regulations that were secret, subject to 
unpredictable and arbitrary changes and interpretation, and yet stringently and harshly 
enforced (Weschler 1990:131-8,147 - which in addition contains information on 
psychiatrists, also see 163 - Millett 1995:310). For allegations of psychiatric 
incompetence/abuse see Blumberg 1962:124-5, Makhoere 1988:105-7, stover and Nightingale 
eds. 1985:17, also First 1965:130).
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made an urgent application to the Supreme Court to stop the police from ill-treating 
hundreds of detainees under her care in the Port Elizabeth prisons. Her action, which 
secured immediate protection for the detainees concerned and focused public attention 
on torture, remained the only one of its kind. Although Dr. Orr received individual and 
some institutional support from the medical community she was also victimised and 
harassed until she left her post (Rayner 1987:67-79).5°
By way of summation, autobiographical accounts are littered with indictments of both 
doctors and magistrates and the system within which they operated. Breytenbach refers 
to doctors "whose professional consciences, when working for the State the way they 
do, do not seem to suffer too many qualms", claiming that they have become "rubber 
stamps for the penal system" (1985:185, see 185-8) and groups judges and magistrates 
together as "part of the system" (1985:179, see 199-200). Schlapobersky refers 
explicitly to his "terrible rage" at "medical complicity and collusion in torture" (in 
Bernstein 1994:85).5» Inquests following the deaths in custody of Neil Aggett and Steve 
Biko substantiated such allegations and experiences.s*
50 Also see Abel 1995:211-58 (especially 255-6), which situates Dr. Orr1s conduct and 
application within the generally lamentable conduct of fellow medical professionals 
around her. Autobiographical accounts provide some positive reflections on medical care. 
Sachs' first disillusioning encounter with the medical profession in fact led to a much 
more positive experience: "I feel elated. Thank you doctor, for being a doctor. You have 
reasserted for me the norms of civilised society, where a doctor is a man who tries to 
heal, and not someone who condones torture" (Sachs 1990:259-60 (see 252-60); also see 
Grace Cele in Bernstein 1994:204-5, First 1965:127, Hirson 1995:183-4,288, Mashinini 
1989:85,88). similar reflections are also registered in relation to magistrates: at 
times detainees attributed improvements in conditions to magisterial intervention (see 
First 1965:44-5, Pheto 1985:167,170, Sachs 1968:262, and contrast Dingake's negative 
experience (1987:109-10), with a much more positive experience that followed (113-14): 
also see P. Naidoo in Bernstein 1994:227). Despite significant shortcomings in the 
process, magistrates appear to have taken action on complaints of assault by Lewin 
(1976:37,63-5) and Pheto (1985:107-9,115-17,121,137,139,150); in an out of court 
settlement, Stephanie Kemp received damages after registering a similar complaint (Sachs 
1968:56-64, 83,162-4,168, 199,274-7,283) .
51 Among the many other similar expressions of disappointment and disgust see, in 
relation to medical care in detention, Chikane 19B8:56, First 1965:130, W. Mandela 
1985:104, Mofokeng in Russell 1991:51, Pheto 1985:77-8, Sachs 1990:256. For comment on 
magistrates and inspectors of detainees, see First 1965:43, Mashinini 1989:64,77, 
Makhoere 1988:10, Niehaus 1994:110, Wolpe 1994:197-8,200, and more generally with 
reference to complaints, see Sachs 1968:254-8,263-4,273-5. Also on doctors/medical care, 
magistrates and inspectors of detainees, see Foster et al. 1987:97-8,100-2,125,142- 
6,156-7,159,187, and Appendices E and G. The white lawyer as detainee was subjected to 
the unnerving experience of seeing the legal system from the other-/in-side (see Kantor 
1967:56,102-4,110,114,128,200,217 - also on Kantor, see Wolpe 1994: especially 152,199- 
201,225 - Sachs 1990:146-59,285, 1968:62, J. Slovo 1996:119-43, also 93-104, Wolpe 
1994:107-8,124,180); on occasion there was a recognition that they shared certain 
skills, characteristics, knowledge with the interrogator/torturer (Sachs 1968:252, also
S. Jacobs 1986:128, Wolpe 1994:136,159-60).
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The Aggett inquest flagrantly revealed shortcomings in the system of detainee 
protection. On several occasions a magistrate and an inspector of detainees had tried to 
see Aggett only to be told that he was "unavailable1'. On 4 January, for example, the day 
Aggett alleged that he was first assaulted, the inspector of detainees was denied access 
to him on the grounds that he was "out on investigation". At the inquest it was 
established that he was, in fact, undergoing interrogation on the 10th floor of John 
Vorster Square. On 1 February, the day after a 62 hour period of interrogation during 
which Aggett complained he had been ill-treated, the magistrate again tried to see him 
but was denied access. Brigadier Muller, the officer in charge of the security police in 
Johannesburg, testified that he had never met a magistrate or an inspector of detainees 
(or a doctor) visiting a detainee on the 10th floor of John Vorster Square, where 
interrogations took place, during the six years he had been stationed there. In his 
judgement the presiding magistrate found that there was substance in the suggestion 
that Aggett had been kept away from the inspector of detainees and the magistrate 
(inquest 139/1982:3691).
Perhaps the most powerful example of medical collaboration in torture and custodial 
death relates to the death of Steve Biko. The inquest into Biko's death, caused by head 
injuries after a blow or blows to the head, provided detailed insight into medical 
provision for detainees. Between the morning of 7 September and 11 September 1977, 
Biko was seen on several occasions by Dr. Lang, a district surgeon, and Dr. Tucker, the 
chief district surgeon, Port Elizabeth. A specialist physician, Dr. Hersch, and a neuro­
On medical care for political prisoners on Robben Island, see Dingake 1987:158-9, N. 
Mandela 1995:482,565,600-2, Dlomo in Cook 1974:73, Naidoo 1982:99,102-4,110,132,137- 
8,153-4,162-3,199-201,204,212-13,217-18,244, Shityuwete 1990:184-5,187,194-8,205,213- 
6,224,229-31,244, and for the white male political prisoners, see Hirson 1995:183-7, 
Jenkin 1987:179-80, Niehaus 1994:124-5; also see Makhoere 1988:30-3, 36,52-3,62- 
3,69,85,93-4,114-15. On the visits of judges to Robben Island see Dingake 1987:220, N. 
Mandela 1995:518-9,547-8, Naidoo 1982:210-11, Shityuwete 1990:203-4, and to the white 
politicals, see Jenkin 1987:150; also Makhoere 1988:109-10.
52 The account below draws in particular on the following sources: Bernstein 1978, 
Lawyers for Human Rights 1983, Woods 1979.
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surgeon, Dr. Keeley, were also consulted. Despite clear indications of brain damage the 
doctors all thought Biko was shamming and his condition was neither properly 
diagnosed nor treated.53
The inquest revealed a catalogue of medical misconduct: the unquestioning acceptance 
of security police versions of events and subservience to their wishes, indifference to 
the conditions in which the detainee was held, unasked and unanswered questions, 
unseen injuries and inadequate examinations - Sydney Kentridge in his submission on 
behalf of the Biko family referred to a ’’studied lack of curiosity" (inquest 573/1977:75) 
- misdirected assumptions, and undiagnosed and untreated illness. Negligence and 
incompetence were compounded, at the inquest, by contradictory and inexplicable 
evidence. Although the conduct of the other doctors was also subjected to criticism the 
main allegations were directed against Drs. Lang and Tucker (Rayner 1987:25-34).
It was in the issuing of false medical reports that Dr. Lang's conduct was most 
lamentable. He was asked by Colonel Goosen to issue a medical certificate on 7 
September after his initial examination of Biko. In it, Lang gave as the reason for the 
medical examination the fact that Biko would not speak. However, in a later report to 
the pathologist conducting the post-mortem, Lang wrote: "The detainee had refused 
water and food and displayed a weakness of all four limbs and it was feared that he had 
suffered a stroke". When asked at the inquest to explain the discrepancy between the 
two statements, he replied, "I cannot explain it. It is inexplicable". In the second part of 
the certificate he stated that he had found no evidence of any abnormality or pathology.
53 The security police and the doctors conspired to mislead each other about Biko's 
condition. The doctors were consistently misinformed by members of the security police, 
particularly but not exclusively by Colonel Goosen, Chief of the Security Police in the 
Eastern Cape. They were variously told that Biko had been a medical student for four 
years, that he was shamming and had behaved similarly during a previous detention, that 
they feared that Biko had suffered a stroke, that he was on hunger strike and that 
previous medical examinations had failed to find anything wrong with him. Obviously, 
such a misleading medical history, designed specifically to direct attention away from 
head injuries, was bound to prejudice the examination and possibly the diagnosis.
Doctors were generally vulnerable to security police misinformation about the detainee 
and the causes and nature of his/her condition or the circumstances of death.
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At the inquest he admitted that this was "highly inaccurate" as he had found, and 
recorded in the above-mentioned report to the pathologist, evidence of bruising, a lip 
injury, and swellings of the hands, feet and ankles. In an entry in the bed letter (medical 
record) at Sydenham prison hospital, on 10 September, Lang recorded that there was no 
evidence of pathology and that the lumbar puncture test was normal. At the inquest he 
acknowledged that this statement too was inaccurate. Dr. Lang claimed that the error 
was the result of the inadvertent omission of the word "gross" in front of "pathology".
The evidence of Dr. Tucker was also riddled with inconsistencies. After an examination 
on 11 September, Tucker deferred to Colonel Goosen's refusal to allow Biko to be 
admitted to a local provincial hospital and consented to the alternative proposal that he 
be sent to Pretoria. Tucker did not see it as his responsibility to check the vehicle and 
the conditions in which Biko would travel nor to insist that Biko be accompanied by a 
medical attendant or his medical records. This was typical of Tucker's extraordinarily 
limited interpretation of his responsibilities towards the patient. When pressed as to 
why he had not asked the patient or the security police about the possible existence or 
causes of a head injury, he stated: "Where persons are brought to me for examination, 
my report is completed on a special form. That is all I am required to do... if I am called 
to see a patient and he has a cut on his head, then I am interested in treating him and not 
in how he got the cut".
Both of the state doctors admitted at the inquest that the interests of the patient had 
been subordinate to interests of security. In his final submission to the court, Kentridge 
stated that the conduct of the medical personnel had a significance that spread beyond 
the case at hand, that Drs. Lang and Tucker "joined with the security police in [a] 
conspiracy of silence", and that at the very best "they turned a blind eye" (inquest 
573:1977:57). The relationship between district surgeon and security police "was one of 
subservience, bordering on collusion. Their obvious neglect of their patient's interests,
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and their deference to the requirements of the security police, was a breach of their 
professional duty, which may have contributed to the final result" (74). He went on to 
state that their conduct was of a piece with Colonel Goosen's disregard for rules and 
regulations. "The police felt confident they could rely upon the doctors to support them. 
And their confidence was justified" (76).54
An irreparable and quite deliberate paradox, therefore, lay at the heart of the role of the 
district surgeon and the magistrate, and the mechanisms in which they participated. The 
violence of the security police and others was not aberrational or the fault of isolated 
individuals, it was structural and institutional; there was in effect only one complaint - 'I 
am at the mercy of those whose job it is to have no mercy' - about which the magistrate 
and the doctor could do nothing at all; for a complaint to be effective the perpetrators 
had to be informed, if the perpetrators were informed the complaint could be used to 
further punish and undermine. Even a conscientious magistrate or doctor could be little 
more than an irritant. When the oppressive state, as the agent of both the violation and 
its remedy, essentially two-faced, claims to police/heal itself, oppression, justice and 
healing, torturer, magistrate and doctor, become one. Responses such as this were 
understandable and commonplace:
But the police know... So why do I need to tell them about the kind of 
treatment they're giving to me? The whole thing is farcical. It's got a kind
54
A fictional reworking and in-filling of this doctor-detainee scenario is contained in  
Ebersohn's S t o r e  up th e  A n g e r (1984: especially 30-6,100-8,153-60,167-9,176,179-83). 
Magistrate Prins made an implicit judgement on the conduct of the doctors by sending 
relevant sections of the inquest record to the South African Medical and Dental Council 
(SAMDC), South Africa's principal regulatory body controlling the medical and dental 
professions. The failure of the South Africa's primary medical institutions to respond 
swiftly and effectively divided the medical community and did considerable damage to the 
reputation of the South African medical profession both at home and abroad (see Baxter 
1985, Motala 1987:53-61, Rayner 1987:23-46, British Medical Association 1992:139,173- 
5,177-8). On the complicity of doctors, and their relationship with the security police, 
in relation to the death of Abdulla Haron see Desai and Marney 1978:90-6,103,118-25,131-
6. As Rayner (1987) illustrates polarisation and institutional weakness were enduring 
characteristics of the medical profession in this field. Dr. Lang appeared to have 
learnt only a narrow attitude of self-defence from Biko's death when, in 1985, he was 
Dr. Orr's superior at the time when she filed her application. She summarised his 
attitude as follows: "'let's just do our job, and that was keep our noses clean, and 
cover our backsides. So that if anyone ever does bring a civil claim the Department of 
Health can say we did our job.'" (Abel 1995:232).
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of legality - but it's really weird. You complain to the magistrate so he 
can tell the police exactly what they already know - because they're 
doing it. (Levitan in Bernstein 1994:276)
Any complaints, Bhengu wondered. I'm a dead man. Is that a cause for 
complaint? And if it is, what will you do about it? Complete a form? 
Four copies - one for the Justice Department, one for the security police, 
one for the district surgeon and one to file. But I'll still be a dead man. 
No complaints, Bhengu thought. No complaints at all. Thanks for 
coming. (Ebersohn 1984:160)
The circulation of documents and participants within a state cabal sought to maintain 
the fiction of an inspection and complaints machinery while in fact merely contributing 
to the state archive and a facade of legitimacy. But the paradox runs deeper still.
The doctor and the magistrate, and the institutional practices of medicine and law, 
having been unmade by becoming weapons used against the detainee, annihilated in the 
very process by which they were made to annihilate, were resurrected after a custodial 
death at the inquest. Having failed to play their part in preventing, and perhaps even 
played a part in facilitating, the death, they were assigned the task of revealing its 
causes: it was either a district surgeon or a state pathologist who conducted the official 
post-mortem to determine the cause of death, while an executive magistrate invariably 
presided over the inquest p ro c e e d in g s .55
55 There are various ways, some of which have already been mentioned, in which medicine 
can be more genuinely resurrected in the aftermath of torture. Elements within the 
medical community who were not in the employ of the state, for example, used a variety 
of methods - the courts, documentation and publicity, the provision of post-detention 
medical care - to address some of the issues arising from torture and obstructed or 
inadequate medical care in the context of state repression (Rayner 1987:66,79-65,87-91, 
also the Human Rights Commission 1990:430 - on similarly motivated psychological work, 
see Chabani Manganyi and du Toit eds. 1990 and Foster et al. 1987). Some such 
initiatives are themselves accompanied by difficulties and ambiguities resulting from 
the nature of torture and its medical/scientific component. During therapy and 
treatment, for example, the tortured may be terrified of touch and/or the discourse of 
therapy, sessions of questions and answers, may be too evocative of the structure of 
interrogation and confession (see Weschler 1990:269-70, Swartz et al. 1990:253). 
Treatment, therefore, may unintentionally reproduce the violation and violence while
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As with Lewin's experience of capital punishment, blacks who died in custody entered 
the white world in the form of death, black death at the hands of the white state. It is 
particularly appropriate in a South African context that for Foucault (1976) the opaque 
body is black - "the black stone of the body", "the black coffer of the body" - while 
knowledge of it is white - the "great white eye that unties the knot of life", "the white 
brightness of death". The official post-mortem, conducted by a district surgeon or state 
pathologist, provided a reading of the dead body, a perspective on and a window 
between, life and death. From the point of view of death, torture could be seen as a 
living and mappable terrain that linked life and death:
From the point of view of death, disease [read torture] has a land, a 
mappable territory, a subterranean, but secure place where its kinships 
and its consequences are formed... Paradoxically, the presence of the 
corpse enables us to see it living - living with a life... that has its own 
roles and its own laws. (Foucault 1976:149, [] bracket my own)
Like torture the post-mortem, which determined the cause of death, read the truth as 
inscribed in-on-through the body, in its depths and surfaces. It did not necessarily 
reproduce the procedures and discourses of torture: the post-mortem could be a 
component of a cover-up or provide dissenting evidence, including evidence of abuse; it 
was a documentary form that could contribute to either the state or oppositional 
archives.s6 Certain factors, such as the political context and personnel involved, often
attempting to heal. Other ways in which it can do this include the following: by 
duplicating the structure of the political trial and abstracting the person/act from the 
broader context or motive - "the political has been psychiatrized, privatized, 
personalized into marginality; the social reality of dictatorship, the politics of 
cruelty have been banalized into a 'case'" {Millett 1995:313) - by overlooking the fact 
that the social/political and considerations of justice are as important to healing and 
rehabilitation as medicine. These debates about torture, medicine and hurting/healing 
have an important North-South dimension (also see Weschler 1990:238-42),
re
There were occasions when medical examinations/reports caste doubt on police/state 
versions of events and, more rarely, when doctors, even sometimes district surgeons/ 
government pathologists, gave evidence in court which corroborated allegations of 
assault and, thereby, contradicted police evidence. Doctors suggested that medical
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served to undermine the post-mortem's more subversive possibilities. There were 
occasions, for example, when attempts were made to suppress post-mortem findings 
(Amnesty International 1978:76-7). Among the factors contributing to a more radical 
potential was that the official post-mortem, while sometimes performed without 
consultation with or the knowledge of the deceased's family and in the absence of an 
independent pathologist, could also be attended by, or complemented by a separate 
post-mortem conducted by, a pathologist representing the family. Where two such 
examinations took place they could produce significantly different medical readings of 
the body (see Motala 1987:88). Like the formal inquest, an independent or 
independently monitored post-mortem, although still subject to manipulation, was the 
best available route to justice.
In Andrd Brink's novel, A Dry White Season, a detainee, Gordon Ngubene, dies in 
custody allegedly having committed suicide by hanging himself with strips tom from a 
blanket. A district surgeon is implicated in the cover up and a state pathologist conducts 
the official post-mortem. An independent pathologist, Dr. Suliman Hassiem, who 
attends the post-mortem on behalf of the family is subsequently detained and banned. 
Because his signature is said to be on the post-mortem report, the inquest goes ahead in 
his absence. The state pathologist, Dr. Jansen, asserts that death had been caused by the 
application of force to the neck consistent with hanging. He confirms that Dr. Hassiem 
had been present at the inquest and that "as far as he knew, Dr. Hassiem's report had 
been identical to his in most respects" (1984:106). The inquest delivers a verdict of 
suicide. It transpires during the course of Ben du Toit's own investigations that Dr. 
Hassiem had not signed the official post-mortem report but had prepared his own
evidence could not prove conclusively that the detainee had taken his own life, 
acknowledged that injuries could have been caused by assault and/or other ill-treatment, 
stated that injuries had not all been sustained at the same time and that it was 
difficult to distinguish between those sustained at, and immediately before, death, 
identified injuries and wounds that were not the cause of death and found that the 
physical damage could not all have been the result of the officially sanctioned cause of 
death (see Bernstein 1972:32-3, Dugard 1985:49, lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law 1983:4,8-9,147-70, Motala 1987:84-5,88, also 23-5,27,44-5,47,49,62,77,98,100, 
105, Rayner 1987:49, and Riekert 1985:125-8).
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report: '"We didn't differ much on the facts... After all, we were examining the same 
body at the same time. But there were differences in interpretation" (205). The 
differences were between suicide by hanging and manual strangulation.
The executive magistrate played an even more important role at the inquest than the 
doctor, particularly in exercising his interpretive discretion within the state-imposed 
legislative framework. The magistrate made the decision, crucial to the procedural 
loading of the inquest, as to whether it should be formal or informal, on the basis of a 
reading of the evidence contained in the inquest docket. For the composition of the 
docket the magistrate was entirely dependent upon the good faith and competence of 
the police investigation; he was confined to the evidence before him which not 
infrequently extended only to police affidavits and the official post-mortem report.& 
The magistrate, however, had effective control, within the bounds set by the written 
record, over the inquiry's scope and rigour. This control to a large extent determined the 
information revealed by the inquest.^ Inevitably, in this context, discretion led to bias.
57 In his summation at the Biko inquest, Kentridge stated that those representing the 
family had been hampered by an inadequate police investigation - described by one 
observer as "perfunctory in the extreme" (Napley in Poliak 1978:16) - by General 
Kleinhans. The investigation officer arrived in Port Elizabeth a month or more after 
Biko's death, failed to subject those involved to any real examination, churned out 
inadequate self-serving affidavits, many on duplicated forms - a kind of highly 
suggestive multiple choice - failed to locate necessary documents, made no search of the 
security branch office, and so on. Poor quality police investigations posed a major 
problem for the criminal justice system more generally.
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This control extended, to, for example, deciding whether a medical examination should 
take place or not and who should be present at the post-mortem besides the district 
surgeon/state pathologist and the police; which documents were admissible as evidence 
and access to documentation; which witnesses were called to give evidence in a formal 
inquest and what questions could be put to them by the interested parties; and the 
magistrate could exclude from the inquest proceedings any person whose presence he 
deemed unnecessary or undesirable (Motala 1987:10-11,89, also on magisterial discretion, 
see Akerson 1989, Bernstein 1972:30-2,43). In his final submission at the Biko inquest, 
Kentridge pointed out the limitations within which the representatives of the family 
were forced to operate. They could not produce any eye-witnesses to the event - a 
custodial death is, by definition, an event without an independent witness - and were 
hampered by the above-mentioned woefully inadequate police investigation. They were also 
tied to the record made by the state prosecutor for the magistrate. All the other legal 
representatives present played the part of defenders of the state rather than 
participants in a genuine inquiry. They could not subpoena witnesses and would have like 
to have cross-examined persons whom the court felt it unnecessary to call (also see 
Woods 1979:371-2). On the rights of interested parties at the inquest, see Motala 
1987:11.
Considerable discretion was also enjoyed by the state-appointed Attorney-General who, 
for example, decided, on the basis of the inquest docket, whether a death was due to 
unnatural causes and therefore whether an inquest took place at all; whether it was 
presided over by a magistrate or a judge; and on receipt of the inquest findings, 
whether there was sufficient evidence to institute criminal proceedings.
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The outcome was predictable enough: the informal inquest was used to circumvent and 
replace the formal inquest with its potentially more far-reaching inquiry and findings 
(on occasion even if a version of events was contested within the documentation: see 
Gauntlett 1989:88); magistrates invariably accepted police evidence at the expense of 
other dissenting accounts; judgements almost always exonerated the police and found 
that no-one was to blame for the custodial death: the security police and the judiciary 
had conspired to produce a culture of impunity.
Magistrates do not allocate blame to the torturers when they preside over an 
inquest. How could they? Whom should they believe? Dead men don't talk, and 
survivors - being 'terrorists' - are ipso facto 'unreliable witnesses'. Magistrates 
normally conclude that death must be ascribed to this or to that accident for 
which nobody can reasonably be held responsible. (Breytenbach 1985:351)59
From the writings and readings of the body, the inquest judgement synthesised a single 
version and attempted to provide a form of closure. James Boyd White describes law as 
"a way of telling a story about what has happened in the world and claiming a meaning 
for it by writing an ending to it" (1985:36, also see 41-2). The inquest, like the 
confession/statement, attempted to fix, to capture officially in writing, a form of state
On magisterial bias, see Akerson 1989, Motala 1987:88-9. In the cases of Paris 
Malatji and Joseph Mdluli, prosecutions were initiated and inquests superseded. With 
regards to the former, a member of the security police, Sergeant J. H. van As, was 
convicted of culpable homicide in 1984, and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for 
shooting the detainee through the head at point blank range during his interrogation in 
1983. He served only six years. This was the only such successful prosecution and the
only case in which there was an acknowledgement by the police - after the Attorney-
General had instituted a prosecution - of criminal wrongdoing. Four policemen brought to 
trial after the death of Mdluli in 1976, were acquitted, even though the judge expressed 
severe doubts over the veracity of their testimony. Only one inquest into a death in
detention resulted in a finding of police culpability. Two policemen were found
responsible by a magistrate for the death of Tshifhiwa Muofhe in Venda in 1981. They 
were also later acquitted. Inquests did, however, on occasion lay the basis for civil 
actions against the government for damages. Rather than face an investigation into 
police interrogation methods, the government often chose, as in the cases of Biko, Imam 
Abdulla Haron, Mdluli, and Muofhe, to settle these claims out of court (see Amnesty 
International 1978:76-7, Foster et al. 1987:38, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law 1983:8-9,12,45-7,72-4,84, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1986:5,53-8, 
Motala 1987:88,90,110-13, Riekert 1985:125-8,138).
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sanctioned life/death story. The magistrate's concluding remarks in the Biko inquest are 
typical: apart from the non-controversial aspects of the judgement - the identity of the 
deceased, the date of death and the cause of death - they were, in their entirety, as 
follows: "The available evidence does not prove that the death was brought about by 
any act or omission involving or amounting to an offence on the part of any person.
That completes the inquest." This was the judgement of an inquest that had lasted for 15 
days and which stretched to a 2000 page record. Magistrate Prins did not deal with any 
of the arguments presented by the counsel for the Biko family. As one commentator 
claims, the verdict is wholly conclusory, devoid of any explanation or rationale. It is not 
that it fails to be persuasive, to provide some understanding of what happened to Biko, 
but that it does not undertake to do these things (Poliak 1978:26-7). He goes on to state: 
"A likely reason for delivering findings unsupported by reasons is that a reasoned 
opinion would not write - or, to be more exact, would have yielded very different 
findings". This is a narrative undone by the accusations of its resounding internal 
silences: "The manifest discourse... is really no more that the repressive presence of 
what it does not say; and this 'not-said' is a hollow that undermines from within all that 
is said" (Foucault 1972:25). The life and death of the deceased, cursorily dismissed as 
without value - Keith Gottschalk describes the post-mortem and inquest procedure as a 
"problem of garbage disposal" ("Petition to my Interrogators", in Oliphant and 
Vladislavic eds. 1988:176) - was consigned to a permanent state of limbo rather than 
being provided with any sense of judicial closure.60 But there was a price to pay for 
such discursive and judicial violence: "In death, Stephen Bantu Biko is even larger than 
he was in life" (Poliak 1978:1).
fin
The official attitude surrounding the Biko judgement is epitomised by two further 
comments, the first, by the presiding magistrate - "'To me, it was just another death. 
It was a job, like any other1" (Poliak 1978:25-6, also 29) - and the second, the much 
quoted response to Biko’s death from the then Minister of Justice, James Kruger: " ’I am 
not glad and I am not sorry about Mr. Biko. It leaves me cold'" (in Essa and Pillai 
nd:91). On custodial death and the inquest seen through the prism of censorship, see 
Merrett 1994:48-9,71,97-8.
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Detention without trial was a world of non-law created and sanctioned by the law and 
on many occasions the inquest functioned as part of the same world, belonged to the 
same regime of truth and power. The law was inverted to the extent that it became 
lawless and criminal. The structure of the inquest held within it the same fundamental 
contradiction as the inspection and complaints mechanism: it was the state supposedly 
policing/healing itself. It was all those agents complied in the death itself - the security 
police, the doctor, the executive magistrate - who presided over all forms of 
investigation and inquiry. An interpretive chain, comprising the interpenetration of 
procedures, institutions, personnel, and discourses, linked the torture chamber and the 
court room within narrow, repressive margins;61 employees of the state inscribed the 
body and then deciphered their own inscriptions within a closed system; the security 
police, the medical profession and the judiciary collaborated in a series of state 
narratives of truth and power, in forms of official discursive tyranny; absolute power 
and lawlessness reduced the court room to a form of bureaucratic violence. Not only the 
possibility of death itself but also the inquest and its ineffectuality became a weapon to 
be used against the detainee during interrogation. In such a context the body was 
beyond healing and justice as it passed from the torture chamber permeated by 
medicine and the law to the court room permeated by medicine and torture. The inquest 
was a 'space of death' in which the parallels with torture are clear.
Legitimacy and Loopholes
But what of the precarious balance between repression and legitimacy at the heart of 
political justice, and the risk/price that this implies? The way in which the tortured body
61
Ronald Dworkin has likened legal interpretation to "a complex chain enterprise of 
which... innumerable decisions, structures, conventions, and practices are the history" 
and it is the presiding official's job "to continue that history into the future" 
(1982:193). Such a chain structures the interpretive legal terrain, it establishes a 
world by the distribution of authority and power within it. Dworkin likens this exercise 
to a co-authored novel in which each writer is responsible for a separate chapter and 
thereby given the dual function of interpreting and creating. This provides a more 
benign example of the experience of being written whilst writing.
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was reintegrated into the judicial world was emblematic of this broader process, in that 
it was carefully structured to predominantly serve the interests of the state while also 
providing loopholes and opportunities which enabled the opposition to utilise and 
manipulate the inquest for its own ends. This allowed court proceedings and the 
meaning(s) of custodial death to be contested. On occasion, usually due to public 
outrage following a custodial death, the state was pressurised into holding a formal 
inquest, thereby forcing the collaborative embrace of torture, law and medicine into the 
uncomfortable glare of the public domain. Those who operated above the law were 
brought back within its ambit. Breytenbach talks of the extraordinary power of the 
security police in South Africa (1985:44-5,53,185,312,350), who thrive in dark and 
secret places and are made uncomfortable - "with their short hair, their dark glasses and 
their tight smiles" (351, also 45,215) - by the probative glare of daylight (also Woods 
1979:253-4). As Abel writes, "[sjunlight was the real deterrent" (1995:257).
The court room, therefore, also made available a range of very different possibilities 
and potentials that distinguished it from the torture chamber. It could operate within an 
alternative regime of truth and power. At the inquest, the ability to uncover certain 
kinds of evidence and information was invariably of greater significance than the 
magistrate's findings: notably in relation to the conduct of the security police, 
magistrates and doctors and the functioning of the state security apparatus in general 
(see Woods 1979:127,248,372). The result was an alternative life/death story to that 
synthesised by the judgement. At the interface of the inquest where opposing powers of 
writing met lives/deaths again were variously written. Lawyers became skilled at 
pursuing this alternative, violently collaborative, narrative within/against the confines 
set by the law, magisterial discretion, police incompetence and lack of co-operation, 
and the more general machinations of the state. They engaged with the writing-being 
written matrix on behalf of the deceased. In doing so, the links between the various 
personnel/institutions and the state could be questioned, and divisions within and
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between different branches of the state exploited. As a consequence of these 
possibilities, insight emerged into the treatment and ill-treatment of detainees: "Bit by 
bit the information about Biko's last days began to emerge. But more than that. Day 
after day South Africa revealed itself through the evidence and the men who gave it" 
(Bernstein 1978:30). The Biko and Aggett inquests, along with other court cases, 
exposed the brutal reality of detention thereby contributing to the opposition archive on 
incarceration under apartheid.
In his final submission, Kentridge argued that the manner in which Biko was treated 
and the callous disregard for his rights was relevant in assessing the evidence of his 
captors. Whatever the regulations in relation to detainees may have been in theory, in 
practice it was clear that Biko had no rights. Between 19 August and 6 September, 
while at Walmer police station, he was kept naked, denied exercise, proper washing 
facilities and the ability to buy food. The interrogation then commenced and for the 
majority of the next two and a half days Biko was handcuffed and shackled by leg irons, 
manacled to an iron grille: even after his hands, feet and ankles became swollen and 
cut, even after he had been seriously assaulted and it became clear that he was seriously 
ill and he had been seen by two doctors, even after it was found that his trousers, 
blankets and mat were soaked in urine.
On the evening of 8 September, Biko was taken to Sydenham prison hospital. During 
the night he was twice found lying in a bath, once clothed in a bath full of water. On the 
second occasion the bath was empty. Despite growing evidence indicating serious brain 
damage, on 11 September Biko was returned to a cell at Walmer police station with the 
doctors' agreement. Again he was left naked on a mat on the floor. Later he was found 
in a state of collapse and transported 740 miles to Pretoria Prison hospital, lying naked 
in the back of a landrover, without medical supervision or medical records, with 
nothing more than a bottle of water. After an 11 hour drive through the night, the
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supposedly outstanding medical facilities that Colonel Goosen claimed were available 
in Pretoria consisted of a mat in the comer of a cell, the attendance of a newly-qualified 
doctor six hours after his arrival at the prison, a diagnosis based on false information, an 
intravenous drip and a vitamin injection. At no time were Biko's next of kin informed. 
He died on the night of 12 September, unattended. In the words of Kentridge, "He died 
a miserable and lonely death on a mat on a stone floor in a prison cell. It is difficult to 
comment on these facts in measured terms" (inquest 573:1977:16-17).
The Neil Aggett inquest, the longest in South African legal history, lasted 44 days. 
Aggett was detained for 70 days. Again a detainee was denied even the limited rights 
and safeguards to which he was entitled: his cell was not visited hourly; he was denied 
access to a magistrate and inspector of detainees; and he was not allowed to exercise. 
Between 28 and 31 January 1982, he was under interrogation for 62 hours, by eight 
security police officers. During this time he was denied even the most basic hygiene 
facilities and exercise. He remained in the interrogation room for the whole period, 
rather than returning at any stage to his cell, and he took what sleep he was allowed on 
a camp bed. Major Cronwright testified that he was quite happy to detain Aggett for 
more than a year in order to extract a statement from him. The security police had no 
knowledge of nor had they shown any concern for the effects of long and intensive 
interrogation.
An application by the counsel for the defence to have an in loco inspection of Aggett's 
cell in John Vorster Square and to have a number of ex-detainees give evidence was 
upheld by a Supreme Court judgement. Evidence from ex-detainees held at John 
Vorster Square or who were interrogated and tortured at other police stations by 
personnel from the same interrogation team was corroborative in many respects. It was 
used to try and establish that there was a pattern of interrogation used by the security 
police, a system of interrogation characterised by official insensitivity and cruelty.
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Counsel for the family argued that the allegations of ill-treatment were sufficiently 
consistent to enable the court to draw an inference that Aggett was similarly treated.62 
Furthermore, some of the ex-detainees had also seen him and had witnessed a steady 
deterioration in his condition. Maurice Smithers, for example, stated that he saw Aggett 
through a frosted glass panel doing strenuous exercise and being beaten while naked. As 
a result of the inquest, the care and treatment of detainees in general and Aggett in 
particular gained publicity. This fact could not be reversed by the magistrate's 
judgement which completely exonerated the police from any blame whatsoever by 
accepting their version of events to the occlusion of all others. Information obtained 
from such court proceedings enabled custodial deaths and the inquest to become a 
weapon that could also be used against the state.
Distinctions and inter-relationships between the oral and the written were crucial at the 
inquest for both the state and its opponents, firstly in relation to the decision as to 
whether it was to be formal or informal in nature. In the latter the official written record 
was read in private by the state as self-evident and self-exculpatory truth. In the former, 
however, the written record could be challenged by other evidence and by oral cross- 
examination, in a public arena where its meaning was open to interrogation and 
contestation. The power of writing could be complemented, and on occasion 
superseded, by the power of the spoken word.6* The layers of evidence at the Biko 
inquest - affidavits, an occurrence book, telexes, oral testimony - contained numerous 
contradictions and slippages: between the written and the oral; between the various
co
A similar strategy had been used, or attempted, before: see First 1965:87-100, Motala 
1987:19,25,89, also Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 1983:3.
go
^ Abel makes the following important point about the power of the oral in the context of 
a discussion of the Wendy Orr application: "The application revealed the enormous 
disparity in the power of South African voices. Black victims (sometimes surrogates for 
whites protected by their skin) have loudly denounced police violence for decades. They 
have little access to media or courts, however, and less credibility with white 
audiences. Torture doubly silenced them: police turned them into ventriloquist's 
dummies, and whites disregarded their complaints - the archetypal nightmare of the 
unheard scream. This application succeeded because it was brought to a white judge by 
white lawyers based on the affidavit of a white doctor and publicized in the white 
press" (1995:257: footnote omitted).
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branches and officials of the state; between state and independent accounts; between 
evidence given at the time of Biko’s death and evidence given later at the inquest.^ 
Among the most blatant discrepancies was that while in court the security police 
witnesses claimed that Biko probably sustained his injuries by banging his head/falling 
against a wall during a scuffle which he himself provoked, this fact was not mentioned 
in any of the original 28 affidavits, nor in statements to the investigating officer where 
their attention was specifically drawn to the question of brain injury, nor were the 
doctors informed of this alleged incident. A second example is provided by a telex sent 
to the Security Police headquarters in Pretoria, which Colonel Goosen denied having 
sent and tried to conceal. In it he referred to injuries "inflicted" on Biko - when asked to 
account for this phrase Goosen explained "inflicted" as "a play on words" - and the 
telex, unlike an affidavit completed by Goosen the following day, made no mention of 
shamming but stated that Biko was in a semi-coma and that the situation was urgent. 
The inter-textuality of meaning could be the undoing of the state as well as of its 
opponents. The juxtaposition of different forms of evidence reveals the way in which 
agents of the state moved unevenly, and in a way that left many issues unresolved, 
towards a state sanctioned version of events to be presented in court, thereby 
illuminating the inner workings of the regime and its use of judicial procedure (see 
Brink 1984:104-14).
As Gutierrez-Jones states, "[t]he law, especially as it is played out in the courts, offers a 
detailed register of how 'official' history functions within a society, revealing what 
evidence and rhetorics will be deemed admissible in judging a contested event" 
(1990:58-9). This, in summary and essence, was the dominant characteristic of the 
apartheid inquest:
On similar inconsistencies with regard to other custodial deaths, see Lawyers' 
Committee for civil Rights Under Law 1983:4, Motala 1987:88-9. Police evidence, official 
versions of events, inquests and trials invariably failed to satisfactorily explain 
custodial deaths and left inconsistencies unresolved. Also, with regards to Dr. Orr's 
application, see Abel 1995:239-41,253.
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... the state speaking the 'truth' about itself; a 'truth' which frequently 
reveals the limits of the possible within a particular structure of state.
Part of the process of authorizing an official way of speaking about 
social realities ('problems'), while silencing unauthorized political voices 
emerging as popular expressions of those realities... (Ashforth 1990:6, 
footnote omitted)6^
The inquest was part of a process whereby the state investigated and passed judgement 
on itself - it was "a story they [told] themselves about themselves" (Geertz 1973 :448) - 
to affirm a view they had of themselves. An interpretive chain bound the torture 
chamber and the court room, torturers, the judiciary, and the state-employed medical 
profession, within the whole that was oppression and terror. While it is important to 
acknowledge that the similarities between these domains/personnel outweighed the 
differences, it is equally important to stress that there were chinks in the chain which 
meant that the process could be manipulated to serve other ends. Equally, it is necessary 
to try to understand how the differences were established and maintained. The aim of 
this chapter segment has been to illustrate the way in which political justice in the form 
of the inquest overlapped with and deviated from the practice and discourse of torture 
and as a result availed itself of a range of limitations and possibilities, and the way in 
which these in turn impacted upon the narration of life/death stories.
Needless to say, literary analyses of custodial deaths provide a very different kind of 
insight into custodial violence and death. Legal judgements usually share several of the 
properties of literary texts. They are narratives that operate through the simultaneous 
processes of construction and interpretation; they adopt techniques of persuasion and 
literary devices of style and rhetoric; neither textual form is transparent or fixed in
65 Also see 3,8. On ways of reading state documents in South Africa see Ashforth 11-13.
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meaning: as the chair of a Commission of Inquiry told Ashforth, "You must read more 
in a report than just the words" (1990:13). But there are also fundamental differences 
between legal and literary discourse. The presiding legal official must decide on a 
single meaning from the available documentation while literary interpretation can 
applaud ambiguity; legal authors speak on behalf of a range of wider authorities while 
literary authors speak only for themselves; legal judgements are uniquely authoritative 
in a material sense due to their institutional power to legitimate the use of force and 
secure compliance. Placed alongside one another, legal and literary discourses, as 
overlapping but also distinct modes of writing, outline a terrain of textual commentary 
on custodial death. While they might both be said to construct and give meaning to 
a/the world, they do so in profoundly different ways, utilising profoundly different 
techniques for the production, verification and contestation of truth and power.66 What 
does literature interrogate and provide access to that the legal/state archive(s) do(es) 
not?
The Novel
Tales... Information in this country has ceased to be objective and has become pure 
fantasy... 'To report' among us now means either to interpret reality according to our 
desires or fears, or to say simply what is convenient... Since it is impossible to know 
what's really happening, we... lie, invent, dream, and take refuge in illusion... life, a life in 
which so few actually do read, has become literary... I, in this case, am history... Tve 
written a novel'.,. In a novel there are always more lies than truths, a novel is never a 
faithful account of events. This investigation, these interviews, I didn't do it all so I could 
relate what really happened... but so I could lie and know what I'm lying about. (Vargos 
Llosa 1987:246,252,287)
The novelist's opportunity to do his work today is increased by the power o f the regime 
to which he finds himself in opposition... we have it in us to compose false documents 
more valid, more real, more truthful than the 'true' documents o f the politicians or the 
journalists or the psychologists. Novelists know explicitly that... reality is amenable to 
any construction that is placed upon it. It is a world made for liars and we are bom liars.
66 Much work has been done on the relationship and linkages between law and literature 
by the likes of Richard Posner 1988, James Boyd White 19B4,1985,1985a, Richard Weisberg 
1984, and by such scholars as Ronald Dworkin and Stanley Fish. Introductions/overviews 
include those to be found in special issues of the G e o r g i a  L a w  R e v i e w  2 0 , 4  (1986), 
M e r c e r  L a w  R e v i e w  39,3 (1988), M i c h i g a n  L a w  R e v i e w  85, 5 and 6 (1987), R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  
30 (1990), and in Thomas 1991, Weisberg and Barricelli 1982, and Ziolkowski 1991.
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But we are to be trusted because ours is the only profession forced to admit that it lies - 
and that bestows upon us the mantle o f honesty... we are a valuable resource and an 
instrument o f survival. (Doctorow 1977:232)
J. M. Coetzee, in an article entitled "Into the Dark Chamber: The Novelist and South 
Africa" (1986), has written that torture has exerted a "dark fascination" on many South 
African writers because "relations in the torture room provide a metaphor, bare and 
extreme, for relations between authoritarianism and its victims", and because through 
the combination of obscenity, exclusion, mystery and fascination it provides a metaphor 
for the creative act: "[t]he dark, forbidden chamber is the origin of novelistic fantasy per 
se" through which "the state creates the preconditions for the novel to set about its work 
of representation". This combination of compulsion and repulsion, however, generates 
two particular dilemmas. "[T]here is something tawdry", writes Coetzee, "about 
following the state in this way, making its vile mysteries the occasion of fantasy". The 
"true challenge" is how not to be impaled on the dilemma proposed by the state - 
"namely, either to ignore its obscenities or else to produce representations of them" - 
but rather "to establish one's own authority... to imagine torture and death on one's own 
terms". The challenge, as he sees it, therefore, is to write without being written. The 
second dilemma is how, beyond a range of cliches, the writer should represent the 
torturer. Coetzee goes on to criticise several South African writers for their 
fictionalisation of torture. He states that Sipho Sepamla's A Ride on the Whirlwind 
(1981) succumbs to "erotic fascination" and caricatures its torturers, while Mongane 
Serote's To Every Birth its Blood (1983) and Alex La Guma's In the Fog o f the Season's 
End (1972) display "a questionable dark lyricism".
Coetzee's own fictional companion to these theoretical and aesthetic dilemmas is 
Waiting for the Barbarians, a novel "about the impact of the torture chamber on the life 
of a man of conscience". The central character and narrator, known only as the 
magistrate, is a servant of Empire in a outpost on the frontier, whose range of 
administrative and judicial responsibilities and powers closely mirror those of the
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magistrate in apartheid South Africa (1982:8, Gallagher 1991:120). In a time of 
emergency, with power in the hands of the Third Bureau, the magistrate expresses a 
desire not to get involved, to look away and block his ears, to shut out the atrocities 
taking place around him. But, simultaneously, he is drawn compulsively to the site of 
torture. A combination of imagination and investigation are marshalled in an attempt to 
compensate for that which cannot otherwise be known. Impaled on the dilemma 
established by the state, the magistrate seeks to both ignore and represent. A dangerous 
knowledge, composed of fragments and obliquely gained, while never complete 
(1982:79-80) is nevertheless enough, even too much: "I know somewhat too much; and 
from this knowledge, once one has been infected, there seems to be no recovering... The 
knot loops in upon itself; I cannot find the end" (21). Having been to the site of torture 
and seen, there is no way back. In the end the magistrate is detained and occupies the 
site himself.
Circled around and passed through, sites of torture/'spaces of death' are not only 
architectural but also corporeal. A barbarian woman, partially blinded and with broken 
ankles, is left behind, discarded by both torturer and tortured/barbarian. Hers is a body 
that is incomplete, "maimed, scarred, harmed" (56), a body that heals over and grows 
into its irreparable deficiencies. She lies at the heart of the magistrate's inquiring and 
imagining: '"Nothing is worse than what we can imagine'... 'Tell me,' I want to say, 'don't 
make a mystery of it, pain is only pain'; but words elude me" (31-2). The magistrate 
describes the woman's body, in a manner that he acknowledges echoes the torturer, as 
closed, a blank surface across which he hunts seeking entry (42-3, also 49,86). He 
washes and massages her broken body, losing himself in the rhythm, entering a sleep 
like oblivion between death and enchantment, experiencing rapture and veneration. In 
the grip of a perverted and obscure passion, a "stupefied eroticism" (56,73), through his 
"inexplicable attentions" (33) to her body, the magistrate approaches what he describes 
as "strange ecstasies" (47). Although acknowledging a complex of motives - protection,
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reparation, penance, expiation, responsibility, envy, pity, cruelty - the magistrate is 
essentially, ultimately, unable to understand the origin or nature of his desire or need for 
the woman, to whom he is enslaved and yet of whom he is free to make whatever he 
likes.6? Even after her departure he continues to "swoop and circle" around her, "casting 
one net of meaning after another over her" (81).
Under the gaze of both torturer and magistrate the woman is reduced to a body, a site of 
torture; both torturer and magistrate privilege the body as text, as the means to and 
origin of the truth; both wish to mark her, to engrave themselves and their desire on her. 
The latter, while attempting a reading of the traces of torture that seeks to access the 
truth of their infliction, nevertheless re-enacts and perpetuates the violence of the 
former: the total body, stripped of self and world, remains voiceless and has external 
meanings imposed upon it. Other than and in the absence of her tortured body, the 
barbarian woman is nothing, featureless, forgotten, blankness radiates from her in space 
and time. But there is no reciprocity or penetration. The body, while broken and 
violated, remains inaccessible, obstinately resisting all attempts at violent 
comprehension. This is not to say that its authority is in question (6-7), it is simply 
variously misread, somehow beyond understanding, The woman and her body are the 
key to the labyrinth of meaning, a dilemma of which the magistrate is aware - "It has 
been growing more and more clear to me that until the marks on this girl's body are 
deciphered and understood I cannot let go of her" (31) - but unable to resolve. Of her 
"there is nothing" the magistrate "can say with certainty" (43).
At the heart of the novel, therefore, lies a radical uncertainty. The magistrate struggles 
with his multiple impotencies, with an encompassing failure of authority - political, 
sexual, interpretive, authorial, linguistic (57-8,64-5,154-5) - and is, ultimately, simply
fiT
The magistrate's continual interrogation of his desire/need can be traced through the 
following references: 30,33-4,40-4,47,55-6,63-4,66,71,73,75,86,135,14 9-50.
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lost. "I think: 'I have lived through an eventful year, yet understand no more of it than a 
babe in arms’... I think: There has been something staring me in the face, and still I do 
not see if" (155, also 136,143,156). Coetzee characterises this complexity and 
elusiveness of meaning in a positive light. Against the truth imperative of Empire the 
novel counterposes uncertainty, arbitrariness, indecipherability, indeterminacy, the 
absence of resolution or closure. In a defining incident, the magistrate is interrogated 
about his collection of poplar slips found in excavated ruins and inscribed in an 
indecipherable script. Asked to interpret these supposedly secret messages, he delivers 
an invented but strategic reading of the slips that, from an imaginary barbarian 
viewpoint, is an attack on Empire, as well as being an assertion of textual 
indeterminacy:
'They form an allegory. They can be read in many orders. Further, each 
single slip can be read in many ways. Together they can be read as a 
domestic journal, or they can be read as a plan of war, or they can be 
turned on their sides and read as a history of the last years of the Empire 
- the old Empire, I mean. There is no agreement among scholars about 
how to interpret these relics of the ancient barbarians. Allegorical sets 
like this one can be found buried all over the desert'. (112)
Waiting for the Barbarians can be and has been read as an allegory. Yet, the non­
specific setting of the novel in both time and space, the clash between Empire and 
barbarian, resonates with and critiques a very particular time and place: apartheid South 
Africa in the late 1970s, at the height of a controversy over the treatment of detainees. 
Under emergency powers the administration of justice has passed from the hands of 
civilians into those of the Third Bureau. The Third Bureau operate through 
incommunicado detention and closed trials, with contempt for the ordinary police and 
the due process of law. As the magistrate reflects: "They will use the law against me as
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far as it serves them, then they will turn to other methods... To people who do not 
operate under statute, legal process is simply one instrument among many" (84, also 
123,125). In addition to the echoes of language, practice, and structure/institution, other 
details resonate quite specifically: official explanations given for a custodial death, for 
example, closely mirror those given in relation to the death of Steve Biko (6, also 
36,84).
The novel represents a complex and layered response to the first of Coetzee's dilemmas, 
that the writer go beyond the desire to ignore and/or represent to establish his/her own 
authority and imaginative terms. From without, circling around the sites of torture, 
Coetzee's magistrate seeks both to ignore and to represent. However, in part as the result 
of a desire to imagine/investigate implicit in the latter strategy, the potential is created 
for an altogether different authority when the magistrate himself passes through the 
various physical sites of torture/'spaces of death'. Coetzee's own authority, somewhat 
paradoxically, is based on indeterminacy and ambiguity, and invested in an allegorical 
reading of the novel's layered textuality. By writing a novel whose relationship to South 
Africa is that of an allegory, and placing at its centre the magistrate and a tortured 
female body beyond the available means of comprehension, Coetzee has devised a 
creative strategy in relation to torture that simultaneously seeks to ignore and represent 
and to neither ignore nor represent. He does not, can not, completely escape the 
collaborative hand of the oppressive state, and therefore is unable unequivocally to 
write without being written.
The fictional treatment of torture from South African literature which Coetzee applauds 
in "Into the Dark Chamber" is the episode in Nadine Gordimer's Burger's Daughter in 
which Rosa Burger encounters a old black man mercilessly flogging a donkey. This 
central moment in the/her story is an abstraction, sign, essence, summation, 
culmination:
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Not seeing the whip, I saw the infliction of pain broken away from the 
will that creates it; broken loose, a force existing of itself... torture 
without the torturer... pure cruelty gone beyond control of the humans 
who have spent thousands of years devising it. The entire ingenuity from 
thumbscrew and rack to electric shock, the infinite variety and gradation 
of suffering, by lash, by fear, by hunger, by solitary confinement - the 
camps, concentration, labour, resettlement, the Siberias of snow or sun, 
the lives of Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, Kathrada, Kgosana, gull-picked on 
the Island... the deaths by questioning, bodies fallen from the height of 
John Vorster Square, deaths by dehydration, babies degutted by enteritis 
in 'places' of banishment, the lights beating all night on the faces of those 
in cells... (1980:208)
Rosa Burger, like the magistrate, has arrived at a situation of self-induced helplessness 
and incoherence, at a recognition of complicity, in which meaningful intervention has 
become impossible. She drives on, turns her back on the scene and on South Africa with 
the words: "After the donkey I couldn't stop myself. I don't know how to live in [this] 
country" (210). But while her immediate response is flight, Rosa Burger ultimately 
returns to South Africa and to a deeper engagement with the country and its problems. 
That the magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians does not take this extra step is 
indicative of the fact that Coetzee's primary interest lies in a range of often quite 
intrusive theoretical concerns, in the realm of the aesthetics of violence and 
representation, rather than the particularities and practice of politics and place. Turning 
to the dilemma of how to represent the torturer provides further evidence in support of 
this hypothesis.
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Coetzee’s dominant narrative investment in this regard is in the task of deconstructing a 
dichotomous vision that separates self and 'other*, Empire and barbarian, torturer and 
magistrate. The magistrate is a man of the law, who believes in civilised behaviour, 
decency, decorum, in the old Empire for the return of which he retains a nostalgia; he is 
opposed to spectacle, abasement, degradation, savagery. The magistrate continually 
interrogates his own relationship to and complicity with torturer and Empire - mainly 
through the prism of the barbarian woman and their respective intimate attentions to her 
body - acknowledging proximity and asserting his distance (1982:5-6,27,43-4, also 81). 
Through the co-existence of proximity and distance, that are both embraced and 
rejected, the magistrate and the torturer can be seen as the two faces of the interrogator 
- good guy/bad guy (7) - and of Empire. The magistrate describes himself as "a jackal of 
Empire in sheep's clothing!" (72):
For I was not, as I liked to think, the indulgent pleasure-loving opposite 
of the cold rigid Colonel. I was the lie that Empire tells itself when times 
are easy, he the truth that Empire tells when harsh winds blow. Two 
sides of imperial rule, no more, no less. (135)
The implications of the ambiguous, uneasy self-positioning are profound. The 
magistrate is alienated from both sides, unsustainably in-between, an unsolicited go- 
between. He possesses a self-consciousness that never becomes (self-)knowledge, an 
unease, frustration, anger, shame and defiance, that lacks direction and consequently 
neither seriously impedes the Empire nor actively supports the barbarians. His is an 
opposition to Empire and a gesturing towards the barbarians that is partial, incomplete, 
always, even in its most determined acts of defiance, isolated, plagued and undermined 
by doubt (52,77-8,95-6,108,135,143,154-5). Colonel Joll mocks the magistrate's self­
perception as the "One Just Man" (113-14, also 104).
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The magistrate's selective assault on dichotomous thinking - in which the law and 
terror, the magistrate and the torturer, co-exist in a relationship of uneasy complicity - 
includes a resistance to demonising the perpetrators of violence, a resistance, in other 
words, to the creation of an alternative 'otherness' (84,104,146). But, in a contradictory 
move, the Empire becomes the enemy, the Third Guard the new barbarians (77-8,114). 
Furthermore, Coetzee employs a number of cliches about the torturer - dark glasses, 
clear blue eyes, black carriage - and wraps the 'dark chamber' and its practitioners in a 
cloak of theatre and mystery. The magistrate's attempts to understand the zone in which 
the torturer lives are not only unsuccessful but also similarly stereotyped (12,84,118, 
125-6). In relation to the second dilemma as to the first, Coetzee both reproduces and 
seeks to transcend the responses he criticises. In truth, what is achieved in the novel is 
less a negotiation or synthesis of oppositions, a middle way through exclusionary poles 
of experience, belief and power, than a collapse of Empire into barbarism and 
degradation, a descent into hell. A sense of impending apocalypse pervades the 
narrative, gathering pace towards its uncertain end.
With reference to the torturer, Coetzee states that the novelist has to solve the following 
problem: "how to justify a concern with morally dubious people involved in a 
contemptible activity; how to find an appropriately minor place for the petty secrets of 
the security system; how to treat something that, in truth, because it is offered... to 
terrorize the populace and paralyze resistance, deserves to be ignored". Those complicit 
in such activity and the shadow cast by the activity itself, however, lie at the very heart 
of Waiting for the Barbarians. It is unclear why the representation of the torturer rather 
than the tortured should be the dilemma. Similarly unclear is why within the complex 
set of alienations and affiliations - racially with oppressor, politically with the 
oppressed - experienced by white writers such as Coetzee, it is easier or morally more 
responsible to imaginatively bridge the experiential void with the former. Coetzee's 
deliberate and self-conscious refusal to give (his) voice to, to take upon himself the
authority to speak for and on behalf of, the 'other1, in this instance the torture victim, 
while in some ways both understandable and admirable, also has more negative 
consequences. How can the chasm between self and 'other' be bridged when the latter 
has no voice? Through the attentions of torturer and magistrate, Waiting for the 
Barbarians reproduces the violent silencing of torture: a body deprived of self, world, 
and voice is variously violated, inscribed and read, by others. This is the act of violence 
internal to the novel itself.
Where does this leave the torture victim? As a programme for change during a period of 
political turmoil, the blurring of distinctions between self and 'other' as a gesture from 
the precariously and uncomfortably powerful suggests tentative reform driven by guilt 
and fear rather than meaningful change; it suggests self-defence, -interest and - 
preservation. It is not a strategy for resistance; it would do nothing for the detainee 
facing the torturer other than undermine his/her defences. For the 'other1, deprived of 
voice and with the capacity for agency and, therefore, resistance curtailed/removed, 
change must come from within the realm of those in power. Using the strategies made 
available by Coetzee the torture victim must wait, not for the barbarians, but for the 
Empire to self-destruct.
Coetzee appears to conclude "Into the Dark Chamber" by asserting the existence of a 
parallel world - of the torture chamber, of the donkey being whipped, of pure violence 
and suffering, beneath good and evil - existing somehow outside morality and humanity. 
There is only suffering and waiting in furtherance and anticipation of the time when 
humanity will be restored to all and, therefore, all human acts will be returned to the 
ambit of moral judgement:
In such a society it will once again be meaningful for the gaze of the
author, the gaze of authority and authoritative judgement, to be turned
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upon scenes of torture. When the choice is no longer limited to either 
looking on in horrified fascination as the blows fall or turning one's eyes 
away, then the novel can once again take as its province the whole of 
life, and even the torture chamber can be accorded a place in the design.
These are extraordinary claims. Coetzee seems to both offer a strategy and an argument 
for the fictionalisation of torture and to preclude, at the time of writing, its realisation. 
Contradictions abound: the writer should not allow his/her agenda to be set by the state, 
but, provided with no opportunity for narrative/political intervention, must simply await 
the restoration of morality and humanity before torture can be meaningfully addressed. 
Thus torture can only be fictionalised when it is no longer taking place. Characteristic­
ally, Coetzee consistently elevates aesthetic and theoretical considerations over the 
practical/political.68 Nowhere is this clearer than in the ludicrously inflated authority - 
"the gaze of authority and authoritative judgement" - that he ascribes to the writer.
Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians is the bastard child within a family of novels - 
which include Mzamane’s The Children o f Soweto (1987), Sepamla's A Ride on the 
Whirlwind (1981) and Third Generation (1986), Serote's To Every Birth its Blood 
(1983), and Tlali's Amandla (1980) - that were written in the aftermath of and in 
response to the events that began in Soweto in June 1976. Following the detentions of 
this period, trials, custodial deaths and inquests, notably of Biko and Aggett, much more 
became known about the nature of interrogation and torture in South Africa. While the 
law attempted to provide a form of narrative closure, literature fought to keep the 
narrative, with all its latent and unresolved issues and questions, open. In general, it 
operated within a different, oppositional, regime of truth and power that sought to 
provide an alternative perspective on the 'space of death'. But writers of fiction also
co
This can be seen in the unhelpful blurring of important distinctions in Coetzee's 
treatment of torture that serve only to obfuscate. Such blurrings include those between 
desire, perversion, sadism, and power, and voyeurism, fantasy, pornography and 
imagination.
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operated in very different ways and with profoundly different aims from one another. 
Coetzee's dilemmas are those of oppositional white South African writers and, more 
specifically, his own preserve. Black writers, some of whom had been detained and 
tortured themselves, identified alternative dilemmas and agendas; they subjected 
custodial violence/death to a very different set of inscriptions and interpretations than 
either the inquest or that proposed/practised by Coetzee.
Such writers wrote novels as others wrote autobiographies: as realist, self-conscious 
acts of documentation, managed in accordance with a strategic political purpose, 
designed to take their place on a particular narrative and political battlefield. Their aim 
was to restore voice, self and world to the body wrapped in silence; to inflict reversals, 
and record/inspire resistance; to see through the official written record, broadcast its 
silences and unveil its hypocrisies. The issues interrogated included those more 
generally overlooked, obfuscated or misrepresented by the courts such as queries about 
the validity of detainee testimony. Novels of combative realism, that sometimes seemed 
to embrace the dilemma of writing the oppressive state while being written by it, 
generated their own range of problems and questions: What are the implications and 
responsibilities of making violation the subject of the imagination? Do such novels 
disclose more about particular kinds of narratives of survival and resistance than they 
do about life under apartheid itself? What purpose is served by the caricatured 
representations of the enemy that such works invariably contain? Do they confront, or 
in fact evade, the dilemma faced so starkly by Albie Sachs of whether the need was for 
idealistic stories of heroism or realistic preparation for capture? What will be the fate of 
such novels beyond the moment of their intervention? Finally, and most importantly for 
the analysis which follows, what truths are available to those who approach truth 
through realist fiction?
Realist fiction uncovers a series of very subversive questions about custodial
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violence/death and control. Within the interrogational encounter the interrogator and the 
detainee constitute for one another a kind of permanent limit, a point of possible 
reversal. While the former's power is virtually absolute it is flawed by the proximity of 
total control to its opposite, the total loss of control. By facilitating one, detention also 
facilitates the other. Usually, it is the detainee who is broken, and whose loss of control 
is objectified through the making of a statement/confession. While the detainee may try 
to control or 'manage' this process, while the product may be a chaos of fact and fiction, 
the detainee is inevitably fighting against losing control. There are circumstances, 
however, in which the detainee's capacity, mentally and physically, to resist, frustrate 
and provoke, may result in the interrogator losing control and the detainee losing his/her 
life. The torturer's task is to brutalise and maim, not to kill.6^
They're dangerous. One always had the feeling that one had to placate 
them... One was not so much afraid of the harm they might do you on 
purpose, but that they may lose control of themselves and maim or 
exterminate you, as it were, by accident... in a paroxysm of unresolved 
frustrations... when in their hands one must learn to become an expert in 
killer control. (Breytenbach 1985:48,50)
It's a fight... my idea is to make them go beyond what they wanted to 
give me and to give back as much as I can give so that it becomes an 
uncontrollable thing... So I said to them, '...If you allow me to respond,
I'm certainly going to respond. And I'm afraid you may have to kill me in 
the process even if it's not your intention'. (Biko 1979:153)
How should such a death be interpreted? Could it have been a moment, perhaps the 
supreme moment, of triumph for the detainee? Can such a violent death conceivably be
See Dingake 1987:102; on Biko’s death see Woods 197 9:264,358.
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termed a triumph? Is death the horizon towards which the detachment of self from body 
ultimately journeys? Does such a death, perhaps, represent the survival and triumph of a 
self and world preserved in silence even in the face of life-destroying pain; does it 
finally set the detainee free? Foucault argues that "death is power's limit, the moment 
that escapes it" (1991a:261). Again death can be seen as a weapon available to both 
torturer and detainee (see Abel 1995:254-5).
This chapter will conclude with an examination of some of these issues in Wessel 
Ebersohn's novel, Store Up The Angers  The protagonist, Sam Bhengu, detained many 
times, seven times in three years, has on this occasion been kept naked and in solitary 
confinement for 20 days. While the last hours of Bhengu's life in the hands of the 
security police in many ways resemble what is known of the similar period in Biko's 
life/death, Bhengu's past is entirely invented. Ebersohn himself has made clear that 
Store up the Anger is not a biography of Biko. But at the heart of this fictional life is an 
attempt to imaginatively represent and recreate, on the basis of the available evidence, 
the manner of Biko's death, the way in which his fatal injuries were sustained, the cause 
of death that the inquest failed to establish. The result is a fictional truth more 
persuasive and penetrating than the truthful fictions of the state archive (Green 
1994:100-1,105-6, also 108-9).
The novel opens with an acceptance of imminent and inevitable death - "Sam Bhengu 
knew that he was dying" (Ebersohn 1984:7) - and the temporal present of the narrative 
follows the last hours of Bhengu's life beyond this realisation. As Bhengu passes 
through the 'space of death' flashbacks accumulate his life history that has led to this 
particular violent present. The flashbacks culminate in the moment during the assault 
when Bhengu realises that he is going to die -"Something gave inside his head,
™  For other fictional depictions of custodial death, see La Guma 1972:169-75, Sepamla 
1981:179-83,212-17,228,234-41, Serote 1983:172-5,193,192-7,200.
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stopping the pain immediately. It was then that Sam Bhengu knew he was dying" (205) - 
thereby casting the reader back to the novel's opening line (Green 1994:104-5,108). As 
the narrative present unravels, a brutalised Bhengu comes to terms with the knowledge 
that he is dying and eventually he feels ready for death. The juxtaposition of going to 
die/ready to die is symptomatic of a shift in the balance of power that accompanies the 
process of dying.
The first component of this shift relates to time. Detention without trial is specifically 
designed so that the interrogator has as much time as he wants and needs; all the time in 
the world. When Bhengu is told that he can be kept there for as long as they like, until 
he tells them what they want to know, he thinks: "No, you can't... You can't keep me 
here. You can keep me for the moment, but you can't keep me for as long as you like. 
You can keep me until it's time, but you can't keep me any longer than that" (1984:15). 
Now that the security police have a finite, and diminishing, period of time to work on 
him, time is on his side and they are disempowered (37,161, also 70). Furthermore, 
Bhengu no longer feels any pain - "They must have broken whatever it is that feels the 
pain... Perhaps a nerve had been severed, cutting off the damaged part from the part that 
feels the pain" (8) - and fights, and eventually comes to terms with, his fear:
Bhengu hated his fear... He hated even more that they might see the fear 
on his face. And he hated it because he knew it to be unnecessary.
Rationally, Bhengu knew that he had nothing to fear. Everything they 
could do to him had already been done. But, in spite of what he knew to 
be true, he still feared them. He feared the loss of control he could see in 
Strydom's eyes and the traces of pleasure he could see in Engelbrechf s 
otherwise expressionless face. They held absolute power over their 
prisoners[...] No, it was not true. Their power over him was no longer 
absolute. He had no reason to fear them. (117, also 53-4,101-2,197)
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There is nothing more they can do to him, they can not harm him any more, therefore 
there is no further reason to fear them (11). As Bhengu gains control of his fear, they 
lose control of theirs which grows cumulatively : fear that he will successfully resist 
them, fear that orders were being/had been disobeyed, fear of what they had done, fear 
of being disciplined (196,201-3,205-6).
Initially Bhengu does not want to die and feels that his life and death have been for 
nothing (11,142,152-3, also 186). But in the end he is ready:
It was all right. Before it had been very bad, but now it was all right. He would 
be able to do it now... He knew that he was ready. It had taken a time to get 
there, but he had done it and he was ready... it was over now. Only one thing 
remained and he was able to do it... He knew he could do it now. It was going to 
be all right. (205-6)
Colonel Lategan tells Bhengu that he is complicit, indeed responsible, for his own 
death:
'...You're dying, aren't you? You're dying and you're blaming us. But we 
didn't kill you. You killed yourself. Where did you think this would all 
end? Did you think we'd allow it indefinitely? You’ve been at it for 
nearly twenty years. Did you think you could go on forever? It wasn’t van 
Rooyen and Fourie who killed you, Sam. You did it yourself. Any time 
in those twenty years you could have stopped and you would have saved 
yourself... You made your own choice... You killed yourself as surely as 
if you'd taken a knife and slit your own throat.' (186-7)
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Bhengu ferociously focuses his energy to reply, '"You also"'. But such a responsibility 
can be construed in an altogether different light. Bhengu is shown to have secured a 
measure of personal control during a past life constructed through a series of deliberate 
choices and commitments and a present in which the relationship between death, 
choice, and control casts Bhengu as the victor (Green 1994:105,108):
For the first time in his dealings with Lategan Bhengu felt a true moral 
superiority, a sense that matters were now in his control, not in the 
control of his adversary. Bhengu sensed that there was nothing Lategan 
could do now. And he sensed that Lategan shared the knowledge. His 
men had played all his cards and they had played them too fast. Whereas 
he still had his last card and he was busy playing it. His death would give 
him the game. (1984:127-8)^
The following lengthy quote about the actual assault on Bhengu brings together several 
of the themes in this section: voluntary and involuntary distancing; the tortured self as 
sensate body in pain; the transformation of pain into voice; the precise and arbitrary 
nature of violence and terror. Having provoked and attacked van Rooyen, Sam Bhengu 
is rendered defenceless (194-5,199):
Bhengu had heard o f the sand bag. Van Rooyen was crouching next to 
his face and holding it up for him to see... The first blow fell just below 
the base o f Bhengu's skull... It was a jarring shock that seemed to travel 
the length o f his spinal column, shuddering into his brain... Van Rooyen 
paused... The pause told Bhengu that that was the first one. Consider 
what ten such will do to you. Consider what a hundred will do. A 
thousand... To Bhengu it seemed that the assault was directed at eveiy
71 Also on custodial death as victory/triumph, see Bernstein 1986:352-3.
part o f him. The blows... vibrated through the length o f his body... There 
was only a moment's hesitation now when the next one fell, then the next 
and the next and the next,.. Bhengu had been through many forms o f  
interrogation... and one particular style had always been the worst.
There was nothing worse than having them work on you but asking no 
questions; inflicting pain but giving you no way by which to relieve it. 
With no questions asked you could give no answers. You could only 
endure. You were not even granted the pleasure o f resisting something. 
There was only pain. And Bhengu knew that van Rooyen understood 
this... Slowly the sense o f vibration grew... eventually reaching every 
nerve end o f his body. A heavy pain was spreading slow moving, first 
filling his head in the back o f his skull and seeping gradually upwards 
and forwards, each blow helping it on, moving it a little further... in his 
head and now flooding his body... He was retreating from the pain into a 
private place where he could do nothing but wait... The mumbling 
started when the pain was filling the whole case o f his skull so that there 
was no room for thoughts, only the thoughts that the pain itself forced on 
him. It was low in tone, the words indistinct, starting hesitantly in small 
bursts, but the bursts growing in frequency until the mumbling was not 
wavering for a moment, running on like a long murmured prayer.
Bhengu listened to his own voice carefully, trying to catch the words... 
The mumbling was filling the whole room... The pain was everywhere 
now... The pain and the mumbling were all one, running into each other. 
The pain had become the mumbling and the mumbling had become the 
pain... He wished there was some way he could stop [the mumbling], but 
his voice was operating independently o f his will, the sound running on 
freely... It's not me. It's my voice. Someone else is using my voice... There 
was no hesitation in the pattern o f the blows... working their inevitable
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destruction on the cells o f the brain... Van Rooyen's voice was far away, 
heard distantly against the thunder o f his own voice... I can hold out... I 
know what to expect now... Bhengu did not expect the scream. It was a 
single long-drawn hoarse note. It was worse than the mumbling, very 
much worse. Something gave inside his head, stopping the pain 
immediately. It was then that Sam Bhengu knew he was dying. (200-5)
Writings and readings of pain and power are derived from and situated within the 
difficult and often deliberately suppressed and falsified translations between body and 
voice, between the body in pain and the manner in which pain is made visible and 
'objective' in language. This is the realm, as Molefe Pheto writes with reference to his 
prison memoirs, of documents written by fists (1985:218). At the inquest following a 
custodial death the body was again fixed in a mass of documents, situated in a network 
of writing. Its story was told through various realist narrative forms: the police 
investigation, the post-mortem, the judgement. The story of the body has also been very 
differently told through the alternative truths of fiction.y* The body passing through the 
'space of death' was variously inscribed, represented and interpreted: various modes of 
discourse, including the legal and the literary, sought to (un)mask and appropriate the 
body's secrets and the scene of its death.
The Body and Memory
The body emerges from interrogation, and to a lesser extent imprisonment, as the site 
on/in which divergent discourses meet. It represents a further arena where constructions 
of truth and power are played out, the irrefutable and infinitely contestable evidence of 
a battle not only over truth and power, but also over life itself. The body, accumulating
7?
On the realist narrative forms that emerged together during the empiricist revolution 
of the seventeenth century, see Laqueur 1989.
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political (autobiographies, is violently (de/re)constructed and staged as a collaborative 
text. The body - "the most inherently political of all subjects" (Scarry 1994:40) - takes its 
place alongside the confession/statement at the heart of interrogation's layered textuality.
As the primary textual representations from the scene of torture the body and the 
statement/confession share certain characteristics - both are violently collaborative texts; 
the body and the word are weapons in the interrogational encounter that can inflict pain 
and/or confer power; and no authority exerts a sovereignty over their meaning or 
political function - but they can also be made to represent fundamentally different 
readings of pain and power. The translation of pain into state power is a transformation 
of body into voice, the body of the detainee into the voice of the state. Through the 
making of a statement/confession, the danger is that the body in pain is silenced, it lends 
its pain to the state by making it vocal, visible and 'objective' in a manner that can be 
misread as (self-)betrayal and state power. Pain, potentially, is neither acknowledged nor 
addressed and the body is effectively erased. Without, and sometimes in spite of, the 
superimposition of the written word, however, and also in the case of custodial death, it 
is the material reality and language of the body that becomes paramount. Those who die 
in custody are subject to the ultimate in silencing and erasure while simultaneously 
harbouring a discourse that inscribes the body as world. The Voices' of the detainee and 
the state, and an account of interrogation itself, are sealed on/in the body, its interiors 
and surfaces. The tortured body has a story to tell; it is a sealed envelope of pain and 
power.
Memory is inscribed on/in the body and its memory is long: de Certeau writes with 
reference to Latin America that a "history of resistance punctuated by cruel repression is 
marked on the Indian's body as much as it is recorded in transmitted accounts - or more 
so". The result is the "inscribing of an identity built upon pain" and the scarred body as
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"the index of a histoiy yet to be made" (de Certeau 1986:227).n Embodied memory is 
singular, idiosyncratic and radical, "the site for surrogate codes, for censored and excess 
experience" (Feldman 1991:15), for the otherwise unsaid and unsayable. Where the 
capacity to communicate is destroyed by pain and/or oppression, the body becomes an 
expression of injustice and suffering, a form of social and political criticism, and a 
repository of dangerous/unwanted knowledge and secret histories.m The body, its 
language and memory, combines an investment and/or corrective against conventional 
silences and avenues of forgetting with its own pathways of silencing and forgetting. If, 
as is often stated in South Africa, memory is a weapon, how is the contested memory of 
the body to be articulated and understood?^
It is appropriate to conclude with an image from the end of Gordimer's novel, The 
Conservationist, of a black body rising from its ill-considered and inadequate burial, to 
the surface of the earth, reclaiming and being reclaimed.
The one whom the farm received had no name. He had no family but 
their women wept a little for him. There was no child of his present but 
their children were there to live after him. They had put him away to
73 Many commentators have argued a similar point. Scarry states: "What is remembered in 
the body is well remembered” (1985:108-21,152), while Foucault notes that the body 
embodies history, descent, memory: "The body is the inscribed surface of events... 
totally imprinted by history..." (1991a:83, also 82,87-8; see Cronin, "A Tale of Why 
Tortoise Carries his Hut Upon his Back", 1987:103-4, Mohamed and Mofokeng in Russell 
1991:43-4,53).
^  It is important to note that memory is created through pain, and the body, in 
different ways. While in some cases pain destroys a sense of community by destroying the 
capacity to communicate, in others it leads to the possibility of new relationships.
Pain, for example in rites of passage such as initiation, creates a moral community out 
of those who have suffered. It is the means through which society integrates individuals 
into such a community and establishes the ties and responsibilities of membership and 
ownership. While in the case of torture it is through pain that the individual resists 
complete incorporation into society, here pain guarantees belonging and the body as 
memory is a sign of this belonging. Of course these two processes can coexist, as a form 
of unity in opposition and a mark of exclusion in relation to the 'other1 within a 
repressive design, in situations of occupation, colonisation and oppression.
75 The arguments of this paragraph owe a considerable debt to Das 1995:175-96, and to de 
Certeau 1986:227. Also on the relationship between the body and memory see Culbertson 
.1995, Khare 1995, and Kleinman and Kleinman 1994.
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rest, at last; he had come back. He took possession of this earth, theirs; 
one of them. (1978:267)
There is a dead body buried beneath the surface of South African life, beneath the 
surface of its psyche, its earth, its body-politic. The surface has formed a non-healing 
scab: a torturer-third force-dirty tricks-hit squad scab, an impunity-amnesty-forgive and 
forget scab. It is a scab that has never healed over a body that has never decomposed. 
The body was beaten to its death and buried in haste to be forgotten. But the scars and 
blood are still fresh and angry. It is a body with a memory and a story to tell. It needs to 
break through the sealed lips of the earth, to tell its story, once and for all, to have its 
say, to be healed and to die. There is a dead body.
SECTION 2 - EXILE AND HOMECOMING
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Chapter 3: Exile as a 'Space of Death'
i) Exile, Postcolonialism, Globalisation, Nationalism: and the case of Bloke 
Modisane
AH social marginals, all exiles, are splayed between these two poles or extremes - one a 
tendency towards death, the other a positive movement towards self-production, critical 
resistance and transformative struggle. (Grosz 1993:57)
Apartheid South Africa was the homeland of both imprisonment and exile. They 
constituted two foundational dimensions of the apartheid 'space of death', linked within 
the framework of repression and resistance by the co-ordinates of time and space.1 The 
exile like the prisoner serves time, and the sentence of exile like that of detention/life 
imprisonment is indefinite. Both develop their own routine and evolve "according to a 
different calendar" (Said 1984:172) in which landmarks and horizons are needed to 
inhabit what is otherwise a vast undifferentiated temporal landscape. Time within these 
"discrepant temporalities" is infinite and yet somehow lost, stacked and stopped, intense 
and empty (Clifford 1994:317-18). To navigate time is to both erect and/then erase 
landmarks to ease the pain of passage. Because otherwise, these are realms 
characterised by "a sameness of time", denying "full citizenship of the present", of "no­
time... whose inhabitants are strung between the rejected past and a future fashioned 
like a paper aeroplane out of manifestos and declarations" (Gordimer 1988:347,211, 
302, also 286). If the exile/prisoner is unable or unwilling to impose a present and 
presence on a context that constitutes their categorical denial - "the alien present... 
becomes the least relevant, most distant, most insubstantial of tenses" (Nixon 1994:116)
1
The commonalities between incarceration and exile were many and varied. For example: 
the whereabouts of those affected was often unknown to family/friends, and both involved 
the fragmentation of families and the harassment of activist's relatives/friends; 
communication, particularly between inside and outside, was of crucial importance; new 
arrivals renewed/maintained/reinforced contact between inside and outside and enabled 
prison and exile communities to combat stagnation; and, neither population was the 
result of a single definitive defeat or calamity but rather was formed by successive 
waves of political resistance and oppression.
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- life is lived in terms of memory and anticipation, in a nostalgic past and an idealised 
future which block out the present almost completely, and which through the continual 
and repetitive movement between the two become fused, melded in a realm outside 
time, often virtually indistinguishable. The present continues elsewhere in the exile's/ 
prisoner's absence.
Dislocation and disorientation are not only temporal but also spatial. Neither the prison 
nor exile occupies an absolute location. Both are forms of confinement, displacement 
and exclusion. In both, resistance attempts to un/remake space, the empty space of the 
prison cell and the one-dimensional landscape of exile, with the particularities of place; 
attempts to un/remake space, as it un/remakes time, so as not to be enveloped in its 
radiating blankness. The body, the senses, memory, the imagination, the spoken and 
written word, political activism and community, are among the weapons of inscription. 
The previous chapter mapped out the terrain of transgressing and remaking for the 
prisoner. For the exile, however, spatial inscription - transgression and remaking - lays 
bare the dilemma of the exilic condition. Exile is a realm of "no-place"; ’"no place that 
belongs even to the dead. That is the greatest dispossession there is. Even to be in 
prison in your own country is to have a place there'" (Gordimer 1988:211,260 also 
286,288,291,314). To transform exilic space into place, to create a new home and 
belong, is both an essential human need and an act of personal redefinition. The rift, 
upon which the exile's identity is forged and depends, is between the monolithic, 
undifferentiated space of exile and what Mphahlele brands "the tyranny of place"
(1984), or/as home. For the exile, the space/place interaction is forged most importantly 
in the distinction between the two, not, in the absence of return, in the transformation of 
one into the other. There is only one border:
There's a strange feeling once you are out of your home that you're in the 
world. This thin line between inside and outside; once you are not inside,
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you are outside. It just didn't occur to me that there was any other border 
in the world... (Ngcobo in Bernstein 1994:351)
The national border is wrapped around the exile as a cloak of security and belonging to 
prevent exile becoming a prison without boundaries, borders or frontiers. It is the border 
that is crossed without being erased; the frontier along which the battle is fought, its 
deepest scar and ultimate prize. And so the blank space of exile that is inevitably, if 
provisionally, inscribed as place, and even as home, is also marked and criss-crossed 
with landmarks and borders that have been erased in order to keep the space of exile 
blank, in order to keep open the promise of return. The exile’s journey through space, 
like that of the prisoner, inscribes and erases boundaries, ultimately attempting to erase 
all but the single border that delimits home, and thereby transgresses and un/remakes 
the space that is traversed.
For both the prisoner and the exile now and then, here and there, are experienced 
simultaneously but differently. The territories of fragmented, multiple and juxtaposed 
times and spaces/places are infused with an oppositional politics which contests the 
un/re-making of time and space/place at the hands of the state. Linkages forged between 
inside and outside, for example, continually undermine and rearticulate the state's 
repressive design. The prisoner and the exile stand with arms locked over the 
discontinuities of time and space.
The topography of exile included a further dimension: exile as a 'space of death'. The 
many deaths of exile were both symbolic and terribly real. They included the death of 
solidarity, idealism and hope, the tragic self-destruction of drink and suicide, the loss of 
innocence and childhood - notably through violence and pregnancy - and the similarly 
incalculable loss and waste of creative death. The pain of isolation and severance from 
people and places at home was exemplified by the deaths of the people and places.
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Such deaths were marked for the exile by enforced absence, by partial and delayed 
information, and by the deprivation of the sense of closure provided by rituals of grief 
and mourning.
There are things that can never be finished in exile, like when my mother 
died. It's an open wound to me. It doesn't close. You see, those who were 
there they had a chance to mourn - and then they can start to live again.
But me, I feel I haven't mourned. I am traditional inside still. There are 
certain rituals that we believe in, and I need to take part in them.
(Katleho Moloi in Bernstein 1994:186, also Kasrils 1993:79)
Perhaps the greatest fear of the exile is that s/he will die in exile. "[M]ust I then be 
separated from my grave?" writes Breytenbach (1985a:209). To die in exile is to be 
separated from ancestors and a "world without end / of the dead" (268). It is to have the 
umbilical chord severed, to be cut adrift. Fearing death in exile Mphahlele wanted to 
return home to die on ancestral ground: "I want to go home to die... I  am deady 
(Chabani Manganyi 1983:289).2 To be in exile is to be constantly diminished by death, 
to be variously dead. In essence, the rift between exile and home is "like death but 
without death's ultimate mercy" (Said 1984:160).
One of the most important parallels between exile and imprisonment is that as 
multifaceted 'spaces of death' they both harbour the potential for a counter-discourse 
which can remake shattered times and places, identities and histories, within narratives 
of resistance, and thereby transform variously inflicted death into forms of life. This
2
There was, inevitably, a "procession of death" in exile: "How far away from home, and 
how far away from one another, they have died!... Everywhere, in the foreign lands there 
is a little bit of South Africa where they lie buried" {Kathrada in Resha 1991:242-3).On 
the death of family members in exile, see Ntantala 1993:217-23,227-9,234 and Resha 
1991:227-64.
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chapter will explore some of the dimensions and transformations of this exilic space of 
life and death, but first it is necessary to situate the dynamics of exile within, and to an 
extent rescue it from, current discourses on displacement and migration.
Exile and the Postcolonial Blur3
The pervasive metanarrative of migration dominates postcolonial discourse. The 
migrant becomes "perhaps, the central or defining figure of the twentieth century". 
Migration as metaphor "is everywhere around us". "We all cross frontiers", continues 
Salman Rushdie, "in that sense, we are all migrant peoples" (1991:277-9). The figure of 
the migrant is at once unsettled and unsettling, decentred and in-between, hybrid/ 
polyglot and continually engaged in cultural translation and mediation. The 
transgression/transcendence of border and boundary and the embrace of a pot-pourri 
pollution is depicted as pervasive and all but universal as reality and preferable as 
prescription. This package of characteristics is seen as encompassing the construction 
of individual and collective identity; cultural form and content, theory and criticism; the 
work of author, critic and academic; their inter-relationships, and more. A major 
shortcoming of this scenario is that the new dictatorship of difference has/will become 
as universalising as the paradigms it seeks to contest. Anne McClintock is not alone in 
being struck by how seldom the term postcolonialism is used to denote multiplicity 
(1992:86,97). This homogenous heterogeneity and the paradoxical obfuscation of 
difference constitute the postcolonial blur. Postcolonial brokers variously negotiate 
binaries and blur distinctions: between the forms, stages and specificities of 
postcolonial conditions; between North and South, centre and periphery, elite and 
majority; between the powerful and the powerless, oppressor and oppressed, tyranny
3
The following critique of postcolonialism, owes a debt to previous analyses and 
discussions. See, in particular, Ahmad 1992, Appiah 1992, Frankenberg and Mani 1993, 
McClintock 1992, Shohat 1992. For analyses of postcolonialism in the context of South 
Africa, see a special issue of C u r r e n t  W r i t i n g  5/2 1993, and Carusi 1993, Thornton 1996.
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and resistance; between sameness and difference, continuity and rupture/rift; and, most 
crucially for the purposes of this chapter, between forms of displacement and mobility. 
Intrinsic to the latter example is the tendency to equate the conditions and 
characteristics of all displaced and mobile people, be they exiles, refugees, migrants, 
expatriates or simply travellers, within the umbrella of migrancy or diaspora, or, as in 
the example cited below, in scatterings and gatherings:
I have lived that moment of the scattering of the people that in other 
times and other places, in the nations of others, becomes a time of 
gathering. Gatherings of exiles and emigres and refugees, gatherings on 
the edge of'foreign' cultures; gathering at the frontiers; gatherings in the 
ghettos or cafes of city centres; gathering in the half-life, half-light of 
foreign tongues, or in the uncanny fluency of another's language... 
gathering the past in a ritual of revival; gathering the present. Also the 
gathering of the people in the diaspora: indentured, migrant, interned... 
the genealogy of that lonely figure that John Berger named the seventh 
man. (Bhabha 1990:291)
What is affected by this definitional vagueness, by the elision of difference within the 
mapping of migrancy/displacement, and indeed by other similar elisions, is a false 
alignment of the elite migrant writer/intellectual. This alignment enables the writer/ 
intellectual to claim a constituency and an audience, and the right to speak in an 
authoritative way for and on behalf of variously defined others.4 Aijaz Ahmad has 
voiced relevant criticisms of what he calls "an opportunistic kind of Third-Worldism" 
and the "incredibly inflationary rhetoric" of exile: "[ejxile, immigration and professional 
preference become synonymous and, indeed, mutually indistinguishable" (1992:86).
4
Also see Rob Nixon's critical discussion of what he calls the "license of exile" in 
relation to V. S. Naipaul (1992:17-43).
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From the perspective of the exile, loose talk of exile and homelessness as postcolonial 
metaphor, existentialist dilemma and/or universal condition, is mere posturing. "Anyone 
who is really homeless", writes Said, "regards the habit of seeing estrangement in 
everything modem as an affectation, a display of modish attitudes" (1984:167).
Postcolonial writers and intellectuals occupy a very particular position. As a 
generalisation, but one that does not degenerate to the level of caricature, the high 
priests and priestesses of postcolonialism are from the South but are based in the 
Western metropolis. They are members of a migrant elite which straddles North and 
South in such a way as to reject national affiliation. The focus of their work is the world 
of empire and its contemporary traces, the colonial-postcolonial axis, rather than the 
complex intersection of this axis with other axes of historical explanation or domination 
and resistance. Similarly, many disciples of postcolonialism provide a fractured but 
linear historical reading in which an era of colonialism/decolonisation/nationalism has 
been overtaken by postcolonialism, exile by migrancy, rather than studying the complex 
of similarities, continuities and differences between the two (Ranger 1996) and/or the 
processes as taking place simultaneously within an overlapping, even circular, historical 
matrix. The valorisation of a migrant hybridity embraces contradiction, ambiguity and 
ambivalence, irony and scepticism, the exotic and the fantastic, in preference to the 
certainties, unities, and necessary choices and sacrifices of allegiance/affiliation and 
resistance. The chosen theoretical framework of the postcolonial is similarly post - 
modem/structuralist6 - accompanied by a movement away from a concern with material 
reality to its construction and representation in discourse. Categories of movement and 
displacement are appropriated and used, at least in part, on the basis of aesthetic or
5
On the distinctions between different forms of displacement and migration, see 
McCarthy 1971 and Nixon 1992:21-8.
6
The specificities of convergence and difference between the postcolonial and the 
postmodern, both of which come in various guises and resist easy definition, require 
further interrogation (see Appiah 1992:221-54 and During 1993).
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theoretical preference. Exile, with its supposedly old fashioned and negative 
connotations of political fixity and fundamentalism, is replaced by migrancy as a 
framework of analysis because it has more positive or diverse associations.
Postcolonialism sheds a dangerously partial and selective light on contemporary 
relations of power. It establishes no unequivocal structures or forces of domination and, 
equally, no unequivocal grounds for or means of opposition. It has no political or 
ideological core, provides no unifying common ground, around which to forge alliances 
or mobilise constituencies. It is not an ideology of resistance. It is a theory that can be 
persuasively applied to areas of identity construction, certain trends in cultural 
production and criticism, and the position defined and occupied by some intellectuals, 
artists and academics. Postcolonialism is perhaps best summed up as a method and/or 
style, articulated by a small intellectual elite whose condition and predicament it 
defines.7 The work of postcolonial novelists or critics is profoundly autobiographical. 
An emergent but still selective and exclusive world is written into being as the norm, 
with the postcolonial as it model, at its centre. The world becomes one through them 
and in their image. This scenario ignores the fact that the polyglot traveller is the 
exception, even, and still, an aberration, within the present world order, not the rule. It 
enshrines a world-view that resonates very selectively with the politics, movements/ 
displacements, nationalisms, and culture of South Africa.
One aim of this chapter is to reclaim the particularities of exile, especially the South 
African experience of exile, and its insistence on politics and place, from the 
postcolonial blur. South Africa has experienced many forms of population movement
7
Appiah's attempt to define ways in which postcoloniality both is and is not a 
meaningful way of understanding African literature/culture leads him to describe 
postcoloniality as "the condition of what we might ungenerously call a c o m p r a d o r  
intelligentsia: of a relatively small, Western-style, Western-trained, group of writers 
and thinkers, who mediate the trade in cultural commodities of world capitalism at the 
periphery" (1992:240, also 250). The definition outlined above differs only in that it 
would close the quotation with "centre" or "metropolitan centre", rather than periphery.
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and displacement. As diasporic source and sanctuary it has been, at specific times and 
places, part of the flow of migrants "specialising in the cross-country" (Sher, 1992:14) 
as starting point, way-station and destination. The specificities of apartheid politics and 
history, however, meant that forced displacement, that was both internal and external, 
predominated over more voluntary movement, as both experience and metaphor, and 
that at the heart of a range of displacements was the rift of exile. As a result, 
understanding the distinctiveness of exile is enormously important. Ahmad stresses the 
difference between personal convenience and/or professional choice and forced 
exclusion by the state or fear of annihilation. "I mean not privilege but impossibility, 
not profession but pain" (1992:85-6). Exile is primarily an experience that speaks of 
violence and pain, of principle, politics and place, of resistance to a regime and to the 
enforced displacement that takes place in its name.8
It is, furthermore, the exile's intention to return. In the meantime, while Breytenbach 
admits that the exile is ultimately marginal, he maintains that s/he retains the capacity 
to be a producer of dissonance and awareness - "I consciously try to shape my work... as 
contributing to the awareness of Africa" - "an underground activist for Africa". He 
argues the exile should be an interpreter abroad, an envoy, even if s/he has no mandate, 
constantly trying to focus attention on the nature of reality back home; must maintain a 
dialogue with the inside, be a conduit to filter back subversive ideas, "bark all along the 
borders"; and s/he may have to try and save that which is menaced by extinction on the 
inside (Breytenbach 1986:75-6,1996:47),
The universalising tendency of postcolonialism is based in part on the increasing 
interconnectedness of the contemporary world. Strikingly parallel elements within the
8
Categories of movement and displacement are not only different from each other but 
vastly internally heterogeneous. The South African experience of exile, for example, was 
diverse, differentiated, among other things, by race, class, gender, and geography.
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process of globalisation include transnational capitalism and culture, the 
internationalisation of information, communication and technology flows, and global 
relations of force. In an essay by Masao Miyoshi (1993), transnational corporatism, seen 
as a form of colonialism/imperialism, is defined in a manner that in several ways is 
similar to the generalised definition given above of the postcolonial intellectual: as no 
longer tied to a nation of origin but adrift and mobile, with no respect for borders or 
frontiers; as self-serving, representing neither home nor the host nation but only (a new 
constituency centred around) themselves. Pursuing this line of argument a stage further 
it can be argued that postcolonialism, with its often uncritical embrace of hybridity and 
syncretism, represents and advocates a 'free' market of the word and mind, with both the 
advantages and inherent shortcomings that such a 'free' global market implies.
Aspects of contemporary culture can be global, however, without it being the culture of 
every person in the world (Appiah 1992:232). South Africa is a particularly stark 
example of the fact that access to the resources of globalisation, and it can be argued of 
postcolonialism, is characterised by massive inter- and intra-national inequality. Large 
parts of this particular revolution relating to information, knowledge, wealth and power, 
with their attendant revolutions in identity and spatial organisation, have bypassed 
equally large parts of (South) Africa. It is important to understand the way in which 
globalisation works: as a complex of resources and strategies predicated upon the 
dynamics of power, oppression and resistance, exclusion and inclusion. Nkosi's 
observations from an earlier era still, to a significant degree, apply: he states that while 
white South African writers could become indigenised as, for example, English writers, 
or 'international1 writers, black writers, not purely as a matter of political choice, 
remained South African (or African), 'national', and on the margins of foreign cultures 
and life (1983:94-5). Globalisation operates as a dynamic of both choice and force; as a 
system facilitating, and indeed dependent upon, levels of participation that differ in 
degree, scale, composition and purpose; as an exercise that erases some borders and
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boundaries only to redraw and establish others; and as a surface that is continually 
ruptured, and thereby transformed, by the particularities of politics and place.
At the level of culture, the relationship between the local and the international takes the 
form of an exchange that, although fundamentally unequal, operates in both directions. 
Local culture is transformed by a process that encompasses submission, mimicry, 
adaptation, syncretism, appropriation, and resistance. As a result the particularities of 
place are un/remade with the complicity of the locality, re-placed, not simply erased.
Ulf Hannerz, drawing on the example of Nigeria and writing about a cultural spectrum 
or continuum of creolisation operating at national and international levels, writes the 
following: "The world system, rather than creating massive cultural homogeneity on a 
global scale, is replacing one diversity with another; and the new diversity is based 
relatively more on interrelations and less on autonomy" (1987:555). The exchange 
between the local and the global, like the related interaction between dwelling and 
mobility/displacement, is characterised by uneven connection, convergence, 
homogenisation and the creation, invention, emergence of new kinds of difference 
alongside forms of continuity and recovery (see Clifford 1988:1-17).9
Apartheid South Africa occupied a particular position within the world system - as a 
state which produced two conditions of exile, the exile of South Africa itself as an 
international pariah state and the exile of those forced to leave their homeland (Rieff 
1994:111) - a position which led to a unique matrix of global isolation and linkage, 
difference and similarity. This matrix is thrown into sharp profile when seeking to apply 
aspects of the theoretical terrain outlined above.
9
The debate surrounding the construction of cosmopolitanism forms a relevant tangent to 
this discussion. While Tim Brennan (1989), for example, has rigorously critiqued those 
he calls "Third World cosmopolitan celebrities", in another strand of this debate, 
attempts have been made to encompass, negotiate in-between, bind together, transcend, 
the local/global divide in relation to conceptions of cosmopolitanism. See Clifford's 
"discrepant cosmopolitanisms" (1992:108) and Rabinow's "critical cosmopolitanism" 
(1986:258). A  general overview is contained in Robbins 1992.
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Purity, Difference, Hybridity: Exile and the Nation/Nationalism
APARTHEID: by itself the word occupies the terrain like a concentration camp. System 
of partition, barbed wire, crowds of mapped out solitudes... the glaring harshness of 
abstract essence (heid) seems to speculate in another regime o f abstraction, that of 
confined separation. The word concentrates separation, raises it to another power and 
sets separation itself apart... By isolating being apart in some sort o f essence or 
hypostasis, the word corrupts it into a quasi-ontological segregation. At every point, like 
all racisms, it tends to pass segregation off as natural - and as the very law o f the origin...
It institutes, declares, writes, inscribes, prescribes... it outlines space in order to assign 
forced residence or to close off borders. It does not discern, it discriminates. (Derrida 
1985:292)
South Africa belongs to all who live in it. (Preamble to the Freedom Charter)
Apartheid's essence was separation and segregation, the attempt to violently forge 
multiple racial/national purities from a plural populace. Hybridity and syncretism were 
outlawed. The chosen (re-)constructions of identity were projected and engraved onto 
the mapping of space. The lines of societal division were not, however, unitary and 
clear-cut but multiple, shifting and often contradictory to apartheid's design. They 
included differences of race but also of class, gender, language, religion, political 
affiliation, and generation, differences contingent upon and feeding into a changing 
economy, differences between the literate and the non-literate, urban and rural, the First 
World and the Third. Diversity and hybridity were the reality; purity, even in the 
context of enforced segregation, the myth. Stark, state imposed, boundaries between 
insider and outsider were blurred and became the subject of economic negotiation and 
political contestation. Ideological and spatial borders were rendered flexible, mobile 
and porous - as suggested by the advent of cross border initiatives and commuting, and 
by the notion of 'soft borders' - characterised by increasingly complex, incoherent and 
unmanageable, strategies of inclusion and exclusion. These developments, concentrated 
in the 1980s, articulated a profound challenge to apartheid. It was confronted by 
internal contradictions, by ambiguous and indeterminate elements that resisted
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categorisation, and by unambiguous resistance. The logic of apartheid, and apartheid 
itself, was under attack (see Norval 1994).
And yet politically, hybridity was often an explosive and hazardous commodity. The 
status of the 'coloured' community is one case in point. Frontiers on both sides were 
often clearly, if usually differently, drawn; it was important to know whose side one 
was on; the ground in-between was a battle ground. To take a political stance in the 
pursuit of societal change involved making choices. Certain possibilities were affirmed 
while others were renounced, options were chosen at the inevitable expense of others. 
There were detrimental factors - ambivalence, contradiction, incapacitation with 
reference to political action - attached to being inside too many things.10 The penchant 
for purity was not a monopoly of the state. Terry Eagleton has demolished with lovely 
irony the notion that difference and plurality - of fascist parties? of social classes? of 
categories of oppression? - are unquestionably good in themselves regardless of their 
political substance and context. The ANC are one of the organisations cited who 
obviously do not subscribe to the relevant academic journals, and who, as a result, 
"obtusely continue to strive to achieve the maximum degree of agreement and solidarity 
among the people of the townships in order to bring the apartheid regime to its knees" 
(1990:87). Discourses predicated on the intrinsic desirability of hybridity and difference 
are often fundamentally undermined when applied to politically riven situations.
Grant Farred, for example, in the context of South Africa just prior to majority rule, 
outlines a scenario in which an alliance between the ANC and the National Party 
government and the growing hegemony of the ANC within black communities, has 
marginalised and silenced the left. He proposes "that the policy of divide and rule be 
stood on its head and utilised imaginatively by South Africans serious about their
10
See Ahmad's discussion of the work of Edward Said (1992:159-219).
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commitment to a radical restructuring of their society" (1992:227), and that a space, 
violently established by the differences and divisions forged by apartheid oppression 
and resistance to it, be used to give voice to other forms of difference, in particular the 
dissenting voice of leftist politics. At one important juncture between violence and 
difference stand the IFP. The 'killing fields' of South Africa, Farred argues, "seem to 
have unleashed a set of political energies that can be used in the struggle against ANC 
hegemony in the black community: the staging of difference gives some shape to the 
ideological battles that are being waged elsewhere between the ANC and its 
opponents", battles taking place, he claims, in labour unions, sports and community 
organisations, and religious groupings. In this increasingly oppressive environment "it 
appears", apparently, "that the only site that continually stages acts of dissent is that of 
cultural difference" which has "therefore made available the political space in which to 
rethink political alliances" (231). Farred advocates a counter-hegemonic power bloc of 
the left, an "organizational hybrid... steeped in difference" (231).
As political analysis this is seriously flawed; as a political programme it is simply 
nonsense. It is important to stress that the society being described is one in the process 
of transition, albeit an imperfect one, from apartheid to majority rule and democracy. 
Farred's proposals overlook the enormous dangers and contradictions of using 
apartheid's violent mapping of difference to serve his avowedly leftist ends, and the 
imperative to go beyond the tainted residue of apartheid's imprint on South African 
identities and social fabric, as both a means and an end, to mobilise and create 
communities and the nation anew. What are the dynamics of this reversal-in-continuity 
of difference? Is violence to be condoned and perpetuated? It is unclear how the 
practice of'divide and rule' can be turned on its head; how the divisions of apartheid 
society or the space they supposedly created or the political energies unleashed by 
carnage can serve the politics of the left against the ANC, particularly as much of the 
left remains within the ANC; or how the staging of difference between the IFP and the
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ANC gives shape to the ideological battles between the ANC and groups that are or 
were its allies. It is patently untrue that cultural difference constitutes or has ever 
constituted the only site continually staging acts of political dissent. Insufficient 
attention is given to the relationship between the many forms of difference in South 
Africa - how is one form of difference transformed into another? - or to the power 
relations relating to difference in a country where, as Farred acknowledges in passing, 
to be different is often to be dead. It is not contradictory to claim both that South Africa 
needs to nurture a greater tolerance for difference while at the same time insisting that 
there are certain kinds of difference that it could easily, and productively, do without.
In another context, that of border discourses, the notion of hybridity, while arguably 
more suggestive and offering more interesting possibilities, is still highly problematic.
The concept of the border is a crucial metaphor in South African fiction. 
Whether it is a cutting edge or a neutral space, a dividing line or an intermediate 
phase in between opposites, a condition of the soul or a physiographical region, 
it represents an ambiguous and unavoidable trope in novels which... deal with 
literal and metaphorical boundaries. The border is a point both in space and in 
time which separates and juxtaposes, a field of action that centres upon the 
encounter and/or separation between known territory and unexplored ground, 
Europe and Africa, North and South, British and Afrikaner, white and black, 
civilization and savagery, law and lawlessness, Christian and pagan, gun and 
assegai, settled... and nomadic... (Oboe 1994:37)
The border conjures up the related spectres of the frontier, colonialism, exploration, 
travel, and conquest. It is perilous terrain for both oppressor and oppressed. 
Breytenbach writes: "I have a mind crisscrossed by borders, the knife edges between 
safety and death" (1985:115, bracket omitted). The SADF's 1975 invasion of Angola
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and the subsequent deployment of the army to fight on the borders of South Africa and 
Namibia can be seen within this context and history. But the border was to tighten like a 
noose around and within South Africa. The border was brought back home by returning 
soldiers: '"It's the border... We bring it back with us'" (Wilhelm, "Veterans", 1987:25). 
From the mid-1980s, and the deployment of the army in South Africa's violence-racked 
townships, the border/frontier and its violence was relocated/returned to the metropole, 
as a component of and commentary upon apartheid's decline (Haarhoff 1991:193-223). 
The border, and therefore the enemy, was both within and without; everywhere.
From this context came a particular narrative of the border: a largely Afrikaans 'border 
literature'.11 It is, on the one hand, a literature of immediacy, experience and 
documentation, but as Koomhof additionally argues, it is also a literature written by 
those who have no experience of the army or the border (1989:275,277-8,281-2). It is a 
literature of internalisation and projection: a sense of the pervasive violence, permanent 
tension, and constant conflict and insecurity of everyday life in South Africa, were both 
internalised/personalised and transposed/projected on to a war setting and the border. 
Although the setting is one of war, therefore, the issues explored have greater 
applicability and relevance. Significantly, border fiction contains/implies a rejection of 
the politics of apartheid and a questioning of previous values and beliefs. Works 
explore and communicate the fracturing and disintegration of Afrikaner identity, unity 
and hegemony; the "erosion of ideas" (279), the grand ideas of apartheid; the loss of 
certainty; the first encounter with black South Africans on an equal footing, in an 
equalising context; and, the context enables the exploration of shifting power relations 
and changing group dynamics amongst whites, the depiction of new alliances, 
identities, strategies. The result is a tangible sense of fragmentation, incoherence,
11
Among border literature1s most notable exponents are Etienne van Heerden, Alexander 
Strachan, Louis Kruger, George Weideman, and Koos Prinsloos. While predominantly an 
Afrikaans genre, some work written originally in English, and some translated into 
English, is available.
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confusion, disorientation, of displacement and alienation, of the need and possible means 
to survive, and the search for the familiar, meaning, belonging, security. The vision is 
often apocalyptic.
The overtly and specifically political, however, is subsumed by the personal and by more 
existential, psychological and philosophical concerns. Rebellion is individualised and 
often eccentric. Borders are geographical, racial, political, cultural, sexual, personal; 
metaphors for division, but also potential transformation, in a context of conflict: "all the 
borders are now fronts and firelines" (Breytenbach, "destination", 1988:8). The border is 
less a geographical or cartographical demarcation than a way of seeing and narrating the 
world; it, also, is variously internalised and projected. In a manner that resembles the 
blank space of exile the geographical setting of these works is simply hostile terrain, 
anonymous, the border and enemy unnamed, the conflict non-specific. A political and 
historical reality becomes metaphor and myth.12
The border contains the potential for an outcome other than polarisation and violence. If 
one such outcome is an isolation and estrangement as neither one thing nor the other, on 
neither one side nor the other, another is a related meeting place in-between worlds, a 
translational position between the self and the 'other'. Du Plessis writes, in relation to the 
post-Soweto novels written when the dominant oppositional political paradigm was 
Black Consciousness, that "[t]he white antagonist of these novels, the racial other, is 
drawn very differently from blacks in recent Afrikaans writing" (1987:39). In a manner 
shared by some English writers, Afrikaners are caricatured as oppressors. "In recent 
Afrikaans writing, however, with its more phenomenological approach, subject and 
object interpenetrate... share the same emotion, they almost mirror each other", whereas 
in the aforementioned black novels "the subject and object of violence are construed as
12
The above two paragraphs draw extensively on Koornhof 198 9. For the impact of the 
border on interrogation/torture, see van Heerden's stories "My Cuban" and "My Afrikaner" 
(1992:74-83,84-95).
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polar opposites, not sharing the same human reality at all... the guilt for suffering is 
never owned, it is always attributed to the other" (39-40). These were the two main 
approaches of the time to violent change: "One is the ’border literature' in Afrikaans 
which explores the horror of violence brought home to roost in sometimes rather vague 
liberal-existential terms. The other paradigm is that of Black Consciousness and 
nationalism, though in the most recent works there is also a strong socialist and populist 
rhetoric underpinning the descriptions of violence" (40-1). Du Plessis concludes by 
advocating a form of hybridity, "the alchemical paradigm" (41). These divergent 
constructions of identity are no coincidence: at its most stark resistance, like oppression, 
is forged on absolute unity and polarisation, while, in the midst of ideological decline 
and bankruptcy, some tainted by association with the oppressor - the magistrate in 
Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians is a powerful example - attempt to forge new, if 
often self-interested, understandings of the relationship between self and 'other', of the 
past, present, and ways to survive in the future.13
As the above examples illustrate, the embrace of hybridity and difference as political 
strategy and mode of analysis has complicated and frequently negative connotations and 
consequences in politically fraught situations, particularly for the oppressed. Proponents 
of postcolonialism have, however, raised important questions about the nature of 
solidarity and resistance. For example: are they necessarily the result of a totalising 
discourse and practice? is it possible, and indeed preferable, to mobilise resistance on 
the basis of an identity that is multiple and heterogeneous? Homi Bhabha talks of the 
fragmentation of identity not as "a kind of pure anarchic liberalism or voluntarism" but
13
In a way that echoes Coetzee1s concerns about the narrativisation of torture - about 
the state setting the terms of engagement, about clich£d characterisation - Ndebele has 
voiced criticisms of South African writing, notably a number of post-Soweto novels: of a 
literature of stereotype, caricature, and stark polarities; of surface, symbol, slogan 
and spectacle rather than of process, interiority and the ordinary; of a literature 
which engages the state/apartheid on its own terms (1994:17-74).
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as "a recognition of the importance of the alienation of the self in the construction of 
forms of solidarity".
It is only by losing the sovereignty of the self that you can gain the 
freedom of a politics that is open to the non-assimilationist claims of 
cultural difference. The crucial feature of this new awareness is that it 
doesn't need to totalise in order to legitimate political action or cultural 
practice. (1990a:213)
And yet such a construction of political agency remains at the level of abstract 
theorising. Which emancipatory projects can be said to have successfully based 
themselves on such a strategy? It is no coincidence that 'divide and rule’ is a slogan of 
oppression and not of resistance. To further interrogate the nature of liberatory 
discourse and practice it is helpful to consider the characteristics of and relationship 
between exile and the nation/nationalism.
Contemporary globalisation is being accompanied and countered by various forms of 
localisation, of which perhaps the most visible is often narrow, fundamentalist, ethnic 
nationalisms. The surface skim of postcolonial politics is a trademark of the migrant. In 
contrast, the politics of exile are obsessively rooted in the politics and place of home. 
Dennis Brutus asks, "How then do I justify / this stubborn single-track anxiety / for this 
one place? / this mad, silly, pitiable concern?" ("In Teheran", 1978:62). By way of 
explanation Rian Malan states, "South Africa holds the souls of its sons and daughters 
in an almost inescapable grasp. History cast all of us in a strange and gripping drama..." 
(1991:102). To paraphrase Keorapetse Kgositsile, the exile crosses innumerable borders 
without leaving home (1991). The exile is separated from home precisely because of a 
deep love for and commitment to his/her country:
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the worst things about it [exile] is that you are just separated from your 
country. It's, you know, you didn't want to leave, you left your country to 
come back to liberate it... you loved your country enough in the first 
place to actually make that type of sacrifice, you know, to commit 
yourself in that manner. And to be separated from that very country and 
the peoples that you love so much is a very wrenching... I suppose it's 
always best described by Dennis Brutus’s poems... like a simple lust, the 
title of one of Dennis Brutus's anthologies, and that's what it is, it's a 
simple lust. (Williams interview)
The exiled writer, therefore, does not share the postcolonial preoccupation with or 
tendency to re-write the metropolitan nation, the west, or the colonial experience from 
its margins, but reclaims and reconstitutes a vision of home from an engaged and 
engaging distance.
Home is the nation and the ideology for its reclamation and reformulation is 
nationalism. Exile is a "'nationalizing' moment", a threshold of nationalist emergence 
(Anderson 1994:315; see Balibar in Balibar and Wallerstein 1991:92). Nationalism 
asserts a belonging and claims a home, exile is a condition of isolation and loss: and the 
"essential association" between the two is of "opposites informing and constituting each 
other" (Said 1984:162). Sceptical and dismissive postcolonial readings of liberation 
struggles and independence are a dangerous irrelevance to the methods and aims of the 
exile. Exile, in the tenacity of its territorial identification and the passion of its 
nationalist ideology, can and often has, with the catalysts of long distance and lengthy 
absence, fostered a form of politics without responsibility, menacing, extreme and 
fanatical. The rise of nationalist movements and their culminations in nation-states can 
be viewed as "a project for coming home from exile, for the resolution of hybridity, for
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a positive printed from a negative in the dark-room of political struggle" (Anderson 
1994:319). But it need not necessarily be so.
Identity, of the individual and the collective alike, is a form of strategic alliance, a 
mobilisation of available components, a management of centripetal and centrifugal 
forces, in the service of an evolving purpose. Particular manifestations of this 
phenomenon form the basis of emancipatory politics. For the exile, multiple and 
overlapping similarities and differences cohere around the fundamental organising unity 
of banishment and political opposition, and around the goals of liberation and return. If 
the crisis of the contemporary nation-state and the ideology of postcolonialism are both, 
in part, symptoms of the post-independence collapse of such alliances, they should not 
be interpreted as evidence that similar alliances are no longer possible or relevant (see 
Fanon 1967:119-65). In many places and circumstances they remain of inestimable 
importance. While nationalism is an ambiguous example of the merits of solidarity, the 
understanding of identity construction outlined above can incorporate and encourage 
more inclusive forms of nationalism:
Nationalism... gathers into its fold the dispersed historical narratives of 
diverse, and often unrelated, communities. On the other hand, nationalist 
narratives also acknowledge, and sometimes celebrate, difference. It 
needs to be emphasised that shaping union through difference is also a 
mode of creating subject positions for subordinate narratives. As a 
reinscription of narratives of community, nationalism does not so much 
erase existing narratives as recast their difference. The recognition that 
different ethnic groups, different locales, different communities and 
religions each have their own role to play in the national project 
underlines their difference at the same time that it homogenizes and 
incorporates them. (Gupta 1992:72)
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Again the local is un/remade in its interaction with broader, more powerful, political 
and narrative forces. The specificities of locality puncture the generalisations and 
homogeneity of nationalism as they do those of postcolonialism and globalisation. On 
the whole the rainbow nationalism of the ANC has been, like the organisation itself, 
broad in composition, acknowledging and welcoming unity-in-diversity, to a degree that 
if not unique was at least very unusual for a liberation movement. It was far from being 
all-inclusive, however, because there were conscious and unconscious omissions and 
repressions, choices were made that affirmed certain identities while rejecting others. 
But neither was it a narrow fundamentalism, and the ANC has consistently defined 
itself against, and contested, narrower nationalisms in South Africa. During the 
apartheid era, the ANC's conception of the South African nation acquired a reality in 
exile on a scale that was not possible, even within the confines of the political prison 
(see Naidoo 1982:56-7), at home.
I think for me as a white South African, going to MK, to the camps... 
made a big difference. I've grown up in the ANC, for the better part of 
my time with black comrades, and that has wedded me to a South Africa 
which I didn't know when I was there. So that I've discovered my South 
Africanism - if I can call it that - outside. It's only through coming out 
that I was able to find a South Africa that I do really love. In a sense I'm 
scared of going back into a South Africa which still retains so much of 
the things I hated. (Gilder in Bernstein 1994:197)14
Both unity and difference were important in the construction of oppositional identity 
and remain important in at least the rhetoric of nation-building. With many multi-ethnic
Also, in the same text, Baskind 321, Lapsley 376-7, Dennis 430; and Kasrils 1993:153.
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nations in a state of disintegration, constituent parts contending for the right to 
statehood, and academic and other commentators overwhelmingly hostile to 
nationalism, South Africa perhaps illustrates the existence of alternative possibilities.
Under apartheid, the forces of both oppression and resistance utilised discourses and 
practices inspired by the desire for purity/unity and for hybridity/diversity/difference, 
albeit in different ways and to divergent ends. In conclusion it is perhaps possible to 
propose that an unquestioning allegiance to either trajectory, in isolation, serves to 
undermine resistance and facilitate oppression and that resistance will always require a 
strategic and context/place specific mobilisation encompassing aspects of both 
strategies in harness together.
The lives and deaths of the ANC nation in exile will be addressed in the second part of 
this chapter. Firstly, the section which follows applies some of the ideas outlined so far 
in this chapter, to the place of Sophiatown, Johannesburg, in the 1950s, and the person 
of William 'Bloke* Modisane, beginning with an analysis of a distinctive example of the 
way in which the local and the global, purity, difference and hybridity, impacted upon 
one another under apartheid.
Bloke Modisane and the 'Situation' as Alienated Cosmopolitan
Sophiatown was "a complex paradox which attracted opposites... joy... laughter... the 
growl and the smell of insult; we sang our sad happy songs, were carried away by our 
erotic dances, we whistled and shouted, got drunk and killed each other" (Modisane 
1990:9); it was "a kaleidoscope of variable moods and passions" (70).15 Sophiatown was 
home to Modisane, the place where he was bom, with which he had grown up, and
15
For cultural and political background to Sophiatown and the life of Modisane, see 
Chapman 1989 and Gready 1990.
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where he had lived all his life. It is striking how similar Modisane's descriptions of 
Sophiatown are to his descriptions of himself (see 117-19). The self as/in place: "we did 
not live in it, we were Sophiatown" (9).
Hannerz (1994) has argued that Sophiatown was a forerunner and exemplar of the way 
in which culture is made in the contemporary world. Both the global and the city-local 
were characterised by diversity and heterogeneity, linked through, albeit unequal, 
cultural networks and flows, imports and exports. Sophiatown was positioned at a 
midway point of a global cultural continuum, "where crosscurrents are strongest, and 
where the interactive processes of creolization bring the most strikingly new results"; 
and Hannerz continues: "But the cultural forms coming out of such midway points are 
often not only original, being neither wholly of the centre nor entirely of the periphery. 
Being midway, they are also in a way more accessible from either end" (193). Such was 
the position of Sophiatown.
In the 1950s Sophiatown's distant horizons were formed by an increasingly American- 
dominated post-war global order and a pre-independence Africa. The combined efforts 
of the apartheid state and the international community had not yet closed the door on/to 
the outside world. Sophiatown's immediate setting, meanwhile, was provided by an 
emergent black urban culture coexisting with apartheid's growing resolve, implemented 
through a battery of repressive legislation, to deny and destroy such a phenomenon. 
Sophiatown was located four miles to the west of the centre of Johannesburg and 
surrounded by white residential areas. Freehold tenure implied permanence while the 
relative absence of regimentation and control which characterised state owned locations 
proclaimed a kind of freedom. The majority of its population was black and working- 
class, but it was also relatively cosmopolitan, socially fluid, promiscuous and ambitious. 
Sophiatown was both a community and an overcrowded, violent slum. Modisane
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describes it as "a political com inside the apartheid boot" (1990:14). From the 
perspective of apartheid's ideologues it was quite simply an aberration.
A particular cultural intensity and dynamism characterised Sophiatown. If there was an 
alienation from aspects of local culture - things rural and 'traditional', indigenous 
literature and languages - the outside world was embraced in an attempt to fill the void. 
Cultural influences and institutions included the cinema, 'anything American' from food 
to fashion, the shebeen and alcohol to the backdrop of jazz and the penny whistle, gangs 
and violence, inter-racial cultural initiatives, a hybrid and bastardised English, the 
literature of comic magazines, detective novels and black America, and the magazine 
Drum.16 An extraordinarily vibrant urban culture, predicated on seething heterogeneity 
and violent and creative cosmopolitanism, was produced by a combination of eclectic 
borrowing, inventive synthesis, illegal flaunting, superficial mimicry, and desperate 
escapism. The Drum writers - Modisane, Themba, Maimane, Matshikiza, Motsisi, 
Nakasa, Nkosi and Mphahlele - were all self-consciously cosmopolitan people and 
writers, "voices of creolization" in the vocabulary of Hannerz (1994:188): none more so 
than Modisane.
Modisane, as the personification of a particular form of cosmopolitanism, attracted a 
specific label in the context of Sophiatown: that of the 'situation':
In him [Modisane] can be seen all the tensions and conflicts of those 
years. He was a walking embodiment of all the contradictions, all the 
paradoxes, all the ironies, all the hurt of being a 'situation'... (Nicol 
1991:288)
16
For a discussion of the influence of American culture on Sophiatown, see Nixon 
1994a:11-41.
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The label 'situation' was a term of abuse for those who differed in education and 
aspiration from the majority of blacks, and were seen to be trying to situate themselves 
above them, and yet were refused entry into the white world. It was a painfully isolated 
and alienating condition.17
At no stage did Modisane learn to live with his blackness. To be black was an ugliness 
and a handicap, something he wanted to hide, a burden and a confinement. Self-hate 
and hate for a collective blackness, often expressed through straightforward prejudice 
and arrogance, became one. This is Modisane reflecting on his marriage:
I was essentially concerned with the problems of living with my colour, 
and at the time I behaved as though I were the only black person in South 
Africa; I persecuted Fiki for her colour as viciously as the white men 
did... I am able to admit that my marriage decomposed because Fiki is 
black... (1990:219-20)
White, meanwhile, was the colour of state authority, violence and the law, of 
prohibition and exclusion, wealth and capital. Modisane's attitude to white South Africa 
included harsh criticisms, of its apathy, ignorance and hypocrisy, but can be summed up 
as one of "complicated ambivalence" (76): a complex of envy, admiration, mimicry, 
hatred, fear, anger, and shame. Modisane was tom between his revolt against being a 
black South African and the illusory promise of a worldly-white cosmopolitanism. But 
he lived within this ambiguous complex in such a way as to make a narrow white 
domain the creator of his values and horizons and the gatekeeper of his dreams. For
17
Modisane himself describes the 'situation' as someone resented by both black and 
white, as "not belonging to either, but tactfully situated between white oppression and 
black rebellion1' (1990:94). For another, related, explanation for the term, see Nicol 
1991:288. Also see Modisane's short story entitled "The Situation" (1962). Chapman 
states: "Blame Me on  H i s t o r y  is probably the most disturbing extended study of the 
alienated black writer-intellectual of the fifties" (1989:221, also 206).
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Modisane, white came to represent status and success, civilisation and culture, while 
black constituted ignorance and barbarism. The result was a cosmopolitanism that was 
extended to pretentious and superficial extremes - in the midst of great poverty, 
Modisane delighted in classical music, fine food and champagne, and called his one 
roomed shack 'Sunset Boulevard1 - and a quest for a universalising art that would 
transcend rather than incorporate the local.
Modisane sought a place for himself in an idealised white liberal world: "I want 
acceptance in the country of my birth, and in some comer of the darkened room I 
whisper the real desire: I want to be accepted into white society" (218). He went in 
pursuit of white women - "black... [was] not good enough; only the state of being white 
could satisfy me, and in a tedious succession I thought myself to be.., lyrically in love 
with eveiy white woman I met" (220) - and confesses a "mania" for white friends (254) 
and to surrounding himself with symbols of the world to which he aspired. "And all was 
done for the pleasure of hearing them say, Bloke you're a white man; why not, if I could 
not be white physically and legally, I could pretend a white existence" (254). The 
yearning for acceptance amongst whites, the desire to be white, and the pretence of 
actually being white, became blurred. Modisane was offered a "shadow passport" to the 
contradictory and unreal reality of the inter-racial frontier, which he could taste but not 
make his own (Berman 1983:284-6; also Gready 1990:148-51). He sought to bridge the 
gap between the black and white worlds - "My little room in Sophiatown was a fly-over 
which connected the two worlds" (1990:254, also 252) - but in the process encountered 
the archetypal dilemma of the 'situation': rejected by both, belonging to neither. "I am 
the eternal alien between two worlds" (218, also 229). Furthermore, Modisane was 
rejected by the black middle class (87-8). Thus, his alienation was complete.
A schizophrenic, tortured sense of self was forged between implausible aspirations and 
the reality of prohibition and rejection. Modisane's descriptions of himself - as hollow, a
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collective 'thing', "a failure, a used-up, left-over man" (260), as less than a man - return 
repeatedly to a sense of inferiority and incompleteness. For this was a life characterised 
by confinement and exclusion, frustration and a sense of being emasculated, trapped 
and manipulated, in which the attempt to "live too many lives" (218) meant that none 
were lived fully. Against the backdrop of repressive identity imposition and denial, 
Modisane attempted to acquire and shed identities like garments, subjecting them to his 
own manipulation and the play of illusion; he wore them like a mask. One such mask 
came from the detective stories of Leslie Charteris whose character, The Saint', fought 
on the side of the good Blokes against the bad Blokes. The depersonalisation appealed 
to Modisane:
I have no face, I have no name, my whole existence slithers behind a 
mask called Bloke... people around us began to assume the label for my 
name, and gradually this label became a part of me I could not 
discourage; it began to overwhelm me, to become a piece of me, to 
impose a life of its own upon me; finally I was to accept it for a far 
deeper significance than I at the time realised... the invasion has been so 
successful and complete that today my name is Bloke Modisane.
(75,167)
The mask is a dominant metaphor and symbol in Modisane's story, playing its most 
prominent role in relationships between black, specifically Modisane himself, and 
white. The violence of such relationships was negotiated through the masks of 
submission and obsequiousness, chicanery and flattery - what Modisane describes as 
"the canvas smile and the yes-baas mentality" (91) - of political innocence and of a 
suppressed or subtle articulation of resistance. Modisane describes his relationship with 
white liberal friends as a masquerade and a charade, "a relationship of masks, in which 
every response is carefully selected and rehearsed", and he continues: "I could wear a
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mask, be the eternal actor in a make-believe world of tinsel reality, revealing the face, 
the profile which photographed best...". As one of a small circle of'eligible' Africans, 
Modisane was "a piece of rare Africana", "a curiosity, a main attraction" (73,158-60). 
The mask also played an active role in other arenas: the avalanche of racial hatred was 
projected onto a faceless, dehumanised, collective mask; white prejudice, guilt and 
embarrassment found sanctuary behind the ubiquitous mask; violence and death 
paraded in many masks as did the drive to escape the reality of South Africa through 
self-destruction.
These examples illustrate that the mask is itself two-faced, double-edged. It 
simultaneously inhabits the worlds of fantasy and reality, and is a weapon of both 
repression and resistance, dehumanisation and anonymity, erasure and sanctuary. 
Modisane's dependence upon masks meant that he equated being unmasked, and 
thereby himself, with being naked, incomplete, vulnerable, thereby failing to see that it 
could in fact be a means/form of liberation. He became a mask without a face, with the 
mask, like so much else, serving more as an agent of self-deception than as a tool of 
disguised irony or subversion. This was a treacherous world for even the most self- 
conscious participant. Flattery, as Modisane acknowledges, was a "weapon" used "with 
vicious enthusiasm to express... sincerest contempt", but there was "always present the 
danger of not knowing where to draw the line" (90-1). Jean Coste’s questions are 
pertinent: "Where does the game end? Where does it begin? Which of the two roles - 
the acted... the real... - is authentic?" (1971:47, also 48). In summary, the mask played 
an ambiguous part within Modisane's ideology of accommodation, laced with cynicism 
and detachment, as a means of securing his own ends: recognition, respect, even 
acceptance; a place in the white world.18 This facet of Modisane's life, however, stood 
in stark opposition to his professed political views.
18
For Modisane's defence of accommodation see 1990:88-91,123-4,133,230/ on cowardice, 
see 224-8. On the role of the mask also see Nixon 1994a:24-5.
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Modisane's critique of African and oppositional politics is scathing. He condemned 
organised political resistance in the 1950s for addressing symptoms not causes, as a 
succession of failures, as immature and more spectacle than substance: misadventures 
in "the political game played by amateurs" (1990:152). In a state of disillusionment and 
disgust, Modisane withdrew from the ANC and entered a period of transition - 
described as "a political wilderness" and "the age of bewilderment" - assuming a mask 
of political innocence/disinterest while searching for an ideology (139,165-6). 
Significantly, however, there is the acknowledgement that being black, on occasion, 
meant being trapped by the colour of one's skin into the cycle of oppression and 
resistance: "I wanted to be both black and unconcerned with the games at politics, but a 
non-committed African is the same black as a committed Native" (140, also 149-51). 
Modisane ultimately aligned his African nationalism intellectually with the PAC. 
Characteristically it fell short of any form of more substantial commitment and enabled 
him to nurture what he calls his "political alienation" (249). The schism within 
Modisane's social/racial world was replicated, albeit with a slightly different slant, in 
the realm of politics. With one foot in the camp of a (white) bourgeois individualism/ 
liberalism and the other in a kind of black consciousness he attempted to uphold 
mutually exclusive ideologies; again he was rejected by both, belonged to neither.
When Modisane could neither join the world to which he aspired nor change the world 
in which he lived, he sought the destruction of all available selves and worlds. He tried 
to lose himself primarily in sex, but also in drink, music, dance and the noise of the 
nice-time parties, in the cinema and detective stories (see 166-71,206-12,229,262-4). 
Creative writing was also a sanctuary from isolation and political disillusionment, a 
form of escape devoid of self-conscious commitment and protest.19 Modisane perceived
19
Modisane talks of writing "innocuous short stories, escapist trash" about "cardboard 
images of romanticism", but goes on to qualify his own damning critique: "and yet even 
against this background my escapist hero was seldom, if ever, on the side of formal law 
and order. Like me, my characters were invested with a contempt for the law, their 
efforts were directed towards a flaunting of the law: my heroes were social maladjusts 
in a society where heroism is measured by acts of defiance against law and order. I did
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and used the word, like the mask, as a "weapon for gate-crashing" and scorning the 
worlds which had rejected him (88, also 139,167). Through (self-)annihilation, the 
components of which often included violence and death, many black South Africans 
sought to live with and through the pain of their lives, but in the process turned in/on 
themselves and each other (see 9,39-40,102,117-18,262). Modisane's particular 
concentration on what he calls his "sex pilgrimage" (220) was due to a typically 
paradoxical desire for both erasure/forgetfulness and achievement/identity: "Through 
sex I proved myself to myself. I am a man" (212, also see 210-11). In the conquest of 
white women there was also an insidious element of revenge. Women were categorised 
as whores or virgins: whores were the receptacles of his annihilating lust while virgins 
were the objects of a hopelessly idealised notion of a pure and cleansing beauty and 
love.
Excess and escape, release and erasure, were part of a search for a moment without past 
or future, an eternal present of forgetting where time would stop: "I am enervated by 
this hunger... to submerge and annihilate myself in every pleasure... to live only in the 
abandonment of each moment of every day... contemptuously disregardful of 
tomorrow..." (206). Self-annihilation provided a refuge from the chaos of life. However, 
the cycle of drowning in, followed by resurrection from, an ocean of excess became an 
end in itself, self-destructive, demeaning, vacuous, mechanical. In the wake of this 
profoundly unsatisfying emotional carnage there was no resolution, only the desire to be 
cleansed, accentuated loneliness and emptiness, exhaustion accompanied by an 
undiminished hunger, violent anger, disgust and shame. Modisane suggests that there 
was, in his "bird-of-passage" or "short-term" morality, a positive reaction to an
not recognise the sociological significance of what I was doing, that with a central 
idea behind them I could use my stories as a reflection or a study of our society’1 (139; 
on "The Dignity of Begging", see 88-9). Modisane's writing does indeed go beyond 
escapism to incorporate albeit unconventional, and perhaps even unconscious, analyses of 
defiance and survival. He published the following short stories in Drum: "The Dignity of 
Begging" (September 1951); "The Fighter Who Wore Skirts" (January 1952); and "The 
Respectable Pickpocket" (February 1954).
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existence of negatives, a contrast, at the very least, to a life of prohibitions (205-9). But 
it was spectacle not substance, addressing symptoms rather than causes.
Both Modisane and Sophiatown were eclectically cosmopolitan, indeterminate 
elements within the apartheid classificatory grid. Hannerz argues that in this context a 
selective appropriation of global cultural resources created a cosmopolitanism in 
Sophiatown that was a form of local resistance (1994:192). It could equally be argued, 
however, that it was Sophiatown's veiy heterogeneity, the absence of a unifying identity 
or cause, which restricted and undermined resistance to its destruction. Similarly, in its 
most extreme and uncritical form, as personified by Modisane, cosmopolitanism at the 
individual level degenerated into make-believe and wish-fulfilment: the "line between 
fantasy and reality becomes less and less distinct" (1990:170). Identity was liberated, 
obfuscated, lost, in an unreal reality, and the illusory promise and 'trips' of the 
oppressive city (Gready 1990). This cosmopolitanism and interaction between the 
global and the local was dominated by metropolitan influences, by mimicry and 
escapism, used to supplant rather than augment the local or the majority. The ambiguity 
of such a position is encapsulated by the plight of the 'situation'. Situated in-between, 
moving between irreconcilable worlds of race and politics, Modisane was neither one 
thing nor the other, on neither one side nor the other. His life was characterised by a 
self-destructive and directionless blend of frustration, meaninglessness, insecurity, 
pessimism, bitterness and incapacitation. His alienation was complete in a world in 
which syntheses of oppositions and negotiations of binaries were often politically 
contentious, self-destructive, impossible. Modisane and Sophiatown can be seen as 
forerunners and exemplars of strengths but also weaknesses of globalisation and 
postcolonial discourse, and of the profound ambiguity of an uncritical embrace of 
diversity/hybridity across the spectrum of identity, culture and politics, in the context of 
political crisis.
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Nowhere is this better illustrated than in Modisane's hopelessly confused and 
contradictory strategies of resistance. One of the things that is lost by being inside too 
many things is the capacity for political action. Modisane could locate no unifying 
ground for solidarity or resistance. The agency/action equation within which he 
positions himself is both too simplistic and too absolute, and ultimately reads like an 
exercise in self-exculpation. In a society in which apartheid is pervasive and intrusive, 
people are portrayed as products and victims of that society, conditioned and blinkered, 
to the extent of being forced into a predestined fate where agency and choice are all but 
eliminated. In relation to the destiny of lives, writing was overwhelmed by the process 
of being written: Modisane claims that "nothing belongs to" black South Africans "as an 
inviolable right", not even their own lives (1990:103). When he comes to the 
apportionment of blame it is almost always the fault of someone or something else, 
and/or he uses such vague formulations as when he talks of "a moment of transference 
of guilt. It was nobody's fault, the whole thing was bigger than all of us..." (120), or 
when he suggests, as he does in the book's title, that the blame can be attributed to 
history. The world view of the alienated cosmopolitan serves to obscure the sources of 
oppression, blur the lines of contestation and eliminate the possibility of effective 
resistance. Modisane was a cross-border commuter, an advocate of soft borders, rather 
than a serious political champion of change. An enormous chasm existed between his 
rhetoric, which was often angry and committed, and any related action. In this regard, 
Modisane passes judgement on himself: "but I sometimes think it is important to 
examine what people do about the things they say, rather than what they say about what 
they more often than not do not do" (247).
Sophiatown as a 'Space of Death'
At its best Sophiatown provided the setting for Modisane's dreams and a vision of 
possible futures. At its worst it was a black hole of violence and death. Death and
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violence, of the state and of the street, were saturating, stimulating, stifling, sickening. 
They were a lingua franca, a part of Sophiatown and the terms of reference of an entire 
society, a form of resistance and oppression, self-elevation/affirmation and self- 
destruction.
I am saturated with violence, it was a piece of the noise that was 
Sophiatown, of the feverish intensity of Sophiatown life, it was, and is, 
the expression and clarification of our society... we are bom into it, we 
live with it and we die of it... (55)
"I learned early in life to play games with death, to realise its physical presence in my 
life, to establish rapport with it" (18), writes Modisane. It intruded into his own life 
when his sister Nancy died from starvation/malnutrition and, while he was still only 14, 
when his father was killed at the hands of a brutal assailant. The death of Modisane's 
father was to become an important point of reference and a metaphor, most 
significantly as a harbinger and symbol of his own death. The coffin by mistake bore 
the name of the son rather than the father: "The shock... confused and frightened me, 
but it seemed symbolic somehow; I was officially dead..." (31). Already dead, granted 
several reprieves from death, living in a place thick with death, Modisane repeatedly 
anticipates his violent demise. Death became an obsession - "my mind was impotent 
with obsessions of death - my own death; I explored the various permutations by which 
death would overtake my life" (114-15) - and its imagery a defining characteristic of his 
life. Modisane refers to "the coffin of my skin" (36) and to being "preserved in a tomb 
of hatred", without feelings or emotions, "I am a corpse" (76-7, also 285). If in the end 
there was a kind of numb accommodation, it is also true to say that violence and death 
were pervasive but never familiar: "each death has its own special pain, each pain kills a 
little something in us" (27, also 64).
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While Modisane professes to be "neurotic about violence" (208), to hate and more 
particularly fear both violence and death - "I fear violence perhaps more than I hate it... 
if I feared death, it was that its component, violence, horrified and intimidated me" (54- 
5, also 170,208) - they were also both contagious and embraced (see 17,66,69). His 
embrace of violence extended to an endorsement of the need for violent revolution - 
this being one of the reasons behind his political realignment towards the PAC - and, 
more specifically, to him expressing a personal desire to fight. "We must fight. We 
demand total commitment... I respond to the call... The people are dying... I will kill" 
(246-7). It was never an easy commitment, he talks for example of being "paralysed by 
the moral conflict that I might have to destroy life that I may preserve it" (245, also 120- 
1,241), and ultimately it is one he is unable to make. Would he kill his white friends? 
Would they not be crushed by the military might of the South African army? Modisane 
retreats behind other needs and priorities to a position of intellectual rather than 
emotional or practical involvement: "In my mind I saw the violence and the blood and 
the death, and I had seen enough of all three, my mind could not take any more killing 
without unbalancing" (250).
Modisane's ambivalence towards violence and death is, characteristically, predicated on 
extremes. The vision of violence, complementing that of escapism and excess, is 
ultimately one of annihilation and apocalypse: "the attitudes are bigger than we are and 
perhaps we might have to destroy ourselves if we are to get at them" (230). Modisane 
continues:
It is inhumanity therefore which we have earned by the labour of our 
intolerance: we refused to love each other, decided, rather, to die... We 
must die, brutally and horribly, that those of us who shall survive our 
intolerance shall by the cruelty of our death be so struck to the quick that 
they shall fear the intolerance which divides people into race groups
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which would rather perish - in their racial groups - than love one another.
We shall annihilate one another in the hope that the world will come to 
understand that man is... threatened... by himself. Man is the danger, and 
by his actions he shall destroy himself. (231-2, also 250)
Throughout, there is the spectre, at both an individual and a collective level, of an 
imminent, barely suppressed, explosion of violent outrage, of a volcanic eruption that 
will obliterate indiscriminately. The spectre of annihilation haunted Modisane, but also 
walked the streets of Sophiatown. Not only were the lives of Sophiatown and Modisane 
inextricably interwoven, so were their deaths: again, the self as/in place. The 'space of 
death' was both in, and of, place.
Blame Me On History opens with Modisane walking through a Sophiatown ravaged by 
its ongoing destruction under the Group Areas Act.20 It is a journey of remembrance and 
reconstruction through a 'space of death'. The people, the places, the stories of 
Sophiatown were gone, only silence and desolation remained: it was "like walking 
through a ghost town of deserted houses and demolished homes, of faded dreams and 
broken lives, surrounded by rousing memories, some exciting others terrifying" (9).
This space of death' contained the overlapping, interrelated territories of Modisane's 
own story, the life and death of his home and/as Sophiatown, and the collective 
inheritance and histoiy - "I seemed to be walking on the pages of histoiy" (42) - of land 
appropriation and annexation. Nowhere were the contours of this layered terrain more 
graphically illuminated than when Modisane returned to the ruins of the house where he 
was bom in Bertha Street. Places of possession and belonging - "Sophiatown belonged 
to me... The land was... not only... mine, but a piece of me; the house was mine" even if
20
On the destruction of Sophiatown see Lodge 1983a.
it failed to keep out the rain and the cold (15) - were in the process of being levelled 
into a featureless, blank landscape of death.
Sophiatown was a part of Modisane and with its death a part of him died. His story
begins with the line: "Something in me died, a piece of me died, with the dying of
Sophiatown" (5); he later reflects that "there in the rubble was a piece of me" (9).
"Sophiatown and I were reduced to the basic elements", claims Modisane, "both of us
for the same reason: we were black spots" (14); both exhausted and expendable,
reduced to dust. Standing on the ruins of his house and home, he writes, "I seemed to be
looking at my whole life, the body which contained that life reduced to dust" (14). In
the mirror of these ruins Modisane saw the collapse of his life, home and world. He also
talks of the destruction of his soul montaged against that of Sophiatown, "I could not
tell us apart (285). The annihilation of person and place become one, interrelated and 
superimposed.
The landscape takes on a corporeal, bodily presence; the destruction of place becomes 
murder and the streets carry rivers of blood (see, for example, 42). Naked walls display 
gaping wounds and scars, bleed slogans of resistance; Sophiatown falls before the 
bulldozers which "gored into her body... for a brief moment... [it] was like one of its 
own many victims", a brutalised corpse (5). Reversing the somatic imagery, the place 
which had eaten away at him during their parallel lives - Modisane talks of the scars 
and wounds "which Sophiatown and South Africa had gored into my body" (285) - 
continued to do so during their equally parallel deaths: "every moment of life in the 
Sophiatown which was dying seemed as a tearing at my flesh, a feast of vultures, which 
left of my body the gaping holes of a skeleton" (115).
Modisane's decision to go into exile is married to these narratives of death. His friends 
were leaving the country; the whites that remained were increasingly reticent about
237
contact - when whites began to fear and shun contact across the colour bar "the country 
began to die" for Modisane (11) - he had resigned his job due to a growing 
disenchantment with Drum publications; his marriage was in a state of collapse; and 
Sophiatown was dying a slow and painful death. Furthermore, Modisane felt that 
violence and death were circling around him, closing in. The arrival of a letter offering 
a possible means of escape "was like a dying man's echo for help... there was the 
possibility of running away from the sight of death, and all around me there was the 
tolling of the bell for my body..." (266). Despite the ambiguities that surround 
Modisane’s departure from South Africa - Sole finds disturbing the "alacrity" with 
which some writers chose exile at this time (1979:164)21 - he can be considered an 
exile. There was a significant component of violence, dispossession, pain, and, 
ultimately, defiance involved in the process. When his application for a passport was 
turned down due to the intervention of the Security Police, Modisane rejected the offer 
made to him of a favourable recommendation in exchange for information about the 
Mr Drum Goes to Church" story with which he had been involved {Drum, March 
1956). He chose instead to commit the criminal offence of leaving the country without a
About to enter exile, Modisane placated his mother by saying, '"Mama, I'm not going 
there to die... Soon our country will be right... and I will come back. You will see... It 
won't be very long’" (1990:292), while acknowledging the terrifying possibility that he 
would never see her again: "for so long as South Africa shall remain white, for so long 
shall I be an exile from the country of my birth" (297).
passport.
  — W C W l  C H I V C
CUi <1990:168)- The language and image
rehabilitation, reconstruction and fulfilment.
an expanded world. He talks of "the 
way of life, to look upon another 
employed indicate a desire for personal
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South Africa and everything I had known, loved and hated remained 
behind me. I was out of South Africa. But it was no victory or solution, 
the compulsive agony was still with me, the problem was still with me; 
only its intimacy was removed... My physical life in South Africa had 
ended. (311)
Autobiography as Suicide Note
A useful point of entry into an analysis of Modisane's autobiography, Blame Me On 
History, is Roger Rosenblatt's notion of autobiography as suicide note: "Every 
autobiography... is an extended suicide note... The life recorded is the life complete to a 
specific point, and is therefore as good as dead". The autobiography, as a full stop at the 
end of the life sentence, is an announcement of closure. It is motivated by "a desire to 
see both a shape and an end to... life, to seek the end of everything that has been in flux 
and process, and at the same time to understand it all". Closure occurs from a vantage 
point where pattern and order replace chaos and the fragments of life coalesce into a 
recognisable whole. The life is isolated and laid to rest "through the act of 
autobiography itself’ (1980.178).22 The cusp of exilic departure and arrival is one point 
at which to write such an autobiographical suicide note. The life story ends with
Can Themba can also perhaps be said to have written fragments of a suicide note ("The 
Will to Die", "Requiem for Sophiatown", "The Bottom of the Bottle", 1982:62-6,102-8,108- 
15). In "The will to Die" he wrote:
I have heard much, have read much more, of the Will to Live... But the 
Will to Die has intrigued me more... I have often wondered if there is 
not some mesmeric power that Fate employs to engage some men 
deliberately, with macabre relishment, to seek their destruction and to 
plunge into it.... (62)
A  number of South African writers committed suicide or died prematurely in exile. No 
generation died so comprehensively as that which ventured into exile during the late 
1950s and 1960s. The list of premature deaths includes Can Themba, who died in Swaziland 
in 1968 of alcohol-induced thrombosis; Nat Nakasa, who died in 1965, aged 28, when he 
jumped from the seventh floor of a building in New York; and Arthur Nortje, who died of 
a drug overdose in Oxford in 1970. The tragedy of suicide confronted and asked unnerving 
questions of other exiles: "There is no adequate way of responding to a suicide... It's 
an unequivocal challenge. It asks: 'What have you got to live for that's so important?'
It's also an accusation; 'we', those who knew him, had failed him" (Akerman 1987:11; 
also on suicide in exile see Moss 1985).
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departure from home because this is the moment when meaningful life ends: life and 
text, life and death, home and exile.
For some banished writers exile represents a form of death, a 
phenomenon which tends to make the former life seem complete, an 
integral structure: birth, life, death. That structure is not unlike a literary 
one, an ordered construction with a beginning, middle, and end. (Ugarte 
1989:20-1)
Rosenblatt goes on to state that since "the 'argument' of black autobiography is against 
the existing universe of which the writer was and is an essential if uncomfortable part, 
the 'argument' of the work is extended against the self'. He continues: "Black 
autobiography annihilates the self because by doing so it takes the world with it" 
(1980:179-80).
Entering exile, Modisane was a free man, a dead man choosing one form of living death 
over another, dying into another 'space of death'. Those in exile live "posthumous lives" 
(Heilbut 1983:31). The obliteration of Sophiatown marked the completion of a cycle of 
superimposed, cumulative death, of the irreparably inter-linked strands of state 
annihilation and self-annihilation, in South Africa: "and it seemed especially 
appropriate that I should be standing there [at the ruins of his house], as if to witness the 
closing of the cycle of my life in its destruction" (1990:10). Along with everything else 
that was destroyed with Sophiatown was a vision of a possible future. Exilic departure 
was a moment of closure, when Modisane imposed a pattern on the chaos and laid his 
lives and deaths in South Africa to rest through autobiography. By recording life up to 
the rupture of exile Blame Me On History is the final act of (self-)annihilation of 
Modisane's South African self and world. It is his suicide note. Autobiographical time 
stopped. Modisane finally found, as he left home and entered exile, his moment of
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forgetting without past or future. Cut off from the past, with the slate wiped clean, the 
future seemed similarly blank. The perpetual present, however, can be both a prison and 
eternity (Hoffman 1991:117).
Rosenblatt argues that the autobiographer dies into a new life, "nothing remains but the 
future that because unknown can be thought utopian" (1980:178). Exile also heralds just 
such an unknown, often romanticised, future. It is an ending which also harbours the 
potential for new beginnings; as one chapter of life is completed, another begins (see 
Hirson 1995:355). In South Africa, Modisane refers to a purposeless drift into "a future 
without a future" (1990:205), to a life of chaos and uncertainty lived with no regard for 
tomorrow. But he also refers to a desire to choose life over death: "my eyes had looked 
long and seen too many deaths... I wanted again to be a part of the living, a piece of the 
cycle of life, to pretend a larger indestructible existence" (49, also 64). Amidst an 
otherwise pervasive sense of death, dying into exile can also anticipate a future and 
form part of a search for the resurrective cycle of life. Writers also wrote, in part, so that 
their death would not be complete or in vain. If there was an immediate sense in which 
autobiography contributed to the writer being cut adrift, to the severance of the 
umbilical cord with home, in the longer term it heralded a homecoming as, unbanned, it 
completed the journey home that the author was often not able to accomplish 
him/herself. Modisane was banned in 1966;23 his banning order was lifted in 1986, the 
same year in which he died in Dortmund, West Germany. The suicide note announced a 
defeat and death while simultaneously asserting a level of control over a personal 
narrative and a past, thereby resurrecting and immortalising a life and history. Texts 
written in the afterlife of exile inscribed a presence in/on the blank time and space of
23
In 1966, under an amendment of the Suppression of Communism Act, which enabled the 
Minister of Justice to ban South Africans and former South Africans living in exile, 46 
people living abroad - including Modisane, Themba, Matshikiza, Nkosi and Mphahlele - 
were designated 'statutory communists' and their work was banned, thereby, at least 
legally, they ceased to exist on the printed page in South Africa. The tragic irony of 
these writers being considered 'statutory communists' could hardly have been greater.
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absence, a past on the present and future, and were their authors' passport to a 
posthumous life at home. As a bridge between past, present and future they ultimately 
reactivated the movement of time (Hoffman 1991:117,241-2,279-80).
Modisane's multiple alienations and (self-)annihilations - in terms of race, politics, 
culture, writing, family, place - found their consummation in the condition of exile and 
in the exilic 'space of death'. The idea of an autobiographical suicide note neatly 
captures this sense of consummation, encapsulating endings but also the potential of 
alternative beginnings and the possibility of an afterlife. It also indicates the importance 
of the written word to these potentials and possibilities. In conclusion, however, and 
returning to a central theoretical premise of this thesis, it is important to stress the many 
collaborative agents which violently underwrote Modisane's life. These included the 
structural violence of apartheid, the violence of illusory dreams and aspirations, the 
turning of the force of violence on himself and others, and the collaboration of all facets 
of violence in promoting the death that is exile and the autobiographical suicide note. 
Modisane both wrote and was variously written, transformed and did not transform the 
'space of death' into a space of life, making the meaning of his writings and life 
complex and open to diverse interpretations.
Modisane's life was peculiarly idiosyncratic: for most of those affected, exile was a 
more collective experience, traversed with other baggage, and engaged with alternative 
weapons. All, however, experienced a sense of transient and restless dwelling that drove 
them into exile and stoked their desire for return. While in South Africa, Modisane's life 
was already underpinned by a sense of restlessness, drift, wandering and searching. He 
was on the run from virtually all forms of responsibility and commitment, both personal 
and political. But from what was he fleeing - apartheid? his colour? himself? - and what 
was he seeking?
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'What will you do?1 they said. 'Will you run all your life?' I wanted to shut 
my eyes and scream: Yes! I will die searching... I can barely understand 
this thing which will not let me be, I cannot sink my taproots anywhere... 
(1990:169)
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ii) The ANC and Exile as a Race Against Death
Once I started to run, where would I stop? (Joseph 1986:196)
Cut him if he stand still, shoot him if he run. (Nkosi 1965:76)
Apartheid South Africa was a nation on the run. Many South Africans, like Modisane, 
were on the run before they left the country - "we running fighting running, / straining / 
like a universe of bending reeds" (Mphahlele, "Exile in Nigeria", in Couzens and Patel 
eds, 1982:169) - because to stand still was to be cut down, to be buried alive. This 
dynamic was most pronounced for the political activist, on the run from the police, 
forced underground, sleeping in different places, avoiding relatives and friends, home 
and the workplace. When the race became too close or too dangerous inside the country 
- most notably during the seasons for running (Langa 1987:143, also 148): in the early 
1960s, after the 1976 Soweto uprisings and during States of Emergency in the mid/late 
1980s - opponents of the state fled rumoured or impending detention/arrest and 
assassination, escaped house arrest, banning orders and conscription, jumped bail, and 
went abroad. At its most stark, the choice was simple: leave or die. The calculation of 
exile - that life and political activity would be extended and made more effective 
outside - was based upon an understanding that while the race would continue beyond 
South Africa's borders, the terrain, rules and weapons would change.
Those that got away often only did so by the skin of their teeth. Alfred Hutchinson 
describes a runaway train, carrying a runaway man" as he escapes the Treason Trial on 
the way to Ghana (1960:81). Exiles left on exit permits, which meant they could leave 
but never return (Nkosi 1983 :vii-viii, 1994), 'skipped' the country illegally, spilled over 
its frontiers, 'footing' into neighbouring states, often covering long distances, travelling
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at night, alone and in small groups. It was an adventure and a nightmare. Departure was 
invariably abrupt, immediate; exiles, like detainees, disappeared without trace. To 
protect both those in flight and those who remained behind, invariably nobody, 
including/especially family and friends, knew anything. The rupture of departure had 
profound effects - guilt, a sense of things left unfinished and unresolved - on the leavers 
and the left, young and old.
It was not good the way I left. Mummy was sick, very, very sick... But I 
didn't tell her I was going - she told me... She said, 'My son, I know that 
one day you will leave me'... in the township parents know who has left 
the country... Then I had to take a decision immediately. She asked me 
several times if I love her... I did promise her that I love her[...] I haven't 
seen her since... What hounds me is how I left my Mum very sick. And I 
don't have information about what is happening there. I don't know how I 
would react if they tell me[...]... I don't want to hear about this, that she is 
missing or what[...] It's been very tough of course... very, very tough.
(Thuso Mashaba in Bernstein 1994:70-1)
Another funeral. Every time there's a funeral I become aware of other 
aspects of apartheid... Comrade Duma... passed away. He had left his 
wife in South Africa - gosh, when was it? 1964 or something like that.
He had had to leave now-now, and he couldn't say where he was going.
At that time she had three children and one on the way... She had to raise 
those kids on her own. And for all those years! A whole bunch of people 
came up for the funeral - from the Durban area where he had grown up.
They said, here’s his widow. Well, hell, she'd already been a widow for 
God knows how many years now. The implications of exile, of 
apartheid, mmm. (Father Cas in Bernstein 1994:193)
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Ruth Mompati was outside the country when the Rivonia arrests took place and it 
became unsafe for her to return. Her children, aged two and a half and six when she left, 
were in South Africa with her family. It was ten years, "[t]en years of real agony", 
before she saw them again: "I used to get ill thinking about my children". At their 
reunion they were strangers.
I was watching their reaction, and they were watching mine. I can never 
explain the emotional suffering of this meeting. It is extremely painful 
for a mother to miss her children's childhood... I died so many deaths. I 
felt, 'Good God, the South African regime owes me something... the 
childhood of my children!' But I'm not unique. Indeed, I'm lucky. I met 
my children after ten years... We could build a relationship again... many 
parents... never get that chance.24
Eleanor Kasrils was similarly separated by exile from a daughter from her first 
marriage, Brigid, for a period often years. Their separation had been so comprehensive 
that she failed to recognise her child when they met up again: "I didn't even know what 
she looked like. I remember rushing up to the wrong person at Heathrow... it was 
dreadful" (in Bernstein 1994:93).
In this way the youngest exiles, often young children, lost parents, parents lost children, 
couples lost each other, one member lost all other members of a family. The problem of 
establishing and maintaining contact was compounded by the security, political, and 
logistical problems of communication with/from South Africa and by the fact that 
people kept moving, both in exile and at home. The result was that lines of
The quotations above are taken from interviews with Ruth Mompati in Bernstein 
1994:18-22, and Russell 1991:106-20.
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communication were never established or were broken, contact was lost. The loss was 
sometimes temporary, sometimes it was irreparable and final. Exile, like imprisonment, 
destroyed relationships.
Families whose fate was tied to the liberation organisations were separated by, but also 
in, exile, as military training and operations, new jobs and educational opportunities, 
and other eventualities dictated. Exiles, in time, were given the choice between 
pursuing military training or educational opportunities. Destination and duration of stay, 
however, were subordinate to organisational needs. Exiles went where they were 
needed; they were still continually on the move: "the norms of exile were constant 
displacement and emplacement on orders not to be questioned, or by circumstances 
over which the one in refuge had no control" (Gordimer 1988:201); "[a]ll the partings 
and reappearances, the arrivals and departures, the climates and languages, the 
queueing for rubber-stamped entry and exit were present between them, as a wind 
gathers up a spiral of papers in dust (Gordimer 1994:183, also 99). Sometimes these 
journeys had to be shrouded in secrecy and unknowing:
and it affects people, it affects families terribly... it undermines the social 
cohesion of your community. It's just a very unnatural state to live in... 
that's a feature of a military environment, but it was a specific feature of 
the ANC environment... I suppose any exile organisation is like that... the 
struggle right or wrong, do what's expected from you... you don't know 
when you're going to be recalled or when you're going to be posted 
elsewhere. It's like a military life writ large... You can be posted 
anywhere in the world... anywhere in the country, and that's exactly the 
way that it worked in the ANC. There was no guarantee that your family, 
well they couldn't go with you... (Williams interview)
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ah, horrible, horrible. You try to influence the structures, to say: 'Try 
your best to keep people together, otherwise we are recreating the very 
same thing we've been criticising - you know breaking families to 
pieces.' But what do you do when you get a scholarship for one and you 
can't get one for the other? And I'm sure that they're aware of it and they 
try. But that's just a part of the tragedy of having to live in exile. (Father 
Cas in Bernstein 1994:193)
Exile, therefore, was characterised not simply by the rift of departure and separation 
from home, but by the repeated, cumulative rifts of multiple departures and separations 
within exile itself. Each departure was an unmaking of identity and relationships. Each 
arrival, sometimes in very alien environments, required that a self and a life be remade 
again. The dismemberment was almost physical, corporeal: ’"my flesh and blood 
wrenched from my own body"' (Sepamla 1986:96). Individuals, families and 
communities were tom apart, fragmented and scattered, exiled time and time again. 
Lives and relationships within the exilic 'space of death' were characterised by absence 
and loss, by the painful rituals of departure and reunion, and all too frequently, by 
collapse and disintegration. Barry Gilder, whose marriage ended in divorce following 
prolonged separation, states simply: "The relationship just ceased to exist" (in Bernstein 
1994:197). Sometimes separation felt like death (Mabena in Bernstein 1994:435-6).25
Writing about his arrival in Nigeria, Mphahlele describes feeling as though he had "just 
climbed down from a vehicle that has been rocking violently for countless miles" 
(1971:218). But quite apart from the dictates of organisational politics, intrinsic to exile 
is a contagious and irrepressible momentum of its own. Exiles have to leam to run
25
On the separation of families by/in exile, see, for example, Eleanor and Ronnie 
Kasrils in Bernstein 1994:87-94,174-81 and R. Kasrils 1993:71,79-81,93- 
4,99,104,121,137,144,167-8,227, 285; also with specific reference to women and children, 
see Bernstein 1994: especially 399-501.
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before they can walk; once on the move the exile can never really stand still again. South 
Africa's literature of frustrated wandering, a literature on the move, is voluminous.
Dennis Brutus, for example, is forever in motion, creating a poetry of departures and 
arrivals: "I shuffle through the waiting rooms / and air-terminals of the world"; "And I 
have done it again / and again / And now on to new terrain... and what new miserable 
uncertainties"; "I have been bedded / in London and Paris / Amsterdam and Rotterdam / 
in Munich and Frankfurt / Warsaw and Rome- / and still my heart cries out for home!"26 
In exile, after being released from prison in South Africa, Breytenbach states: "I found 
myself running through the streets of winter at five o'clock in the morning, tasting the 
tears of helpless despair. I am not in exile. I am travelling. What is it I keep on running 
away from?" (1985:259) 27 This momentum can easily become a sign and component of 
despair.
Having died into exile, seeking regeneration and rebirth, the restless unfulfilled 
movement of the exile represents a search for life. Bernstein talks of those who 
"continued to move in search of something that they had been forced to relinquish and 
for which there would never be an adequate substitute" (1994:24). It is also, therefore, 
an attempt to outrun death in its innumerable guises. But to run harder, faster, further, 
was to engage in a race that could not be won; death could never be outrun. "It is 
miraculous the way flight can turn into dead falling" writes Breytenbach (1989:259). The 
exile was diminished by perpetual and tortured flight. Each new departure/arrival 
reopened and aggravated the wound of exile, the seemingly perverse nurturing of a slow
26
Brutus, "I Come and Go", "The Golden Afternoon Drags", "Sequence for South Africa", 
1978:25,40,94.
27
Although Christopher Hope is more accurately described as an expatriate writer than 
an exile, the account of his return to South Africa in 1987, Whit e  Boy .Running, is 
pervaded by a similar question: "'Why are you running, White boy?'", "a question no one 
stopped to answer... a question to which there was no answer" (1988:113). The book ends 
with Hope muttering his election mantra of President's names - Malan, Strydom, Verwoerd, 
Vorster, Botha...: "I begin to run in time to the rhythm, not because there is anyone 
after me, or anyone about to see me, but because somehow it is appropriate to keep 
moving" (273).
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and protracted death. And yet, as has already been outlined, the exilic 'space of death' is 
also a transformative space that harbours the potential for resistance, and for death to be 
recast as various forms of life. The cycle of departure and arrival contains and repeats 
Modisane's volatile moment without past or future, with its potential for the un/re­
making of identities, individual and organisational, social and political. But, more 
importantly for the discussion which follows, framing this cycle and channelling all the 
transformative potential of exile are the politics and place inherent in the condition of 
exile itself. They provide the exile's flight with a past and a future, purpose and 
direction, source and ultimate destination. Lindiwe Mabuza, in a poem entitled 
"Embracing Exile", writes: "Yes / We drift / Country to country: drift? / 1 move!" (in 
Feinberg ed. 1980:89). Nowhere is this anchored movement and its transformative 
promise more clearly illustrated than in the organisational face of exile politics: in the 
South African context this arena was dominated by the ANC and its allies.
The ANC in Exile
The ANC, its allies the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the South African 
Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), and the liberation anny, Umkhonto we Sizwe 
(MK), were in exile for three decades. If the already mentioned construction of a 
nation-in-exile encapsulated some of the potential of a future democratic order it also 
realised and anticipated some of the difficulties of constructing a shared nationalism 
within South Africa, given its shifting sands of diversity and a history in which such a 
sense of nationhood has not been attempted let alone achieved. Exile politics is 
characteristically divisive, self-destructive, fatally introverted and relegated, over time, 
to irrelevance.28 Clearly it is a distinctive form of political practice removed from any
28
A perceptive analysis of exile politics in southern Africa is contained in Marcum 
1972. Nadine Gordimer's, A S p o r t  o f  N a t u r e  (1988), explores the South African experience 
of exile, including its politics.
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potential future political dispensation at home by distance, time and political 
circumstance. Nevertheless, aspects of political and organisational culture are likely to 
provide threads of continuity, with the result that exile politics is important both in its 
own right and, in the event of ultimate victory, in relation to the politics of 
homecoming/home.
Throughout the years in exile the main sources of tension within the alliance were 
essentially both consistent and predictable. There were disputes and power struggles of 
an ideological, institutional and personal nature - between and within the ANC, SACP 
and MK, between Africanist tendencies and those who favoured a non-racial approach, 
between communists and non-communists, between factions belonging to different 
ethnic groups, between the leadership and the rank and file membership, between 
different generations, between the ANC alliance in exile and the opposition within 
South Africa - which damaged organisational effectiveness and morale. Exile political 
leadership and organisation was essentially authoritarian and centralised in nature, and 
tarnished, periodically and/or in relation to specific individuals, with allegations of 
elitism, corruption, incompetence and inertia (see Anthony 1991). Further sources of 
resentment among the rank and file were the ideological straitjacket of political 
education; the lack of consultation, stifling of debate and intolerance of criticism; the 
petty and intrusive restrictions on daily life - permission was needed, for example, in 
order to marry - and the brutality and excesses committed by the Security Department, 
known as Mbokhodo, 'the stone that crushes'. Extremely harsh living conditions in the 
camps were compounded by the boredom of endless waiting, and frustration at the lack 
of military activity within South Africa and entanglements in other wars in the region. 
There were also related questions about priorities: for example, should emphasis be 
placed on the external or internal fronts, on political or military objectives and 
command structures?
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At certain important junctures, levels of dissatisfaction both increased and coalesced 
into more widespread/organised expressions of dissent and/or rebellion. These included 
the disaffection in the Tanzanian camps in the late 1960s; the tensions that led to the 
expulsion of the 'Gang of Eight' in 1975 (see Resha 1991:236-7,252,258-61); the 
discovery in March 1981 of a comprehensive spy network and the resulting crackdown 
by the Security Department that seemingly escalated into an attempt to silence and 
purge opponents and critics; the mutinies in the Angolan camps in 1984; and, again, the 
growing frustration and anger among the rank and file by the end of the 1980s.29
What is notable, even extraordinary, however, is that in the face of these enormous 
difficulties and over a veiy long period of time, the ANC managed to avoid the kind of 
debilitating splits and disillusionment which are characteristic of exile politics in 
general, and affected other South African opposition organisations, notably the PAC 
(see Lodge 1983:305-17,342-4, 1992a:191-8). Among the reasons for the relative 
success of the ANC were the quality to be found amongst its leadership and the 
suppression of rampant, institutionalised corruption. Aid from the Soviet-bloc, the most 
important source of external assistance, was also crucial, as was the resultant ability to 
steer clear of financial dependency on, and entanglements in the politics of, host 
countries in Africa (Lodge 1983:304-5). Lodge has argued that the ANC was in fact 
strengthened by exile in that it provided protection, security, powerful forms of external 
support, and facilitated organisational and resource development that would have been
29
As with the allegations in relation to human rights abuses by the ANC, significant 
information relating to internal disputes comes from literature informed by ANC 
dissidents (on sources of such information also see chapter 1, footnote 1). Material 
which initially appeared in A f r i c a  C o n f i d e n t i a l  was later incorporated into Ellis and 
Sechaba 1992 (see in particular 47-8,54-66,87,116-21,128-36,191-3); also see Ellis 1994. 
Allegations and testimony relating especially to the 198 4 mutiny have featured in 
S e a r c h l i g h t  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a . This literature paints a very different picture of the ANC 
in exile from previous, broadly sympathetic, academic analyses of the organisation (for 
a brief survey of the two different literatures see Lodge 1992:44-9). As Lodge implies, 
the truth probably resides in a yet-to-be-written middle path between the divergent 
narratives and political allegiances/sympathies (49). For a view on the camps from 
within the ANC, see Kasrils 1993:136-89,24 6-60,269,274-7.
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impossible within South Africa (1988:229-30,232,251). Writing in the late 1980s, he 
concludes that the ANC
is an army, an education system, a department of foreign affairs, a mini­
economy, a source of moral hegemony - in short, a government. Despite 
the manifest insecurities of dependence on weak countries unable to 
protect the organisation from the hostility of the South African Republic, 
despite the modesty of its material assets, and despite the human 
suffering which produced it and continues to inform every facet of its 
existence, it is a state in exile, and only in exile could such a state have 
been constructed. (1988:251)30
The histoiy of the ANC in exile is extremely complex. In part this is because to talk of 
the ANC in exile is to talk of a sometimes fraught unity-in-diversity and of exile in 
every form and on every scale: from the individual to a microcosm of a nation-state; 
from those flung to the furthest reaches of the diaspora, to others holed up in the 
metropolitan centres of the world, and to the majority experience of rural, frontline, 
southern Africa; from those who were in exile for over three decades to others whose 
experience could be measured in a handful of years and even months. According to 
Lodge, by the 1980s the ANC probably represented a total of 10-15,000 people in exile, 
scattered through as many as 25 countries, but concentrated mainly in Tanzania,
Zambia and Angola (1992a: 173-4).31 Nevertheless, the strategic alliances and 
management of diversity maintained enough of a shared purpose, the organisational and
30
The footnotes have been omitted from this quotation. Also see Lodge 1992:44-5,49,
1992a:173-4.
31
Obviously, South African exiles/refugees in the southern African region, who decided 
"’to at least stay in the same season'" (Weschler 1990:129), exceeded those expressly 
represented by the ANC. This is also clearly true of other locations. In the late 1980s, 
according to Mazur, the vast majority of the 30,000 South African refugees in Africa 
were in the southern African region (1989:447,455).
253
ideological identity un/remade in exile held sufficient coherence, and the race against 
organisational exilic death retained enough direction, for the ANC to survive and return 
home to govern. To understand how this happened it is necessary to examine the ANC's 
histoiy in exile.
In the Frontline States
Following quickly on from the Sharpeville shootings and the declaration of a State of 
Emergency, the ANC and PAC were banned in April 1960 under the terms of the 
Unlawful Organisations Act. Shortly before the banning order came into effect Oliver 
Tambo left South Africa under orders from the National Executive of the ANC to set up 
an external mission. Others within the leadership went underground within the country. 
The latter, through the newly formed MK, orchestrated the sabotage campaign of 1961- 
3.32 After the arrest of the core of MFC's leadership at Rivonia in 1963 and the virtual 
elimination of the ANC as an organised presence within South Africa by the middle of 
the decade, the site of organisational decision making and control shifted into exile.33
Denied a base within striking distance of South Africa by a ring of hostile colonial 
states the ANC in exile established itself in Tanzania.34 Confined largely to looking-on 
from afar, the frustration and demoralisation of the 1960s was punctured in military 
terms only by the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns of 1967-68, a symbolically important 
but ultimately unsuccessful joint operation with the Zimbabwe African People's Union
32
According to one estimate around 200 attacks were carried out in the space of 18 
months (Ellis and Sechaba 1992:34).
33
Lodge provides a four phase framework, of which the 1960-63 period of fundraising, 
diplomatic initiatives and the development of a military training programme was the 
first, for the development of the external wing of the ANC between 1960 and the early 
1980s (1983:297).
34
The dangers faced by South African exiles/political refugees in neighbouring states 
prior to their independence are described, for example, in Bernstein 1989:273-309, 
Dingake 1987:81-96, Jordan 1986:172-85,192-6, Kasrils 1993:71-8, Resha 1991:195-213.
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(ZAPU) forces of Joshua Nkomo.35 However, a series of events generated a momentum 
through the mid-1970s which served to undermine the apartheid regime and assist in 
solving some of the problems facing the ANC alliance in exile. To the backdrop of 
labour unrest and the rise of Black Consciousness within the country and, with the 
independence of Mozambique and Angola tightening the embrace of black independent 
Africa around South Africa's borders and transforming the ideological frontiers of the 
region, MK established its first effective command structures in what became known as 
the 'forward areas' (Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Mozambique). In June 1976, by 
which time there had been no armed struggle inside South Africa for over a decade, the 
Soweto uprisings began.
The Soweto revolt was instigated, initially around the issue of Afrikaans language 
teaching in schools, by radical township youth, a new generation of activists steeped in 
the ideology of Black Consciousness and largely cut off from earlier political traditions. 
Although the ANC was marginal to the events taking place in South Africa, its 
organisational life in exile was irreparably changed in their wake. In a number of post- 
Soweto novels the narrative journey culminates in exile; as the race against death 
becomes impossible within South Africa it is carried over into a different/further 
dimension of struggle.36 The dilemma the ANC faced was how to tap this 
extraordinarily vital resource and moment. In contrast to the PAC, perhaps the logical 
ideological home for the students at the time, which was in disarray, the ANC was 
sufficiently organised to react in a swift and effective manner. MK structures in 
neighbouring states made contact with student activists urging them to leave the country 
and join the ANC in exile. Military training facilities were available, mainly in a
35
Norman Duka, in Mercer and Mercer 197 4, and Graham Morodi and Isaac Maphoto in 
Bernstein 1994:162-74, provide first hand accounts of these campaigns.
36
See Mzamane 1987:136,138,243-45, Sepamla 1981:84-5,87-98,100-1,137-9,151,163- 
8,172,17 9,201,210-12,219,226-34,237-44, 1986:41-2,79-86,94-103,139-43,145,155-63, Serote 
1983:85,88,91,97,142,160,171,181,183-90,192-206, Tlali 1980:82,121-2,172,183,282-94.
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growing number of camps in Angola. The result was an unprecedented influx of new 
recruits: this, after Sharpeville in 1960, was the second major exodus, a new diaspora 
(Mzamane 1987:136, also 244).37 As on Robben Island, the ANC won the contest for 
the new generation of anti-apartheid activists. From its bases in exile MK was able to 
mount its first series of military operations in South Africa. The number of insurgency 
attacks reported rose from 13 in 1979 and 19 in 1980 to 55 in 1981 (Lodge 1988:230; 
also see Barrell 1990:48).
The state responded to the Soweto uprising and its aftermath with the 'total onslaught' 
doctrine detailed in a Defence White Paper in 1977. This doctrine depicted South 
Africa as being under siege from a communist enemy that was omnipresent, 
multifaceted and orchestrated by the Soviet Union. The enemy sought the violent 
overthrow of the South African government and the destruction of the supposed 
foundations - Christian values, capitalism - of South African society. A 'total strategy' 
was required to combat the onslaught. These policy initiatives were closely associated 
with the presidency of P.W. Botha, who came to power in 1978 and who had forged 
close links with the SADF during over a decade as Defence Minister. On his accession 
to power the military not only came to dominate the security establishment but also 
played an increasingly significant role in policy making and government. The result was 
an attempt to provide an integrated and comprehensive defence of the state using a 
united and coherent command structure, and a flexible combination of repression and 
reform, co-ordinated by the State Security Council (SSC). The SSC, came to head a 
parallel system of government, establishing as its operational arm the National Security 
Management System (NSMS) which enabled the military to extend its influence down
37
By 1970 the ranks of MK had not grown beyond 2000; between June 1976 and early 1977 
as many as 4000 people left the country (Ellis and Sechaba 1992:47,84; also see Barrell 
1990:33, Lodge 1983:339; Lodge 1992a talks of an exodus of at least 6000 people 
following the Soweto unrest (177)); and between 1977 and the end of 1983 MK trained 
about 8,700 combatants (Barrell 1990:52). The much larger, but perhaps more general 
figure, of 14,000, for those who had gone into exile by the end of 1977, is provided by 
Allister Sparks (in Bernstein 1994:66).
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to the local township level. These structures facilitated a significant militarisation of 
government and society.38
Regional policy was an important component of the 'total strategy' doctrine. Its aims 
were a combination of the economic and the political: to perpetuate and accentuate 
regional dependence; to hold other states hostage against/to international sanctions; to 
discredit black majority rule; to dissuade neighbouring countries from providing bases 
for the ANC; and to seal and secure its borders and re-establish a neocolonial buffer 
zone of friendly/compliant states. A Constellation of States (CONSAS) and agreements 
securing non-aggression and economic co-operation were to be used to formalise the 
arrangement. Destabilisation, which was to impose enormous and diverse costs on the 
region, was the coercive component of the policy.39 The weapons within the 
destabilisation arsenal were fonnidable. Complementing a range of measures relating to 
the region's infrastructures and economies, and intelligence and espionage activities, 
were tactics of both overt and covert repressive force: conventional war and invasion/ 
occupation, surrogate forces such as RENAMO and UNIT A, cross-border raids, death/ 
hit squads, sabotage, car and parcel bombings, kidnapping, and more. The marshalling 
of tactics varied over time and from country to country, targeting particular 
dependencies and vulnerabilities.
During the early months of 1980 the landslide victory for Robert Mugabe's ZANU (PF) 
in Zimbabwe's first independence elections was quickly followed by the launch of the 
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), one of the
38
The 'total strategy' doctrine evolved during the course of the 1980s. For a 
discussion of its different phases see Swilling and Phillips 1989, and Hansson 1990.
39
The internal and external components of the 'total strategy1 were obviously 
inextricably interlinked. Like the former, the latter employed both carrots and sticks, 
was shrouded in secrecy, and evolved through different phases (see Cammack 1989). On 
South Africa's regional policy with particular regard to destabilisation see Hanlon 
1986, Johnson and Martin eds. 1986, and Johnson and Martin 1989.
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primary aims of which was to reduce regional dependence on South Africa. South 
Africa responded to these events with a more aggressive regional policy which 
continued with brief interruptions from mid-1980 until the end of the decade. During 
the 1980s a war was fought by and for South Africa with/in the region. With the 
exception of Angola, the South African security forces relied upon unconventional 
methods (counter-revolutionary/insurgency warfare, low intensity warfare) and military 
units. From the first joint MK-ZAPU campaign in Wankie in 1967, neighbouring states 
such as Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies and South West Africa/Namibia were used as 
training/testing grounds in counter-revolutionary warfare for the South African security 
elite. These experiences, and indeed foreign security personnel once countries like 
Zimbabwe gained independence, fed into the creation of clandestine forces in South 
Africa. Elite special forces included Reconnaissance Commando units (the ’recces'), 32 
Battalion, for many years headed by Colonel Jan Breytenbach (the brother of Breyten 
Breytenbach), the Namibian-based Koevoet (Crowbar), the Security Police hit squads 
operating out of Vlakplaas and similar Civil Co-operation Bureau units within the 
SADF. Although led by whites, most of these forces were predominantly composed of 
blacks from the defeated and disbanded guerrilla annies of the region and those who 
had been 'turned' or 'rehabilitated' under interrogation. Ex-MK combatants known as 
Askaris, for example, were deployed in Security Police hit squads. The special forces 
soldiers were brutalised, compromised, and carried out the dirtiest of the state's dirty 
work.
In the world-view of the state, the militarised special forces were on the front line of a 
just and almost holy war fought for the survival of the Afrikaans people, their God, 
ideology, way of life, and country. Violence and terror were institutionalised and 
normalised. Theirs was a mission in which everything and anything went. The forces 
and their methods grew out of and helped to perpetuate a particular kind of institutional 
culture. An insular brotherhood and its operations were characterised by arrogant
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exclusiveness, autonomy, information on a need to know basis and secrecy, loyalty, 
blind trust, and the most extreme of actions and orders carried out without question, the 
use of various forms of cover/fronts allowing official and ministerial denials of all 
knowledge and responsibility, and an effective immunity from prosecution. Sanctioned 
to work with almost unlimited powers, accountable only to themselves and above the 
law - "the country's borders were just fences and laws and regulations nothing more 
than words" (Pauw 1991:62) - members of the special forces regarded neighbouring 
states as their "playground" in which they could operate freely and virtually without 
interference (Pauw 1991:42,84-5,147,172,189). Dirk Coetzee, commander of the 
Oshoek border post between South Africa and Swaziland from 1977 to 1979, has 
claimed: "I just took over Swaziland" (in Bernstein 1994:211). Their operations 
respected one golden rule, "the eleventh commandment", never get caught. The 
military, and the security establishment more generally, became a law unto themselves, 
a state within a state.40
In the activities of the special forces a familiar pattern can be identified in which 
boundaries were erased and redrawn, distinctions blurred, sometimes deliberately and at 
other times unconsciously or in error. Distinctions between the police and the army 
became blurred: both were highly militarised, both operated within the townships/South 
Africa and abroad, and both targeted the ANC and its allies. Further distinctions that 
were obfuscated included those between legal and illegal repression, between different 
forms of warfare, between South Africa and its neighbours, between military, political 
and civilian targets, and between South African and non-South African citizens. If 
anything, the forces operating in the region had a freer rein, a worse reputation for 
brutality and a lower level of accountability than those active within South Africa. As 
was implied by the terms of reference of the Harms Commission - appointed in January
40
On this culture, often associated with notions of a 'cop culture1, see Pauw 
1991:62,91,106-13,245 and Steytler 1990.
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1990 to inquire into "murders and deeds of violence allegedly committed with political 
motives", but only when they were committed within the borders of South Africa - 
security force actions outside the country were seen to be legitimate acts of war. In the 
battlegrounds of the region South African forces, both geographically and in 
innumerable other ways, respected no boundaries or borders. The aim of the South 
African state was to deny the ANC protection, security, support and the possibility of 
expansion, in other words all those things that Lodge claims the ANC acquired in exile, 
wherever it was based. If this meant terrorising the region, violating the territorial 
sovereignty of neighbouring countries, and undermining governments, then so be it.
In Steve Jacobs' "Diary of an Exile", a lawyer has gone into exile in the hope that his 
past will "slip off’ (1986:127), His past encompasses interrogation and torture, being a 
state witness, the suicide of his wife, and exile. In exile he hears that Alfred Nguza, 
whom he testified against in court, has died in prison. The past does not, will not, slip 
off. The guilt "would follow me anywhere, its poisonous claws embedded in my 
psyche" (79). His betrayal is continually relived. Nguza haunts him: '"Tell them, and my 
messengers will kill you... No matter where you flee, no matter how far, my messengers 
will seek you out"' (138). The lawyer lives in a world increasingly dominated by illusion 
and becomes paranoid that his guilt has been announced to the world, that the nearby 
villagers have become Nguza's messengers. The book ends with him anticipating the 
messengers' arrival: "They are coming, I know... They are coming. I feel their presence 
in the wind... I hold my rifle in my lap... Outside, the darkness is pure; I will see their 
faces when they enter. I switch off my light. I wait" (143,145-6). This represents an 
inversion of a more familiar scenario in which the state’s messengers of death stalked 
their running, waiting, anticipating prey. They were stalked at home, in neighbouring 
states, throughout the world. The race against death could not be won because there was 
ultimately no destination or location that was safe (see Cele and P. Naidoo in Bernstein 
1994:199-208,233). The South African government attacked the ANC wherever it
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sought refuge, bases or safe passage, and used its formidable arsenal of military and 
economic weapons, a blend of force, threats, diplomacy and positive incentives, to 
persuade its neighbours to stop supporting or even tolerating the ANC's presence and 
activities. In 1988, the then Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, made the point 
succinctly: '"Wherever the ANC is, we will eliminate it"1 (in Pauw 1991:114).
The Messengers of Death
In June 1980, in the first of a number of spectacular attacks that formed part of a 
campaign of'armed propaganda’ designed to generate publicity and mobilise support, 
MK successfully exploded several bombs at the South African Coal, Oil and Gas 
Corporation (SASOL). The state responded in January 1981 with a new style of cross- 
border raid on the Maputo suburb of Matola, in Mozambique (see Khanyile in Bernstein 
1994:415,418-19). Due to the ongoing activities of agents of the South African state, 
southern Africa went on to experience more cross border violence than any other region 
of the world during the 1980s (Pauw 1991:124). The exchange of attacks/raids became 
a common feature of regional warfare. The December 1982 raid on Maseru, Lesotho, 
was followed within days by the exploding of several bombs at the Koeberg Nuclear 
Power Station; similarly, an MK car bomb outside the headquarters of the South 
African Air Force in Pretoria in May 1983 which killed nineteen people and injured 
more than 200 was followed by a bombing raid on Maputo three days later. Other 
patterns of attack favoured by the South African state included those timed to coincide 
with the meetings of significant organisations and institutions - such as the 
Commonwealth, SADCC, and the raid on Gaberone, Botswana, on the eve of the ANC's 
conference in Kabwe, Zambia, in June 1985 - and to otherwise influence political 
developments. Spanning both categories were a series of co-ordinated SADF raids on 
Frontline States which sabotaged the Eminent Persons' Group peace initiative by the
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Commonwealth in 1986. In this unequal struggle, as never before, the soldiers of MK 
became death’s messengers, and their message was clear:
Around him in the dark, an horizon darker than the dark held the cold forms in 
which the old real, terrible needs of his life, his father's life and his father's 
father's life were now so strangely realised... You could not eat the AKM assault 
rifles... brought in golf-bags, you could not dig a road or turn a lathe with the 
limpet mines, could not shoe and clothe feet and body with the offensive and 
defensive hand-grenades, could not use the AKM bayonets to compete with the 
white man's education, or to thrust a way out of solitary confinement in 
maximum security, and the wooden boxes that held hundreds of rounds of 
ammunition would not make even a squatter's shack for the girl and child. But 
all these hungers found their shape, distorted, forged as no one could conceive 
they ever should have to be, in the objects packed around him. These were made 
not for life; for death. [They] lay there protected by it as they had never been by 
life. (Gordimer, "Something Out There", 1984:145-6).
The fear of a raid in the Frontline States by the regime's messengers of death, whose 
message was equally clear, was pervasive and ever present. The attack when it came 
was at once anticipated and unexpected. Mostly attacks took place under cover of night, 
when the sounds of death were both a source of terror and the only measure of the raid's 
scope, proximity and passage. At the heart of this darkness and disorientation was the 
sense of not knowing what was happening, who was attacking who and why, or of 
knowing all too well; and the question: are they coming for us? To frighten the local 
population raids were sometimes intentionally indiscriminate while on other occasions 
they were rendered so by poor and dated intelligence. Casualties, as a result, included 
civilian citizens of southern African states as well as political opponents. One of the 
most notorious cross-border missions took place in the early morning of 10 December
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1982 when a commando force attacked various sites in Maseru. Of the 42 people killed,
30 were South African and 12 were Lesotho citizens.
They came in the middle of the night... I will never forget the anxiety I 
felt there. We knew what was happening. Already there were sounds of 
people talking through the house... I just remember this sense o f ,'... what 
about the children sleeping next door?' And we looked at each other and 
we knew we were thinking about the same thing... It's easy to relate these 
things as if you had time, but it was all happening at once. And before I 
knew it, there was shooting in the passage... shooting and other war 
noises from outside of the room next door to us... where the children 
were sleeping... Well, it's you or[.,.] We had to defend ourselves... Then 
the attack concentrated on the outside of the house and at that time, the 
two children flew into the bedroom where we were. I just remember this 
sense of relief and just hugging them... And up to now I wonder what 
went on in their minds. But my second daughter... was not there; my 
sister-in-law... was not there. I remember this sense that we both had, 
communicating just by looking at each other... that they have been killed.
That commotion lasted for a long time... it was like a lifetime... they re- 
attacked... re-attacked... we crawled out through this passage that was by 
this time just a scene of war, to the kitchen which was the only room 
which was not burning... And the only thought I had was, 'Are these two 
alive?... the thing that drove us out of the house was the fire... I couldn't 
just think of running and leave my daughter burning in there... And he 
[Sexwale's husband] went in... and after a while his sister joined us, and 
after what seemed like a year he emerged with my first daughter... We 
left. We took everybody. We crawled. (Bunie Matlanyane Sexwale in 
Bernstein 1994:238-40; also Matsobane Sexwale 486-9)
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Clearly such raids inflicted deep physical and psychological wounds on individuals, 
families and communities, and changed lives. "It was actually the turning point of my 
life, of my family life, of my political life, of my academic life" (B. M. Sexwale in 
Bernstein 1994:238, also 241). While, miraculously, there were no fatalities in 
Sexwale's family - a fate which had its own problems: "I have to live a life of having to 
justify why I did not die!" (243) - the family of Nelly Marwanqana (Ma-Mai) was 
decimated. She had been in Maseru with her family for only four days when the raid 
took place. Of the ten people in the house in which they were staying, five were killed - 
including her husband, a daughter, herself a young mother, and a son - and five, all 
family members, survived. Marwanqana's initial reaction was one of despair: "That 
time, I say, it's better if me I die all together with my children... why these Boers left me 
alone, it's better to kill me and all this family of Marwanqana must be finish". But it was 
a reaction which changed, with time: "Then I'm say ah, I must look forward. Yes, yes, 
yes. And my children has grown nice... I have no problem... Ja, is better now, somebody 
look after children, ja" (in Bernstein 1994:237).
In the aftermath of such raids, the centripetal unifying pull of a shared sense of grief and 
outrage was countered by a formidable array of centrifugal forces that profoundly 
damaged exile communities. The horrifying task of finding out what had happened, 
which relatives and friends and comrades had been killed - "I will never forget the sight 
I saw at that house that day... They had obviously shot them, shot them, until they could 
not die any more, and they still continued to shoot in them" (B. M. Sexwale in Bernstein 
1994:241) - was followed by accusation and suspicion and dissatisfied constituencies 
challenging organisational authority and discipline. The civilians of host countries 
became more careful, suspicious and even hostile in dealings with exiles, while their 
governments were often forced into greater vigilance and harassment, sometimes to the 
point of deporting some or all South African exiles/refugees. For those who remained, it
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became much more difficult to operate in the affected countries. The insecurities and 
uncertainties of the race against death in South Africa were transposed, virtually in their 
entirety, onto life in the Frontline States. Sexwale states: "It was impossible to lived 
there [in Lesotho]. It was hell... living always with this fear: where shall we sleep 
tonight? What have they seen? All that tension all the time" (in Bernstein 1994:241).
The political life and work of the ANC in Botswana was transformed by and in the 
wake of the June 1985 raid on Gaberone. The change was from a country characterised 
by relative openness into one in which conditions were extremely tense and difficult. 
Within Botswana the raid and subsequent smaller attacks provoked fear of both further 
violence and of the South African community of exiles and refugees. South Africans 
stood out - "[pjeople have a way of telling South Africans by the way that they walk, 
talk, dress and act" - and it became difficult "to survive, to get accommodation, to move 
in the streets", underground work became virtually impossible. A cycle developed in 
which ANC activists would be arrested by the local police, held for a short period and 
then deported to Lusaka. Due to the absence of replacements and the desire to maintain 
continuity of leadership in the country, deportees were sent back illegally. The pattern 
continued indefinitely: "It was a sort of... gentleman's agreement. We would get 
arrested, deported. They’d know we would come back". But as these recidivists became 
increasingly well known to the local police, political and other activity became more 
and more difficult. "Every time that you went to any public place you knew you were 
exposed... So that the act of going out to the shops, meeting people, doing your work, 
created a lot of tension" (Gilder in Bernstein 1994:196-7, also Moatlhodi 412-13).
The countries that comprised the 'forward areas’ were not only powerless to act against 
the frequent violations of their borders by South African agents, they were almost as 
powerless to prevent the ANC traversing their territory and borders in order to infiltrate
265
South Africa 41 They were in an unenviable position, between the two major players in 
the struggle for South Africa, neither strong enough to stand above the fray nor to 
unequivocally back one side against the other. In this political and military struggle the 
space in-between was again highly ambiguous. The space was both geographical and 
political, and the states that occupied it were both violated and violating. Often 
internally divided, tom between solidarity and expediency, South Africa's neighbours 
were, to various degrees, forced to adopt and/or embraced, forms of political 
compromise. The cycle of deportation and return in Botswana in the wake of the 
Gaberone raid is an example of one such compromise, but there were innumerable 
others.
An interrogation technique employed in Swaziland was to blindfold and disorientate 
ANC captives, give them the impression that they were near/on the South African 
border with 'the Boers' on other side, and to threaten that if questions were not answered 
satisfactorily they would be handed over. The border as weapon ran through the heart of 
this interrogational encounter. The Swazis performed the function of conduit. Ronnie 
Kasrils claims that although the Swazi police asked the questions, they "wore ear­
phones and were directed by the South Africans sitting behind glass partitions in a 
make-shift studio" and that while making this concession to Pretoria they could not 
afford the opprobrium of the OAU that would follow handing ANC members over to 
the apartheid state; but they "were prepared to co-operate in this bizarre form of 
interrogation" (Kasrils 1993:225).
In a further more general example of political compromise, pressure was placed on 
southern African states to sign the agreements which sought, among other things, to 
drive the ANC from the region. Of the agreements signed the most significant was the
41
On the ANC's vocabulary of border violation, see Kasrils 1993:197-200,205-6; on 
strategy, see 262-6.
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Nkomati Accord of March 1984, a non-aggression pact between South Africa and 
Mozambique. It stands as the most powerful illustration of the impossible fate of the 
states caught in-between. Mozambique had a Marxist government, closely allied to the 
ANC and bitterly opposed to the apartheid regime. It was the most proficient of the 
’forward areas’ for the ANC. From the base of Maputo, Swaziland had been the gateway 
to South Africa. And yet the accord resulted in the expulsion of the ANC from 
Mozambique, with the exception of a small diplomatic mission. It was an enormous 
setback and disappointment for the organisation: "Ja, that is the time that really broke 
me. It was painful you know, after all the ten years that I had been working with 
FRELIMO, that that happened. The way they handled our people I just couldn't take" 
(Joyce Moodley in Bernstein 1994:35).42
Facing the threat of imminent deportation from Mozambique, large numbers of MK 
cadres, along with sizeable quantities of arms and explosives, had to be rushed into 
Swaziland. In an equally hurried manner they then had to infiltrate into South Africa. 
Swaziland, which itself had secretly signed a security pact with South Africa in 1982, 
was extremely treacherous terrain due to its diminutive size and population, and the 
high profile of the South African Security Branch working in co-operation with sections 
of the Swazi police.
It was, from an underground point of view, more dangerous than being in 
South Africa; because you were in a pocket-handkerchief kingdom, with 
two towns of about thirty thousand people in each and a strip of highway 
forty kilometres long. There was a saying that after 10 p.m. only the 
ANC and the South African Special Branch were on the road. (Ronnie 
Kasrils in Bernstein 1994:179)
42
On the role of Mozambique and Swaziland for the ANC, see Kasrils 1993:191-3; on the 
Nkomati Accord, see 211-13.
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According to Kasrils, Swaziland was "a capricious blend of beauty and the beast"; a 
'Disneyland' "of daydream and delusion which could suddenly transform into 
nightmare" (1993:217). Leadership of the operational structures in Swaziland fell to 
Kasrils who remained in Swaziland illegally for over a year. The ANC machinery 
operated under enormous pressure, struggling to ensure security and maintain internal 
discipline. Kasrils describes this period of arrests and raids, escapes and deportations, 
mounting tension and surveillance, when the race against death quickened and 
"[h]ysteria in Swaziland was at an all time high" (224), as follows:
It was... incredible... I was now heading a structure in Swaziland that had 
been dealing with forty, fifty, sixty people, and we now had two hundred 
armed guerrillas on the run, who we had to accommodate and look after 
and find money for. And prepare to infiltrate... into South Africa. 1984 
was the most hectic... underground ANC houses were besieged... 
shootouts occurred... our comrades, shooting over the heads of the Swazi 
forces, attempted to hold out or break out of that siege and just escape.
Cases of comrades being rounded up and put in jail, and breaking out en 
masse... cases of comrades being killed by the Swazi forces; one or two 
Swazi security people being killed; South African Boers coming in, and 
with the complicity of the Swazis, arranging a so-called escape from 
prison which was actually South Africans kidnapping our guys back to 
South Africa... comrades... captured by the Swazis... were interrogated 
ostensibly by Swazis, but really by South African Special Branch... It 
was real tough stuff, (in Bernstein 1994:179-80)
Kasrils states that during this period, "[w]e managed to survive, managed to get a lot of 
comrades into South Africa, and keep an underground structure going..." (180).
268
Elsewhere he claims that although over 100 cadres were rounded up and deported, the 
organisational machinery managed to infiltrate over 150 into South Africa (1993:226).
In some ways, "the MK cadres and the innovative ANC underground in Swaziland 
snatched a short-term victory from the jaws of defeat" (Barrell 1990:53).
Nowhere was the sense of being on the run from death more pronounced for the exile 
than in the Frontline States, nowhere were South Africa's messengers of death more 
powerful, nowhere was life more insecure and uncertain. Warning of an impending 
attack or crackdown led to rapid action - going into hiding, departure, self-defence - 
while in their aftermath exiles faced increased tension, hostility, and, potentially, 
deportation. Exiles were often present in the countries of the region illegally, operating 
underground, sleeping by day and active at night, watched, followed and continually on 
the alert, moving from safe house to safe house, known by numerous aliases: "he was 
Paul in Swaziland, in Lusaka he was David, in Botswana he became Benjamin, in 
Lesotho he became something else" (interview Mabitsela). They travelled in disguise, 
on the improvised and forged travel documents of the stateless. Kasrils writes of this 
particular exilic 'space of death': "Those years in the Front Line, with an AK-47 always 
under the bed and regular changes of address to keep one step ahead of death, were 
indeed Desperate Dan stuff" (1993:261, see especially 189-243). By way of conclusion, 
this is Lauren Richer, an exile in Botswana, talking about living with a sense of fear and 
foreboding in the 1980s: "We used to sleep with an AK under our bed[...] being aware 
of being followed and watched, not know[ing] when it would happen, if it would 
happen; terrible strain, hell of a thing[...] all of the time" (interview).
Losing Military Battles, Winning the Political War
The level of anned resistance achieved in 1981 fell or was not significantly surpassed in 
the following three years (Barrell 1990:52,54,60; Lodge 1988:230). Moving through the
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early 1980s the effectiveness of the ANC and its anned wing was undennined from 
within and without. They were rescued again by events in South Africa. Government 
reform initiatives of the early/mid 1980s, such as the Tri-Cameral Parliament, 
floundered in the face of widespread resistance epitomised by the formation of the 
United Democratic Front in August 1983 and a period of massive civil unrest between 
1984 and 1986. Circumstances in the increasingly ungovernable townships at last 
seemed to favour popular insurrection, the definitive era of'people's war', which would 
enable MK to infiltrate and build or link up with support/organisational networks in 
South Africa, instead of attempting to influence events from exile as it had done since 
the early 1960s. Despite problems of command and control that spanned both political 
and military spheres there is no doubt that, unlike during the 1970s, the ideology of the 
ANC dominated oppositional political culture in the 1980s.
In 1985 reported incidents of revolutionary armed activity were three times more than 
the previous year, at 136 incidents, and rose again in 1986 to around 230 (Barrell 
1990:60, Ellis and Sechaba 1992:171, Lodge 1988:230-1,1992a:178). Accompanying an 
upsurge of activity within the country was a third major wave of South Africans going 
into exile. Although there is significant disagreement about the size of MK (see Lodge 
1988:233, 1992a: 179), by the end of 1987 one commentator states that over 12,000 
combatants may have been trained over a ten year period (Barrell 1990:42,64). A 
reasonable estimate of the size of MK at this time would be that it comprised around 
10,000 members. The South African state's objective in the region was still to drive the 
ANC from the Frontline States. The policy of destabilisation was applied ruthlessly and 
without regard for paper agreements such as the Nkomati Accord. With the ANC denied 
bases in Mozambique since the signing of this accord in 1984 and still periodically 
vulnerable to further purges, attention shifted to other states in the region. A raid on an 
ANC house in Lesotho's capital Maseru in December 1985 was followed in Januaiy 
1986 by the closure of the Lesotho-South Africa border and an economic blockade. The
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resultant coup brought to power a pro-South African military regime and the ANC was 
forced into retreat by expulsions and an ongoing offensive against its members. 
Subsequently, ANC and MK structures and operational capacity in Swaziland and 
Botswana were also undermined and destroyed.
Within South Africa itself, the state responded to the ongoing uprising by declaring a 
series of States of Emergency, beginning in 1985. This perpetual emergency was 
characterised by the presence of troop in the townships, by violence stoked by 
conservative and officially backed vigilante groups, so-called ’black-on-black' violence, 
let loose in an attempt to impose a degree of govemability on the townships, and by hit 
squad activity both within and outside the country's borders. This was one of those 
"undeclared wars that maim and kill without battlefields or boundaries", with a front 
that was "anywhere and everywhere" (Gordimer 1988:252). There were no boundaries 
left to erase, no thresholds to cross.
The activities of death/hit squads need to be understood within the context and history 
of repressive methods deployed under apartheid. A number of the factors that 
contributed to their emergence have already been discussed: the 'total onslaught’ 
doctrine, the militarisation of government and the security establishment, and the 
prevailing institutional culture. The security forces had also grown accustomed to both 
legalised repression and to illegal/informal repression operating above and beyond the 
law, to unilaterally imposing any sanction up to and including death in the name of state 
security, to official public language that seemed to invite such abuses, and to not being 
held accountable for their actions in the courts or elsewhere. The pattern of combating 
crisis with terror, of sub-contracted and extra-legal repression, enabled the state to 
increase the levels of violence and destabilisation while covering its own tracks. Death 
squads controlled opposition when other methods failed, or even threatened to fail, 
targeting those who otherwise were out of reach: when security legislation proved
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ineffective or the authorities lacked the evidence to obtain the conviction of a known or 
suspected opponent; when the security forces preferred the immediate and definite 
finality of its own expedient brand of justice to the time consuming niceties of judicial 
procedure with its, albeit minimal, chances of acquittal; and so on.
Custodial violence/death and death squads function within the same institutional 
culture. Both collapsed the elements of the criminal justice system into the moment of 
execution. Impunity and blanket denials were the order of the day. One fonn of 
violence fed another. The victims of torture were 'turned' into the perpetrators of state 
sanctioned murder. Extra-judicial killings were sanctioned to avoid the scandal of 
further custodial deaths, notably after Biko's murder.
The death of scores of detainees without visible punishment of the 
people responsible for their safety created a milieu which nurtured the 
growth of death squads. It encouraged some policemen to think they 
were above the law when dealing with people suspected of crimes 
against the state. From that mind-set there were but a few steps to 
serving in, or even organising, death squads to hunt down anti-apartheid 
activists. (Laurence 1990:66)
The death squads, therefore, were a natural and predictable outcome of apartheid, its 
ultimate and most secret weapon.43 Albie Sachs was the victim of a car bomb during 
April 1988 in Maputo, Mozambique. Another passage through the 'space of death':
On hit squads and their history, see Laurence 1990 and Pauw 1991. Beyond 
assassinations - Pauw (1991:257-8) suggests that probably 230 activists were the victims 
of death squads, but other estimates put the death toll at nearer 50 (Laurence 
1990:2,63) - death squads undertook a range of other activities including 
'disappearances', bombings, sabotage, arson, vandalism, burglaries, and break-ins. Again 
it is worth stressing that the political stature of those killed - Rick Turner, Joe 
Gqabi, Griffiths and Victoria Mxenge, Ruth First, Jeanette Schoon, Mathew Goniwe,
Cassius Make, Dulcie September, David Webster, Anton Lubowski - meant that their 
significance went beyond any mere tallying of figures. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that the activities of death squads are particularly associated with central and 
southern American countries in the late 1970s and 1980s where the number of dead and 
'disappeared' was more usually in the thousands and tens of thousands. For a brief
Oh shit. Everything has abruptly gone dark, I am feeling strange and 
cannot see anything. The beach, I am going to the beach... something is 
wrong. Oh shit, I must have banged my head... The darkness is not 
clearing, this is something serious, a terrible thing is happening to me, I 
am swirling, I cannot steady myself as I wait for consciousness and light 
to return. I feel a shuddering punch against the back of my neck, and 
then what seems like another one. The sense of threat gets stronger and 
stronger, I am being dominated, overwhelmed. I have to fight, I have to 
resist. I can feel arms coming from behind me, pulling at me under my 
shoulders. I am being kidnapped, they have come from Pretoria to drag 
me over the border... This is the moment we have all been waiting for, 
the few ANC members still working in Mozambique, with dread and yet 
with a weird kind of eagerness. 'Leave me,' I yell out. 'Leave me.'... 'I 
would rather die here, leave me, I'd rather die here.' I feel a sudden surge 
of elation and strength as I struggle, making an immense muscular effort 
to pull myself free... I hear voices... But I am unable to struggle any 
more, I just have to go along and accept what happens, my will has gone. 
We are travelling fast... consciousness fades and returns, swirls away and 
comes back... no thought related to action, but passive acknowledgement 
that my body is being transported somewhere, that I exist, even if 
without self-determination of any sort. I wonder if we have reached the 
South African border yet, I wonder who my captors are...?... More urgent 
voices... treating me as an object, to be lifted and carried and moved this 
way and that[...] I feel the... people all around me. Nobody engages me 
as a person... I am wrapped in complete darkness and tranquillity. If I am
a1oofC^ n i°n °f thS links/ties between South Africa and Argentina/Chile, see Pauw 1991:257-9, Steytler 1990:114-15.
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dead I am not aware of it, if I am alive I am not aware of it, I have no 
awareness at all... ’Albief...]' through the darkness a voice, speaking not 
about me but to me... sympathetic and affectionate... A glow of joy of 
complete satisfaction and peace envelops me, I am in the hands of 
Frelimo, of the Mozambican Government, I am safe. 'What happened?' I 
am asking the question into the darkness, my will has been activated... I 
have a social existence once more, I am an alive part of humanity. A 
voice answers... ’[...] a car bomb[...]' and I drift back, smiling inside, into 
nothingness. (Sachs 1991:7-10)44
As the States of Emergency crushed the uprising within South Africa, the ANC and its 
army were being systematically hounded out of its frontline bases. As a by-product of 
the New York accords of December 1988, which set a timetable for the departure of 
Cuban troops from Angola and committed South Africa to decolonise Namibia under 
the auspices of the United Nations, the ANC had to close down its camps in Angola and 
move several thousand MK cadres to Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda. "Some [from the 
Soweto generation] had already experienced a similar expulsion from Mozambique, and 
now they were on the move again, always one step further from home" (Ellis and 
Sechaba 1992:191). Nevertheless, in 1988 MK mounted the highest number of armed 
attacks ever, and the number of such incidents exceeded 200 in both 1988 and 1989 
(Barrell 1990:66, Lodge 1992a: 178).45 Overall, however, the ANC’s position was 
deteriorating. The war, at least in the form envisaged and for the time being, looked
44
For other accounts of hit/death squads see Bernstein 1994:198-225, and in fiction, 
Gordimer 1988: especially 247-54.
45
Barrell goes on to argue that the number of MK combatants reported captured and 
killed dropped dramatically, largely due to "improvements in the ANC's underground 
inside South Africa and its capacity to integrate an armed presence, and a winding down 
of new infiltration” (1990:66). In contrast, Ellis and Sechaba claim that the record 
number of attacks in 1988 was achieved only at the expense of losing large numbers of 
trained soldiers to Security Police actions, and by attacking undefended soft targets, 
for which the ANC paid a heavy price in terms of declining international support 
(1992:181). From 1987 the ANC did attempt to build a more comprehensive and integrated 
internal presence and leadership through Operation Vula.
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increasingly unwinnable. MK lacked bases in the Frontline States, Soviet support was 
withdrawn with the ending of the Cold War, and morale in the camps was again 
dangerously low. While the ANC was in a weak position as the 1980s came to a close, 
the position of the South African government had also significantly deteriorated.
The apartheid regime was under enormous pressure from economic decline, internal 
resistance and international sanction(s). If the era of destabilisation began with South 
Africa treating the region as its own backyard, it ended with military defeat in Angola, 
the independence of Namibia, the withdrawal of South African and Cuban forces from 
these countries, and regional peace initiatives sponsored by the United States and the 
Soviet Union. In this context of mutual fatigue and converging interests the political 
journey to majority rule gathered momentum.
Any assessment of the effectiveness of the ANC, and particularly its army, in exile must 
take into account not only the condition of political exile itself but also the enormous 
problems - such as the lack of advantageous terrain and the fact that at no stage was it 
possible to establish secure military bases in neighbouring countries - confronting the 
liberation movements. The outcome was, perhaps, inevitable. The armed struggle never 
developed to any significant degree beyond externally commanded and supplied cross- 
border raids by small, organisationally isolated units. Relatively few combatants were 
active within South Africa at any one time. Survival time was short and survival rate was 
low as MK consistently sustained heavy and damaging losses. Its members gave 
themselves up, were captured, imprisoned, 'turned' under interrogation and/or killed, and 
returned, often having abandoned their missions, to local political or civilian life. A major 
reason for these losses, and perhaps the most important unresolved problem of the 
ANC's exile, was the poor co-ordination between military actions and political
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structures and between external and internal opposition.46 'Armed propaganda’ never 
sparked a decisive and/or sustained assault on state power.
MK... never became a true ’people's army’ in the classic sense... it 
focused on attacks by small units which rarely interfaced with the 
civilian population... [a 'people’s war'] was never fully achieved. It 
remained relatively isolated from the upsurge of mass protest in the 
1980s and its major weakness was that it remained an 'army in exile' - 
with long communication lines - rather than a force fully absorbed into 
society. (Shaw 1994:231, footnote omitted)47
As a result, despite the mystique attached to MK, the armed struggle played a largely 
symbolic role, and MK's greatest success and influence was in the arena of propaganda 
and the inspirational example provided by its cadres' commitment and courage. While 
on balance the ANC lost the military battle, on balance it won the political war, and in 
this victory both the political and military components of the struggle played a part. It 
was through this ultimate victory that the ANC transformed its exilic 'space of death' 
into something that resonated with life; exiles returned home, alongside prisoners, to 
profoundly influence the creation and possibilities of a new democratic South Africa.
If, as is being argued in this thesis, the apartheid state externally framed and underwrote 
the lives of its opponents, in forcing significant organisational structures into exile it 
attempted to locate them outside the frame or text of the struggle for the country, while 
itself acknowledging no borders or boundaries and still hunting them down wherever
46
The undeniable military difficulties faced by the ANC were compounded by 
incompetence. See, for example, Lelyveld 1987:335-9.
47
For an assessment from within the ANC/MK of their armed activities and the armed 
struggle more generally, see Kasrils 1993: especially 180,186-9,193-6,200-13,218,226- 
7, 231, 234-46, 252, 263-6,2 76-7,281-2,285,288,297.
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they sought refuge. Death - in the form of exile as a 'space of death', the race against 
death, and the state's messengers of death - was a constant companion. Frontline lives, 
in particular, were violently collaborative as a result of this death driven exclusion and 
pursuit. Exiles contested this dominant flow of force in the quest for security, and re­
entry into and participation within the national frame. The breaking of the frame of 
exclusion, full participation in the future, and the filling out of previously 'half-told', 
'half-known' lives and stories are, for the frontline exiles, among the fruits of victory.
The Guide-Line Across the Chasm
Breyten Breytenbach's Memory o f Snow and o f Dust explores the multi-layered 
interaction between the creative act, home and exile, birth and death. The first part of 
the book is a letter written by Meheret, an Ethiopian exile in Paris, to her unborn child. 
The father, Mano, a 'coloured' South African actor returns on a mission to the "land of 
absence". The day before his departure Meheret tells Mano that she is pregnant: "I 
wanted to give him hope (or rope enough?), a reason for believing, a motivation for 
coming back to us. We have nothing left but hope" (1989:6). She believes the child will 
bring Mano back to them. Meheret announces to her unsuspecting child, "This [the 
letter], the telling of your past, will be my present to you" (11). The letter serves to 
"fashion" the child, who in a sense is written before birth. By the end of the letter 
Meheret is informed that Mano has been falsely arrested on a murder charge, sentenced 
to death, and that "there was no more hope... Nothing could be done now to save him" 
(208). Her final words are as follows:
Nine months full. You are not a book. And yet you are nearly written.
You have come with me such a long way. Now the detachment must
come. Tonight will be a wake. By dawn, I know it must happen by
daybreak... You will lift your blue, smothered head to the light, tied to
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me with a rope of blood. The rope is the connecting link between death 
and life. May you go out the good way. May you walk well. (209)
As the child and the letter in which the child is written are due to be bom in exile, the 
child's father is to die at home. The child, and by implication the letter, are the umbilical 
chord or rope linking life and death, child and father, exile and home. These images and 
events are irretrievably bound together: "It [hanging] is easy like birth, being bom, 
cutting from the neck the rope which cut into the neck" (291). Exile is a race against 
death which can not be won. But it can be survived and constructively transformed. This 
chapter has argued that even in its most individualistic form, as the example of Modisane 
illustrates, and in the most politically dangerous frontline terrain, as shown by the ANC, 
the exilic 'space of death' contained within it potentially resurrective life. Mano writes 
from prison: "Writing is like plaiting a rope. And the rope is the present linking past to 
fixture. The guide-line across the chasm" (306).48 Exile autobiography can take the form 
of a suicide note, but it can also provide a "guide-line across the chasm" linking death 
and birth, past, present and future, exile and home. Again writing reconnects, and 
reactivates the movement of, time, and across space. Such autobiography can be a 
continually reworked rite of passage which implies the possibility of survival and 
continuity in exile, of creativity in exile as an ongoing process. In the words of Mano, 
'"[e]xile is the living proof that death doesn't kill'" (29).
In Coetzee's Age o f  I r o n , Elizabeth Curren describes her letter as a "rope of words" 
(1991a: 181); a rope that attempts to link mother and daughter, home and exile, death and
1 i f e.
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Chapter 4: Permanent Exiles and Retrospective Migrants: Breyten Breytenbach 
and Es’kia Mphahlele
it is obviously only one form o f exile when you are far away from the society that gave birth to 
your work and for which it is destined. Nearly all South African writing reflects varying stages 
of exile and alienation. That is what our literature is all about. (Breytenbach 1986:77, also 
Gordimer 1989:135)
Exile is, in many respects, the central problem in South African literary history. In no other 
country save perhaps 1930s Germany did the state mount such a concerted effort to expel and 
destroy the most innovative representatives o f nonofficial culture. (Bunn 1996:33)
Artists and purveyors of culture crossed the burning bridge into exile for a range of 
reasons relating to politics and culture. Among these were the poverty of resources and 
opportunities, the segregation of both performers and audiences, various forms of the 
most overt censorship and oppression, and the suffocating cliche that the South African 
condition could become for artistic expression. Whether the creative imagination was 
overtly political or not, whether the passions of resistance ran deep or were a matter of 
indifference, a political identity was invariably imposed; culture became an inherently 
political activity. Exile, furthermore, was a moment of politicisation, a threshold of 
radical emergence. As the example of Modisane amply illustrates, however, not all such 
exiles were political activists.1 Nevertheless, culture's practitioners, because of the 
relatively wider embrace of their influence, were among the first and among those most 
consistently targeted by oppressive measures and, as a result, left in droves. Nkosi went 
so far as to say: "It would appear that for creative South Africans, both black and white, 
exile is now an inescapable condition" (1983:88). Among the cultural exiles were jazz 
musicians, singers, actors, painters, and writers. It is on the latter group that this chapter 
will focus.
1
The outcome of the political-cultural complex, of combinations of force and choice 
motivating exile, were articulations of self-definition that were rarely 
straightforward, often ambiguous, sometimes incoherent (see Hope in Bernstein 1994:34 5- 
8, Nkosi 1994).
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The written word and creative process, like organisational politics, are agents of 
transformation within the exilic 'space of death', 'guide-lines across the chasm'. The 
lives and works of Breyten Breytenbach and Es'kia Mphahlele provide testimony to the 
fact that exile can encompass the, albeit painful and fraught, unfolding of a creative 
process. The process takes on a particular form. Each new literary creation plants a 
milestone on a path to survival, a footprint along the way. Preoccupations appear 
repetitive, circling what Breytenbach has described as the "central wound of exile" 
(1989:45). Resisting the forces of healing, exile becomes "a wound like a mask which 
had grown to the flesh" (Breytenbach 1993:95). The story remains the same: "The 
biography / 1 am repeatedly in the process of / writing is always the same one, / and it 
may be described / as a variously sliced-up or tom-apart / book of myself'
(Breytenbach, "A Kind o f  Telling", 1989: prologue). Self and exile, art and life, narrate a 
single story which treads and threads the narrow line between awareness and obsession. 
The story is told and retold so compulsively because otherwise it and the author and 
their exile and South Africa's exile would have no tangible existence. Edward Said has 
said the following with reference to the Palestinians: "there seems to be nothing in the 
world which sustains the story: unless you go on telling it, it will just drop and 
disappear... The other narratives have a kind of permanence of institutional existence 
and you just have to try to work away at them" (in Rushdie 1991:178). The telling itself, 
the forms and techniques of telling, the bold intent to "tell / the world about what still 
lives" (Modisane, "Lonely", in Couzens and Patel eds. 1982:273), are a way of staying 
the course and staying alive.
The lives/works of Breytenbach and Mphahlele indicate that at some point in this ritual 
of (re)living and (re)telling, exile becomes its own subject matter and its victims
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become "permanent exiles".2 Like no other single moment, the (non-)resolution of 
return crystallises the permanence of exile. But it also transforms, and chrystallises the 
transformation of, exile; natural and complete, a condition, it is also redefined, in a way 
that recasts the past and present, into the fold of migrancy. The process of becoming 
both permanent exile and retrospective migrant involves a violent un/remaking of 
identity, imagination and the creative portfolio.
Creativity, for the exile, is impaled upon the inherent dichotomy, contradiction and 
paradox of the condition, upon its essential duality. Perhaps the most significant duality, 
because it informs all others, concerns the interplay between absence and presence. It is 
as if the exile carries the absence "as an unspeakable disease - and this disease keeps 
him separate from others" (Breytenbach 1986:75). Breytenbach also writes: "You live 
and you write in terms of absence, of absent time (or in terms of a questioned present 
time). Not an imagined or remembered existence: more an absent presence. A state of 
instant reminiscence" (211). Presence and the present are always displaced, deferred, 
somehow absent. Relating two temporal discourses from the previous chapter, from 
departure/arrival, a moment without past or future, exile becomes its opposite, a 
lifetime culled of any sense of the present, lived in terms of a remembered past and 
anticipated future. But there is also the potential for an unequal coexistence of both 
absence and presence/present, and of the variously achieved, often creative, 
transformation of one into the other. Breytenbach has written of a stage when writing 
comes into its own, "the missing is transformed into a delicious mixture of ache and 
ecstasy, changing shape and modifying its nature, until the very absence becomes 
presence" (1990:31). And elsewhere: "Absence, that was the very presence!" (1989:82). 
The duality may take root to the extent that it retains its hold independent of exile itself.
2
This phrase is borrowed from the title of Jay 198 6.
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This remark relates to Mphahlele after his return home: "I desperately want to be 
present and absent at the same time" (Chabani Manganyi 1983:11).
The paradox of exile has paradoxical creative implications. Breytenbach talks of "the 
contradictory redundancy and fertility of the state of exile"; of "the sharpened sense of 
loss and the increased awareness of gain" (1996:41-2).5 In the sphere of language, for 
example, he states in relation to his native tongue, Afrikaans, that on the one hand "it is 
rather like carrying the bones of your ancestors with you in a bag: they are white with 
silence, they do not talk back" (1986:74), while on the other, exile made his mother 
tongue "into a 'homeland', a movable feast, indeed a dancing of the bones... It gave a 
taste to words" (1996:46). The bones of language may become white with silence or 
dance with new meanings.
Various forms of displacement/migrancy have been likened to a state which activates 
artistic creativity. For Terry Eagleton this has to do with a point of balance between 
operative distance from a society and intimate involved with it: "great art is produced... 
from the subtle and involuted tensions between the remembered and the real, the 
potential and the actual, integration and dispossession, exile and involvement" 
(1970:18). One might easily add to this list absence and presence. Michael Seidel, in a 
similar vein, states that "experiences native to the life of the exile seem almost activated 
in the life of the artist: separation as desire, perspective as witness, alienation as new 
being" and he talks of "exile as an enabling fiction" (1986:x,xii). For Ugarte, "the life of 
exile is, in many ways, the life of fiction" and "exile literature lays bare the workings of 
literature itself (1989:26,20), while according to Said, also, the unreality of the exile's 
world resembles fiction (1984:167,1984a:52). From various perspectives, therefore, the 
connection is repeatedly made between exile and a fictional state of being and between
3
Also in this regard see Nkosi 1983:vi-xi,93-6.
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exile and the literary imagination. The exile appears to be almost uniquely well placed 
to become a writer. Alongside the dark chamber of incarceration, exile is seen to be 
creatively enabling. But how has exile, with its connotations of loss and death, been 
transformed into such a potent motif of twentieth century culture (see Said 
1984a:49,53)? How has the exilic 'space of death' been transformed through the 
creativity of art into a landscape of life?
In a South African context it is mainly Breytenbach who has equated exile with the 
make-believe and unreal, with writing, and more particularly with the creative act 
(1986:153, 1993:222,1996:38-49).4 "And if we were to generalize some more - could it
not be said that all literature as we know it today, wherever its origin, flows in fact from 
exile?" (1986:77). More specifically, what, according to Breytenbach were the 
advantages of being out of South Africa, away from apartheid, in exile? Firstly, to be in 
exile was to be free from fear and oppression. He has described not belonging, being an 
outsider, as "probably a blessing in disguise" and even a privilege (1986:211-12): the 
exile could learn the chameleon art of adaptation; inspect the inner lining of integration; 
was taught something about mechanisms of survival and tolerance; and began to 
understand the feel of hannony, if only as a conscious construct from which s/he was 
excluded Alienation provided access to the essential. Furthermore, the writer could 
look back at a homeland armed with new ideas, altered perceptions of space and time, a 
sense of distance and a different perspective, a broader, more international, vision; was 
free to imagine/dream a past and the future of that past. There were lessons to be learnt:
4
Also see Hope, although as mentioned before technically more expatriate than exile, in 
Bernstein 1994:345-8. In an interview with Andries Oliphant, Njabulo Ndebele stated that 
being outside the country afforded him "a necessary distancing from South Africa. This, 
paradoxically, served as a means of recall, of retaining a kind of distilled memory. I 
found that being removed from some experiences at home served to recall those very 
experiences in a very vivid and compelling manner". Oliphant goes on to say. "apart from 
the crucial aspects of recall and reflection, I think absence from a place with which 
one is deeply engaged can lead to the enhancement of the specificity of that place in 
relation to other places. This then may establish the possibility of engaging in a 
radically transformed fashion with one’s place of origin". Ndebele responds, "quite 
true... it is very well stated in terms of my own experience" (1988:342-3).
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"In telescoping many contradictions and opposites, exile has provided me with a 
panoply of lessons" (1996:46). At the heart of his response to exile has been the notion 
of creativity. Breytenbach claims: "You learn about creation - because you must 
compensate for not fitting in naturally with the environment - and thus transformation 
and metamorphosis" (42, also 46). It has provided motifs for his work: silence, death, 
transformation, the void.5
For Mphahlele, exile was blighted by long periods of drought with regards to his 
creative writing. Academic achievement, literaiy growth and intellectual stimulation 
were the most significant, indeed the only, gains of exile. Although ultimately 
insufficient it was this creative component that made life in exile bearable (Chabani 
Manganyi 1983:12, Mphahlele 1984:119,163,168). Work, in its various forms, provided 
a form of insulation, shelter from the storm. Exile also impacted upon themes that litter 
Mphahlele's writing: the wanderer, the glass-house, the 'tyranny of place'.
In stark opposition to the notion of exile as enabling creativity is a very different 
concept: exile as creative death.
Exile as a mode of genius no longer exists; in place of Joyce we have the 
fragments of works appearing in Index on Censorship. These are the rags of 
suppressed literatures, translated from a Babel of languages; the broken cries of 
real exiles, not those who have rejected their homeland but who have been 
forced out - of their language, their culture, their society... amputated 
sensibilities, not free... whole... (Gordimer 1989:288)
5
See Breytenbach 1986:75,1988:129,1996:41-2,46,109.
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The writer risks "the rupture of silence", "eventually becoming the living experience of 
the fact that exiled memory is the slow art of forgetting the colour of fire" (Breytenbach 
1986:211,1996:39). Nortje writes: "[p]ast does not cling, but spreads and settles / like 
colour in the water, heart's diffusion" ("September poem", 1973:51).
In exile, you cling to memory because you daren't forget, cannot afford 
to. That brutal memory assures you of an identity, which absence... 
chews up slowly at the edges; like a caterpillar travelling along the edge 
of a leaf, destroying the very physical prop on which its body rests.
(Mphahlele 1985:73)
Mphahlele bemoaned the lack of a meaningful cultural context, community and 
relevance, and their replacement by an ocean of insecurity. He could not survive on 
borrowed fears and commitments, the 'tyranny of place' demanding his loyalty. For 
Breytenbach being in exile meant being deprived of the enviromnent where one 
belonged naturally, functioned completely, fitted in instinctively, and enjoyed a shared 
and unquestioned sense of security. The immediate ability to serve, communicate and 
contribute were lost. These characteristics of exile inevitably had creative 
repercussions.
Wally Serote has claimed, "exile is an assault on creativity" (in Bernstein 1994:335).
The implications of distance, in time and space, were accentuated by the fact that, in the 
exile's absence, apartheid relentlessly un/remade the physical and human landscape of 
South Africa. Writing often assumed an air of unreality due to a lack of immediacy and 
contact. Those who had developed their craft using the troika of politics, realism and 
home, found the loss of the tangible directness of lived experience, and what Maughan 
Brown evocatively calls "adjusting the focal length" (1991), difficult to overcome/
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achieve or turn to their advantage.6 Significantly, Mphahlele notes that an exile's writing 
registers ideas more readily than it dramatises concrete experience (1981:12, also 
1974:241). Perversely, writers who went into exile in order to escape creative death, 
often simply confronted it in a different form. The creative problems were profound 
indeed: who to write for, what to write about, was it possible to write any more at all?
These difficulties were compounded by the banning of writers and their work in South 
Africa. Banned writers existed, as has been said of Dennis Brutus, as a vacuum, an 
absence, a black hole in the firmament of South African literature (Gardner 1984).
All one attempts is talk in the absence / of others who spoke and 
vanished / without so much as an echo. / 1 have seen men with haunting 
voices / turned into ghosts by a piece of white paper / as if their 
eloquence had been black magic. (Nortje, "Soliloquy: South Africa",
1973:5)
Such writers wrote about and for people who could not read their work; they were 
physically, creatively and politically erased from the text of apartheid South Africa; 
silenced and effaced, they became missing persons, the 'disappeared' (Lindfors 
1994:160-1). Banned at home and lacking, indifferent to, or indeed hostile towards, an 
international audience, many were "like disembodied voices crying out for a dimension 
that [would] give them meaning" (Mphahlele 1984:130). They often fell silent: "our 
hearts are dry / with your silence. Exile / is no more than a part of death.... I cannot 
break / the stones of your silence or send you / the irreparable grief / of your homeless 
land." (Cope in Cope ed., "Silence", 1979:25). Clearly not all exiled writers were 
equally affected by banning and censorship: for example, while Mphahlele's work was
6
Maughan Brown uses this phrase in the context of an examination of the implications of 
exile for the work of Alex La Guma.
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banned, Breytenbach was less harshly treated by the censor: while the opponent was 
exiled the Afrikaans writer remained free.7
In this context it is possible to see the exile, alongside the prisoner, as variously written 
and contested through writing. Prisoners, with the exception of Breytenbach who wrote 
into a state manufactured void, were not officially allowed to write creatively at all. In a 
not dissimilar way, the state wrote the exile out of the country, off the page, and into a 
void. Banning and censorship regulations, as another manifestation of the state's power 
of writing, functioned as messengers of death for writers in exile, as an attempt to force 
them outside the frame of creative discourse. The state’s role in lives and their telling 
was again violently collaborative: exile was compounded by banning and censorship, 
the ’ownership’ and meaning of texts was contested and manipulated, violence was 
internalised as self-censorship, and opponents were written into various forms - 
absence, silence - of creative death. Counter-discourses, life stories, were repeatedly 
narrated as part of the exile’s attempt to regain a voice, self and world, and to re-enter 
the national and discursive frame. Life stories did not so much enter an arena dense 
with prior versions as attempt to inscribe the state-imposed absence, silence, void, with 
oppositional texts and lives. Again the word was a weapon in the un\remaking of the 
self and its attendant worlds, and in the struggle to transform a 'space of death' into 
something that entertained the possibility of life.
Not only the word, but also the body, was compiicit in the mechanisms of un/remaking. 
For the exile, like the prisoner, space/landscape was layered, exfoliative. Variously 
alienated from space/landscape by apartheid (by its geography of dislocation, racial 
classification, political exclusion) and by exile, this layered world could, again like that 
of the prisoner, collapse down to the body, the total body as self/world. David Bunn, in
7
On the subject of censorship and literature, see Merrett 1994, Visser 1992.
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relation to an exilic "crisis of representation" (1996:33), writes: "When landscape 
conventions failed for exiles such as Arthur Nortje, the body became their only place of 
imaginative refuge... In writing a new literary history that will unify the experience of 
exiles and local writers, we should not underestimate the effects of this imaginative, 
self-directed violence [and healing] that, for some, became the only means of keeping a 
far-off home alive to them in the present" (43,[] bracket my own). The body provided 
the irreducible core of the "imaginative geography" (33) of both prisoner and exile; and 
articulated a violently collaborative textuality.8
The coexistence of exile as creative life/rebirth and death suggests the need for a 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between the paradox of exile and the paradox 
of writing. This chapter seeks to examine the complex impact of this relationship on the 
work of Breytenbach and Mphahlele. In plotting the biographical and narrative 
trajectory of these two exiled writers, the chapter focuses on the twinned evolution of a 
lifetime impaled upon exile's contradictions and the central ideas and themes of their 
writing.
Breyten Breytenbach: The Journey of the Eternal Dissident
Breytenbach left South Africa in 1960. "In the beginning there was leave-taking. I can 
just about name the date when I found myself suddenly stripped of all previous 
certainties... At the age of twenty I left behind me a country, a continent, a youth, a 
language, an identity and perhaps also a memory. What came after would have to be 
imagined" (1996:159). Finally settling in Paris, Breytenbach effectively married into
8
With reference to the body not only were exiled writers ’disappeared1 and like 
’disembodied voices', lacking the dimension that would give them meaning, but exile was 
also experienced bodily, as amputation (Moss 1994:11), and as the voluntary and 
involuntary detachment of body from mind/soul: "The body is far wiser / than the brain, 
it makes / its home where it finds itself / thinks less of exile" (Tromp, "Still 
Feeling", in de Kock and Tromp eds. 1996:289).
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exile, entering into an 'inter-racial' marriage with a Vietnamese woman and thereby 
restricting his ability to return home. He also became involved in anti-apartheid 
activities. Repeated applications for a visa were rejected until permission was granted 
for a three month visit, from December 1972. Breytenbach had been away for, 
"[tjhirteen years. A lifetime. A waste" (1985a:46). A Season in Paradise is the story of 
this first journey home.
Homecoming had both a pnvate and a public face. In the private realm Breytenbach 
sought cathartic closure - "the trip turned out to be an effort to come to terms with my 
roots, to be finished with the business of youth" (1988:129, also 1985a:39) - recollection 
and remembrance - he walks the fields of his youth, encounters previous selves, moves 
through layers of his own being (1985a:55-6): in a beautiful image he recalls waking at 
night to "tiptoe back past all these moments of myself / taking care not to wake the little 
corpses" (140). Something "forgotten (or thrown away?)" (228) had to be retrieved. 
Home, in one sense, meant childhood, youth, family. It had the aura of magic and 
paradise. "But what will I find there? What late lamented T will I encounter there?... I 
am in search of simplicity, I want to rediscover an innocence... I am on a quest for that 
safety which was mine before there was any need for me to recognise it" (37). At 
another level, however, Breytenbach recognised that the reality of home would not 
coincide with his idealised reconstruction: "And it won't be like that. Perhaps I will then 
be able to destroy the image and grow lucid?" (37).
Complementing the return to youth are intimate reflections on family, notably 
Breytenbach's parents and ancestors. The heart attack suffered by his father towards the 
end of the visit permeates the writing of A Season in Paradise, the shadow of death 
accompanies revisited youth and hangs over impending departure: "I will die and go to 
my father /... my father has a boardinghouse with many rooms" (195-6). His father's 
boarding house is an ancestral home. Breytenbach returned to lay claim to his
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beginnings and his right to an end - "For me, beginning and end lies in this earth" (230)
- that part of South Africa which was his and his alone: "It's my land, isn't it? It's private 
property?" (219).
But Breytenbach's private South Africa had an ugly public face. Hopes were high that 
he would return to the fold: "The word in the air was 'reconciliation'. The prodigal son 
would yet return, the breach would be healed, and all would be well" (Coetzee 
1992:375), This was not to be the case. "I looked on darkness a great deal" (267), 
Breytenbach confesses. The homecoming was plagued by the attentions of the media 
and security police, and by controversy. "I felt exposed and hunted" (1996:160). At the 
heart of the darkness was Breytenbach's powerful sense of estrangement from his own 
people:
That was the reality with which I had to come into contact. People of my 
tribe, people of my history, people of my language, people who are at the 
core of my unconscious safety wanted to talk to me - is it from that 
unconscious and fundamental safety then that I must become alienated?
The sting of death lying in one's own bosom... The land is screaming 
death if only we cared to listen.., We are responsible for what has 
happened, we are responsible for what is going to happen. (1985a:209- 
10)
Estrangement from his own people meant alienation from unconscious and fundamental 
safety. Breytenbach's private South African paradise could not be separated from its 
public face. He summarises his own dilemma: "You can't get away from your own past, 
even if you wanted to. And you can't tie your own people to you, no matter how dearly 
you'd like to" (217).
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Memory, imagination and expectation, reality - the interaction between the home of 
youth, exile and adult homecoming, alienation and belonging, life and death, innocence 
and loss of innocence, his love and hate for his people and country - provided the 
paradoxes, fractures and continuities of insight upon which A Season in Paradise was 
written. New impressions and formulations are superimposed upon, and interwoven 
with, the old. On departure Breytenbach was "provisionally free / and deprived of all 
genealogy and memory and security, / in search of the frontiers of the night" (268). 
However, some corpses Breytenbach had tiptoed past were now awake and were asking 
familiar questions: about who he was; about his relationship with his home country; 
about the still unresolved contradictions between its private and public faces; about the 
role of the artist-activist and exile. These questions were soon to draw Breytenbach 
back to South Africa in a very different capacity and on a very different visit.
As already discussed in chapter 1, when Breytenbach returned to South Africa in 1975 it 
was on behalf of a resistance organisation, Okhela. He travelled in disguise carrying a 
passport identifying him as Christian Galaska, citizen of France. Again there were 
complicated private and public reasons for this return; he was still riven by 
contradictions and unanswered questions:
How much of [my trip] was an attempt to force a break in the 
contradictions in which I was caught up: the dreamer ensnared by 
political work - neglecting his art - and suffering from it; the exile who 
had never accepted the finality of his exile, whose roots were still in 
South Africa; the man, becoming a European, writing in an African 
language, with the world evoked by it, which no one around him 
understood? How much of it was suicidal? Or repentant homecoming?
(1985:95, also 1983:4)
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The resulting period of imprisonment provided a further chapter to his ongoing 
relationship with South Africa: his family, his people, his home. Divisions and 
bitterness within the family, merely hinted at in A Season in Paradise, were brought 
into the open. One brother was a member of the armed forces, the other a reporter "with 
decidedly fascist sympathies” (1985:68), the family contained both heroes and traitors, 
gaolers and prisoners. In April 1978 Breytenbach's mother died. He was not allowed to 
attend the funeral. His father suffered a stroke as a result of which he was partly 
paralysed. The private South Africa of innocence, youth, safety, and family - his 
memory and reconstruction of home - was falling away behind, and even conspiring 
with, the horrors of its public reality. "There will be much killing of the image. Reality 
is that the illusion will be executed" (239). Having been imprisoned by his own people 
there was now no way back. "To be an Afrikaner is a political definition. It is a blight 
and a provocation to humanity" (354):
my alienation as a subversive criminal is permanent; nothing can ever 
bridge the gap between the authorities of the Afrikaner tribe and myself.
And [ accept this and I would not be happy otherwise, because I do not 
consider myself to be an Afrikaner. To be an Afrikaner in the way they 
define it is to be a living insult to whatever better instincts we human 
beings may possess and struggle to maintain. (280, also 73,257, and 
1983)
To be imprisoned in South Africa, particularly in the situation in which Breytenbach 
found himself, was to experience perhaps the most comprehensive form of exile.
What The True Confessions does so brilliantly is relate how a character 
disappears under multiple layers of exile in prison: exiled from society at 
large, from his family, from his former life in Paris where he was already
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an exile, exiled in solitary confinement from his fellow inmates, and 
even exiled, like a pariah, from the Afrikaners, his own people, who are 
holding him. (Campbell 1986:1028)
Breytenbach was in prison long enough for it to become a home of sorts, but his real
home had been disfigured irretrievably. It was "a home that would never be home again,
which I had become alienated from forever. But the alienation was not from the earth,
which I still recognized, with which I still felt at peace" (1985:257). On his release from
prison Breytenbach was seeing everything "for the first time" and "for the last time",
"[ejverything was dying, everything reborn" (327,332): "It is always the time to go" 
(331).
The return to Paris in December 1982 was a form of homecoming. But for "the man 
who went down to the comer to buy cigarettes and who came back eight years later", 
things had inevitably changed, people had moved on: "I came back from that 
paradoxical paradise and have no life left... What remains is gratuitous, free, no 
attachments, no importance. I have no affairs. I have no interests. These too have been 
scorched clean" (27). Breytenbach knew what awaited him in exile, and he couldn't get 
there fast enough. While on his previous return into exile he had been "provisionally 
free , in search of the frontiers of the night", now he was "turned entirely free in the 
gardens of the night" (378).9 With reference to his relationship with South Africa 
another stage seemed to have been reached: "For the dream is saying to some extent 
that the flying dreamer's native land is inaccessible to him" (238).
9
JThis translation from Afrikaans is by Denis Hirson. In the collection of poems, J u d a s
poems the6S r s t  ^ i k e ^ h a ? 13 °^n .Soiae^ at freer translations of two almost identical
"Liberation"' S i ^  that quoted m  the m a m  text, entitled "Release", and the second, 
Liberation . all freaked free m  the boweries of night"; "entirely released in  the
gardens of the night" (1988:53,113). The sentiment, however, S m S j s  X e  same
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In the aftermath of his release, during the 1980s, Breytenbach's unease with exile as 
label, condition and community became clear. Alongside statements stating 
categorically that he was not an exile were descriptions of himself as an emigre and a 
vagabond. Breytenbach asserted that he abhorred the concept of exile. It was a 
condition and a set of expectations he did not want to fall into. It was a "meal ticket", 
debilitating, self-pitying. It was too revered a condition, clothed in a myth of romantic 
lamentation, theatrical and overly dramatic. It was a crutch and a cliche. It was frozen 
in time, petrifying, awash with nostalgia. He was repulsed by exile politics. And yet 
Breytenbach also saw himself as the perennial exile and his work continued to circle 
around its central wound.10 Proclamations of an attempt to move beyond exile, as with 
imprisonment, coexist with their continued influence in/on his life and art.
In December 1983, Breytenbach became a naturalised French citizen. For the first time 
in his adult life he could live somewhere without being a foreigner, he was no longer a 
political refugee. Like Bamum in Memory o f Snow and o f Dust, Breytenbach "swapped 
his pale prison skin for that of a Frenchman", (and even underwent "a heart 
transplant"?), but similarly he was to have "some rejection problems" (1989:85). Later 
he was to write: "Indeed, I am but a momentary Frenchman passing through" (1993:73, 
brackets omitted)." Breytenbach's inability to truly become a Frenchman was only 
exceeded by his failure to cease to be South African. He has stated that imprisonment 
severed the umbilical chord,"[thereafter I could continue, knowing that South Africa 
will always be the mother-prism and pain for me... I was liberated to live my leftover 
life fully elsewhere. To move with the changes... To accommodate the unexpected 
death" (1988:130); and, after a subsequent return trip, he claimed that the return had
10
In relation to the above arguments about exile see, for example, Breytenbach 198 6:18- 
20,207,210-11, 1988:129,130, 1992:62-3, 1996:39-40. Also see Nixon 1992:24-5.
11
Breytenbach has also written that he is destined to be a foreigner, but not a 
stranger, in Paris, "the only town I know really well" (1996:161).
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released him from exile, exile became a thing outside him that could be discarded 
(1996:48). But Breytenbach's alienation/liberation from his people and country, and his 
parallel alienation/liberation from exile, was typically ambiguous. The evolving set of 
relationships with both home and exile, as fleshed out in the following examples, were 
to be characterised by both continuity and change.
The publication in 1986 of End Papers, a collection of pieces about South Africa 
written both before and after his imprisonment, was one staging post along the way:
you came to the conclusion that you'd have to conclude this in-between 
slice of your existence - already out of prison but not yet arrived in 
paradise - that you'd have to back out of the hack standby role of'Mr Ex- 
Detainee', 'Mr Anti-Apartheid', Mr Odd(er) Afrikaner' if you wanted to 
survive at all through creating... that above all you'd have to tip a 
goodbye hat to the personage of Mr Exile' and move forward into new 
pastures unrestricted by past and guilt and passport and belonging to 
death. Except that you're wedded forever to the cause of the South 
African people. Except that... But finally got around to ... putting 
together this record passing itself off as a book... To get it over and done 
with. As of now. The last will and testament o f the wandering African.
(1986:19)
The answer to the question of whether he was burned clean of any attachment to his 
ancestral earth was "Yes and no". Entanglement had simply become "more complex, 
my rooting more painful, my involvement deeper, my concern more acute" (208). But 
Breytenbach also refers to a desire to move out of this "monstrous interregnum, to move 
away from old attachments": "And the need to get it all behind you. You have identified 
with the agony for too long. The stage is bare" (29,225).
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But the stage, of course, was by no means bare. Memory/ o f Snow and o f Dnsi was 
published in 1989 and is a novel which remains autobiographical but treats exile as 
something from which he had been released to the extent that it is a fictional reworking 
of experience and ideas. The three main characters are exiles in Paris: Bamum is a 
white South African writer whose exile has been interrupted by a period of 
imprisonment in South Africa; Mano is a 'coloured' South African actor; and Meheret is 
a part-time journalist from Ethiopia. Mano, in particular, personifies exile and 
alienation: 'coloured', bastard, actor - "the imitator moving over foreign territory... 
invisible... a transit point, an impersonation - better still, a translation" (1989:24) - a 
tortured mix of revolutionary and artist. Breytenbach's own experience of exile is 
dispersed between his characters and used to link individual and national fate with their 
perceived universal implications.14 Bamum states: "'We humans are now a foreign race, 
ear-marked by absence, and the absurdity of our lives reverberates in us"’ (63). Exile, 
like imprisonment, becomes a universal condition, a state of being.
This understanding of exile is again inextricably interwoven with the process of artistic 
creation. Bamum continues: "'The magic of the writer is that he can shape this absence 
and then slip into the skin of his making. And what if writing were the art of selling the 
skin of absence?"'; but also refers to the need to "'break through the screen of 
absence!"'(63,87). The writer can concoct and discard lives, take on the attributes of a 
God with no responsibilities, to ensure his/her own survival. Bamum again: "'I can 
create people out of paper and ink, from thin air... making them dance the way I want 
them to... plotting their destinies for them... killing them off. You could say they are as 
many sacrificial goats dying in my place. As long as I can kill and describe the killing, I
12
Breytenbach has written elsewhere: "Exile teaches you about individual fate with 
universal implications - because it is eternal and has always been with us: we are all 
dimly aware of our incompleteness, of the thick veils of illusion in which we are 
draped" (1996:47, also see 1992:59).
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shall be alive"' (62), Parts of Breytenbach, older versions, previous Ts, other selves, die 
and are resurrected throughout his writings. Much can be learnt from the way in which 
fictional characters and selves who share the writer's burden of exile survive or pay with 
their lives/deaths for the author's survival (see Milbauer 1985).
Soon after the publication of Memory o f Snow and ofDust, in early 1990, South Africa 
entered its political transition to democracy. What does such an era imply for the 
troubled, eccentric exile? Return to Paradise is described by Breytenbach as the last 
part of a triptych, the other components of which are A Season in Paradise and True 
Confessions. Its focus is another three month trip to South Africa, in 1991, under the 
auspices of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA). A 
profound sense of pilgrimage to the intimate and familiar - "This is my world, my voice 
fits precisely in these patterns of speech, my eyes see the same aloes the ancestors did" 
(1993:168): "It is the heritage you [father] left me, an inner presence, the sliding 
distances to which I belong, the reverberations etching my dreams" (177) - is again 
countered by the feeling that he is a foreigner, a stranger. With the death of his parents 
there is no longer a house/home. The past is "[a]nother country, another life" (186). 
Tracing his family genealogy at one point, Breytenbach exclaims: "'Give me back to 
myself!"' (162). He can still neither stay nor leave; doesn't know if he is coming or 
going.
Why did I come back? Nostalgia, unfinished business, loose ends, to
complete the incomplete, for annihilation, deathwish. Why will I not
return to stay? Too late now. Foreigner here... Bitter dreams. No roots.
Attachment too painful. Deathwish[...] (162)
In the familiar cycle of beginnings and endings, openings and closures, arrivals and 
departures, the emphasis is on the latter half of the binaries. Breytenbach's private South
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African world is slowly dying, increasingly overwhelmed by the country's seemingly 
irreparably ugly public face.
Breytenbach describes himself as of, or at least previously of, the ANC, as an anarchist, 
and as having run out of convictions. During the 1980s he largely withdrew from 
involvement in organisational politics. He felt that he personally and the revolution had 
been betrayed. The forces of liberation had learnt too much - corruption, ideological 
dogmatism, lying and self-dillusion, a lack of democratisation - from the oppressor. 
Breytenbach himself was regarded as contaminated by all sides. As a political identity, 
he has chosen the role of eternal dissident, defining himself in negatives, "in absences 
and hollows", as against and in opposition to (74,196). In relation to the ANC and the 
new dispensation, Breytenbach has talked of dissent as a manifestation of critical 
loyalty, of loyalty as vigilant opposition, and of a collaboration which is conditional and 
based on principled criticism (1996:79,82,86, also 150). There is still much to admire in 
Breytenbach's vigorous independence of mind and in his determination to speak out 
about the unpalatable and the controversial. Fervent critiques of the unholy trinity of 
politics, state and power; an unwillingness to condone/accept last minute conversions 
during the death throes of the old regime; a hostility towards the unseemly haste to 
forgive and forget; the frankly expressed view that one hegemony is simply replacing 
another: all these are genuine concerns. But Breytenbach ignores the wisdom of his own 
comment that "only a fool would pretend to understand comprehensively what South 
Africa is really about, or be objective and far-sighted enough to glimpse its future 
course" (1993:xiv).
The partial picture is consistently taken and inflated into the whole. Incredibly, he can 
identity virtually nothing positive or constructive in the transition from apartheid to
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majority rule.13 Less laudable tendencies that have always been present in his work have 
become its dominant trajectory. The negativity of the eternal dissident is exemplified by 
a flailing anger, bitterness and cynicism, by relentless and destructive sniping - at exiles 
and expatriates, Afrikaners, the ANC and particularly the SACP, at critics, writers and 
intellectuals, and assorted others - by trivial superficiality, tedious caricature and 
irrelevant and crass heckling. Breytenbach truculently destroys the sand castle being 
built on the beach and walks away. He has neither cause nor vision. The drive to bum 
bridges and wilfully (self-)destruct appears absolute: his almost genetic rebelliousness is 
typified by an apparent delight in the accumulation of enemies:
The line of my life as indicated here - a warped thread in the complex 
cloth of a much larger tale - seems to be woven against the woof of 
Government and State, the Afrikaner establishment and the new 
politically correct orthodoxy, the exile community of professional 
victims, and finally the ANC. It has been my pleasure to disagree with 
the living and the dead, (xiv-xv)
I lost my friends and my sense of direction, I discarded my dreams, I 
scuttled my chances of participating in the National Reconciliation... I 
forfeited the repose of belonging to 'my country' with 'my own people', I 
deformed my past and destroyed my future. What freedom! (217, also 
209)
Alongside Breytenbach's private creative discourse in which he conducts a dialogue 
with his own demons is a parallel public creative discourse in which few are now 
omitted from the voices against which he speaks in a no longer hidden contestatory
13
Further reflections on the transition are contained in Breytenbach 1996:7-9,20-37,74- 
87,100-5,142-58.
299
dialogue. The dialogue has become a rant and the process is characterised by exclusion 
and isolation. The brilliant aphorisms; the self-consciousness and -criticism; the 
wonderfully moving passages written about his mother and father (145-6,174-81), about 
friends such as Uys Krige (141-6), and about the South African and African landscape; 
his deep ambivalence towards the Afrikaner people drawn with greater sympathy and 
attachment (also 1996:32), and a more generous embrace of his family: all these things 
are present/remain, but they are no longer enough. Words weave ever tightening, 
ultimately suffocating, circles of selfhood. The worlds of others are inaccessible to him.
What, then, of art and politics? Or, indeed, of responsibility? Breytenbach's world has 
become one in which there is a fundamental incompatibility between politics, which 
"presumes (upon) power and must therefore posit non-transformation to ensure the 
mediocrity of control", and revolution, which is "inserted in the 'acting process' of 
creation which is an undoing" (218).14 This quarantining of politics divorces it from 
mechanisms of change. Structures of power are depicted as resilient and irreversible, as 
inherently corrupt and oppressive. The often repeated question, "What happened to the 
revolution?", is enveloped in a mood of fatalistic resignation and determined 
pessimism. "Things have fallen apart", "[tjhe situation at 'home' will continue 
deteriorating" (109,221). There will be no fundamental change. The future is bleak. "So 
where does that leave me? Where do I stand? What is my politics?" writes Breytenbach 
elsewhere: "It may shock you when I say I find this personal tabula rasa, this zero 
degree of functionality, rather exhilarating" (1996:104, also 71-3,86,95,105).
14
For Breytenbach, revolution and creativity/art/writing share a potential for radical 
transformative change, for extending and transgressing limits; in this regard they are, 
in essence, fundamentally different from politics. "Writing which aims at transforming 
awareness can be about searching (for) the margins to stretch the limits; politics 
however moves down the centre from compromise to collusion to corruption" (1996:104). On 
the relationship between politics and art, see 1996:7-8,10-19,65-6,71-3,94-105.
300
The most consistent component of Breytenbach’s pessimism is the violence racking 
South Africa. He talks of the ANC and National Party "gradually imposing a 'stability' 
laced with blood" (1993:xiv). Violence is recorded through barrages of brutality taken 
from newspaper reports. It is in Natal that this vision of apocalypse finds its most 
poignant source and vindication (200-5). It is a "war zone" complete with its "killing 
fields" and "pogrom areas". The war is pervasive yet invisible, the perpetrators are 
known but cannot be stopped, the reality is ethnic cleansing and refugees, a young life 
is described as "a scorched area of screaming numbness" (203), peacemakers are 
rendered incoherent. Breytenbach provides, as he himself observes, a litany of violence 
- "The land is awash in blood" (204) - but nothing else. "There is nothing one can do. So 
what does one do? Continue!" (202). Again the truths of his account are insidiously 
generalised and projected into the future: "I am looking at the future and it chills me to 
the bone" (201).
During the 1980s Breytenbach was still selectively politically active. As he puts it, he 
was "lucky enough to be of some assistance in breaking down the walls of taboo 
between 'inside' and 'outside'" (xiv). Most significantly, he helped facilitate the first 
major meeting between Afrikaner intellectuals from within the country and the ANC in 
Dakar, Senegal, in 1987, and was involved again when, in 1989 at Victoria Falls in 
Zimbabwe, a meeting took place between Afrikaans writers and the ANC.15 Although 
Breytenbach's claims for these events are on occasion grandiose - of the Dakar 
conference he states: "We were putting in motion a process that would decisively alter 
the history of confrontation between black and white[...]" (17) - they were 
groundbreaking and courageous events. But as the division between inside and outside 
became less stark, mediators were no longer needed. Beyond these events numerous
15
The proceedings of the Victoria Falls conference are recorded in a volume 
appropriately called Crossing Borders (A. Coetzee and Polley eds. 1990) . The ANC in 
exile met a succession of delegations from various interest groups in South Africa 
during the second half of the 1980s.
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gatherings and journeys - both South African and African - are woven into the text of 
Return to Paradise. They thereby extend the scope of the journey in time and space, and 
mesh together the past and the present - "the story is neither of the past nor in the 
present but winds its way through words in a lost time" (xv) - South Africa and an 
elsewhere dominated by Africa.
This is a story about a journey home within the journeys of a decade within a life as 
journey. "The original text is a journey" (2). Breytenbach talks of having "become 
accustomed to a nomadic existence" (xiii) and it is a wandering that affects all areas of 
his life. "This book was written on the wing" (xv). "It is a story of the crossing... It is a 
story of the passage..." (218). In perpetual transit, his eye is trained on displacement and 
mobility, on the nomad, the refugee, the migrant, the exile, the traveller. His is a world 
variously on the move. The contingency of identity, for example, is explained through 
the notion of travel;
Perhaps the deciding factor is not who you are, but where you find 
yourself. Which already implies that identity is circumstantial and 
relative, an idea which only gets fleshed out in the search for positioning 
in relationship to the Other... through the recognition of differences. It is 
through shifts and attempts at fixing, as in olden days when one tried to 
plot a course with an eye on stars which themselves were always on the 
move, that you realise you are alive... Fernando Pessoa has claimed: 'To 
live is impossible; to travel p e r h a p s I t  is also said that in olden days 
you travelled so slowly that you were no longer the foreigner at your 
point of arrival[...] (73-4)
There are many aspects of Breytenbach’s world view - the emphasis on the 
journey/travel, diversity, transformation, on the in-between/hybrid and borders, on the
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shifting, unstable 'I' - that resonate with that of postcolonialism. In one of his essays, for 
example, Breytenbach talks of erasing boundaries and extending limits specifically with 
reference to awareness of Africa, but the notion has broader application.
It is another contradiction that exile should be a pointed experience and 
yet, in a world of specialization, be promoting lateral vision and parallel 
thinking. You have to think yourself out of a hole. Indeed, the experience 
and products of exile could be a dissolvent of border consciousness. It 
could be a way of reconnoitring, shifting and extending the limits.
(1996:47, also 10-19)
Illustrations of the in-between/hybrid include the South African population/nation and 
Breytenbach's belief that Afrikaans is a creole language. Their narrative influence 
extends through content, form, and the blend of fact and fiction: "All meaning is of 
course metissage, a new mixture of existing truths" (1993:xiii).16 But to study 
Breytenbach, like Modisane, through this particular theoretical lens is essentially to be 
struck by the profound ambiguity of postcolonial discourse in the context of political 
contestation, and by the centrality of components of its vision to a comprehensive 
alienation and a political incoherence/incapacitation. The need to unpack the potential 
and pitfalls of postcolonial theory is illustrated by the fact that Breytenbach's attempted 
negotiation of binaries - self and ’other', writer and activist, resistance and co-option, 
life and death, continuity and change, fact and fiction, home and exile: denying 
oppositions, reading one in the other and going beyond - is a source of liberation but 
also, and increasingly, of estrangement and confinement.
16
On the/a middle ground/way, see 87,158,161.
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Breytenbach's personal journey has a, perhaps increasingly tenuous, place of anchorage 
in (South) Africa: a point of departure, and certain "constants... [t]his earth was the first 
to speak. I have been pronounced once and for all" (75). But the journey has lost the 
purpose and direction of exile. Although the motif of exile remains, as universal 
condition (182) and in the characters/selves - Mr Ixele, Elixe, Walker - that people his 
story, Breytenbach has been cut adrift from its certainties and sanctuaries. "The more 
you travel, the less chance you have of arriving" (76).’7 The journey has become a 
catalogue of people known and met, of meetings and conferences and world travel. "I'm 
aware of the superficiality - from airport to dinner table to lecture room" (217). It is the 
superficiality of the former exile growing into the clothes of the disorientated, estranged 
recidivist returnee passing through. "I found that one could travel from language to 
language, from death to life and from exile to home, but not translate from one into the 
other" (218). Again there is the suggestion of an irrevocable rift, the dream of shedding 
an old, superfluous, skin.
It is time for me to return where I came from. Am I happy now? It is of 
no importance. I came, I saw, I was confused... Anyway, I have finally 
become redundant. Wasn't that the true purpose? The man with self- 
respect should leave when he wants to. Nothing particularly noble in 
that... And then? Perhaps it will be like death. Certainly the spring which 
made me react at opportune and inopportune moments will be broken.
I'll be rootless... a wandering monk... (209-10, also 217)18
17
Elsewhere, Breytenbach states: "Perhaps the long walk to freedom knows no final 
destination" (1994a:162); and in a related observation: "For me, more and more, writing 
is about travelling and not about destinations” (1996:95).
18
Breytenbach's farewell to exile, and to South Africa, continues (1996:7,25- 
6, 86,100, 106-16) .
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Breytenbach's is a journey that increasingly takes place under the shadow of death. Not 
only is South Africa a country deep in corpses - "One picks up death in this country"
(30) - but alongside the anonymous dead, the journey takes in dead writers, notably Uys 
Krige to whom the book is dedicated, pilgrimages to grave-sides, and the experiences of 
death in exile, often of those who died struggling to get home. "The ferrying of corpses... 
Moving the corpse... Carrying the corpse... Holding the corpse... Corpses floundering in 
the flush, tossing and bobbing like words which the watery throat cannot pronounce, 
these are shadows of my imagination" (122,125,126,129,132, also 73). And, finally, 
Breytenbach's relationship with South Africa remains a form of living death. He writes 
that "completing life is to fill remembrances with collected death" (72). Each book, each 
suicide note, grows heavier with its weight.
Breytenbach is an Afrikaner, a South African, an African, a Frenchman, a European, a 
cosmopolitan and very much an individual. He writes in Afrikaans, English and French.1" 
In an interview in December 1991, and elsewhere (including in Return to Paradise, if 
in a qualified past tense (xiii)), he has described himself as '"a Whitish, Afrikaans- 
speaking South African African temporarily living outside the continent'" (1992:57). As 
the personification of the state of exile, "it is difficult if not impossible for [him] to 
indicate and describe the state of non-exile, of belonging, of integration" (1986:71).
To be an exiled writer is "to be living elsewhere... to be writing differently..." (211).
The sense of non-belonging has been rendered complete by the discovery that he
19
To my knowledge a study remains to be done on the implications for Breytenbach of 
linguistic homelessness, and/or the ways in which each of these languages have become 
informed by the others within a language matrix of creole, bastard tongues, and/or of 
the extent to which he writes, in whatever dominant language, in distinctive private 
dialects of often opaque and multiple meaning, and/or the degree to which the linguistic 
results can be attributed to exile. In this vein, George Steiner, in an essay on 
"extraterritoriality", talks of "the condition of multilingual imagining, of 
internalized translation, of the possible existence of a private mixed idiom 'beneath,' 
'coming before' the localization of different languages in the articulate brain" 
(1972:10, see 3-21). This too, of course, is a reformulation of barriers and boundaries 
and a mode of travel. According to one interview, Breytenbach wrote part of R e t u r n  t o  
P a r a d i s e  in Afrikaans before translating it into English, and then started to write in 
English to save time. It therefore represents something of a movement between languages 
(in Viljoen 1995:8-9).
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does not belong at home, by the (non-)resolution of return. Exile has become 
existential, a condition, and in the process universal and total. But, paradoxically, 
Breytenbach's exile became permanent at the moment when he ceased to be an exile at 
all; his displacement/migration can no longer be understood under the rubric of politics 
and place. Home and exile - and again, the same could be said for imprisonment - as 
idea and rhetorical device/capital, to be selectively appropriated and manipulated, have 
overwhelmed their political and geographical counterparts. Accumulating exclusions, 
alienated and adrift - "The political person doesn't easily comprehend the notion of 
drifting" (1993:183) - Breytenbach's journey is now that of the migrant. What light does 
such a definitional shift shed on his past and work?
One of Breytenbach's poems contains the lines: "each journey has its time-bound reach 
and intention / just as the verse on the line must know the point of its turning" ("transit", 
1988:60). But Breytenbach's own journey, and its narrative telling, has missed or lost its 
point of turning and, with it, its direction and purpose. Each journey/story is another 
return to sniff the same old sour vomit, a further aggravation of the unhealed wound, a 
final farewell to people and places jilted many times before, one last look in the mirror.
It is better to write one's memoirs when still young, when one can yet 
strike resonances from the unknown. Passing time brings only shrivelled 
yesterdays and a bitterness to the tongue. For me it is too late... My 
journeys have become embarrassing confessions. (1993:189)
Breytenbach's creativity has been both inspired and maimed by the duality and paradox 
of exile. And the creative process of unravelling and reknitting the life fabric goes on. 
"Of course the book doesn't stop here... Where to? One day I should write a book about 
exile..." (219,222).
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Es'kia Mphahlele: The Wanderer and the Premature Return
Mphahlele left South Africa for Nigeria in 1957 at the age of 37. Down Second Avenue 
was written on the cusp of departure and arrival. It is the story of the alienation and 
exile within South Africa that drove him to seek exile beyond its borders. Mphahlele 
states, "I have been moving up and down Second Avenue since I was bom and never 
dreamt I should ever jump out of the nightmare" (1971:159). He was progressively 
alienated from family and home by education, as teacher and writer, by his rejection of 
Christianity, and finally by exile. During 1952 Mphahlele was banned from teaching 
after orchestrating opposition to the introduction of'Bantu Education'. There followed a 
five year period of uncertainty and frustrated professional nomadism. Mphahlele has 
described himself as a pathological teacher, and the same could be said about his 
writing: "conditions were crushing me and I was shrivelling in the acid of my bitterness; 
I was suffocating", largely because he was "'contributing nothing'... ’I can't teach and I 
want to teach, I can't write here and I want to write'" (200,210). Like many exiles, 
Mphahlele has written and rewritten his early South African life in relation to his need 
for a viable past and the changing demands of the present (see Chapman 1989:218): 
"How nostalgic one can become for even those things, those people, those places which 
inflicted such savage pain" (Chabani Manganyi 1984:61). Exile was to prove as much a 
jump into as a jump out of a nightmare.
The pattern of movement, transience and searching established within South Africa 
acquired another dimension when Mphahlele sought sanctuary in Nigeria. Mphahlele 
completed Down Second Avenue on the momentum of arrival. It was a time of 
unwinding into the freedoms of exile, of release and adventure, of being uncommitted 
and free of allegiance, which nurtured a love for Africa and for its promise. Mphahlele 
has claimed that it was Nigeria in particular that restored Africa to him. While the 
momentum of arrival in Nigeria lasted, exile was "exquisite and enriching" (1984:247).
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But the euphoria was never uncomplicated and waned rapidly. His feelings from early 
exile are captured in the poem "Exile in Nigeria", which illustrates the ambiguities of 
learning to adjust to freedom: "windows open... that were shut so long... in the painful 
south of the south" at the beginning of what was already acknowledged to be "a long 
long road" (in Couzens and Patel eds. 1982:167-174). "Three years in Nigeria. Three 
years of adjustment, and still no solution in sight", Mphahlele writes elsewhere, and he 
continues: "A hard fact to live with: that once an exile, always one" (1962:223).20
Most of the first decade of exile was spent in Africa, with the exception of a two year 
period from 1961 to 1963 in Paris working as Director of the African Programme for 
the Congress for Cultural Freedom.21 Mphahlele grew into exile as the African continent 
grew into independence and various literary renaissances. He almost seemed to fall 
from one literary renaissance into another: from the Drum generation in South Africa, to 
Nigeria and West Africa in the late 1950s and Kenya in the early 1960s. He entered a 
cauldron of debate about issues such as negritude, of which he was a dedicated and 
controversial critic, and through his writing, teaching and activities for the Congress for 
Cultural Freedom was centrally placed to contribute to the wider renaissance. During 
the 1960s, as something of a champion of and ambassador for African culture 
Mphahlele travelled widely in the continent and elsewhere. His influence extended to 
establishing, organising, securing funding for, editing, participating in/contributing to a 
range of initiatives including cultural centres and conferences, anthologies, journals 
and other publications.
20
For a discussion of Mphahlele1s Nigerian short stories, see Mzamane 1989.
21
Mphahlele, and others, did not know at the time that the CIA was channelling funds 
into the organisation (see Mphahlele 1984:90-1, Chabani Manganyi 1983:236, Nkosi 
1990:33-4).
308
Mphahlele moved to Kenya in 1963 under the auspices of the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom. Two periods of professional frustration, political anger and creative drought 
in Kenya and later in Zambia created a rupture with his native continent: "Kenya 
severed the bond and set me looking elsewhere for a possible home - outside Africa.
The honeymoon with Africa came to an end" (Chabani Manganyi 1983:245). After two 
years in Denver, in the U.S.A., Mphahlele returned to Africa to become Senior 
Lecturer in the Department of English at the University of Zambia. It was to be a 21 
month period of total frustration, an utter waste. Accumulated frustrations from his 
exile in Africa were given their sharpest focus in Zambia. Africa was restored to 
Mphahlele by personal freedom, African independence and a widespread literary 
renaissance, only to be taken away by a realisation of the limits and fragility of an 
exile's freedom and security, disillusionment with independent Africa, and a drying up 
of his artistic well-springs.
In between these two periods when Africa was pulled from under his feet Mphahlele 
experienced exile in America. During his two year stay at the University of Denver he 
acquired a PhD in Creative Writing, which provided temporary relief from an otherwise 
ongoing creative slump. Mphahlele wrote the autobiographical novel, The Wanderers, 
as a dissertation for the doctoral programme. In this next instalment of a life in 
progress, moving from exile at home into exile abroad - "I travel my story..." (in 
Duerden and Pieterse eds. 1972:110) - the journey within and without both overlaps 
with and is taken beyond Second Avenue by the protagonist, Timi Tabane, who is 
clearly based upon Mphahlele himself. The Wanderers introduced various Mphahlelian 
exilic themes that were to become familiar touchstones in his writing, most notably, the 
exile as wanderer: "the darkness of exile the long long road, a road full of wanderers, 
wanderers of no fixed abode" (1971a:204). It also introduced what were to be the 
subterranean mediums of exilic expression throughout his wandering: music, especially 
jazz and the blues, as a medium capturing the essence of the exile condition - "the long
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black song" - and recurring dreams, of the northern Transvaal of his childhood and of 
pursuit. Tabane acknowledges an endemic restlessness and rootlessness:"... I recognise 
the urge to keep going. You see, once you have left your native shores, you continue to 
circle up there, like a bird in a storm. Only, the storm is inside yourself this time" (263- 
4), In the preface to the 1984 edition of the novel, Mphahlele writes: "I intentionally left 
the ending of this novel open: no resolution; only suspended disbelief; hard questions; 
disruption of family life; rejection and acceptance of black aliens in African countries; 
the continued attachment of these to their former colonial masters..." (1984a:6). This 
most autobiographical of novels provided a promise of further instalments; self-creation 
was to be the project of a lifetime.
At a personal level, Mphahlele did not wander alone but with a family 'caravan'. The 
Wanderers analyses the increasingly alienated relationship between Timi and his son 
Felang in a manner that parallels Mphahlele's relationship with his eldest son, Anthony. 
As becomes clear in this novel and in subsequent writing, children and family 
relationships became a victim of rootlessness, of perpetual transience and movement, of 
the tug-of-war between family and the peer group and environment of alien cultures, 
particularly later in America. There was no common culture or past. Generations within 
the family experienced exile differently. Home and exile meant different things, 
assimilation was resisted to different degrees, the balance and nature of profit and loss 
in exile varied. The result was a tremendous sense of loss:
They had seen too much in too short a time... we were caught up in a 
spiritual web in which a value took precedence over people - our own 
family of five children. What we saw in their personal struggles was 
shattering because in a way it showed us what exile could do to us. But, 
and here is the rub, there was no way of seeing it clearly without being
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thrown off balance... it was a love without understanding... Exile turned 
the family unit into a battle front... (Chabani Manganyi 1983:264-5)”
In The Wanderers the death of Felang while fighting for the Congress in exile is linked 
to Timi's desire to leave Africa. The novel also registers the evolution of a 
disenchantment with post-independence Africa: ’’Africa is still a white man's paradise, 
not a black exile's” (1971a:304); "Where's the roar of triumph, the triumph of black 
rule?” (311). Such feelings prompt Timi, as they had prompted Mphahlele, to seek to 
leave the continent. Mphahlele wrote of the fictional death of a son and the symbolic 
death of a continent perhaps in an attempt to keep the real relationships between 
himself and son/continent alive, but equally plausibly, perhaps, in recognition that the 
relationships had died or been irretrievably changed. In relationships with both his 
offspring and Africa a pattern of exile and return, rejection/separation and 
reconciliation/reunion, was in the process of being established.
After leaving Zambia, Mphahlele experienced a second sojourn in America. It lasted for 
seven years during which he was based at the Universities of Denver and Philadelphia. 
While the period was one of academic and intellectual stimulation, the exilic 
momentum from Nigeria had long since dissipated, and this was notable as the era of 
longing for and ultimately planning for the return home. Mphahlele came out of a 
further fictional drought with the completion of the novel Chirundu in 1975. Chirundu 
is an angry synthesis of Mphahlele's frustrations as an exile in Africa, and in Zambia in 
particular. The compromise and hypocrisy of Africa's ongoing confrontation with its 
colonial inheritance and neo-colonial present in education, law, politics and religion is 
mercilessly attacked. Corruption of a moral, personal and political nature is rife. In such 
a context refugees and exiles are refuse, to be dealt with at the whim of the political
22
Powerful testimony to the fractured dynamics of family life are contained in 
Mphahlele's letters to his daughter Teresa (in Chabani Manganyi 1984).
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expediency of the moment. Mphahlele's indictment of post-independent Africa draws 
on his personal experience and the exile condition in the context of the broader canvas 
he paints of political and moral malaise.33 The novel, while still autobiographical, is a 
more complex fictional undertaking than The Wanderers. Perhaps appropriately, this 
novel of disillusionment with African independence returned with him to South Africa, 
as preparation and warning (1979a).
In 1975 Mphahlele, aged 55, entered a period of crisis which is most poignantly 
captured by the twinned concepts of the glass-house and the 'tyranny of place1:
every so often you hit a certain age when you pause on the road of this 
life to take stock... I live in a glass-house, the one I ran into eighteen 
years ago. It's roomy but borrowed. I can live in it as long as I pay the 
rent and as long as I don't start kicking things about, scratching or 
staining the walls, I'm told. ... I could, if I chose, renew my lease 
indefinitely in this glasshouse, quite forget, write off my past, take my 
chances on new territory. I shall not. Because I'm a helpless captive of 
place and to come to terms with the tyranny of place is to have 
something to live for that saves me from stagnation, anonymity... A little 
while longer, you keep saying to numb the pain... The glass around me 
registers again on my senses, reminds me that I have been looking at the 
landscape outside so hard the glass dissolved, merged into the light out 
there... So much to learn to endure or just to know at fifty-five, so much 
to affirm, so much to taunt the adventurer. (1984:159-65)
23
See Mphahlele 1982, for his thoughts on the phenomenon of exile within Africa.
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Since 1966 all Mphahlele's work had been banned in South Africa. The loss of place 
and absence of a native audience condemned him to an irreparable erosion of his South 
African identity, to creativity as reflection without presence, echo without origin, and to 
self-narration into a void, as interminable monologue. He was in an insecure, vulnerable 
glass-house. His place was elsewhere.
Mphahlele resisted assimilation and integration in his creative work, and more 
generally, in all of his places of exile, but particularly in America. Drawn from 
Mphahlele's African experience, where his fingers were burnt on several occasions, was 
the conclusion that he could not fight other people's cultural battles in search of 
commitment, trade his identity for borrowed fears, that causes could not be 
promiscuously traded merely on the basis of colour. This, in part, was the essential 
distancing of the glass-house in which he lived. Resistance to an irrevocable 
assimilation and/or involvement elsewhere was due to the extra dimension that made 
his cause and perspective his own, the 'tyranny of place': "The tyranny of place, the 
tyranny of time[....] Grassroots. The muck, the smell, the fortitude, despair, endurance.
Always the sounds begin again. Experience and the place that contains it[ ]” (20). This
was a tyranny that had profound creative implications: "Some people say they can write 
novels in which place does not matter... They can create a theatre in the mind. This kind 
of experiment goes against everything I hold sacred in the composition of fiction. The 
tyranny of place is something I submit to" (168).24
For Mphahlele, such a condition - caught between the glass-house and the tyranny of 
place - eventually became untenable. He could not be satisfied nor function effectively 
in a world composed solely of ideas. A plundered memory had been exhausted, it could 
not carry the search for the fiction writer any more. The life project, what Chabani
24
Also on the tyranny of place, see Mphahlele 1979,1981.
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Manganyi calls the search for the novelist, became increasingly desperate. By the early 
to mid-1970's this symbolic death could no longer be contained by a creative solution. 
Paradoxically this crisis accompanied the completion of Mphahlele's most ambitious 
work of fiction, Chirundu. Was the novel and its setting an admission of being 
irretrievable cut adrift from a South African context and audience? Was it the final act 
by which he, like the leaf eating caterpillar, destroyed the very prop, in this case 
memory, on which his creativity depended? Was Mphahlele simply tired of raking over 
the same soil and battling with the same interface between autobiography and fiction? 
"How long could I survive the curse, as a writer, of leaving my finger-prints on 
everything that I wrote?" (Chabani Manganyi 1983:289). There was a sense of death 
closing in (Mphahlele, "Death" and "Death II", 198la;274-7,283-9). Whatever 
Mphahlele's motives in the manipulation of death in The Wanderers, in Chirundu not 
only was Africa written to death but so was the novel genre.
I came to fear death in America most passionately and this then became 
the supreme metaphor for the exiled writer wading through his fifties.
Not only a metaphor of death, death also became the subjective kingpin, 
spiritual reality - the supreme paradox. I want to go home to die[...] I am 
dead. True and false, for a return home would be an act of reclamation.
The first death, the death of the novelist, had announced itself...
(Chabani Manganyi 1983:289)
The desire to return achieved a kind of irrepressible momentum, a pattern of 
inevitability, during the 1970s. In May 1976, after 19 years in exile, Mphahlele was 
granted a visa to visit South Africa for three weeks to attend a conference at the Black 
Studies Institute in Johannesburg. The joy of homecoming - "What a homecoming...." 
(1984:171-95) - was juxtaposed with the Soweto uprisings. For Mphahlele the urge to 
return permanently was strengthened. Tired of restlessness, insecurity, and
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statelessness, he wanted self-reclamation, self-renewal, rebirth and to die on ancestral 
soil. The call of the ancestors, community and place became irresistible; the search for 
self had become a search for community which would give the teacher and writer 
identity, and in which relevance and commitment were possible within a known cultural 
framework. Just as an inability to write had spurred Mphahlele's exile so it contributed 
to his decision to return to South Africa. In Philadelphia what remained of the 
Mphahlele caravan - none of the children were to set up permanent residence in South 
Africa - packed their bags for the final homecoming in 1977.25 He arrived as he had left, 
an unemployed black male, with nothing more than pennission to enter the country. 
Homecoming was a profound, even blind, act of faith. It replaced one form of exile with 
another, the familiar "spiritual exile" of South Africa (Chabani Manganyi 1983:29).
Mphahlele's homecoming was laced with controversy, particularly among his fellow 
exiles. It was seen as a betrayal of solidarity that compromised the exile community, 
and as an event that would have propaganda value for the regime. Criticism was 
directed at a decision based unashamedly on self-interest, at a return on a "government 
ticket" (Chabani Manganyi 1983:13), and at his willingness to work within the system, 
notably its bantustan and 'Bantu Education' components, with particular venom directed 
at the "intellectual dishonesty" (1984:212) of being prepared to teach under the system 
of education which he had condemned in the past. The political situation had if 
anything deteriorated since his departure. It was a homecoming fraught with risk and 
confined by conditions. Mphahlele maintained his right to teach African students 
wherever he could do so and to work within a system he abhorred. He, like 
Breytenbach, had ceased to be involved in overt/organisational politics while in exile 
and in justifying his return took a further step back from politics by attempting to 
remove his reasons for exile and return from the political domain into that of the more
25
For Mphahlele's reflections on the positive and negative repercussions of exile for 
his children, see, for example, Bernstein 1994:54-5.
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narrowly personal, Although Mphahlele underwrote his exile with the importance of 
place, by draining it of a political dimension he became, in a sense, a retrospective 
migrant. Nevertheless, he picked up the badge of oppression as he was recycled by the 
bureaucratic procedures of apartheid. His experience at the University of the North, 
where due to political intervention his application for the chair of English was 
unsuccessful, and in Lebowa more generally, Mphahlele's ’homeland', where he worked 
as a civil servant for the government of Lebowa as an Inspector of Education, before 
gaining an academic post at the University of Witwatersrand, was a
staged political humiliation. The trap was set and I walked straight into 
it... I find that after various circular movements I can rationalise it and 
live with it. The conclusion, however, fails to give me the sense of 
release which I experienced after I had made the decision to return...
Everyone... is compromised. It is a matter of style and degree... In exile, 
it was the literary compromise that bothered me. After my return it is the 
existential and political compromise... What may yet redeem the 
situation for me is that unlike the literary compromise which is 
essentially a personal idiom, the existential compromise is a national 
dilemma. (Chabani Manganyi 1983:296)
Elsewhere Mphahlele claims, "There are no victories, no heroes, in this process of 
resolving the compromise that exile is, or in the silent refusal to contemplate a 
resolution" (1984:248). These widening circles of accommodation and rationalisation 
become increasingly convoluted.
In 1984 the second instalment of Mphahlele's autobiography, Afrika My Music, 
unravelling the wanderer's life in exile from Nigeria to homecoming(s), was published. 
Like Down Second Avenue it was written partially at home and partially in exile; the
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exilic cusp was again an autobiographical moment. What this otherwise disappointing 
book captures most effectively are the co-ordinates and evolution of Mphahlele's 1970s 
crisis, which ultimately came to encapsulate for him the essence of the exile condition, 
and the joys and turmoil of homecoming. It was left to a biography, Exiles and 
Homecomings by Chabani Manganyi, published in 1983 and written largely in the first 
person, to impose its title as the dominant paradigm governing Mphahlele's life. 
Descriptions of his early years at home could just as easily apply to adult life in exile:
many changes, transitions and disruptions of one kind or another occur.
In my case, there had been several such discontinuities and changes... It
was not the physical movement from pillar to post that mattered so much
as the emotional swings that accompanied these changes. (41)
Homecoming for Mphahlele ended years of restless and frustrated movement abroad, 
and despite its problems and ambiguities brought with it a sense of continuity, renewal, 
and belonging, and a sense of place; it restored to him a community and an audience 
and bequeathed a sense of fulfilment and completion. After his return the prohibitions 
on his writings were, in stages, lifted. Mphahlele's most recent novella, Father Come 
Home, moves towards the completion of the creative cycle, the simultaneous 
rediscovery of self and creative writer, following the completion of the physical cycle of 
exile and return. It is the most profoundly fictional of Mphahlele's longer prose and his 
fingerprints, although still present, leave a much fainter imprint. The story is set largely 
in northern Transvaal in the aftermath of the 1913 Land Act, and is still a story of exiles 
and homecomings although wandering is now occasioned by migrancy, removals, 
family separation and reunion. Certain stock Mphahlelian concerns - such as the 
indomitableness of African women and the importance of the ancestors - are brought 
home again. It is the story of a father and son, of a family divided and reunited. Such 
themes resonate throughout Mphahlele's life. Towards the end of the novel Maredi
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Tumalo, the restless wanderer, the boy who searched for his father now himself an old 
man, says: "'When you have grown away from a place you only begin to long for it in 
your old age...’" (Mphahlele 1984b;93). When he dies, like Mphahlele, he seeks to join 
his ancestors.
Conclusion
The continued drifting of Breytenbach could hardly be in greater contrast to 
Mphahlele's return to his childhood and family home in the northern Transvaal. While 
the former will return, within the conventional politically-determined trajectory of 
exile, too late if at all, the latter, within the same trajectory, returned too soon. The idea 
of exile/homecoming, uprooted from the initial parameters of place and politics, has 
thoroughly permeated the life and imagination of both men. It is arguable that 
Breytenbach and Mphahlele had their status as permanent exiles clarified and 
entrenched at the moment when their exile was effectively over, through its unorthodox 
(non-)resolution; and that simultaneously their exile, past and present, was revealed 
as/became something else, something altogether less politically committed within the 
lexicon of displacement and migration: retrospective migrancy. Exile drove them out of 
its harsh and jealously guarded terrain and became more complete, imposed itself as a 
condition, a state of mind, universal, permanent. Either way, the moment of return 
engendered further dimensions of alienation. This violent and paradoxical un/remaking 
of identity, imagination and life work, although it may be unmasked elsewhere, is most 
obviously made manifest through the dilemma and ambiguities of return, at the juncture 
- possible, real, deferred - of homecoming.
26
For a discussion of the impact of return on the writing of Mphahlele, see Lindfors 
1994:156-9.
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It is important to acknowledge that the identity of permanent exile/retrospective migrant 
was forged in violent collaboration with the regime. Agents of this un/remaking of the 
exiled self included the various erosions and accretions of time, related changes in the 
nature and political/cultural capital of exile, evolving political beliefs, and more: but all 
such agents were rooted in the ongoing violence of the apartheid state. Furthermore, the 
violence of state-subject collaboration, of the contestation, dependence, complicity 
nexus, previously outlined in relation to Breytenbach - the 'other' and/as self - is now 
complemented by the violence of the state induced experiences of imprisonment and 
exile/homecoming, that for him are both over and eternal, continue in different ways to 
mould his identity and imagination, and by which he is written whilst he writes. The 
same could be said for Mphahlele in relation to exile/homecoming. A final set of actors 
within the ambit of violent collaboration were the already mentioned banning and 
censorship, which played an inestimable role in the formation and deformation of exile, 
and other, literatures.
Breytenbach and Mphahlele have been unravelling the same story, their own and that of 
their exile, for a lifetime. It is their life-work. Creatively in form and content, and 
experientially, exile is a process. Each new book is a beacon that lights up the journey. 
The life story becomes a sentence that will not end, an endless page that cannot be 
turned; these writers lay their lives, back to back and cover to cover, continually 
exploring new dimensions of exile, of decades spent impaled upon its paradoxes and 
contradictions. Repetition attempts to affirm a tangible and sustainable existence and 
the writing of a past and future in/onto an ambiguous present; enables the continuous 
un/remaking, most importantly of the self, in the context of the evolving demands of the 
present; and represents an attempt to reclaim/resuscitate life from the 'space of death' 
through writing. It is an agent of survival in the discursive void and an attempt to re­
enter the frame of relevance. A large caste of characters and selves, an eclectic group of 
heroes and villains, tread the same path. They have been messengers of life and death,
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sacrificed and substituted, heralds of danger and hope. They have provided a means of 
escape and/or simply carrying on.
In the exilic realm of living death the creative process itself is a journey : between 
autobiography and fiction, memory and forgetting, reality and the world of ideas, 
commitment and the self-serving, the fragment and the whole, home and exile, absence 
and presence, the past/future and the present, life and death, rootedness/confinement 
and liberation/alienation. Over time, however, the attrition of the journey takes its toll. 
Memory yields diminishing returns; the retellings, in conjunction with exile itself, lose 
their original direction and purpose in the drift away from politics and place; categories 
of movement and displacement begin to blur; the pendulum within the essential duality 
of creative life and death often swings decisively towards the latter. The ambiguous 
(non-)resolutions to exile chosen by both Breytenbach and Mphahlele indicate a desire 
to go beyond the strictures and limitations that it imposed upon their lives and work. 
While some writers seek a way out by variously shedding their exile and embracing 
other identities and imaginative terrains, others choose alternative identities and terrains 
from the start. For migrant writers the world is perceived as more of a space of life than 
of death: politics and place are more willingly jettisoned, creative and life 
transformations are generally easier, undertaken with a freer rein, a broader brush. One 
such writer in the South African context is Dan Jacobson.
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Chapter 5: Dan Jacobson as Expatriate Writer: South Africa as Private Resource 
and the Literature of Multiple Exposure 
"Literatures of Exile": "Literatures of Counter-Exile"
Claudio Guillen (1976) has described writing in which exile becomes its own subject 
matter as the "literature of exile". The "literature of counter-exile", in contrast, is that in 
which "exile is the condition but not the visible cause of an imaginative response often 
characterised by a tendency towards integration, increasingly broad vistas or 
universalism"; separation is incorporated insofar as it is triumphed over, enabling the 
writer to offer "wide dimensions of meaning that transcend the earlier attachment to 
place or native origin". Generally the writer moves from the former preoccupation to the 
latter. Andrew Gurr has plotted the dimensions of a similar transition quite meticulously. 
He identifies a pattern among exiled colonial writers who initially painstakingly 
reconstruct a vision of home in realistic prose fiction. Such a process can take a decade 
or more and only thereafter, "if the vision is achieved and the therapy works, does the 
writer emerge, truly detached, homeless and historyless... in Naipaul's gnomic phrase, 'in 
a free state'" (1981:11).
In an argument that is both related and different, the processes of alienation/liberation 
from home and heterogenisation can be said to be inevitable for all those subject to 
migration and displacement. But in the case of the exile they are resisted by the demands 
and responsibilities of politics and place, and hence occur begrudgingly, more slowly, 
almost as an admission of failure. For the migrant, expatriate and emigre, in contrast, 
they represent a tantalising and world-expanding exploration, embarked upon with 
more enthusiasm than trepidation, embraced as the key and path to success. The 
processes are, therefore, the result of a many-paced transition or translation. Taking the 
debate a stage further, the following adapts the previously discussed argument of
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Hannerz concerning Sophiatown: in relation to perceptual worlds and modes of cultural 
production/reception, the migrant, it can be argued, is located where cross currents are 
strongest and where interactive processes produce the most striking new results. Cultural 
forms are often not only original, being neither entirely of one place nor of the other, but 
also more accessible from either location. Equally, it can be argued that such a hybrid, in- 
between position and production, is accessible from neither location, and as a result 
belongs to neither, is rejected by both.
The migrant is caught between contrasting and competing worlds, confronted with 
crossing over between them. Denis Hirson has written: "We belong to no single place, 
ours is the history of / those who cross over" ("The Long Distance South-African", 
1992:6). Salman Rushdie describes migrants, "bome-across humans", as "metaphorical 
beings" (1991:278). The migrant is blessed with what Said has called "contrapuntal" 
awareness (1984:172, 1984a:55) and Rushdie labels "stereoscopic vision" (1991:19). 
Situated between worlds, in both and neither, fragmented and multiple, less than half but 
also more than double, such people occupy a space in which perceptions and worlds, 
home and abroad, inside and outside, the old and the new, can interchangeably be 
rewritten, superimposed, on one another. The most powerful image of this process is the 
double exposure of film.1
In the case of South Africa, to spurn the demands and responsibilities of exile was to 
run the risk of being labelled escapist and irrelevant, to disappear into the margins of 
South African literature and/or edge towards the mainstream of other national or 
international literatures. To avoid this fate, that which was gleaned from exile was 
typically projected back onto a South African context. However, reversing the process -
This idea is borrowed from the Russian emigre poet, Vladislav Khodasevich, as discussed 
by Brown (1984). A further relevant image, analysed by Stone, is that of pentimento 
(1982:265-324) .
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projecting South Africa and understandings and perceptions forged in South Africa onto 
a variously defined elsewhere - offered an alternative to the exile whose fading glance 
was forever homeward, and who invariably suffered the multiple erosions (of identity, 
of creativity, of being itself) of long term estrangement. A shifting of emphasis within 
the double exposure opened up fresh perspectives and new worlds. This discussion of 
Guillen, Gurr and the literature of multiple exposure situates the analysis which follows. 
Few South African writers can be, or indeed would want to be, located within creative 
transitions such as those outlined by Guillen and Gurr. Dan Jacobson, however, in 
interesting ways conforms with and departs from the trajectory outlined by both men, 
and is, amongst South African writers, furthest along its course.2
Going Round the Course Twice
Dan Jacobson's life has been caught up in both the Jewish and South African diasporas. 
He is a second generation South African of Eastern European Jewish descent who grew 
up in Kimberley. Following a first encounter with England in 1950, when he taught at a 
Jewish boys' school before returning to South Africa the following year, Jacobson has 
lived in London since 1954. For the adolescent Jacobson there was an essential 
unreality to his immediate surroundings while England, as frame of reference and 
seductive idea, had irresistible substance:
My parents from one world, this constrained yet half-abandoned world 
around me, I read in book after book of yet another: of England, of 
Britain... As so many others have done... I found it wasn’t the reality of
2
The definition of exile used by both Guillfen and Gurr differs from that outlined in 
this thesis, in which their theories would be seen to be more applicable to the migrant, 
expatriate and emigre than the exile. Within this range of terminology, Dan Jacobson is 
most accurately defined as an expatriate writer. For Christopher Hope's reflections on 
Gurr, see 1989:93-5. The work of Peter Abrahams could also usefully be discussed within 
these paradigms.
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the countries from which the books and movies came that 1 was 
compelled to doubt, but the reality of the country I lived in: this 
undescribed and uncertified place where not a single thing... was as other 
places were. Everything around us was without confirmation, without 
background, without credentials; there was something unreliable, left 
out, about the whole place, and hence about all of us, too. (1985:8-9)
Jacobson was subject to the shared feeling of "ambitious, young provincials": "the 
feeling that they are living in disguise in their own homeland; that they are positively 
disfigured by their surroundings, compelled to conceal their deepest natures from 
themselves and from everyone else; and that all this is going to be changed soon, 
somehow, elsewhere" (120). His descriptions of, and the status bestowed upon, both 
colony/province/periphery - barely half a country: "A colonial culture is one which has 
no memory" (1971:7) - and coloniser/metropole/centre, were inextricably bound up with 
their respective unreality and reality, and, in part, the product of a mind steeped in the 
latter's written word.3 Unlike the exile, expelled from all they hold to be real into the
unreal beyond, the journey of the expatriate, migrant, and emigre while often 
geographically the same, is imaginatively and ontologically the reverse.
Jacobson has described his desire to leave South Africa and settle in England as "really 
quite imperious": the political dispensation and cultural terrain in South Africa were 
depressing and stifling; to become a writer seemed an easier ambition to fulfil 
elsewhere. By venturing to London, into a chosen culture, Jacobson was participating in
3
And, it might be added, ignorant of the former's oral word and tradition. Furthermore, 
in literary terms, South Africa was not as barren as Jacobson suggests above as he 
himself has noted elsewhere (1971). On the unreal nature of South Africa also see 
Jacobson 1960. Christopher Hope has made numerous observations about South Africa's 
unreal, fictional quality,* for example: "The real world... lay elsewhere, so we could 
not lay claim to a history, all we had were politics, and if you discounted the 
politics, all we had left were fictions" (1988:105, also 1984). For a reflection on 
similar beginnings but a very different resolution to this archetypal colonial dilemma, 
see Gordimer's "That Other World That was the World" (1995:114-34).
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a particular kind of colonial narrative: "All this is one version of the standard 
provincial-metropolitan experience; of the ambitious young man from the backveld 
going into the big city and seeking his fortune. This is what I was doing" (Gray 
1989:77). And what, in Jacobson's terms, did it mean for a South African to go 
England?
England is truth, and it is dream; England is reality, and it is pure vision. 
England is like a mirror in which they see their deepest selves reflected, 
the selves they have sought for and never found, and have known only by 
the sense of incompleteness that haunted all their previous days; yet 
England is chillingly, vastly, uncomfortably strange, with a strangeness 
made only the more poignant by the sense of dream-familiarity that 
accompanies it. England is their own past; yet they have never seen it 
before: England is all they have hoped for; yet it is a disappointment that 
endures and endures... England contains nothing less than the meanings 
of the words they have used all their lives; yet they understand them no 
better for having seen her. England makes unreal all they have done, all 
they have been, outside her; but grants no reality to what they may 
become within her. They would not have her any less than she is; yet 
they can never forgive her for being all that she is. If they stand in an 
English street and look about them, there is a secret, insistent whisper in 
their ears, inescapable - the echo, the resonance of that past which is 
altogether theirs and yet not theirs at all. (1992:140-1 )4
The host or metropolitan country as idea(l) and dream, as a country of the mind, is 
familiar territory for the colonial, and also for the migrant more generally, as is the
4
On England as idea see Jacobson 1960a.
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imaginative or illusory knowing, the ’’half-right, half-wrong vision" (Heilbut 1983:18), 
obtained from books and other cultural artefacts. It was to England and English 
literature that Jacobson went when tracing his literary genealogy, and books functioned 
as passports, to use Rushdie's term (1991:276), to imaginative and literary worlds, to 
geographical worlds, and to the professional world of the writer. Arrival for such a 
traveller is the moment when a read past and a dreamed-of future converge in the 
present. On arrival in London, Jacobson was treading between the lines of a read- 
London/England, negotiating the contours of an idea. London was "familiar in a ghostly 
way" (1985:88), and the act of verification was a confirmation not only of place but also 
of self. The remoteness and glamour of imaginings, of the city and of himself in the 
city, were contextualised and transformed by the reality. There was a sense of loss, 
dislocation and loneliness - "Now that I was on my own I knew that I had really come to 
London, Evidently London did not care" (85) - but also unrivalled opportunity: "It was 
as though some part of my imagination had been dry before, deprived of the 
nourishment it did not even know it needed; now, immersed in the English medium, it 
slowly filled itself and expanded" (88). Jacobson's primary emotions were pride, 
gratitude and rapture (1960a:26-7, also 1995:17). From England - which seemed so full, 
so packed with life, rich, dense, elaborate, immense - South Africa appeared uniformed, 
flat, bare. England was presence, South Africa was absence.
Jacobson has talked of both a responsibility in relation to writing about South Africa 
and a sense of irresponsibility in not doing so. The former related to "THE 
SITUATION" and, at the time in question, to the fact that South Africa had been written 
about relatively little and therefore there was a responsibility to try to "render its 
surfaces" and give them words. Jacobson wrote several 'South African' novels - The 
Trap (1955), A Dance in the Sun (1956), The Price o f Diamonds (1957), The Evidence 
o f Love (1960), The Beginners (1966): the dates given in brackets are those of the 
original dates of publication - that were to varying degrees "naturalistic" (realistic), in
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addition to a number of short stories. Already, within and by the end of this initial 
sequence of novels there was evidence - geographically and in literary style - of crossing 
over.5 In time the feeling of responsibility diminished: "when I found that I no longer 
wished to write about South Africa, or rather that I could no longer write about South 
Africa" a sense of external obligation fell away. After something of a creative drought 
Jacobson reached a quite explicit decision to move away from South Africa as both 
setting and broader inspiration for his fiction, a decision reached less because a vision 
of home had been achieved than because he had exhausted his stock of material with 
which to continue the attempt. Irresponsibility was something Jacobson was "glad to 
exploit", it entailed a sense of liberation and release: "To be free of those pressures was 
perhaps to be free to attend to other, internal needs which might otherwise never have 
been known to me".6 Jacobson has tried to fly by the nets that South Africa throws at its 
writers' souls.7 On the relationship between politics and writing, he has stated that, 
"[l]ess and less... do I find that that which really matters in imaginative literature
5
The novels map a seemingly inevitable trajectory and series of connections: the South 
African land and landscape is empty, vast, barren, virgin, silent (A Dance in t h e  Su n  
1988:140-1,153, T h e  P r i c e  o f  D i a m o n d s 1968:5,58, T h e  B e g i n n e r s  1968a:23,34); this is 
related to it being inhospitable in other w a y s , unrecorded, provincial, to reality, 
which is also an idea(l), being culturally and more generally elsewhere, to a desire to 
leave ( T h e .Evidence o f  L o v e  1992:63-4,72, T h e  B e g i n n e r s  1968a:19-20,2 7-8,30,195-7,210- 
11,226-7,236-8,472); which in turn is related to the move from province to metropole, 
where the latter is characterised by freedom, abundance, depth, complexity, by 
incomprehensibility, indifference and alienation, by ambitions and successes, 
frustrations and disappointments, and the former by a contrasting meagreness, "poverty- 
stricken in its inventions... blank in its surfaces" (1968a:292, also see, T h e  E v i d e n c e  
o f  L o v e  1992:140-2,170-83,198-9, T h e  B e g i n n e r s  1968a 263-4,292-4,299-317,367,386-7,392- 
5,429,439,462). In this scenario it is not exile/abroad which is a blank space, but 
home.
6
For the above arguments and quotations, see Gray 1986:34-5, 1989:79-81, and Hamilton 
1977:26.
7
A number of Jacobson's characters, in both his earlier and later novels, leave their 
provincial home for the metropolitan centre, some bearing it within them as a culture- 
and book-bound idea. Like Joyce's Stephen Dedalus they attempt to fly by the nets - of 
politics, nationality, ethnicity/race, language, culture, religion - that are flung at 
the soul, in different contexts and countries, to hold it back from flight (this 
reference is specifically made with reference to Adrian Bester, a South African in 
London, in Jacobson's Hidden in t h e  h e a r t  (1991:22-6)). In the metropole the characters 
can know themselves anew, attempt to make a fresh start, lose and remake themselves. 
These characters echo the experience and desires of Jacobson himself [ s e e ,  for example, 
1995:17).
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emerges from the level of consciously held opinion or belief in the author, or speaks to 
that level in the reader" (1984:288).s
Jacobson has "gone round the course twice as a novelist: first as a South African writer; 
then... writing fiction which is not only not about South Africa, but is also a different 
kind of fiction from what had gone before... much less straightforwardly naturalistic in 
character" (Hamilton 1977:25). In the same interview he also described this change as a
reversion to an earlier or older self. If I became a writer for any single 
reason, it was that I loved reading as a kid... because it was a way of 
being other than I was, someone else... And as I grew older this was still 
essentially the reason why I loved reading and wanted to become a 
writer. I wanted to participate in this activity, this other-making activity.
(26)
While experiencing a greater freedom to creatively un/remake the self/'other' and world 
than the politics- and place-bound exile, Jacobson is definitively not truly detached, or 
in a free state. A writer, any writer, continually writes and rewrites him/herself onto a 
progression of chosen contexts. Hope has stated: "increasingly now... I find myself 
transposing elements of my own life into non-African situations and making fictions of 
them" (1989:94). The experience of South Africa can be (re)written onto a range of 
contexts in a variety of ways. It does not diminish Jacobson’s imaginative achievement 
to state that he remains irreparably formed and conditioned by his initial years in South 
Africa.9 Jacobson has distinguished his external connections with South Africa - those
8
Also see the interview by Hamilton (1977) for Jacobson's reflections on the role of 
literature and "art for art's sake".
9
Sheila Roberts has also argued that preoccupations in Jacobson's non-South African 
work derive from political insight and from a way of perceiving moulded by South Africa 
(1984) .
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relating to people and places - which have changed irreparably with the attrition of 
time, and internal connections which remain: "memories, in the first place; and beneath 
even the deepest of memories, those modes of apprehension through which the world 
makes itself known to each of us, and which thus create our individual past, present, 
and future, and our sense of the relationship between them". Writing has value because 
it reveals "as nothing else can, the quasi-instinctual, self-created modes of 
apprehension... and the worlds which have been made available through them to the 
writer". Jacobson concludes that "everything I write has something more than its 
origins" in South Africa (1984:287-8)/° Collaborative agents in such modes of 
apprehension include the family and a society/culture, and their articulation in the 
formative place of childhood, as well as the violence of the state.
It is important to illustrate both how South Africa is an integral part of Jacobson, a 
heritage in which he is imprisoned, a world by which he is written, and also how it 
represents a world from which he is alienated and liberated. With reference to his 'final' 
return to Kimberley, Jacobson writes of a "dreamlike world... which represented myself 
to myself more deeply than anything I had seen or felt since; and from which, at the 
same time, I felt myself to be utterly sundered" (1985:184, also 1994:175,367-8). It is 
worth noting that Jacobson absolutely belongs and absolutely does not belong in 
London too.11
10
Also see 1994:40. Similar observations are made with reference to the formative 
nature of the narrator's childhood in Hidden in the H e a r t {Jacobson 1991:108-9; also see 
1968a:394-5). other writers have made comparable observations. Brutus states, "this was 
the world through which I learnt the world /  and this the image for my vision of the 
world" ("It was a sherded world I entered", 1978:31) and Breytenbach talks of a 
"substratum which constitutes the mechanism of my being" which was "formed during the 
tender pre-rational years in Africa" (1988:126; also 1996:25,159-60). While both Brutus 
and Breytenbach fall or at least fell into the category of exiles, expatriate and 6migr6 
writers voice related sentiments. Rose Moss writes, "South Africa is the soil of my 
imagination. It appears in my work continually as the original world where things are as 
they must be. This world - sun, sky, stone, grass - has been, is, will be" (1984:298). 
These observations about a childhood home, although not written by a South African, are 
also pertinent: "All it has given me is the world, but that is enough... Insofar as we 
retain the capacity for attachment, the energy of desire that draws us toward the world 
and makes us want to live within it, we're always returning" (Hoffman 1991:74-5).
This is a phrase used by Doris Lessing with reference to her feelings about England, 
which is noted by Clayton (1992a:22). Jacobson has documented further observations on 
alienation and non-belonging, with reference to England, South Africa and as an
329
Such is the plight of the migrant/expatriate/emigre: caught between worlds, forever in 
the act of crossing over, within a double or multiple exposure that implies a state of 
perpetual negotiation and translation. Within this scenario, South Africa has profoundly 
influenced the worlds made available to Jacobson as a writer, and is a primary world 
transposed back onto these other worlds. Nowhere is this more relevant than in 
Jacobson's insight into the workings of power.12
Psychological Manoeuvres in Individual Minds
A childhood experience of bullying and ostracism was something from which Jacobson 
was "never wholly to 'recover'". The episode was often to be recalled in later years when 
he speculated about how incomparably greater horrors could take place: "about the 
ever-repeated psychological manoeuvres which had to be gone through in innumerable, 
individual minds" before the perpetrators could act; and about why the victims and 
bystanders reacted as they did (1985:36-7). Jacobson's reflections on the operation of 
power dissect the psychological manoeuvres of individual minds.
The Rape o f Tamar, published first in 1970, four years after The Beginners, marked the 
beginning of Jacobson’s second career as a novelist. The story is that contained in 2 
Samuel 13: it concerns the rape of King David’s only legitimate daughter, Tamar, by his 
son Amnon; the hatred Amnon feels for Tamar after the rape; the repercussions for 
family and state when Tamar seeks help from her brother, Absalom, rather than David; 
David's refusal to punish Amnon in accordance with the law and Absalom's rebellion,
existential/universal condition (1960a:26-8, also 1995:19). Roberts has made the 
perceptive point that for Jacobson’s characters alienation is an existential phenomenon 
and so their geographical situation, whether real or imaginary, is not of primary 
importance (1992) .
12
South Africa also bequeathed an attention to power to others (see Hope in Bernstein 
1994:347; also Cilliers 307).
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which encompasses the revenge murder, two years in the making, of Amnon and 
ultimately his own murder as well. The story spoke to Jacobson, in part, because of its 
South African resonances:
It was only when The Rape o f Tamar was done that I realised it was not 
only as a Jew but also as a South African that I had presumed to feel a 
special affinity with some aspects of the story of David. Why as a South 
African? Well, in relation to the empires and metropolitan powers of his 
time, he was a provincial, a man on the margins. Yet, thirty centuries 
later, it was his life, not that of any of the greater kings contemporary 
with him, which was still feeding my own fantasies... (1988a:140)
Therefore, somewhat paradoxically, it was in a book that contained a "secret assertion 
of the priorities or rights of the provincial" that Jacobson moved away from an overt 
preoccupation with South Africa (Gray 1986:36). Drawn to the story - as a Jew, as a 
South African, as a provincial - Jacobson wrote into it an exploration of the 
psychological manoeuvres of individual minds behind the story's bare rendition in the 
Bible. The resulting multiple exposure speaks of and to both South Africa and 
elsewhere.
How does David preside over the somewhat precariously united kingdom of Israel and 
Judea? He makes use of the inexhaustible tricks of the governing trade: credulity, the 
capacity to believe passionately practically anything that it suits him to believe; a 
mastery of surprise and duplicity; an attachment to justice that is never greater than his 
attachment to his own power; a preparedness to cut his losses and never to ally himself 
to defeat, least of all his own; he "rides upon the very crest of that tidal equipoise 
between the violence of law and the violence of lawlessness..." (1973:10-11,15,94,98). 
David is the consummate politician. To his sons he grants everything except power,
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security and freedom (15-16). To be his son, a prince, is to be both a master and a slave; 
to enjoy the ambiguous liberty of being able to do what others simply dream; to be 
above the official law but subject to other less stable, less reassuring, laws. What is the 
point of being a prince if you can't do what you like? What is the point of being a prince 
if you can and do? Amnon, longing for self-transcendence, for the magic of the 
forbidden and that which would always be just beyond his reach, rapes his sister. 
Absalom takes the law into his own hands and murders his brother. For each their 
ultimate success is also their ultimate failure. David still rules over his kingdom.
"Yonadab can live only in Yonadab's world" (48), and as he is the narrator of the story 
so can the reader. Yonadab is well connected but not sufficiently well connected to be 
anything other than a lackey in David's court. He is riven with ambition and jealousy; he 
is a liar, a sceptic, a schemer, and a meddler; he serves and betrays, serves in order to 
betray. It is he who watches the rape and reports back as our special correspondent, and 
who has the uncanny knack of being present, present in order that he may observe. And 
yet he is more than narrator and observer: he is determined to be seen as an active 
participant in the story and an influence on the course of events, as someone who 
counts. Yonadab urges Amnon to commit the rape and plans its execution, just as he 
later connives with Absalom in the plan to kill Amnon. As a servant to many masters he 
is often in possession of foreknowledge within the unfolding events, as well as of 
hindsight within their telling. Yonadab's power is based upon interference, manipulation 
and betrayal, but ultimately his ambition gets the better of him, he is unable to withdraw 
in time to save himself In the end he is undone, found out, banished from the court.
The fictional Republic of Sarmeda in a subsequent novel, The Confessions o f Josef 
Baisz, owes a great deal to South Africa: in the naming of its people(s) and places, its 
landscapes, and so on. But Sarmeda is ultimately a fictional country, politically as 
suggestive of the former Eastern Europe as of South Africa, whose politics are an ironic
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blend of fascism and communism. Jacobson has described it as a "dream country... 
quite literally. Many of my dreams are set in a place which runs together Europe and 
Africa in bizarre ways. So does Sarmeda" (Hamilton 1977:25); while for one reviewer, 
this nowhere/somewhere place, was "the solution" to the problem of the exiled 
imagination, "the pulling together of all his exiles - from Russia, from Israel, from 
South Africa" (C. J. Driver 1977).
The story is about political power pursued solely for personal gain and devoid of 
broader commitment or conviction, it is power as the psychological manoeuvres of 
individual minds broken down to its lowest, meanest, common denominator - and at its 
heart lies another lackey, Josef Baisz. Josef Baisz is "bodyguard, police-spy, kidnapper, 
murderer, and favoured son of the regime" (1977:4), a conniver in unfolding events 
whose political philosophy can be summed up as follows:
To wound and to love; to love what I wound; to betray and look pityingly 
upon the consequences of my treachery; and to do it again - and again - 
and again - and each time as if for the very first time, with a trembling, 
magnetised sense of fate or inevitability upon me: that was my addiction.
( 120)
Josef Baisz loves only what he betrays, loves only through betrayal. Jacobson has stated 
that Baisz "operates the system... I think that in operating the system, which just is, as 
far as he's concerned, he's rather more like most of us than most of us care to 
acknowledge" (Hamilton 1977:25).
Josef Baisz's own unique gift or talent is an addiction, the master or God he serves, and 
there can be no escape, reformation, or transformation. It will never set him free. In the 
end he turns the addiction on himself: "At last I was going to take Josef Baisz by the
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throat. Yes! At last I could begin to feel for him that soft, loving tenderness which 
hitherto had been reserved only for his victims. I could even begin to pity him" 
(1977:202). If he is never to be discharged from the necessity of double-dealing, 
treachery and betrayal then the master within him shares the vulnerability of all the 
other masters he has ever served. Josef Baisz writes his autobiographical confession to 
all his masters, before taking his own life and himself becoming the last of his victims. 
The story ends with the completion of an autobiography, quite literally, as suicide note: 
"Many years ago, in the silence of my father's warehouse, I swore that I would make 
something of my life. Well, I have. This" (204).
It was perhaps in The Rape o f  Tamar and The Confessions o f Josef Baisz that Jacobson 
finally achieved his vision of home. Home was a fictional world of which Jacobson was 
the sole creator, on which he was the sole authority, and for which he was answerable 
only to himself. This new home represented a departure from South Africa but also 
contained strands of continuity, notably an interest in the mechanisms of political 
power. If South Africa fostered, even wrote, Jacobson's concern with power, he has 
been able to take a step back from its specificities and deal with power as mechanism 
and process. Both novels dissect the ‘ever-repeated psychological manoeuvres’ in 
‘innumerable, individual minds’ of the leaders, the lead and those in-between, which go 
to make up the workings of power. They depict the kinds of personalities that 
oppressive and corrupt regimes reward and bring to the fore, the kinds of personalities 
that operate a system that just is. Jacobson does not offer partisan politics or the hope of 
radical, revolutionary change. Instead he offers a scepticism that attempts to uncover 
that which he feels lies at the root of politics, especially repressive politics, and an 
implied warning that this could provide the continuity that underpins, perhaps 
undermines, political change. This political vision, further developed in his later 
writing, is clearly a multiple exposure: it draws on and is relevant to South Africa and
334
simultaneously gestures towards a significantly conditioning elsewhere. It is a vision 
synthesised from different worlds, constructed between worlds.
Autobiographical Fiction and Fictional Autobiography
Imaginative writing is in some respects a curiously merciless business: merciless to the 
writer, I mean. On the one hand he wants what he has written to have a life o f its own, 
to be answerable for itself, to speak to the reader on its own terms and for its own ends.
On the other hand, the completed story or poem is bound to reveal more about his mind 
and sensibility than he can even know. The work will not conceal from others his need to 
hide himself within it; nor can he hope to surprise the reader if he has not succeeded in 
surprising himself. (Jacobson 1988:6)13
Exile, immigration, and the crossing o f boundaries are experiences that can therefore 
provide us with new narrative forms or, in John Berger's phrase, with other ways o f  
telling. (Said 1989:225)
The paradigm of crossing over is also relevant to Jacobson's movement between and 
experimentation with literary genres, and it is possible that this, although by no means 
an automatic or universal reaction to it, owes something to him being an expatriate: 
destined to be located between worlds in all things. Jacobson, although primarily a 
novelist, displays a multi-dimensional interest in things autobiographical. As has 
already been indicated there are powerful undercurrents of the autobiographical in his 
fiction. There is also a recurrent interest in the craft of autobiography itself, and many 
of his fictional characters are themselves autobiographers. Autobiography in the hands 
of the novelist consciously dissects the nature of the autobiographical act: the interplay 
between fact and fiction, the creative tensions between memory, forgetting and the 
imaginative ordering and reshaping of experience, and the resultant personal and 
literary vision projected onto a multitude of worlds (see Cavaliero 1986). The
On the autobiographical nature of fiction also see Jacobson 1995.
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autobiographical and fictional need to be read in, and through, one another, as a further 
manifestation of the double/multiple exposure.’4
Jacobson's work theorises the complexity of self representation. In The Confessions o f 
Josef Baisz, the protagonist states the following with reference to the task he has 
undertaken:
To use the insidious form of untruth known as 'hindsight1 in order to re­
create the untruth of bygone ignorance: that, I now see, is the real art of 
the autobiographer. What a job! Sometimes it seems to me even more 
ambiguous than any other task I have ever undertaken. Which is quite a 
claim to make, all things considered. Told one way, looking forward as it 
were, and proceeding from one event to the next, my story may seem to 
be a mere sequence, without design or purpose. Told another way, 
looking backwards, it can be made to resemble a plot, a plan, a 
cunningly involuted development leading to a necessary conclusion.
Being both narrator and subject, how am I to know which way to look?
Besides, I have to contend like everybody else with the idiotic 
haphazardness of memory... But whatever way the story is told, whether 
as a plot or a series of accidents, as a design or a mere addition of day 
upon day and year upon year, it must lead eventually to this moment.
Here. Now. To me sitting in this chair and putting these words to paper... 
(1977:80-1)
Jacobson's fictional and autobiographical writings can be used to shed light upon one 
another, as has already been illustrated in the discussion of the workings of political 
power. For a further example, see Roberts 1993.
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Jacobson has made much of the relationship between hindsight and foresight, past and 
present, in his stories: Yonadab confesses, "Hindsight tempts one to pretend to 
foresight"; while the narrator of Hidden in the Heart states with reference to hindsight, 
"How sagacious it makes one feel! And how helpless" (1973:45, 1991:27). Life stories 
are told at the intersection - at once inevitable and insidious, transparent and opaque, 
beyond manipulation and self-serving - between past and present, hindsight and 
foresight, and the persistent randomness of memory and forgetting: in other words, they 
are told at the junction of fact and/as narrative shaping.
The Dinan Collection featured in Her Story is an indiscriminate assortment of papers 
and writings belonging to the late Celia Dinan which are edited and presented by a third 
party to serve two closely related purposes: firstly, to introduce the collection and their 
author and secondly, to organise the notebooks which contained Her Story. Her Story is 
described as "an angular or unexpected filling-in of the most familiar of sacred tales" 
(1988b:42), the familiar tale being that of the crucifixion of Jesus and the two thieves. 
While Her Story is obviously not an autobiography, the proposed relationship between 
the author's writing and her life/world provides insight into a distinctive way of 
understanding the relationship between autobiography and fiction, and in particular the 
autobiographical nature of Jacobson's own work: "Her life was what she wrote out o f 
not what she wrote about" (34). "Being wholly a fiction it reveals to us, as nothing else 
could, the sense she had of her own being - and of ours" (43).
In a related way Jacobson's novel, The Wonder-Worker, offers the possibility of 
transformation at the interface of autobiography and fiction, It is the story of a fictional 
autobiographer writing his 'memoirs', in the form of autobiographical fiction. Both the 
central character/autobiographical mirror, Timothy Fogel, and the narrator/author seek a 
kind of liberation through the power of transformation. The act of writing and that 
which is written offer the potential for layers of transformation within the same text. On
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encountering a temporary writer's block, the narrator/author describes a sense of 
"panic... from the thought of being left quite on my own, to get on with whatever I am, 
in this nowhere of a place, having nothing to look forward to - no developments, no 
surprises, no other selves to entertain" (1973a:75-6).
Several of Jacobson's novels are more fictional autobiography than autobiographical 
fiction. Characters engage in writing which is to varying degrees and in different ways 
autobiographical, and which is used in the subsequent construction of the narrative. 
Sometimes it quite simply is the narrative. Fictional autobiographers are depicted 
constructing their own story. Life stories are superimposed on one another and 
characters/lives can be seen emerging through one another in a further example of 
multiple exposure. This is another arena of multiply told, collaborative lives. Hidden in 
the Heart contains a complex interweaving and layering of lives and strangely parallel 
love stories. The story is one of obsession: obsessional love; obsession with the past, 
someone else's past, the inaccessible past of a lover; and ultimately obsession with the 
life of another. The narrator states with reference to herself: "she is writing something 
which is both autobiographical and about the life of someone else; which is 
autobiographical precisely because it is about someone else's life" (1991:104). She tells 
her life by being a conduit for the life of another; and in the end, through the 
completion of the story, she is able to definitively strike out for her own life and 
abandon the past. In a sense the telling has bequeathed her a life.
Like Celia Dinan, Jacobson writes 'out of rather than 'about' his life, including its South 
African component - the difference being the transformative power of writing and the 
written - in fiction that reveals to us as nothing else can the sense he has of his own 
being, and ours. It is the telling and the 'other-making activity that bequeath to him the 
primary facets of his own life and identity. It is his own personal 'regime of truth'. This 
is the most important sense in which Jacobson's fiction is autobiographical. Few
338
novelists have so profoundly explored the potential dimensions of the autobiography/ 
fiction multiple exposure and the need to see one through the prism of the other. His 
own autobiography was to take this exploration a step further.
Time and Time Again
In 1985, Jacobson published his autobiography, Time and Time Again. It had been two 
decades since he had written fiction explicitly set in South Africa. Autobiography 
facilitated a return to a South Africa that remained intimate, the South Africa of his 
childhood. Experience in a country that was fixed and distant in time remained accessible 
in this form. Autobiography also enabled a return to the naturalistic/realistic mode, albeit 
in an autobiographical configuration, in which he had previously written about the 
country. Jacobson presents a series of'"autobiographies'" that carry the tension of his 
desire both to "tell the truth, as far as I knew it" and also to produce narratives, real 
stories (1985:vii); thereby providing another manifestation of the creative tension 
between the autobiographical and/as narrative shaping in his writing. The story-teller 
turned to his advantage the fickleness of memory by constructing an episodic account 
that attempts to "preserve or even dramatise something of the erratic or fitful nature of 
memory, and hence something of its intensity, too" (viii),15 The combination of memory
and forgetting, truth and real stories, foresight and hindsight, past life and present 
retelling, give the life recalled a particular texture, structure and direction. Not 
surprisingly, given the nature of his fiction, Jacobson wrote an autobiography that was 
also a theory of the genre.
15
With reference to the writing of the novel, M i d n i g h t ' s  C h i l d r e n ,  Salman Rushdie has 
noted the following: "it was precisely the partial nature of these memories, their 
fragmentation, that made them so evocative for me. The shards of memory acquired greater 
status, greater resonance, because they were r e m a i n s ; fragmentation made trivial things 
seem like symbols, and the mundane acquire numinous qualities" (1991:12).
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The structure of the autobiography testifies to Jacobson's bipolar life: part 1, to a 
childhood spent in (provincial) Kimberley and part 2, to an adult life spent in 
(metropolitan) London. Polarity has both a spatial and a temporal dimension: a childhood 
and adult life spent in different places create "territories of time" (Gray 1989:77-8). A 
distance in time is superimposed on a distance in space. The passage of time and ageing 
are major preoccupations in Time and Time Again. Time is folded back upon itself. The 
child becomes an adult who in turn becomes child-like again. A further shift in emphasis 
within the multiple exposure can be identified: a movement towards South Africa as a 
territory of time. Such a shift perhaps captures all that is ultimately left of home for the 
long-term expatriate or exile.
Jacobson's recent fiction - Her Story (1988), Hidden in the Heart (1991), and The God- 
Fearer (1992) - dwells significantly on an obsession with the past. There is a 
simultaneous desire to reverse time, undo the past, and to preserve the past. Kobus the 
bookbinder in The God-Fearer takes the familiar route to life-preservation, he writes it 
down. But the story told is not the one he intended to tell. His tired memory can no 
longer remember the events of yesterday - Jacobson's observations about memory, 
hindsight and the ambiguous nature of the autobiographical venture are, if anything, 
accentuated by old age - but he can not forget, indeed is haunted and obsessed by, 
memories from almost three quarters of a century previously. A 15 year-old 'Christer' 
girl, Sannie, had committed suicide after Kobus gave evidence at her trial, which was 
quite literally a 'God-Fearer' witch-hunt. Religious turmoil and persecution followed. At 
the trial Kobus, who knew her innocence, had lied and prevaricated; he chose what he 
thought to be the safer and less painful path. The truth would not have saved her - 
although she would have known that she had not been abandoned - but it would have 
ruined him. Such were the psychological manoeuvres within an individual mind that 
enable Kobus to become a witness and accomplice. In retrospect he recognises the loss 
of a unique chance to make something of his life.
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As an old man Kobus is haunted by two 'Christer' children, Sannie's children, 
generations never to be bom: "Unspent possibilities, lives denied, stories never told, 
breaths never taken, souls forever houseless, hopes forgotten..." (1992a:84). There is no 
escape from what he has done, no retrospective justice, he can not unsay his words or 
undo his deeds. Kobus is left to moum "not only their unlived lives, but the lives of all 
others like them; and his own unlived life too, the possibilities he had never taken 
advantage of..." (156). The expatriate writer, whose position has provided unique 
opportunities to create lives and worlds, perhaps in the autumn of life comes to reflect 
upon lives, worlds and stories, both autobiographical and fictional, that remain merely 
denied possibilities, unvisited, uncreated and unlived. The multiple exposure and 
repeated narration of lives, which circle around the life of Jacobson himself, occupy an 
arena that although dense with prior versions is always incomplete.
Kobus commits a life to writing that when folded back upon itself is seen in a new light. 
It is only as an old man that he can see the significance of a moment in his youth and all 
that flowed from it. Territories of time have become a important component of 
Jacobson's work.16 The territory of childhood remains both intimately known and 
crucially formative. Within Jacobson's autobiographies, time is folded back upon itself 
to identify those moments and episodes with which he is "still living with the 
consequences" or from which he was "never wholly to 'recover'" (1985:36,60). 
Autobiographical writing unravels the author's life back to and forwards from moments 
that lie at the heart of modes of apprehension and from which all else follows; thus, the 
past is seen within the perspective of the present. As Jacobson has said, the world
16 The conclusion to T h e  B e g i n n e r s  provides an early exploration of territories of time. 
Suffering the twin ills of ageing and deteriorating health, Sarah Glickman becomes 
dependent and child-like; reminiscence, over a distance in time and space, provides a 
further folding back of time. After her death a child is named Sarah after her deceased 
grandmother (1968a:469-93).
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makes itself known through such modes of apprehension which create our individual 
past, present and future, and our sense of the relationship between them.
In 1994 Jacobson published The Electronic Elephant, an account of his travels through 
southern Africa, along the Great North Road from the Cape into the interior to the 
north. His interest in the road was both historical and personal. Among the sources of 
the latter were that he grew up in Kimberley, whose diamonds irrevocably altered the 
course of the road, and whose history was inextricable from that of the great, semi- 
desert hinterland to the north and west. "I had never doubted where this journey should 
begin. Kimberley was the obvious place. It was where all my journeys had begun" 
(1994:17); Kimberley, where "a forgotten self instantly re-formed within me... which 
had forgotten nothing" (20, also 25). Jacobson talks of a dream landscape "which I 
always knew, even while I dreamed of it, to lie somewhere to the west of Kimberley", a
secret territory... waiting for me... It was as if I owed something - though I could 
not have said what - to that half-known, half-feared region which had lain 
forbiddingly on the very doorstep of the Africa I had grown up in. In a perverse 
way, the fanciful inventiveness of my dreams, the complex human and 
topographical features my unconscious mind bestowed on it, helped to make 
clearer to me the real nature of the hold the territory still had over my 
imagination. Ultimately my dreams seemed to express a dread or shame that 
there might be nothing there: nothing to be seen, nothing to be learned, no one 
to meet, no past to register, no future to care about. Which would be a source of 
greater wonder: to go there and discover that this was indeed the case, or to 
discover that it was not? (12, also 92)
This eloquent travel account provides a further acknowledgement by Jacobson of his 
being marked by South Africa as time and place, and a linking of a personal history and
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knowledge with other histories and knowledges.17 It is also an autobiographical journey 
through territories of both space and time.
Conclusion
Jacobson is forever finding new ways of hiding within his texts, ways that retain the 
capacity to surprise. He un/remade himself by leaving South Africa, in reading and in 
writing. This chapter has sought to illustrate how, in ways which have evolved over 
time, he remains a writer who speaks of and to South Africa. He departs from the 
theories proposed by Guillen and Gurr in several ways. Among the most important are 
that the initial home is never totally transcended but variously continues to influence the 
worlds made available to, and created by, the writer. Furthermore, autobiography can 
provide a literary homecoming to that intimate and formative territory, as a territory of 
time, even after decades of living elsewhere.
The story contained within Hidden in the Heart is turned on its head towards the end 
after the Afrikaans writings of Adrian Bester are translated. The Afrikaans language is 
described by the narrator as "a kind of private resource for him; he returned to it every 
now and again, unpredictably, especially as he grew older" (1991:151). Later she refers 
to it again: "Apparently his native language had become a kind of half-code for him...
He used it to conceal and reveal what he was unable to put down in any other form" 
(195). South Africa has functioned for Jacobson, during his second career as a novelist, 
as such a 'private resource' and 'half-code1. His writings illustrate clearly the complex 
manner in which he is written by South Africa while he writes, in which the agency of 
an original home collaborates in the construction of identity, imagination and modes of 
apprehension in ways that are both violent and non-violent, overt and subtle, relating to
See 1,7-9,11-13; on the future as a territory of time, see 6-7.
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the state and to other components of society. His experience and evolution as a writer 
perhaps gesture towards future possibilities for South African literature: with South 
Africa functioning as 'private resource' and 'half-code', lives written 'out of rather than 
'about', with less violence and less involvement of the state in the collaboration that is 
narration.
Jacobson can live only in Jacobson's world. The expatriate is forever condemned/ 
liberated to a fate of residing or falling between worlds, crossing from one to another, 
living a multiple exposure. In this case, the result is an identity and creativity that share 
the time, space and some of the characteristics of the postcolonial, but which is arrived 
at via a different route and subsumed within other languages/discourses entirely. 
Jacobson's ideas are interesting and persuasive across a range of applications - identity, 
culture, politics - due to the subtlety and selectivity of their application, the disarming 
clarity of their presentation, the lack of universal explanatory ambitions and the absence 
of preconceived, abstract, intrusive or grandiose theoretical intentions. Temporal worlds 
(past, present, future), physical worlds (South Africa and both real and imaginary 
elsewheres), literary worlds (fiction and autobiography) and lives (actual, potential, 
imaginary, unlived) can, as in the case of Jacobson, be projected onto an infinite variety 
of canvases, notably each other, to create a literature of multiple exposure. In such a 
way, to use Jacobson's vocabulary, while the provincial may be moulded by the 
metropole it is also true to say that the metropole is moulded by any number of 
provincials. Jacobson came to England as an ambitious young man hoping to make 
something of his life. Well, he has. This.
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Chapter 6: Home and Homecoming
Exile both nurtures a heightened sense of home and anticipates a homecoming. In this 
sense the culmination of exile, its conclusion and closure, is written. The preceding 
chapters on exile and expatriation contain a number of possible trajectories homeward: 
Modisane's autobiographical suicide note as a passport to a 'posthumous life' at home; 
the arrival of the ANC's nation-state in waiting; the (non-)resolutions of return for 
Breytenbach and Mphahlele; and Jacobson's return to a territory of time and as travel 
writer. The necessity, dream, illusion, reality and impossibility of return are intensely 
contradictory, a cause of inspiration and fulfilment, and at the core of the violence of 
exile. Homecoming, like exile, as an product of the repressive state can be seen as a 
violently collaborative agent in oppositional lives.
Home for the exile is an imagined country created through layers of memory, nostalgia 
and desire: "the expression of the desire for home becomes a substitute for home, 
embodies the emotion attendant upon the image" (Seidel 1986:11). Home is a function 
of place. There’s no place like home: there's no home like place. But it is also a function 
of time. Like so much in exile it is of the past and future not the present, a shadow 
country that might have been or might yet be (Rieff 1994:197), a territory of time. 
Imaginary territories of place, time and belonging coexist uncomfortably with very real 
places and times where belonging was ambiguous and from which it was necessary to 
escape. Home is fixed in time, defined in terms of time, a place set in time and a time 
set in place. And yet it evolves through forgetting and imagining, as it acquires the 
fragmentary accretions, learned from afar, of its more recent history and of other times 
and other places. Between the static and the dynamic, past and future, old and new, 
memory/forgetting and imagining, reality and the ideal, home and away, lies the place 
called home.
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The shrine of home occupies the space and time of absence, yet it is simultaneously 
absent and present. The immediate reality of exile is suppressed and denied while the 
open wound of a lost home is both felt and acted upon as if it were real. A present 
absence cohabits with an absent presence. "You are engaged with an elsewhere that 
cannot be reached: isn’t it the defining characteristic of exile?", writes Breytenbach 
(1996:43). Denied the sustenance of tangible immediacy, home is inevitably 
undermined by the contagious plague of absence, receding into the realm of the 
selective and partial, metaphor, allegory and symbol. And yet in a context marked by 
their loss and denial, home represents completion and wholeness. In the words of Gloria 
Nkadimeng: '"Home is home! There is nothing more than home...'" (in Bernstein 
1994:137). The ideal of home becomes both more abstract and vague, and more 
exacting and embracing, the greater the exile's distance from it in time and space.
Home is a reality which becomes an expectation, a dream; whereas exile is an 
expectation, a dream, which becomes a reality. The grass is always greener on the other 
side: "The exile’s new world never fulfils his expectations, and his old world... grows 
sweeter with distance, and its sweetness makes him more bitter" (Roberts, "Ah, 
Prague!", 1993a: 170). Absence makes the heart grow fonder. If this home elsewhere 
were to have one defining characteristic, it would be a longing infinitely stretched on 
the rack of loss: "The longing remained, pitiless, inescapable... In the entire structure of 
the lives they had built up in foreign parts only one thing had reality: the land they had 
once possessed and then lost" (Schoeman 1978:81, also see 35,80,82,201). This longing 
for home is a disease, the disease of homesickness - for which the symptoms are 
longing and loss, endless reminiscence and nostalgia, a painful sense of distance and 
absence - which can be fatal.1
1
See, for example, Esme Matshikiza on the life and death of her husband Todd, in 
Bernstein 1994:325-9.
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Of the many losses of exile perhaps the most devastating is the loss of that which the 
exile did not even realise s/he had at home. Breytenbach talks of the attempt to 
"recapture from the outside that which [the exiled writer] possessed from the inside - 
which he possessed so completely that he didn't even know about it" (1986:75). That 
which makes home home, something unconscious, taken-for-granted, is at once 
recognised and lost in exile, its loss is as irretrievable as the desire for its restoration is 
insatiable. Home is never appreciated until it is lost.
At the heart of home lies the almost mystical need to belong.2 Home is the most 
precious possession of those who do not belong, for whom all sanctuary and safety is 
provisional, who feel permanently temporary and for whom all things are shadowed by 
immanent peril. Home is everything that exile is not. It is, in one sense, security, a 
haven of the familiar; while in another it is obscene and unliveable; it is charged with 
meaning, a place where living on the edge can, at least from a distance, become 
shrouded in nostalgia.
It struck me, after a few years in exile, that I had thrown away something 
very precious by leaving South Africa. Maybe it was just nostalgia, but in 
my memory my former life seemed somehow charged with meaning.
Every day had been a battle against howling moral head winds. I had 
lived amidst stark good and evil, surrounded by mystery and magic...
Nothing in America could ever compare with so powerful a set of 
intoxicants. In America, my soul was desiccated. (Malan 1991:96, also 
see 422)
2
"'The garden for which you are presently heading is nowhere and everywhere... It is 
another name for the only place where you belong... where you do not feel homeless. It 
is off every map, no road leads to it that is merely a road, and only you know the way'" 
(Coetzee 1985:228). Also see B. Kgositsile1s "Where is Home" in Oliphant ed. 1992:37-42.
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Home is a manipulation of negatives: a distance in space and time, an absence, a 
longing and loss, a disease, defined by what exile is not. But it is also much more than 
this.
Here, There: Everywhere, Nowhere
For the exile, South Africa is and always will be home. "I've realised that there is 
nowhere in the world one feels at home, except in your own country" (Moatlhodi in 
Bernstein 1994:414, alsoNtantala 1993:189). But if home and exile are mutually 
exclusive, radically antithetical, seemingly irreconcilable, they are also mutually 
dependent, problematised, both undermined and expanded. This is true to different 
degrees for the expatriate, migrant and exile alike. Home may be neither here nor there 
(Gurr 1981:13). "The question yet disturbs: Why is it / Neither, nor any land, is home?" 
writes Peter Harris ("Slightly Displaced Persons", 1964:51), while David Wright states 
the following on his return to his adopted home, England, from South Africa, where he 
was bom: "The scene is where I would belong / But do not, any more than there / Do I 
belong, where I was bom" ("A Letter ffom Westmorland to Isabella Fey", 1980:119). 
Equally home may be both here and there. The migrant and exile may experience 
homes rather than a single home, exiles rather than a single exile.3
What does it mean to be homeless? Are the homeless those without a home, language or 
name who are simultaneously at home in many places, fluent in many languages, and 
known by many names? Is homelessness an essential feature of the condition of
3
On the above, also see Clayton ("Dream of a Small Planet" and "Double Track", 63- 
4,67), Harrison ("Homecoming", 158-9), and Swift ("Home Thoughts", 279-80), all in de 
Kock and Tromp eds. 1996. For Justin Cartwright in the revealingly named N o t  Y e t  H om e, 
South Africa both is and is not home; he grapples with the meaning of South Africa as a 
home; states that from London, home was elsewhere although not necessarily in South 
Africa; claims to be rootless, to have the haunting feeling that he has lacked a sense 
of being home, and lays claim to "a changeable sense of home... a place which no longer 
exists... but might have... mythological..." (1996:99): not yet home, far from home 
(also see 34-5,54,80,92-3,154,164,187-8,192).
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modernity? Perhaps there really is no place like home any more. If there is such a place, 
what makes or constitutes home? Where, in what circumstances, does the exile feel, or 
is the exile made to feel, at home? Is the exile at home everywhere, at home in the 
world; is it possible to be both a citizen of a country and a citizen of the world 
(Bernstein 1994:xxv)? An exile and at home, here and there, everywhere and nowhere: 
or is this the fate only of the migrant? Is the exile always absolutely anchored to home 
by politics and place?
For the migrant, expatriate and escapee, home may be left in conscious pursuit of 
another home or the homelessness of international belonging. Some South Africans felt 
there was nothing to lose and much they wished to forget, and they longed to be rid of a 
home associated with alienation, frustration and/or guilt. In such cases, finding a home 
abroad was often motivated predominantly by cultural ambitions and concerns. White 
writers, such as Dan Jacobson, Christopher Hope, David Wright, and Justin Cartwright, 
headed for their cultural centre, their metropole, and found a home of sorts. But such a 
quest can foster its own illusions, for home is as much a function of fate as of choice. 
Wright refers to a South Africa, "[fjrom which I never can depart / Without a tearing of 
the heart / Strings that tie me lightly to it / And irrefragably also" ("A Letter from 
Westmorland to Isabella Fey", 1980:116), while Hope identifies escape from South 
Africa as simultaneously impossible and desirable (1984:286).‘1
Internal Exile: a Home to Outsiders
Historically, as previously outlined, South Africa has produced an intricate matrix of 
exclusion and inclusion, exile and homecoming. Home itself can come to embody a 
form of exile. Few countries have so comprehensively alienated and exiled their own
4
Also see the reflections of the character Malcolm Begbie in Jacobson’s T h e  B e g i n n e r s  
( 1 9 6 8 a : 3 9 4 - 5 ) .
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population as South Africa. Arthur Nortje writes: "Exile was implanted / in the first 
pangs of paradise" ("Questions and Answers", in Feinberg ed. 1980:156). What function 
does the notion of home serve for the politically disenfranchised, the worker migrant, 
the prisoner, the banned or banished, the person under house arrest, the removee, the 
guerrilla soldier? South Africa invented its own 'homelands' into which people were 
herded on the basis of ethnicity. South Africans became foreigners, illegal, in South 
Africa and citizens of a place in which they had often never lived, and which they had 
frequently never even seen. 'Homelands' in the sky, 'homelands' of oppression. For home 
to be home there must be the possibility of choice and of leaving. South Africans 
wanted not homelands but a homeland.
Somewhat ironically, South Africa has also been a refuge, and even a new home, for 
exiles, refugees and migrants from elsewhere, fleeing from persecution, civil wars, 
poverty, and hunger; an economic and ideological haven and a home for the world's 
white right wing.5 The place that is the source of exile to one is the sanctuary of home 
to another. Again, there could be overlap and complexity in the relationship between 
the two: South Africa as both home and exile. Ruth, a South African Jew in Rose Zwi's 
novel Exiles, reflects on her movement between South Africa and Israel: "Nothing is 
forever... Except exile? Her parents when they came to Africa, had also said, another 
year in Africa, another year in exile. They sighed but remained on. Home. Der heim. 
Was she going to it, coming from it? Would she always be a sojourner, an exile?" 
(1984:181, and 16, also see Jacobson 1968a).
5
See, for example, Gordimer's "The Ultimate Safari", "My Father Leaves Home", "Home", 
in Jump a n d  O t h e r  S t o r i e s  (1992:33-46,57-66,121-40) and Roberts' "Ah, Prague!" in Coming 
Jn a n d  O t h e r  s t o r i e s  (1993a:159-81).
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The 'Many Homes of Exile'
Home can be anything one wants it to be; it is in the eye of the beholder. On being 
forcibly removed from Sophiatown, Don Mattera finds consolation in the following: 
"Home was where I wanted to be, wanted to remain until the end of my days" 
(1987:145). Home is another country, a mother tongue, a relationship - "It's possible to 
live within the ambit of a person not a country" (Gordimer 1980:302) - a family, an 
exile community, a political organisation. The ANC was often home, family, parent, 
guardian. Some found in exile - in the camps, for example - the home they could not 
find at home. The various homes of the imagination - for the creator and audience, 
through education and study - were a frequent source of solace and return for the exile, 
migrant, and expatriate. Jacobson, who it has been argued created a home in fiction, 
likens the '"Republic of Letters'" to a "homeland", "a place in which I could be 
naturalised without seeking a licence from any authority other than that of my own 
tastes or talents, inclinations or ambitions" (1985:127). The writer may find a (way) 
home in writing about and recreating home, in characters who also seek a home or who 
can be written home in a kind of vicarious homecoming. All art forms offer such 
opportunities. For Miriam Makeba it was, "[t]he concert stage: This is one place where I 
am most at home, where there is no exile" (1988:230).
The notion of home takes on a form, scale and intimacy all its own. Denis Hirson's 
family reconstruct, quite literally, their old home on the kitchen table: "One by one our 
hands record what we remember of the house / and garden, till everything of import is 
more or less where it / should be. And when finally the wayward gooseberry bush / has 
been democratically rooted, we lean back and survey our bonds and our losses" ("The 
Long Distance South-African", 1992:5). Home is a nation and it is a house, a room, a 
place within a room; it is in something as intangible as the timbre of a voice, a few bars 
of music, a fragrance or a taste (see Berold, "Home", in de Kock and Tromp eds.
1996:42). How is home remembered and reconstructed? What are the reminders of 
home?
Then the wind came at him and in the sudden gust the vanes of the 
windmill began to revolve; he heard their rhythmic clanging coming 
from beyond the bam and the sound made him pause, overwhelmed by 
the intensity of the feeling it evoked. He had heard it before, that sound 
was one he had known long ago and then forgotten, but now it was bome 
towards him from the past with the wind. When exactly had he heard the 
clanging of the revolving blades as a child, and where? And what were 
the feelings which now overwhelmed him? Heartache and longing and 
hope, a whole world waiting to be conquered, safety, security and 
illusion, and the turning of a windmill in the long silence of a summer's 
afternoon, in the vast dusk of the summer night. He walked on to the 
house, astonished at the emotion which possessed him, and it was as if 
he were coming home. (Schoeman 1978:86, also see 61, and Gordimer 
1988:286)
Breytenbach has a library of reflections on home, evolving, from different times and 
places:
'Home1? How long have I been dragging my 'home' around with me?...
This distance, this anticipation, the long winter are now the only things 
familiar, my home. And that which is there has become a subconscious, 
a wound which has healed, a memoiy, a past and a future, the blueprint 
of a dream, Paradise... Paradise is the unknown, remembered. (1985a:37)
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Home is the only place in the world where one is not a stranger. Prison then became a 
kind of home and home - '"Home? What home? Where...? What a debilitating 
concept'?" - was never to be home again in quite the same way. France was also to 
become a home of sorts. More recently Breytenbach has talked of the "many homes of 
exile", of acceding to the "homeland of perpetual movement", of being "at home 
nowhere, and by that token everywhere", of the right to a home as one component of his 
personal declaration of human rights, of a "subconscious place" and a "free place"/'
Home as Private and Public Property
Home is intensely private property, idiosyncratic, individual, unique. It is an absolute 
possession. But it is also shared, public property, reconstructed, reclaimed, defended 
and contested by, with and against others within the sanctuary and ghetto of the exile 
community and beyond. Home is talked to death, reminisced about, ruminated upon, 
invented, transplanted, extracted from fellow South Africans newly arrived, and 
devoured from the media. Shared but no longer the same.
Christopher Hope's 'Hottentot Room' is such a community, created in the author's own 
eclectic image. It is a place for those with nowhere else to go, unalterable exiles/ 
migrants who could never go home, a strange assortment of people, inconceivable back 
home, held together by peculiarly diasporic loyalties, interests and hopes, which make 
their lives tolerable. These are the Hottentots, the select members of the tribe. For the 
tribe: "Home was the Hottentot", a home away from home, the only home they knew, a 
refuge. It is a place built on illusions, where talk is "'about what might have been, or 
could still be. Never about what is. What might be true in the Room is not true
6
See Breytenbach 1985a:222, 1985:25-6,71,214,251,257, 1988:124, 1996:40,42,44,161.
Those who passed through imprisonment and exile typically experienced and inhabited many 
homes (see Lewin 1991).
353
anywhere else1" (1986:14,55,93,124,139). Exiles and migrants who shared a great deal 
or shared almost nothing beyond "a geographically named node of feeling" (Moss 
1985:239) reconstructed a shared home. Just as the group doing the reconstruction was 
often one that would have been inconceivable back home, so too was the home 
reconstructed.
Exile communities, as already mentioned in the context of exile politics, are often 
complicated and troubled environments, savagely self-destructive, unstable, riven with 
insecurity, suspicion, guilt, bitter rivalries and impotent anger.7 Home, like all else in 
exile, is a fragile and precious resource, fought over all the more fiercely for being so. 
When exiles are thrown together understandings of home are as likely to be destroyed as 
they are to be maintained or created. Home, furthermore, can be shared, defended and 
contested by, with and against others as a form of narrow and exclusive fundamentalism: 
a certain form of nationalism as the ideology of home. But as previously indicated, 
nationalism need not necessarily revolve around absolute notions of the pure, essential 
and authentic, and/or an intolerance of difference and fear of the 'other*. Finally, and in a 
way that has a bearing on the above, home was regularly impinged upon and 
appropriated by outsiders who sought to control it as image and idea(l), as political cause 
and international symbol.
Home is an agent of violence. It requires the painful un/remaking of a nest of negatives. 
To use Breytenbach's phrase, it is a 'debilitating concept'. Home is carried across 
borders like a disease; projected onto that one place where it is impossible to be; 
permeated with guilt and a sense of betrayal because it has somehow intrinsically been 
wronged by departure and absence; and contested with and defended against others to
7
See, for example, Noma Kitson's (1986) description of the exiled political community 
in London. Also see B. Kgositsile, "Exile Blues", in Oliphant ed. 1992:71. Breytenbach 
and Mphahlele were both deeply ambivalent, and sometimes scathing, about exile 
communities and politics.
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the point of self-destruction. Home is a form of (self-)mutilation and punishment. It is 
that imagined destination which maintains the often violently illusory hope of a final 
return or arrival, and belonging.
Home is source of hope and inspiration, a question and investment of faith. It is a quest, 
a journey, a mission, a destiny. Where do you want to be and remain until the end of 
your days? "Was there, after all, a place like home?" (Zwi 1984:16). There's no place 
like home.?
There are as many homecomings from/in exile as there are homes. South Africa has 
experienced homecomings from repression and political isolation, from exile and 
expatriation, from prison, migrancy, removals, on military operations and from military 
service and combat.9 The definitive homecoming - "that / one last journey for which we 
bum" (Brutus, "Snarling, the great beast hurls through the dark", 1978:54) - is to the 
original, primal, home from exile. This homecoming is the arrival in that home, 
remembered yet unknown, from which all other homes grew and to which they all 
return.
8
Few idea(l)s are so subject to the significance bestowed by, or the platitudinous 
nature of, clich&: there's no place like home; home is where the heart is; show me the 
way to go home.
9
South African literature is littered with these various homecomings, of which the 
following provide merely a few examples. On homecoming from prison see Afrika's 
"Shacklemates" in de Kock and Tromp eds. 1996:26-7, Essop's "Home-coming" (1990:118-28), 
Gordimer1s "Amnesty" (1992:247-57), and Langa 1987:425-7. Narratives featuring returns 
on opposition military operations include Gordimer, "Something Out There" (1984), Langa 
1987:406-19 and 1989, Sepamla 1981,1986:110-25,162-3, Tlali 1980:262-6; while analyses 
of homecoming from military service are contained in Rule's "A Return" (1987) and many 
contributions to 'border literature'. Also, in autobiographical accounts, Norma Kitson 
(1986) poignantly describes her trips home to visit her husband in prison while Mary 
Benson was allowed home to visit her ailing father (1990:224-35).
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In the Darkest Hour
"... go and see how dark is the darkest hour..." writes Daniel Kunene (1981:65). 
Opponents attempted to return both legally and illegally, and were greeted with 
rejection and endless bureaucratic wrangling in the first instance, and harassment, 
intimidation, imprisonment, and even death in the second. Depending on the returnee’s 
status and aims the door home was opened in welcome, left to swing free, selectively, 
randomly, tortuously, miraculously left ajar, slammed in backward glancing faces, 
barred, and forced open. During visits home - due to the illness or death of a family 
member, to give birth to a child, in the course of study abroad, as preparation for a final 
return - contradictory reactions and emotions (validation and alienation, intimacy and 
fear) were evoked in equal measure. Those who visited freely, came and went as they 
wished, for whom home was a holiday, could find the experience hollow and 
unfulfilling. Carol Hermer describes a trip home as "a nightmare", the reality of a 
holiday home being a poor substitute for the reality of living in South Africa 
(1984:282).10 Homecoming in the darkest hour was perhaps inevitably part nightmare. 
And yet for those who made it in, there was also ecstasy. "What a Homecoming" 
declares Mphahlele (1984:171-95). Breytenbach is equally effusive about his arrival in 
paradise:
I am the happiest man alive. You wake up thus inside your own dream.
This is the point I have been dreaming toward... How do you say such 
joy?... All I can say, is: even though a joy such as this may be unique, 
even though you know in advance it can't last, even if I had to die
10
Fictional testimony complements the autobiographical in this regard. The return 
visits of Stacey in Roberts' "Ah, Prague!" (1993a), for example, are riven with 
ambiguity.
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immediately afterward, even then I would wish for nothing deeper or 
greater... (1985a:47-9, also see 57)
A ’Hinge of History’
Homecoming took/takes place in its own time: "The call is from afar unto afar. It 
reaches him who wants to be brought back" (Heidegger in Hope 1986:206). For some 
there may appear to be little logic or careful reasoning behind the homecoming: to such 
wanderers comes their own realisation that the time has come to return home, and their 
own reasons for doing so. For the exile, in contrast, whether and when the call is heeded 
is a matter of political circumstance as much as individual choice. Some knew very 
clearly why and on what terms they would return. It is not a decision taken alone.11
Then: "Mandela comes walking, behind him the / unsealed door of an entire country" 
(Hirson, "The Long Distance South-African", 1992:6). With the door unsealed, all who 
wanted to could return home. The Rift by Hilda Bernstein contains a remarkable 
collection of interviews with South African exiles and migrants, carried out on either 
side of 2 February 1990.
From that date the status of exiles changed, for the possibility of return 
was opened up for tens of thousands. Before 2 February, 'going home' 
was a dream deferred over the years, all the more sweet because of its 
remoteness. Return was insubstantial, while the longing for it remained 
clear and unconditional. But the opportunity of return revealed the 
irreparable nature of exile. It exposed lesions that will never heal. For
11
See Cope's "A Time To Go Home" (1967), and Martins' "Time to Come Home" (in Couzens 
and Patel eds. 1982:357-8) . Interesting meditations on it being time to go home are 
explored through the characters of Andrea Malgas (Brink 1985) and Rosa Burger (Gordimer 
1980).
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once the legal obstacles to fulfilling that dream were removed, then 
ambivalence blurred the clarity of the perception. (1994:xxiii)12
Some exiles as an act of faith had remained confident of a permanent return to South 
Africa. Others found such confidence waning over the years; came to see a lifetime as 
too short a timescale for return; became used to exile (C. J. Driver, "Somewhere Else", 
in de Kock and Tromp eds. 1996:103-4). Many, therefore - having become too old, been 
away too long, invested in a life and career, or simply not wishing to live in South 
Africa again (Bernstein 1994:xxv,9,28,251-2) - would not return, while for another exile 
constituency the desire to return was taken for granted, unequivocal, instantaneous, and 
its imminent realisation embraced with infectious enthusiasm and joy.13
February 1990 was a defining moment for the South African diaspora, a moment of 
choice, of definitional clarity and self-acknowledgement in relation to articulations of 
home and identity. The decisions made at the point of return - as indicated by 
Breytenbach and Mphahlele - contain within them an un/remaking not just of the 
possibilities of the present and future but also of the actualities of the past. Can 
someone who returns too soon, too late or who does not return at all, claim to have been 
an exile? If not, what were/are they and what are the implications of such a redefinition 
of self? What, after years of absence, is the difference between an exile and an 
immigrant and what forces/forges the changes in identity of those in the diaspora? Is the 
dream of return best understood as a strategy, a source of strength when strength is
12
This is Tanya Hodgson: "I'm very scared of going back to South Africa - you live with 
a dream for twenty years and all of a sudden it's going to be reality, and it is a bit 
frightening. But I'm sure that's not just for me, I'm sure that's for everybody" (in 
Bernstein 1994:493). AnnMarie Wolpe writes in a similar vein: "Going home. Those words, 
once spoken spontaneously, are no longer in the same league as... 'I would love to see 
what Johannesburg looks like now', or 'Wouldn't it be lovely to go and stay with my 
sister, Betty, and walk on the squeaky white sands of Clifton Beach', Going home is no 
longer fantasy" (1994:18).
13
See Ginwala, Kasrils, Moloi, Kleinschmidt, Levitan, Baskind, Masekela, M. Kunene, 
Lapsley, Eggenhuizen, Vania, Moatlhodi, M. and L. T. Kunene in Bernstein 
1994:13,181,185-6,263,278,320-22,344-5,358,378,387,409,414,4 60,4 63-5.
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needed, or does its non-fulfilment mean that the exile has nurtured loss, place, hope, has 
lived, for nothing (see Rieff 1994)?
Among those interviewed by Bernstein after 2 February 1990, many expressed 
uncertainty about the prospect of leaving exile and return home, couching it in terms 
that were conditional and provisional. Both personal and practical issues had to be 
addressed. There was always something, and frequently a great deal, to lose or at the 
very least profoundly threaten and/or jeopardise: non-South African partners and 
friends; children in school or grown up and established in their own lives; investments 
in mortgages, welfare benefits and pension rights, a job/career and, more generally, in 
the construction of a life; a standard of living; stability and security. Commitments and 
responsibilities meant that the exile could/would not just up and leave as many had 
done when fleeing South Africa. Attachments to the places of exile were made 
apparent, drawn into sharper focus, at the moment when departure became possible. 
Some were wary of the consolations of exile that would be missed. The currency of the 
would-be returnee was a pocketful of difficult questions: how? where? when? "Do I 
want now to return to South Africa?" asks Ronald Segal: "Thafs a very difficult 
question after thirty years. Yes. For what? For how long? On what basis?" (in Bernstein 
1994:9). And if South Africa failed to provide a sense of belonging and home, what 
then? Some were not yet ready, were waiting for things to settle and/or for confirmation 
of genuine, irreversible change, and/or were held back by unfinished business of various 
kinds. Alongside waiting and delay, there was talk, and in some cases the actuality, of 
exploratory visits, short term returns, international commuting, "sabbatical 
homecomings" (Nixon 1994:116). For many, however, there was also a strong, 
overarching, desire to contribute, to participate in a way that would be constructive.
Some returnees anticipate the ambiguity and difficulty of the encounter with home. 
"Exile / is not leaving... or coming to... or being in... but knowing / there is no easy
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going / back" (Amelia House in Couzens and Patel eds. 1982:9).14 Bernstein's 
interviewees raise a number of concerns about the possibilities of adjustment and 
integration. These ranged from anxieties about finding a job and a place to stay, to 
apprehension about reuniting with family/community; from a desire not to return in a 
vacuum, to a fatigue at the prospect of having to variously start all over again. Again 
exiles faced the prospect of not fitting in, of being out of touch and outsiders; again they 
would have to compromise on terms set by others. Seeing themselves as more broad/ 
open minded, returnees were worried about their re-entry into a society with different, 
and often more conservative, values and mores. The children of exiles - bom in South 
Africa, bom in exile; old enough to choose a homeland, young enough to have to follow 
their parents - faced a 'return' to a country where they had often never lived and about 
which they were largely ignorant: many, for example, had never known apartheid or 
township life. While for some exiles homecoming heralded a contraction of their world, 
a restriction of choice and opportunity, for others it promised a dramatic and heady 
expansion. Aspects of apartheid were still in force, its legacy was pervasive, everything 
and nothing had changed. There were also more overt political concerns, notably in 
relation to violence. Uncertainty was compounded by a multi-faceted fear. The prospect 
of return could seem almost overwhelming: "And after that, this is what we really have 
to go back for... So it’s going to be a long road home, and yes, I’m scared" (Ngeleza in 
Bernstein 1994:441). The return home was also, at least implicitly, acknowledged as the 
defining moment for notions of the essence of South Africa and South Africans, for 
constructions of home and nation, brought back home from exile.15 Return to the shrine
14
Also see Maphepha, "Our Home-Coming", in Feinberg ed. 1980:107.
15
Despite the existence of communities and organisations that constructed a shared 
idea(l) of home, and of vehicles for national liberation and nation-building, the 
constructions and imaginings of home by those scattered throughout the diaspora (in 
prison and elsewhere in South Africa) differed, within, between and in ways which cut 
across and were extraneous to organisational affiliation (see Bowman 1994). What were 
the implications of such differences to be?
The sources for the above two paragraphs are: Segal, Mvusi, Reddy, Vikalala, Xulu,
Gilder, Schoon, Davis/Kumalo, Mhlangu, Nchabeleng, Shearing, Strauss, Bhyat, Cawthra, 
Baskind, Gwangwa, Hope, Ngcobo, Motaung, Msomi/Dumakude, Gertz-Mketo, Stevenson,
Khanyile, Mafaje, Ngeleza, G. Slovo, M. Kunene, E. o. Beck, R. and I. Beck, D. Tambo, M. 
Sexwale, Hodgson, Mohamed, Vileika, Randeree in Bernstein 1994:9,38-9,52,143-4,155-
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of home, that has been so obsessively nurtured over the years and whose hold remains 
undiminished, is inevitably an occasion for apprehension (Huddleston 1991:25, also 
34,43).
Many exiles - because of the generally high levels of criminal and political violence 
during the transition, subject to state-sponsored surveillance/harassment and to attacks 
by right-wing groups and other political opponents, wary of askaris and returned ANC 
ex-detainees, without or unsure of their indemnity - were reluctant to return particularly 
to live in the townships, and therefore delayed, returned illegally, worked underground, 
lay low. Ronnie Kasrils returned to South Africa at the end of 1989 under the auspices 
of Operation Vula. Following the February 1990 unbanning of the liberation 
movements, Kasrils left South Africa secretly and returned publicly in an official 
capacity soon afterwards. After Operation Vula was uncovered, Red Plot’ allegations 
depicting it as an SACP-inspired attempt to overthrow the government by force led to 
the detention of a number of its leading operatives in June/July 1990. In the aftermath 
of these events Kasrils was once more forced to live an underground existence, on the 
run again. Following the withdrawal of his temporary indemnity and the charging of 
Vula operatives with attempting to overthrow the government by force, came the 
November 1990 announcement that the authorities were looking for Kasrils and three 
others and that they were "armed and dangerous". Kasrils writes, "I was in no-man's 
land, caught up in a hinge of history, between two distinct eras" (1993:vi). In March 
1991 charges were dropped and the Vula operatives released, but not until June 1991 
were the fugitives at large indemnified. By this time Kasrils1 homecoming had consisted
6,197-8,225,264,270,286, 288-92,295,297,304-5,317,321-2,339-40,348,353-4,366-7,371- 
2,395,402-4,421,431,441,451,453, 462,472-7,480-1,489-90,492-6,500-1. On anxieties and 
misgivings about homecoming, also see Wolpe 1994:3-59; specifically on what she 
anticipates missing about exile: 17-18,25-9,32. In addition, on aspects of exile that 
will be missed, see s. Laufer, "Byebye Berlin. Home is Where the Hope is", W e e k ly  M a i l  
26/3-1/4 1993:15-16.
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of almost a year on the run from the authorities, preceded by six months of undercover 
activity (see Kasrils 1993 :vi,1-10,301-68).
Another, much more public return, at the 'hinge in history' was that of Trevor 
Huddleston, who had previously stated that he would not return to South Africa until 
apartheid was dead and buried. But he was persuaded/decided to change his mind after 
35 years in exile, and visited the country in June-July 1991 having been invited to 
attend the ANC National Conference in Durban. '"I still believe that apartheid will be 
dead and buried before I am[...] I hope I have made it clear that I do not regard my visit 
as a cause for celebrating the end of apartheid but for taking part in the final stages of 
the struggle'" (Huddleston 1991:14). The welcome, the reunions, the returns, were 
magical: "For that journey has been the most significant journey of my life. Everything 
else is certain to be anti-climax" (24); elsewhere he describes his return as "truly a kind 
of miracle, never to be repeated, sufficient in itself' (71, also 133). It was a moment of 
hope, but throughout the trip ecstasy was accompanied by agony, the two inseparable: 
"Egypt, the land of bondage at last left behind but no Promised Land in sight: only the 
wilderness" (53, also 20,122,128).
As complement and contrast, numerous returnees re-entering South Africa in the early 
1990s became involved in and part of the process of political transformation, in/of the, 
at least partial, realisation of a vision/dream. Returning exiles moved into positions of 
authority, influence and power and found enormous satisfaction therein. Williams, 
testifying to the many textual manifestations of the self, talks of
the varial influence that one has as an individual with an accumulated 
amount of expertise and experience in a country like this, where you can 
actually see the concrete product of what you're doing, you know, it's not 
lost in this vast old country... you get engaged in a project and its written
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into the constitution, you actually see little epitaphs to yourself all over 
the place. And I mean I think that, you know, it labours the self 
actualisation of the species, I mean that's a very good example of it, 
because you're actually leaving monuments behind you all the time.
(interview)
Exiles and prisoners returned to un/remake the nation in their individual and collective 
image.
Dreams and Reality
To return, at any time and in any context, is to be poured from one reality into another: 
"The transition between winter and summer, life and death, Europe and Africa, being 
and alienation, castration which exile is and integration... One has to be dead first in 
order to rise again" (Breytenbach 1985a:39, also see 41,58). To return home is to be 
reborn. There is nothing quite like homecoming. A "humdinger" states Keorapetse 
Kgositsile (1991:5), while Rian Malan, who returned to South Africa in the mid-1980s, 
states:
Exile is a sweet thing to end... They say that junkies sometimes put 
themselves through the cold sweats and sickness of withdrawal just so 
they can start anew, and experience that wild rush of intoxication to the 
brain as if for the first time. Coming home was like that. (1991:109)16
16
On the post-1990 era of homecoming also see Mazisi Kunene 1993:14. Elation 
during this period was often linked to specific homecomings, a first return, for 
example, or homecoming for a particular event. One such event was the 1994 
election. See Nkosi 1994a. Nkosi quotes a communication from Tim Holmes: "'I have 
never felt so blessed in all my life, after 31 years away. The first impression 
on the streets is that people have come alive '" (21). Homecoming was the occasion 
not only of joy, but also of humour. This is Joe Slovo on his return after 27 
years in exile: '" A s I was saying before 1 was so rudely interruptedt...]1"
(Slovo 1996:193).
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Just as the experience of exile varied enormously, so too did that of homecoming.
While some former exiles returned in the transitional phase to positions of power and 
influence, others returned to nothing at all.1"5 Homecoming is a dream and an 
expectation. The dream/expectation of a rapid, military return, a return in triumph, as 
victors and heroes, to implement the revolution - ’’you know we thought we would go in 
the Zimbabwean style. I used to imagine myself on the plane in my combat uniform and 
my AK, yah, and on an airforce plane landing at Jan Smuts... but no, no, things didn't 
work out that way" (Mabitsela interview) - was progressively undermined, by delays, 
due to the difficulties of infiltration, and military setbacks/defeats, and ultimately by a 
negotiated settlement without absolute winners and losers, and a bewildering and 
violent transition. "Wonderful as the changes have been, they are not quite the changes 
we wanted. We have to learn to come to terms with this" (Schoon interview).
"The principal revolution has been the revolution in expectations" (Nixon 1994:115): 
many, like C. J. Driver writing earlier, had "the usual fantasies / Of return and 
recognition" ("Not Quite", 1984:275). Kgositsile suspects that the most treacherous 
thing about expectation is that it so quickly turns into demand (1991:6). The expectation 
is that something will be "made clear", "unformulated questions" will be answered, and 
"fragmented memories" will "cohere in a recognizable pattern". That homecoming will 
have meaning and lead to some kind of understanding. But, "[t]here was no answer... 
there was life which had to be continued, and perhaps that continuation was in itself 
something like an answer or as near as one would ever get to an answer" (Schoeman 
1978:59,83). The deep and varied demands of homecoming swamp the capacity for 
supply. Homecoming, therefore, is often an ambiguous and disorientating experience,
17
For returning exiles, Sibongile and Didymus Maqoma, in Gordimer1s N o n e  t o  A c c o m p a n y  
Me (1994), homecoming is accompanied by, respectively, political elevation and 
marginalisation, and by a continuity of violent threat and fear.
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with joy, hope and relief tempered, even eclipsed, by other emotions such as 
disappointment and unfulfilled expectations, disillusionment and anger.18 It can be 
tarnished in/from the very moment of arrival. More often than not there was no heroes 
welcome, no large cheering crowd to await the exile's arrival, no ritual slaughtering of 
the fattened calf. Could any welcome have compensated for the years of farewells? Was 
the lack of reception and recognition liberating or annihilating?19 Is a resolution - of 
dreams, expectations, demands, and reality - possible?
Organisational and Mass Return
In the aftermath of February 1990 and its unbanning it was time, at last, for the ANC- 
led alliance, the largest and most important organisation in exile, to return home. While 
unprepared for homecoming, exile was becoming increasingly untenable. By June 1990 
the ANC's centre of gravity had returned to Johannesburg. Homecoming on such a scale 
was an enormously complex task. The ANC had to repatriate both a significant volume 
of people - soldiers, students, employees, dependants - and a liberation movement and 
institutional infrastructure; the ANC/South African nation/state in exile. Also relocated 
onto home territory were both the strengths and the weaknesses of exile politics. The 
ANC had to combine the logistical challenge of return with the political challenge of 
transformation. As a liberation movement it needed to integrate the structures, 
organisational cultures and leaderships from exile, prison and elsewhere within South 
Africa, and to transform itself from an authoritarian, centralised and secretive 
movement into a democratic political party. All this within unfamiliar and often hostile 
circumstances. There was tension, to mention just one example, between key internal
18
There are not infrequent expressions of anger and pain at reunion and return, at a 
sense of futile loss and waste: why was what appears to be so easy now so hard before? 
had so much been suffered and sacrificed for so little? {Bernstein 1990, Lewin 1991, 
Ngeleza in Bernstein 1994:441).
19
On the anti-climax and alienation of arrival, see Nkosi 1994.
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players and returnees in the competition for political authority and positions of power, 
in some cases to the extent of violence and killings, 20
Significantly, the process of repatriation took place during a period when the ANC was 
not in power and as a result was limited in its capacity to facilitate and resource the 
process. Am agreement signed in September 1991 between the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the South African government enabled the 
UNHCR to establish an office in the country to assist the return of exiles. Although the 
UNHCR developed a plan for the voluntary repatriation of 30,000 exiles, it soon 
became clear that there would be far fewer returnees. The implementing partner of the 
UNHCR, the National Co-ordination Committee for the Repatriation of South African 
Exiles (NCCR), was mandated to facilitate repatriation and reintegration. Set up under 
the auspices of the South African Council of Churches and the liberation movements, 
the NCCR's functions included distributing cash payments from the UNHCR - returnees 
were entitled to R4,250 spread over a six month period - operating a development fund 
to provide loans to returnees to start their own small businesses, organising 
employment, education and skills training, and counselling. The brief life of the NCCR 
was tarnished by inefficiency, fraud, corruption, bankruptcy and, ultimately, 
dissolution.21
20
On the homecoming of the ANC see Lodge 1992,
21
For Willy Leslie, who was involved in NCCR work in Natal, the experience of
homecoming was bound up with the NCCR and the homecoming of others:
The whole programme became a very unpleasant experience. An experience I'd love 
to remember because of all the hard work I put into it... There are those rich 
and fulfilling experiences, but what I'd love to forget is the last two months... 
became a nightmare. where it was now evident that the UN wasn1t putting in any 
more funds, where in Natal's case, we now had a situation where more than 400
people were claiming to be exiles and we had made it perfectly clear to them that
they don't qualify for whatever assistance. The last two months became an 
avalanche that we had to ward off all the time; that was an experience I'd like 
to forget, (interview)
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Exiles were deposited in an alien environment and told to take responsibility for their 
lives. Paradoxically, the enveloping material security of organisational/camp exile was 
shattered by the myriad uncertainties of homecoming and home. Many exiles had been 
ensconced within a culture of dependency in which basic material needs were catered for, 
and, therefore, had become unused to such tasks as managing money and budgeting. 
They lacked necessary life skills and knowledge, and possessed skills and knowledge 
which were redundant in the new context of home. Aspects and periods of life abroad 
were unknown, unrecognised, and unacknowledged. Parallel and starkly different 
systems of evaluation often made the returnees feel as if they were entering the brave 
new world empty handed. Frustration was compounded by a sense of lost time (in a 
career/profession, material circumstances, education, relationships). The exile, now 
returned, was once again running to catch up on/with life. In this uncomfortable new 
world, returnees encountered a sense/glimpse, through friends and contemporaries who 
chose different paths, of other lives they might have lived, of lost and unlived lives that 
could have been theirs if they had made different choices - about political involvement, 
about leaving the country - if they had lived in a different country and/or in different 
times. Contemporaries were in various ways, particularly materially and professionally, 
further advanced and in a prime position to reap the benefits of political change which, 
often, they had done nothing to bring about:
your ex-schoolmate is living in the northern suburbs, and you say, aiy, this 
is another thing that really makes us... because this person was even dull 
in class and she stays in Bryanston, she is big... vast difference between 
our dwelling places, sort of feel like, it makes you feel smallish, makes 
you feel small. There is some complex involved, at the same time, if I am 
to be honest. (Mabitsela interview)22
22 Alongside regrets, there are aspects of difference that are potentially positive, 
opportunities gained rather than lost. Cronin talks in this way about having children 
who are much younger than those of his peer group: "we are younger for it" (interview).
367
Large numbers of returnees remain homeless, in informal settlements and squatter 
camps, having moved - because their parents/family members could not or would not 
look after them or had died, because they are trying to trace family members, because 
they have been displaced by violence and harassment - from place to place, between 
family, friend, stranger. Unemployment became a major problem. Exiles were 
victimised by employers, particularly in the private sector, because of their political 
background. The majority lacked qualifications and skills - what could the former MK 
soldier put on a cv for jobs outside the army or the ANC? "I mean they don't have other 
skills except the gun” (Mkhize interview) - and often the educational and professional 
qualifications obtained in exile were not recognised at home. Promises made in exile 
were not, perhaps could not be, kept; little effort was made to assess and make use of 
the returnees' strengths; their special needs were not met; they were further 
disadvantaged by their lack of understanding of how to work the system. As a worst 
case scenario returning exiles came home to no home, returned with nothing and were 
simply left to fend for themselves. The plight of returnees has often, as a result, been 
characterised by neglect, loss, and invisibility, destitution and desperation.23
Counteracting understandable tensions and jealousies is a pride in lives lived and the 
correctness of moral choices made, a desire to stress the many benefits of exile and an 
alternative currency for evaluating life and status:
after all is said and done, I love the life I led, I would do it all
again, even the suffering that I went through, because it made me the 
person that 1 am. I am one of those exiles that came back and is
certainly living a better standard of life than 90% of exiles who did
come back. I am living relatively comfortably... yes, I look at some of 
my comrades, friends, neighbours that I left behind, who might be way up 
there in terms of what I have and, you know, what they have... But they 
don't have the experiences I have, and they're honestly not the human 
being that I am, and that I can't put a price to, no-one can... (Leslie 
interview)
23
In February 1993, the NCCR reported that less than 6% of returnees had been able to 
find jobs (SAIRR 1993/4:162). A  survey of 450 returned exiles, carried out by the Human 
Sciences Research Council and the Pretoria Returnees Project Committee, found that 7 6% 
of returnees lived in informal settlements. A  loss of status, depression and 
disillusionment were also prevalent(SAIRR 1994/5:323). Also see Zonke Majodina's study 
of black/African returnees, which examines the problems faced by returnees, and the 
contribution of these problems and social support and coping strategies to reintegration 
(1995).
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There were times when the anger and disappointment of returnees boiled over. Tensions, 
for example, surfaced during the return and integration into the new national army of 
MK soldiers. The forces that fed into the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) were the SADF, the bantustan armies from the TBVC states, and the armed 
forces of the liberation movements (MK and the PAC's military wing, the Azanian 
People's Liberation Army (APLA)). Although estimates of the size of MK prior to 
integration vary considerably, even by the most generous calculations it stood to be 
significantly outnumbered in the new army, notably by the dominant component from the 
former SADF. Within the processes of negotiation and integration, many in MK felt 
marginalised, neglected/abandoned, betrayed, used; resentful of the imbalances and 
inequalities: for example, although former guerrillas had to be evaluated and trained 
before being placed on active duty, SADF members did not have to undergo any such 
process. Frustration and disillusionment became widespread.
I see no future in the army for myself... it is so discouraging about this 
new national defence force because of all the problems we encountered 
there. I mean we are not integrating, we are being absorbed, that is our 
feeling... it is like going... with cap in hand, from generals[,..]... you are 
deranked. And you feel that no I deserve this rank because of the number 
of years I have spent in the army and the ANC. You feel you can deliver 
the goods, what you just need are to do those courses, and you are 
prepared to do that. Now if you are deranked and deranked and 
deranked, and the process is slow... That is why I just got disillusioned... 
(Mabitsela interview)
the fighting in these camps where they were training, the SADF, their 
enemies are in charge and they know very well that these are our 
enemies, and one of them, that group that defied Mandela and refused to
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go back, he said to me, what made him do it - very angry, he's one day 
talk about an experience - how the very commanders attacked them at 
Lesotho some time back, and now they were in charge. And they couldn't 
take that. (Mkhize interview)24
Once the ANC was in government, albeit coalition government, its constituency and 
responsibilities had changed. Those who had sacrificed so much to go into exile and in 
exile itself, were made to sacrifice again on their return: in terms of the lack of 
investment in them and their future and in terms of the calls for reconciliation. Having 
had to remake and reinvent themselves in exile, often many times over, they had to do 
so again on their return. These veterans of survival often had to build a life again, start 
again, in any and every possible way, from scratch:
oh yes, starting from buying a teaspoon... Had two small pots, one fork, 
one teaspoon, one tablespoon, one table knife given by another comrade, 
and two plastic plates - so I had to start from scratch. (Mabitsela 
interview)25
24
Frustration and disillusionment took many forms. Former-MK members became involved in 
violent crime and gangsterism, hijacked Self Defence Units for their own, often lawless, 
purposes, were 'turned1 and recruited to work for the state and other former opponents. 
There were also particular flashpoints. The first national MK conference in Venda in 
September 1991, illustrated the organisation's considerable internal problems and 
articulated widespread criticism of its leadership (Pillay 1991) . Grievances including 
training facilities, procedures and conditions, and the racism of white officers, 
resulted in a mutiny and the subsequent dismissal of about 2,000 former MK soldiers from 
the army in October 1994. This is the mutiny referred to in the Mkhize quotation above. 
The integration, rationalisation and transformation of the various military forces 
within the SANDF remains one of the great challenges facing South Africa (see Kynoch 
1996).
The process of remaking the self on return also unquestionably had its positive 
dimensions, particularly if it could be done in material/professional security: "you 
actually have a chance to choose how you come back into that society. Exile has given me 
that freedom to create my own life when I go back. And I'm going to be more free in that 
country than I would have been if I hadn't had an enforced break" (Dunkley in Bernstein 
1994:283).
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The Impossibility of Return
Exile serves as interminable and yet hopelessly inadequate preparation for the re­
encounter with home.26 Propelled and lured into a return by the image of home, the 
exile is then abandoned to the reality of something entirely other. "Satisfaction at home 
could not rival the desire activated in exile... the mental energy expended on the image 
of home in absence proves incommensurate with the reality of home as presence" 
(Seidel 1986:12). There can be no return to an imaginary and imagined homeland, no 
restitution, redemption or resolution.
South Africans have experienced the attenuation of exile without the fullness of 
return; without, that is, anything approaching liberation, deliverance, or what the 
Martinican poet, Aime Cesaire once called 'the rendezvous of victory'. (Nixon 
1994:114)
Homecoming, like exile, combines both rebirth and death. "There we shall meet with 
our broken selves," writes Mazisi Kunene, selves to be brought back to life: "Giving 
them the fulfilling word of life / Making them climb the last hill of the sun / Certain, by 
such magic our triumph is assured" (’"Unfinished Adventure’", in Feinberg ed. 1980:80). 
Those without the magic, however, are denied the triumph and left simply with one 
more, and perhaps the ultimate, addition to a collection of broken selves. Homecoming 
is redolent with death: "Sometimes returning feels like death", remarks Wolpe 
(1994:31). In some cases it is the death of a dream, in others the death takes a different 
form.
26
For a contrary view - exile as preparation for homecoming - see Shearing in Bernstein 
1994:292.
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I remember one guy very well... 1 could see that [he] was suffering from 
PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder]. But there was just so much 
when coming back here: some of his comrades had been killed... we 
worked through that, but I could see that it was more than that specific 
trauma... Many people died in exile... when [the returnees] come back 
here to this violence, or when they see things on the TV... it triggers off 
their own issues. And some of them... have been perpetrators... [Others] 
were actually tortured... I know of so many people who have been 
wanting to slaughter goats and stuff, because when their parent or a sister 
or a brother was buried they were not involved... thinking that they can't 
get jobs because they have this curse hanging over them... So people now 
are living those experiences, it's so difficult. (Mkhize interview: Mkhize 
is a psychologist who worked with returning exiles)
When I came back home, I couldn't go to the beach, because when the 
water hit me it felt as if it cut my leg, and I could see my son coming on 
the waves as he used to, you know. It was very difficult. Returning, I 
went down hill completely. All his friends would come to see me and 
there was no joy in seeing them, just terrible terrible grief... I had to give 
up working as a lawyer... It just became more and more difficult, you 
know, it didn't get easier. I think it's better now that I'm writing and 
talking about it a lot more... (Naidoo interview: Naidoo is a former exile 
whose homecoming was inextricable interwoven with mourning for her 
son who had been killed in Lusaka by a South African agent)
The returnee is anxious to have something to show for the years in exile, "all those 
years of absence / varied and intricate in themselves / at once wonderfully light and 
horribly heavy" (Fitzgerald, "Returning Exile Psycho-Babble Blues", in Oliphant ed.
372
1992:352). The returnee brings the world, the burdens and insights of exile, back to 
South Africa, returns with "scars" and "precious gifts" (Breytenbach 1996:47). But 
there was often a discrepancy between what the exile returned with and what others 
expected him/her to return with. Families, for example, had specific, often material, 
expectations, that the exile would return with bounty from abroad.
There is also much, as has already been mentioned, that the exile returns without. 
Homecoming destroyed the exilic communities that enabled the experience of exile to 
be survived.
You know, I've been totally thrown by the fact that there's a group of 
exiles here, and we've all been together for something like twenty-five 
years. We're a very close-knit group in some ways. And suddenly it's all 
over and we're all going to be dispersed! And there are people who are 
really important to me, close comrades; and suddenly they're going to 
be[...] one's going to Johannesburg; one's going somewhere else; and I 
just feel very disturbed by the fact that I might not see some of these 
people again. I hope that we do keep in touch. We'll probably have 
something dreadful like reunions! [Laughs] (E. Kasrils in Bernstein 
1994:94, also 225,441)
Exiles marry foreigners and/or raise their children abroad, thereby, as was the case with 
Mphahlele, creating a family that are divided by different understandings of home. For 
the children of exiles the return of parents often represented another abandonment and 
betrayal, another disruption of their lives and division of their social world, the source 
of further anger and resentment, another placing of politics and place above all else
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including and especially them.:" For the returning parents the anguish could be just as 
deep: "The separation will simply leave a gaping wound" (Wolpe 1994:29). 
Relationships and marriages between exiles were put under intense strain where the 
decision to return was straightforward for one and not for the other. For AnnMarie 
Wolpe, in ways that echoed with her past, homecoming brought with it a sense and 
feeling of being taken for granted, of her life and the forces affecting it being out of her 
control, of her life being dictated by another's wishes, of having no choice (1994:9- 
13,15,17,28-9,55-9). In some instances, the contingencies of exile forged and kept 
relationships together - in camps, for example, where South African women were few 
and sought after - that homecoming split apart. Considerable problems were also 
experienced by exiles with/and their foreign wives on return: "it was amazing to see 
how they were abused by families of the returning people, they were seen as intruders, 
people didn't want them, they were seen as a burden, with no consideration that some of 
them had really looked well after their sons when they were outside" (Mkhize 
interview). Homecoming creates a diaspora of its own.
Most importantly, while the exile may not realise it, s/he often returns without any real 
anticipation or appreciation of what s/he is coming home with, without or to. Exiles 
expect home to have been irremediably changed in/by their absence and for their return; 
exiles expect to go home and find it waiting, as before, as remembered, unchanged. 
There will be continuity and change - but the exile's absence and return will have had 
little or no effect on either - both having a logic of their own. The dynamic of continuity 
and change that is discussed below extends its influence to affect all members of the 
diaspora at every moment of return. In "Last Holiday Home", Jacobson writes:
See Wolpe 1994, especially 12-13,25-6,32,55-7,271-2,215-6, and Peta and Tessa Wolpe 
in Bernstein 1994:465-70.
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There was no such thing, it seemed, as the passage of time... nothing had 
altered, what was there that could alter?... So time was absent; as if it 
had done away with itself. Yet there was nothing around me other than 
the depredations of time. Time lived through us or on us as a flame lives 
on the wood it consumes and chars..., (1985:176)
Noni Jabavu states, "I have mentioned the chasms that yawn at your feet even 
while you rejoice in the framework that produced you" (1963:261). The result is a 
peculiar blend of the strange and the familiar: "no, strangely familiar. Just strange little 
things. The type of people you had forgotten existed, the kinds of shop assistants one 
gets here... it was strange... and very familiar in ways but very strange in other ways... 
(Richer interview)."8
Just as residence abroad provides a different perspective and fresh insight on home, so 
does homecoming. That which was previously subconsciously absorbed, transparent 
and taken-for-granted as home, and then yearned for and recreated from a distance, is 
made strange and unfamiliar, consciously seen and felt as if for the first time, in the 
event of homecoming. Malan writes: "When I came home from exile, I was 
overwhelmed by the feeling that I was seeing South Africa clearly for the first time" 
(1991:273-4, also see 110,330-4). As the prologue to her autobiography Mary Benson 
chose the famous lines by T. S. Eliot: "And the end of all our exploring / Will be to 
arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time" (1990).
28 Also on continuity and change, the familiar/intimate and the strange/estrangement, 
see Cartwright 1996:63-4,75,94,101,116,118-9,166, Jacobson 1968a:14,38,43-4,47,51-2,58- 
9,208,350-3,451,487, 1992:236-8, 1994:20-1,24-6,46,71,73,87,143-4,153,175, Lewin 
1991:22, Wolpe 1994:21-3,39-42,47-9. In some cases this ambiguous contract of return was 
further complicated by the patterns of all change/no change and the strange/the familiar 
that also characterised the political transition to democracy.
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Homecoming is a transition in time, a violent journey through condensed time (Peters, 
"Parachute Men Say...", 1981:26). It is an attempt to grasp the thread that spans 
continuity and change, the familiar and the strange, past and present, home and abroad; 
to understand the ways they coexist and are superimposed upon one another; to heal the 
rift created by absence. But is such a healing possible? Is it equally possible for all 
members of the diaspora?
An exile never returns. Before' does not exist for 'them1, the 'others', 
those who stayed behind. For 'them' it was all continuity; for you it was a 
fugue of disruptions. The thread is lost. The telling has shaped the story.
You make your own history at the cost of not sharing theirs. The eyes, 
having seen too many different things, now see differently. (Breytenbach 
1996:48).
In reality, both the returnees and those who remained behind have changed. People have 
grown up, grown old and died, lives and relationships have evolved, and those long 
absent have been forgotten. Absence strips away attachments and connections, makes 
the returnee into an outsider who has no life left in that place called home. Even with 
close friends and family they may still find themselves struggling "like tourists in a 
market place" (Wicomb 1987:109). "Here I come," writes Jeni Couzyn, "who will claim 
me?" ("The Return", 1973:64), while Ntantala states: "Most of the people who are dear 
to me are now gone... Now I ask myself: To whom am I going back, if I go?"
(1993:235).
Returnees and those who remained at home inhabit different worlds. This, for example, 
has been the experience of some exiles who returned post-February 1990. Different 
experiences, social mores, interests, commitments, priorities, and horizons made 
integration and socialising with South Africans at home difficult. Reunited families
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were fraught with disjunctures, fortunes had varied, roles had been challenged, remade 
and reversed, the wounds of absence festered still. Returnees encountered problems 
with relationships, in forming the new and rekindling the old; they harboured feelings 
of resentment at being misunderstood when others were not interested in their stories or 
the pain of their past, in their cargo of exile and return. Adaptation was made more 
difficult as many returnees brought home the innate suspicion of the culture of exile 
that made them slow to trust. In the face of uncertainty and hostility, returnees 
frequently withdrew and clung to a familiar reference group of former exiles for 
company and support. Although this pattern of social behaviour will in all likelihood 
break down over time, the initial social alienation, that extended into intimate social 
worlds, has been one of the hardest experiences of homecoming.
I find that extremely difficult to do... Socialising with friends from 
school, unless its with those who are now in the struggle... But I cannot, 
will not, find it extremely difficult to go to a family wedding... or just an 
ordinary disco of coloured people, the community that I come from, I am 
a sore thumb standing out, so obvious. Compounding this of course I've 
become the focal point, because everyone hasn't seen me for the last 10,
15, 20 years, and everybody would want to know what type of car I'm 
driving, what type of... That's the type of crap I've got to talk if I'm with 
them, and I can't talk that language. I want to talk about delivering the 
RDP... I want to have this kind of conversation with people if they want 
to talk to me... I've become maybe a political animal and I expect my 
friends and my people to be the same. And I understand I'm selfish. I 
understand and I accept that. (Leslie interview)
You know, this is funny, we find it difficult to socialise with local 
people... I would find myself saying 'South Africans'. I would say, 'oh,
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that's us', no seriously... because I mean it is like we are operating on 
different wavelengths. Their priorities and ours differ. They want to live 
in the northern suburbs, have a good job and drive a dolphin or a 
mercedes... they are, I know it is not really nice to say, they are very 
materialistic... With you there are a lot of things that you want to see 
happening, like a fair deal for squatters, a lot of all round development, 
and you worry about Sarajevo. I mean with them... it is like it is another 
world, it is not happening here... we've got a broader outlook... we have 
been exposed to a lot outside, but here they've been confined... There are 
some attitudes as well: 'these ones from exile, the exiles, they think they 
are better - OK, don't come with your high ideas’... undertones there:
'don’t think that you were the only ones who fought for this... Who was 
getting killed, shot here, raided, teargassed'... they have... different 
interests. So it is very difficult to mix with them... Not that we are hostile 
to South Africans, OK, we do mix with them but there is that thing, it is 
there, in there. We feel more comfortable at home when with comrades.
Go to any party, will find exiles, anywhere, its exiles. And even with us 
we are too outgoing. Our girls, we are different from local girls, more 
assertive... [we] break social patterns... (Mabitsela interview)
Another generally encountered dynamic of continuity and change concerns place. A
sense of place - there's no home like place - lies at the heart of the homecoming dream.
Stephen Watson writes of one such place:
And it's always one place only, always the same place /... nothing 
matters now but his desire, but this mad longing / to know that there is 
still a place, that it still exists /... but to know that he can come, return to
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that road's crest /... There has to be a place. ("In Exile", in Bunyan ed. 
1989:71-2)
But Hermer states that "whereas you can slot back into a true friendship instantly, a 
move away from your homeland changes your relationship to it for ever" (1984:282): "A 
napalm of the mind has hit this place", remarks Hope on a return visit (1988:125). 
Homecoming, for exile, emigrant and migrant alike, if possibly to different degrees, is 
to a home that has been rebuilt, renamed, removed, that has moved on. Kgositsile 
remarks on his inability to recognise, relate to, know, his physical surrounds:
there are no memories here. The streets of Johannesburg cannot claim 
me. I cannot claim them either. Their names...remain, but it seems there 
is not much more than that for the returning one after ages and ages...
Even at a very physical level, you cannot - or should I say - you should 
not destroy everything which connects people to history, to certain 
memories, to certain places, to memorial reference points... you destroy 
those physical points of reference, you destroy the individual, the 
compatriot, the son or daughter returning 'home'. (1991:6)-
That which is known and recognisable can be at once reassuring and unsettling: "It is 
not the Cape Town I used to know" writes Breytenbach, "But occasionally something I 
see this time suddenly corresponds to an old dream which I myself had lost, and the 
coincidence is confusing, and for a split second I am back where I want to be" 
(1985a:179).
29
Also see Fitzgerald, "Returning Exile Psycho-Babble Blues", in Oliphant ed. 1992:350, 
Huddleston 1991:30,32,37-8,61,66, Stevenson in Bernstein 1994:403, and Wright, "Notes on 
a Visit", 1980:112.
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Returning to a focus on the 1990s mass return of exiles, there is a possibility that exile 
or aspects of it will be missed - comradeship, the sense of purpose, a clearly defined 
identity, certain kinds of security - and become the subject of constant reminiscence, 
wrapped in nostalgia, the 'good old days'; that all the future holds will be measured, 
usually unfavourably, against that period or perhaps the hopes that the period 
symbolised. Some indeed have left/will leave home again and return to their previous 
place of exile.
Writers testify to the ambiguity of homecoming. Feinberg talks of being "suspended /... 
with no home-coming"; "at some wild initiation gauntlet / 1 enter my airlock / out of 
exile" ("My Airlock out of Exile", 1992:69-70). Kgositsile writes: "my return, no, not 
return, arrival in this strange place"; "Therefore, return? Return to what? This place is 
foreign..."; "at one level, my being here is a homecoming... But at another level, the 
returning one has never left... I crossed borders and borders... But I never left" 
(1991:7,8). Others echo Kgositsile's claim to a home always at least partially inhabited, 
occupied, claimed, claiming: "So, in a sense, though I left South Africa so long ago, 
South Africa never left me" (Huddleston in Bernstein 1994:257, also 238,278,344, and 
Bernstein 1993:12). Finally, C. J, Driver comments: "How strange it is to be alive, and 
back / Where I belonged so much, now not at all" ("Aubade", in de Kock and Tromp 
eds. 1996:105, also see "Elegy", 106-8).30
Homecoming is to go home, to go back, to return, to re-enter (Nixon 1994:114), 
although there is also no going home, no going back, no return, no re-entry. 
Homecoming is to arrive, to start again, to attempt to pick up the thread in a place that 
in some ways was never left and in other ways can never be returned to. The exile can
30
Such reactions are not confined to exiles or to the moment of political 
transformation. "Claimed and disowned, disowning, peculiarly / Belonging here" states 
Wright: "Feeling, as always, at home and alien" ("A South African Album", 1980:63, also 
B 8 ) .
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"never, never, never come back... In all the places where we have been, we have left 
little pieces of ourselves" (Langa interview). The exile returns as a divided self, as is 
poignantly illustrated by Barry Feinberg on his return after thirty years in London: 
"London / where home was home / for real / if not at home / in my soul"; he refers to a 
tongue that "seems / still steeped / in London" ("My Airlock out of Exile", 1992:69), 
Homecoming represents another division of a multiply divided identity, not a reunion of 
the self, a making whole. The fragments of the self are scattered along the trajectory of 
lifetime's journey, yet again reformulated into a self at once augmented and diminished.
Those at home take on unfamiliar and unsettling roles in honour of the returnee: full of 
hope and expectancy at the prospect of a homecoming; host - "Can you deal with that? 
Hosts! In my own country" exclaims Kgositsile (1991:6); driven by the desire to make 
return wonderful and memorable; driven by resentment at the return of the prodigal son 
or daughter. The returnee is also relegated to unfamiliar and unsettling roles: a traveller 
on a foreign passport, refugee, stranger, outsider, tourist, and even an exile: "Past days 
of anguished pain, / Relentless memories of exile / In foreign lands! / (We never 
believed it possible), / Overlaid / By new pain, new uncertainties. / Comrades all, / 
Exiles in a strange land, / Our Motherland!" (Mudaly, "Homecoming", 1991:13).
Homecoming, like home, can be anything one wants it to be. Kgositsile found that 
younger writers, cultural workers and activists knew his work and could even 
impersonate him reciting it, and declares, "Perhaps that was my Homecoming!" 
(1991:10). Rose Moss in her autobiographical story "Stompie" describes voting in the 
1994 South African election in the U.S.A. as a kind of homecoming which, like the 
story itself, would "knit my divided countries" (1994:11), enabling her to transcend rifts 
in time and place/space.
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Homecoming, across eras and categories of migration/displacement, precipitates 
something. Sometimes it is a further homecoming or a final and permanent return that is 
precipitated. It can also facilitate a release from exile, a liberation from home, an 
exorcism that allows the returnee in some way to move away and move on.
Homecoming can be the point at which looking back to where one has come from 
transforms itself into planned arrival at those places to which one wishes to go.31
Ironically, for the writer, homecoming, like migration/displacement, can herald either 
imaginative renewal or imaginative death (as return, for example, destroys the security of 
exilic and anti-apartheid imaginative obsessions). Lindfors has asked the question; when 
exiled black South African writers return home, what kind of literature are they likely to 
produce? Drawing on the examples of Peter Abrahams and Es'kia Mphahlele, he predicts 
a future of celebratory and heroic effusion, autobiography and biography, but then 
disappointment, disagreement, disillusionment followed by protest and repression. He 
concludes by arguing that if the returning exiles live to see this dark day, they will feel 
horribly betrayed, "for their homecoming will have turned out to be merely another sort 
of alienation, another erasure, another extinction, another inglorious death. In the end 
they will still be exiles, cut off forever from the promised land of their dreams"
(1994:162, also see Hope 1993). While some of this prediction has already come to pass, 
it is too soon to assess the validity of its conclusion.
Homecoming is another autobiographical moment: a moment in which memories of a 
past home, long dormant, will germinate; in which a sense of closure can be established 
enabling coherence and structure to be imposed on the past; a moment that will enable 
exile to be laid to rest; and lives to be told, made known, rescued from past 
misrepresentation, written into the official record. Andrew Gurr has stated the
31
See Breytenbach 1988:130, 1996:48, Hoffenberg and R. Slovo in Bernstein 1994:380- 
1,442-3,450, Hope 1989:103-4, and Wright, "A Voyage to Africa”, 1958:14.
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following: ’'Homecoming as an ideal of course does not respond readily to being 
deployed in literature. The twentieth century has found it easier to celebrate dystopias 
than to welcome utopias" (1981:142). What is interesting about the growing South 
African literature of homecoming is that it has been forced to engage with the fact that 
homecoming does not usually correspond to the envisaged ideal, elements of dystopia 
and utopia coexist as return generates a bewilderingly wide spectrum of experiences 
and responses. The most overt collaborative violence of the apartheid state in the lives 
of its opponents, and the narration of their life stories, perhaps ends with the experience 
of homecoming, with the rupture of return and its unexpected un/remaking of selves 
and worlds. What was written into the script as the culmination of exile, of oppositional 
victory and apartheid decline, has had to be rewritten in the light of its paradoxical and 
complex reality.
Like exile, homecoming is both a beginning and an end: "So although my homecomings 
were a beginning of sorts, they were also a culmination of movements, actions, 
decisions and realities that went far back in the echoes of time" (Chabani Manganyi 
1983:30). It is also a continuation. Homecoming provides a different, more complex, 
perspective not only on home, but also on exile; the divided self projects one onto the 
other, qualifying, overlaying, re-evaluating what has gone before. Going home 
precipitates a continuation and further evolution of the dialogue between home and 
exile.
and return is unbitter only for the yet unborn
So what can he be doing now> 
awaking from a dream o f returning 
or dreaming o f that time away from home.
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(Fitzgerald, "Returning Exile Psycho-Babble Blues", in Oliphant ed. 
1992:352)
"Yet - are we really home?" (Wolpe 1994:278). Show me the way to go home.
SECTION 3 - THE WITNESS
385
Chapter 7: The Witness: Imprisonment and Exile as Symbol
... what could be truer, after all, than a subject's own account o f what he or she has lived 
through? (Scott 1991:777)
... they all had a story, and... were driven to tell it... their story was always there and it 
was always the same: it went, 'Put yourself in my place'. (Herr 1991:29-31)
... you don't know what I saw, what there is to see, you won7 see... I could formulate 
everything they were, as the act I had witnessed; they would have their lives summed up 
for them officially at last by me... I could have put a stop to it, the misery; at the point I 
witnessed. What more can one do?... I drove on... I don't know how to live in [this] 
country. (Gordimer 1980:208-10)
The following was a common scenario in apartheid South Africa: a crime took place in 
broad daylight, in full view of crowds of people; and nobody saw anything. There were 
no witnesses. What if a person felt that they had lived their entire life on one or other 
side of such a crime? What if lives are destined to remain at the scene of the crime until 
a witness is found?
To be a witness, to testify, as their legal connotations imply, is to take responsibility for, 
to provide a signature for, the truth (Felman in Felman and Laub 1992:204-7, 265- 
7,276-80). What could be more authentic or persuasive, indeed what could be 'truer', 
than the testimony of an eye-witness? The visual is both evidence and explanation, it 
renders meaning transparent and irrefutable. Seeing is believing, and such belief can be 
persuasively shared. This is the power of the witness (see Ginzburg 1992). And yet the 
visual is also riven with ambiguity. The most transparent of the senses is simultaneously 
the most opaque, profoundly susceptible to manipulation and illusion. Nor can it be 
assumed that the word unproblematically reproduces or transmits the visual.1
1
For Michel Foucault's reflections on this ambiguous relation see, for example, 1973:9 
and 1983. Also see Deleuze 1988:47-69 and Rajchman 1988.
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The eye is a window and a mirror. Ways of seeing cohabit with ways of being. What I 
am determines what I see as much as what I see determines what I am; I am changed by 
what I see just as what I see is changed by my having seen it. An eye for an 'I'. And 
somewhere between the window and the mirror is you. What if I can formulate, 
'officially', eveiything you are in the act of witnessing; if, essentially, I witness and you 
are witnessed? What if this translates into lives being told by me and your life being 
told for you? What if the process of witnessing is both a form of oppression and 
resistance? To witness: potentially, another violently collaborative intersection, and one 
that extends beyond state and opponent to condition interactions between subjects. An 
eye for an T: a contest over identity, another relationship at the juncture of truth and 
power.
Power visualises itself and constructs the terrain of visibility. Who witnesses what and 
why? This is in part a political question relating to the production of identity and 
knowledge, truth and power. To truly bear witness is to recognise that there is more to 
any given situation than meets the eye. Apartheid precluded the possibility of a 
"community o f witnessing" (Felman in Felman and Laub 1992:211), and created stark 
divisions between notions of insider and outsider; an infinite terrain of the 'other'. Such 
a society, "surgically and scientifically divided" (Malan 1991:413), (chiefly) along 
racial lines, was predicated upon a clear distinction between that which could be, or in 
fact had to be, seen, and the unseeable, the unsightly, the invisible (out of sight, out of 
mind), upon its many ways of looking at itself - "of explaining, rationalising, and 
forgetting" (Lelyveld 1987:25) - and on its multiple forms of ignorance, blindness and 
(d)illusion. In part, for those complicit in oppression, particularly whites, not seeing or 
seeing differently was contingent upon the practice of collaborative unknowing, or 
"willed ignorance" (Steiner 1974:35, Levi 1989:65);2 and the equally collaborative
2
Primo Levi denounces the majority of Germans during the Holocaust for, "deluding 
themselves that not seeing was a way of not knowing, and that not knowing relieved them 
of their share of complicity or connivance... It is enough not to see, not to listen,
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failure to imagine: 'put yourself in my place'. This too was a form of violence. In this 
domain of annihilation - "’Our eyes did not meet. He never became human"’ (Malan 
1991:207) - witnesses testified from opposing positions (victim, perpetrator, observer...) 
and to lives and worlds that were both dependent upon each other and seemingly 
irreconcilable. Apartheid became a peculiarly contested event, beyond unanimous 
corroboration.
This chapter argues that witnesses' accounts, like autobiographical accounts more 
generally, gain their authenticity through an immediacy and a contagious self-belief. 
Moving beyond this argument, however, it will also be suggested that the witness 
produces a "testimony which is inadvertently no longer in the control or possession" of 
its author(s),
which exceeds the testifier's own awareness, to bring forward a 
complexity of truth which, paradoxically, is not available as such to the 
very speaker who pronounces it... [the reader is urged] not simply to see 
the testimony, but to see through it: see - throughout the testimony - the 
deception and self-deception which it unwittingly displays, and to which 
it unintentionally testifies. (Felman in Felman and Laub 1992:263)3
In addressing these issues, the chapter will implicitly address much of what has gone 
before in relation to imprisonment, exile and homecoming, while explicitly focusing on
not to act"; and states that, "Most... didn't know because they didn't want to know. 
Because, indeed, they wanted n o t  to know... those who knew did not talk; those who did 
not know did not ask questions; those who did ask questions received no answers...” 
(1989:65-6, and 150,170, 1987:386, see 382-6; also see Gordimer 1989:265-6,303).
To see/know in such a context can be profoundly unsettling. See the narrative thread of 
visualisation for the characters Elizabeth Curren and David Miller, in Coetzee 1991a:90- 
1,95,100,116-17,123,129,159,163-4, and Moss 1981:33-4,39,59,96-7,111-12,126,141.
3
Scott states: "Experience is at once always already an interpretation and something 
that needs to be interpreted... is... not the origin of our explanation, but that which 
we want to explain" (1991:797, also see Coetzee 1992:251-93, and Loftus 1979).
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Rian Malan’s My Traitor’s Heart and the collaborative narrative, Poppie, by Elsa 
Joubert and Poppie Nongena. Neither Malan nor Nongena were prisoners or exiles in 
the conventional sense; symbolically, however, they were both prisoner and exile: in 
that confinement and blinding proximity interwoven with estrangement and 
unbridgeable distance structured ways of seeing and being. These two narratives 
recount lives lived on different sides of the apartheid crime and represent a community 
of witnessing only in the sense that, both within and between texts, they contribute to 
the development of what Felman calls a "community of testimonial incommensurates 
which, held together, have an overwhelming testimonial impact" (Felman and Laub 
1992:279). As life stories, they acquire additional narrative power when superimposed - 
as layers of experience and interpretation, complex interpretations themselves in need 
of interpretation - one on another. The result is that apartheid and lives lived within it 
can be both seen and seen through.4
Rian Malan: The Journalist as Witness
But, before he said any more, he wanted to know if the journalist would be allowed to 
tell the truth.
'Certainly I shall,' Rambert replied.
'I mean,' Rieux explained, 'would you be allowed to publish an unqualified 
condemnation o f the present state of things?1
'Unqualified? Well, I must own I couldn't go that far. But surely things aren't quite so 
bad as that?'
'No,' Rieux said quietly, they weren't so bad as that. He had put the question solely to 
find out if Rambert could or couldn't state the facts without paltering with the truth.
'I've no use for statements in which something is kept back'... (Camus 1960:12-13)
I was there to watch.
Talk about impersonating an identity, about locking into a role, about irony: I 
went to cover the war and the war covered me... I went there behind the crude but 
serious belief that you had to be able to look at anything, serious because I acted on it 
and went, crude because I didn't know, it took the war to teach it, that you were as 
responsible for everything you saw as for everything you did. The problem was that you
4
The arguments outlined above clearly also apply in a sense to my own analysis. I do not 
intend to imply that a complexity of truth, not available to the witness, is somehow 
uniquely available in its entirety to me. My interpretation is also in need of 
interpretation, in turn requires seeing through.
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didn't always know what you were seeing until later... that a lot o f it never made it in at 
all, it just stayed stored there in your eyes. (Herr 1991:20)
The journalist is society's witness: professional witness, witness as a job.5 The journalist 
is primarily an observer - Crary notes: "Though obviously one who sees, an observer is 
more importantly one who sees within a prescribed set of possibilities, one who is 
embedded in a system of conventions and limitations" (1990:6) - but an observer who, 
ideally, cultivates a kind of required intimacy that verges on self-obliteration (Hart 
1979:203): the intimate observer. Herr writes, "I stood as close to them as I could 
without actually being one of them, and then I stood as far back as I could without 
leaving the planet" (1991:67).
Was such a stance possible in South Africa, and if so, what were its objectives? To 
convey both the veracity of the eye-witness and the fact that such testimony is also, 
always, an interpretation in need of interpretation; to see and see through apartheid as 
lived reality; to move within and between variously constructed worlds, of insider and 
outsider, self and 'other', the blind and the invisible, and create a dialogue between 
them, a community of incommensurates; to make a greater part of South Africa 
imaginatively, yet tangibly, available to its inhabitants; to inhabit and communicate a 
sense of not-knowing?
New journalism would appear to be one way into the labyrinth. Such narratives are 
often structured as a transition from innocence to experience. They capture a 
fragmented, fluid, complex and volatile reality - typically war, violence and political 
events - by combining a content based on experience and witnessing with fictional 
technique and a self-conscious obsession with style. Events and experience are shaped 
and patterned, given meaning, by the pervasive and sometimes self-indulgent presence
5
Of the numerous journalistic accounts about South Africa, in my opinion the most 
powerful are those by Lelyveld 1987 and Malan 1991.
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of the author. The genre is disdainful of the pre-packaged insights of the mass media 
and the guardians of political correctness, and favours a/any more original perspective 
often typified by parody, satire and cynicism.6
The journalist as witness: intimate observer and new journalist. These are useful 
concepts with which to frame a discussion of Rian Malan, a member of a famous 
Afrikaner family, a liberal(ish) new(ish) journalist, and a self-conscious guru of 
political incorrectness.
In the beginning...
To be a Malan is to be "poised... on a cusp of history": "a Malan has been present at all 
the great dramas and turning points in the history of the Afrikaner tribe" and yet, or 
probably and so, the name was chanted by black comrades as among those who would 
die "when the day comes" (Malan 1991:13,15,174). Lives lived on the cusp of history 
readily become symbols, "myth made flesh, the destiny of a nation embodied in the fate 
of a single man" (16). Dawid Malan's is presented as one such life; Rian Malan's is 
another.
In 1788 Dawid Malan fled the Cape with a neighbour's black slave named Sara and 
disappeared "into Africa, where he was transformed" we are told "as all white men who 
went there were transformed" (21). He re-emerged 25 years later, not as the man who 
had given up everything for the love of a black woman, but as a white supremacist and 
participant in the Slagtersnek uprising against the British. For Rian Malan this 
seemingly inexplicable transformation, this wilful self-blindness and annihilation of the 
’other’, lies at the root of South Africa's agony because it is symbolic of what befell
6
On new journalism see Carlean's "A Case for a South African 'New Journalism'"(1990); 
also Hellmann 1981, and Wolfe and Johnson eds. 1990.
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Afrikaners as a whole. And yet he is "one of them": "I am a white man bom in Africa, 
and all else flows from there" (29).
In the beginning it was all so simple. Rian Malan's Johannesburg youth was a world of 
self-indulgent, largely abstract angst and adolescent political posturing he later reflects 
upon as self-righteous and characterised by "callow acts of self-aggrandizement" (63). 
He loved 'natives' indiscriminately and smoked dope with wise old 'Afs'; sprayed the 
title of the James Brown song, 'Say It Loud, I'm Black and I'm Proud', on concrete in 
white suburbia; and at 16 lost his virginity to a black woman. He was the Just White 
Man and a communist, "whatever that was supposed to be" (43). It didn't really matter 
that few whites seemed to share his views, nor that nobody, black or white, was 
impressed or even particularly interested. In part, Malan shared a blinkered world view 
and certainty - an unconditional and indiscriminate faith - with those Afrikaners he 
sought to oppose. He simply reached different political conclusions. Malan was blinded 
by the necessity to choose sides, in his case by the desire to side with the opposition, to 
be on 'their side'. But he knew nothing of'their side'.
As a politically credible calling and the first staging post on the long journey of 
avoiding military service, Malan became a journalist, working for The Star (with its 
corporate slogan: 'The Star tells it like it is1!), covering the magistrate's courts and then 
as a crime reporter.7 He was soon moving too much and too quickly between radically 
different worlds, from suburbia to torture chambers to drinking holes; trying to choose 
between military service and leaving the country; dealing with the silences and 
ambiguities in his relationships with his first black friends, fellow journalists; torturing
7
Working as a journalist introduced Malan to what, in South Africa, was 'news': the
search for the unusual, usually white, angle; which things (a scream in the night from a 
police station, a trip in a lift with two white policemen and their savagely beaten 
black quarry, crime or violence perpetrated by blacks on other blacks) were not a story 
but just one of those South African things to be ignored, put on the inside page or 
hopelessly homogenised in a brief statistical summation.
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himself over what was to be done; 'j oiling', seeking solace in the shared haven of the 
drunk and the stoned; and passing out at night with a pistol and knife to hand - yawing: 
"the shuddering of an aircraft in a dive too steep and fast for its design; an aircraft that's 
shaking itself to bits? I was yawing in that time, going too fast, propelled by fuels too 
volatile between points immeasurably distant from one another. It was too far..." (82). 
There was a marked divergence between Malan's politically correct explanations - 
Soweto was an apartheid aberration - and the way he actually felt - it was "charnel 
house" (87) and scared him stiff. He was always relieved to leave and fearful on his 
return, ashamed of his racism:
I loved blacks, and yet I was scared of them... It was a most paradoxical 
condition. One minute, you'd be harrowed with guilt and bleeding 
internally for your suffering black brethren. The next, you'd recoil in 
horror from the things they did... You yawed between extremes.
Sometimes you completed the round trip in just fifteen minutes. (88)
The black world, the 'other' side to which Malan sought access and claimed allegiance, 
was simply 'too far’. Then came June 1976. Malan's adolescent fantasy of being the Just 
White Man leading the blacks to the barricades died in the aftermath of the uprisings.
He feared being consumed, obliterated, by that which was 'other', by the indiscriminate 
black tidal wave of rage. Face to face, daily, with murder, brittle ideological certainties 
simply failed to contain or account for reality as witnessed. Why did blacks murder 
fellow blacks in such numbers and with such cruelty? Why did blacks murder whites 
without finding out which side they were on first? "Was I really on their side? Were 
they really on mine?" (90). Malan testifies to an ideological breakdown and bankruptcy. 
He had looked up to, looked down upon, and looked on with horror, but he had not truly 
seen. Could he otherwise have loved or feared in a way that was simultaneously so 
indiscriminate and discriminatoiy? It was time to run.
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Malan embarked upon a race against the multi-dimensional spectre of death, running 
from, trying to outrun, his incapacitating personal paradox; scared of the coming 
changes and yet scared of the consequences of not changing; unable to carry a gun for 
or against apartheid; he hated Afrikaners and loved blacks and yet he was an Afrikaner 
and feared blacks. He ran because in South Africa's polarised society he was stuck in 
the middle, in-between, unable to commit himself either way. Malan ended up in Los 
Angeles. As the would-be-but-not-quite exile he could be the Afrikaner rebel, unwilling 
to fight on the side of apartheid and, therefore, liable to be imprisoned were he to 
return. As the escapee he could actually return whenever he wanted to. Flight took its 
toll; the paradox remained.
I had been running for eight years, and I had to run to the far side of the 
planet, but I hadn't outrun the paradox. It still had its claws in my brain. I 
had been running all my life, and each flight left me weaker, more 
diminished, more deeply dishonored... I had no idea what my role was, 
and felt I would never be whole unless I found out. I would live and die 
in LA and be buried under a tombstone that read, 'He Ran Away'. People 
would ask, who was Malan? Ah, a South African. And what did he stand 
for? He never really knew. (102)
As a crime reporter in South Africa Malan had been granted access to "all those 
extraordinary places" (102) where he had learnt about the paradox. He had been in a 
position to ask the right questions but had not waited for the answers. Fearing death in a 
foreign land, Malan went home to the South Africa of the mid-1980s, the South Africa 
of States of Emergencies, P. W. Botha's 'reforms', the UDF/ANC rendering the country 
ungovernable, and a virtual state of civil war, to be a crime reporter again: "to seek a
394
resolution of the paradox of [his] South African life in tales of the way we killed one 
another" (103).
You can tell the enemy by the colour of their skin
By now Malan was without faith. The main political options seemed, to him, absurd 
and he took up his place, full of scepticism and doubt, within his own particular "circle 
of hell... the circle of bourgeois leftists, white-suburban division" (166). Malan 
describes this circle, with acidic scepticism, as having been bom again through 
socialism - which he decries as an opium of the elite - in which whiteness was 
theoretically irrelevant, and one could change sides and join the masses, thereby gaining 
immediate relief from racially derived guilt and complicity. He himself, however, was 
heading in another direction entirely. In answer to the question, what does race mean in 
the South African context, everything or nothing, Malan increasingly answers, 
everything: "In the end, all South African issues merged into one - the race issue, the 
issue I had come home to resolve" (271, also 303). Added to his own "secret racist 
heresies" are a shared white "genetic complicity". The world according to race is a 
bleak place: you could tell the enemy by the colour of their skin (112); '"every white 
man we see is an enemy to us"' (287). And the bottom line? - when "the killing started, 
there were no whites on the black side of the barricades. None. Ever" (170, also 177).8
8
This is Simon Dunkley, in 1985, at the start of the clearance of Crossroads squatter 
camp outside Cape Town, where he was working as a journalist:
We had to come in from the police side... And I was just saying the whole 
time: I'm not these people... And then there was a stalemate... and there 
was a kind of no-man's territory... I had this feeling, 'This is South 
Africa. You've got to take your side now. You've got to make a statement.
For myself, find out where I stand.1 So I started walking out across this 
like no man’s land. Later that whole year we worked every day... But that 
first experience for me was the key moment... Here was this young white 
guy walking out across this bullet- and rock-strewn territory, across the 
line. The police were all shouting at me saying, 'You're taking your life 
in your hands' and 'We're not going to help you.' And I'm trying to 
ignore them. I got to a certain range, the rock range, and there were 
kids on the other side in the mass of black faces, saying 'Come! Come 
over - we're not going to hurt you. Come and speak to us . ' I thought,
'I've got to go,- there's no question about it, I have to do it now, I 
have to! ' And I went; and the moment I got within range, a shower of 
rocks came at me, and these people were all stoning me. And that for me 
was the whole situation - that I wasn't allowed to cross... I retreated
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On his return to South Africa, Malan "seemed to be seeing... for the first time, and 
finally understanding" (110, also 273-4), particularly what it meant to be white. The 
reality was one of darkness and fear on all sides. Malan writes of seeing his white 
darkness for the first time, about the night that changed his life, but it all sounds 
remarkably familiar.
A lone white man on foot in Soweto in the middle of the night in the 
midst of the black uprising, looking for a car parked hundreds of yards 
away. Maybe it was paranoia, but I figured my chances of reaching the 
car alive were less than even... I was out of my mind with terror, and in 
that moment, in that moment, it came to me: This was it: the unseen 
force that obliterated reason in South Africa; the force that held the 
white tribe together, and kept our sweating white fists locked in a death 
grip on the levers of power. (289)
In this context to see clearly was to convert the enveloping 'other' of race into a pattern 
of meaning, a desperate kind of faith. That which was 'other' had been clearly identified: 
'Africa', also the townships, all things black and alien (see 25,43,62,110,194,234-5). 
'Africa', typically, was entered 'into':
approached... in fear and trepidation, or better yet, we didn't approach 
Africa at all. It seemed to me that this was surely our central problem.
We had yet to come to terms with Africa, and doing so was not going to
at that point... that first day just remained with me. Because if you 
want to ask, 'When did you confront that point of who are you in South 
Africa? Where do you stand?’... it was that pure moment, (in Bernstein 
1994:280-1)
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be easy. I mean, how do you come to terms with something you don’t 
really understand? (180)
In reality Malan uncovered little that was new on his return to South Africa. All the 
ingredients were there from the beginning, characteristics of his quintessentially 
tortured relationship with the 'other': blindness, fear, yearning, eagerness to please, love, 
guilt, disappointment, distance, tension. As for the generation of younger Afrikaans 
writers within the 'border literature' movement, the confrontation with the 'other' - "that 
shadow from the unconscious, that object which is the target of your bullets, the one 
that is trying to kill you" - was traumatic (du Plessis 1987:38). Malan was seeing, 
clearly, but through eyes forged in the violently collaborative cauldron of apartheid.
"And now you must steel yourself, for what is to come is hideous" (1991:132)
"'Can you imagine... how many people are going to die in this country?'" (139), Malan is 
asked at one stage. He returned to South Africa to catalogue its murders. Lives and 
deaths are depicted as representative, parables, revelatory and prophetic, tales of 
"ordinary life and extraordinary death" (181), "ordinary murder in this extraordinary 
country" (279). The destiny of a nation - of Malan himself - is embodied in such life and 
death.
Dennis Moshweshwe's brutal murder was a traditional South African death at the hands 
of whites, within the "quintessentially South African tableau of braaivlies, rugby, sunny 
skies, and torture" (137); Moses Mope, aged 13, died as the result of being beaten by 
drunken white police while on his way to church. "With the killers of Moses Mope and 
Dennis Moshweshwe on one side" writes Malan "how could anyone but a monster not 
be on the other?" (152, also 161). Again, things were so easy in the beginning.
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But other deaths were more difficult to categorise, more unsettling in their implications. 
Simon Mpungose, the Hammerman, attacked whites at night with a claw hammer. He 
personified the worst fears of the collective white unconscious about the ‘other’ because 
he raised the spectre of indiscriminate black retribution. Life became thick with terror 
and hysteria until he was caught. His hatred, and murder, of whites had its source in 
witnessing: '"It is because of what I had witnessed happening to my fellow black men 
and also to me, because of all that was done to us by the white people..."' (203). So 
Simon Mpungose fulfilled the murderous prophecy of a dream he had had several years 
before in Barberton prison, a message from his ancestors that he tried to escape but 
ultimately could not ignore. He wanted to die and be free of his life of torment, and 
through hanging he got his wish.
It struck me as a remarkable parable of life in a country where blacks 
were being kept down lest they leap up and slit white throats. This was 
Dawid Malan's law, and it fulfilled its own grim prophecy: If you treat a 
black man that way, he will indeed leap up and drive a hammer into your 
brain. That seemed to be Simon's message. I heard no hatred or despair... 
just clarity, which he seemed to be offering as a man offers a gift - a gift 
of understanding, I thought, and a warning... I presumed to know exactly 
what Simon meant... As it turned out, I presumed a great deal. (204-5)
This clarity did not last long into Malan's subsequent investigation. Simon Mpungose's 
own version of his life was a fiction. In the eyes of his own people in rural Zululand he 
was an abomination whose family had been cursed by the ancestors. The familiar 
’other', black as victim of apartheid, was replaced by an altogether more unsettling 
spectre of the 'other1. In this world Rian Malan was lost: "I was deaf in Simon's 
language, and blind in his culture" (224). "So what was the truth of Simon? I was so 
certain in the beginning... Who was the Hammerman? In the end, I couldn't say " (222).
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Themba Ngwazi was a miner on Randfontein Estates, near Johannesburg. Again Malan 
was plagued by not knowing. He could say few things of significance about Ngwazi 
with any certainty: he was an angry man, he wasn't afraid to die, he hated whites. This 
is, at least initially, a story of industrial relations, of workers and management. Ngwazi 
was at the forefront of a union recruitment drive that was in turn agreed to, obstructed 
and - with workers divided and the mine sliding into chaos - repressed. But when, one 
Sunday, the whole thing started again it originated from an'other' black world, of 
inyctngas and battle medicines applied to incisions in the skin to turn bullets into water. 
Ngwazi led a group of renegade black miners into the first clash in which the main 
weapon of riot control used was a water cannon. Inexplicably or predictably, depending 
on which side you were on, it inspired elation among the miners. The scene was set for 
a final showdown. Gunfire was met head on by totally unafraid miners. The result was 
carnage. But for the first time during the mid-1980s uprising white police were killed in 
action. Police reprisals claimed the life of the leader of the revolt, Themba Ngwazi, in 
circumstances that like so much else remained unclear.
And the reader is assailed with yet more conflicts - like the one between AZAPO and 
the UDF - and yet more murders. How, Malan asks, do you assimilate the fact that even 
actively anti-apartheid blacks were killing each other? The catalogue of death goes on 
and on.
What, if anything, was Malan discovering here? That in such a divided society a sense 
of the 'other' was a limitless kingdom, containing the familiar and the unfamiliar/ 
unsettling. That worlds contradictory and incommensurate to him were inhabited 
simultaneously, and sometimes unproblematically, by others? That South Africa 
encompassed worlds within worlds, some of which had nothing to do with apartheid? 
That people died, tragically and brutally, due to the misunderstandings, hatreds and
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fears generated at the interstices between worlds? That for many South Africans the 
choice of which side they were on, which world they inhabited, was a matter of life and 
death? Malan accelerates the narrative into that archetypal media product, a frenetic and 
superficially motiveless litany of murder:
Am I upsetting you, my friend? Good. Do you want to argue? Do you 
want to tell me about the evil of apartheid... Okay. Let's open my bulging 
files of tales of ordinary murder. You choose your weapons and I'll 
choose mine, and we'll annihilate the certainties in each other's brains...
I'll hold you down and pound these images into your brain... and I'll keep 
on pounding until they poison you the way they poisoned me... I dunno 
what to say any more. When I came home to face my demons, 1 heard a 
song... and its chorus had a line that broke my heart. It ran, 'How do I live 
in this strange place?’ That seemed a very valid question to me. I had 
never learned how to live in my own country. I ran away because it was 
too strange to bear, and when I came home, it was stranger than ever.
Everyone had blood on their hands... The time had come to make 
choices, but there was nothing on the market but rival barbarities and 
absurd ideologies... there were no rational choices at all... South 
Africans... grow numb and blind, but if you leave long enough to 
detoxify and come back with clear eyes, your skull gets fractured. You 
see too much, and it makes you sick... Blindness and lobotomy. These 
were not metaphors, my friend. They were physical conditions in my 
country, in the winter of 1986. You could not afford to see everything.
You could not afford to go from... grave... to... grave... Such pilgrimages 
made you sick. They forced you to your knees, begging an 
accommodation with the howling ambiguities; begging for your eyes to 
go blind. (330-4)
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Finally, Malan could find no theory to contain or explain what he had seen. The 
apparent clarity of race as 'other' had been overwhelmed by a completely saturating 
'otherness' that affected everyone and everything. 'Seeing clearly' became a source of 
terror. The result was the further epistemological breakdown described above. In such a 
world to be blind seemed a blessing, even a self-preserving necessity. An eye for an T.
In a hopeless frame of mind Malan set out for Msinga in KwaZulu.
Seeing through African eyes
Searching for a way to live in South Africa, Malan went to a "very strange place indeed" 
(344), certainly given the terms in which he describes Msinga. On the one hand,
"Msinga is... Oh, God, how do I explain Msinga?... It is a place of head-spinning 
contrasts" (354), "an intoxicant" (359). On the other it is "an ecological Hiroshima" 
(339), "the ultimate apartheid horror story" (342). It is also a swirling vortex of violence 
and war, a seemingly endless site of carnage. Compounding Zulu factional warfare is 
war on the frontier dividing KwaZulu and 'white' South Africa - "another front in the 
war without end" (365) - between blacks and whites.
Malan went to Msinga to visit Creina Alcock, wife of the late Neil Alcock, who lived 
on the last farm in 'white' South Africa. Due to their desire to live among Africans, like 
Africans, until they saw through African eyes, the Alcocks had, according to Malan, 
"penetrated deeper into Africa than any other whites in our time" (343), and Africa 
returned their embrace, they belonged (see 342,367,381,397,408,413). They seemed to 
have crossed over to the other side, into another world, and Malan wanted to know: 
what had they learnt? what was it like?
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The Alcocks established an agricultural development project called Mdukatshani, the 
Place of Lost Grasses. Their fate reads like something from the Old Testament: wars 
and terror; failed rains interspersed only by floods; pestilence and famine; hated by their 
own kind. Chaos and disaster followed in each others footsteps with no end in sight. 
"Beyond a certain point, Neil and Creina's lives seem to assume the quality of myth or 
fable" (379). While trying to mediate between warring Zulu parties, Neil was killed by 
the Ndlela faction. Neil Alcock - the famous liberal; completely at ease in the world of 
Africans on whose behalf he undertook numerous crusades; the secular saint ("He's 
your Jesus'" (393), said a policeman after his death) whose disciples saw into his 
"half-black and half-white" heart (395) and followed him - had been killed by Zulus in 
broad daylight, on an open road, in a densely populated area, and nobody saw anything.
Staying on seemed to be the only way for Creina Alcock to salvage meaning from Neil's 
life and death. Life was bitterly hard for a lone white woman who had mastered neither 
Zulu nor farming. Farm labourers, and even some who had been virtually members of 
the family, her adopted Zulu 'sons', turned against her: "the darkness seemed to close in 
on Creina... was there anyone in the valley whom she could trust? Suddenly, every sign 
seemed ominous... For the first time in her life, Creina grew afraid" (403). Then goats 
invaded her land. "Like [Dawid Malan], Creina entered Africa an enlightened creature... 
She had always tried to love, but now it was time to kill" (407), and her dogs set to 
work. Creina thought that she had won, finally found a language Msinga could 
understand, but it was also the language in which Msinga would reply. She could not 
sustain this communication through violence and her subsequent vulnerability was 
further exploited.
For Malan this was confirmation of his darkest fears: "I didn't want to hear any more...
If you loved you were vulnerable, and if you were vulnerable you were weak, and if you 
were weak in Africa you got fucked, and fucked again, and again, until you could no
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longer stand it" (408). Creina felt she could not stay in Msinga because she could not 
live by its rules; she felt betrayed by loving. Malan felt like he was "staring into hell"
(409).
Malan concludes that it was only the Msinga experience that took him beyond what he 
already knew. Initially its implications seemed desperate. He was briefly a totalitarian, 
nine generations of Boer blood commanded that there was no middle ground and he had 
only one choice: "A white is a white against the black" (414). He wanted to become 
deaf and blind to all other dissenting evidence. Then his blood lost its hold, and Malan 
formulated a different understanding of what he had seen. At one stage he states: "Is this 
beginning to sound like hell to you? It sounded that way to me when I first heard it, and 
yet it was really a love story, a story about two whites who loved Africa... to hear Creina 
tell it, it was often a life of unbearable ecstasy ..." (380). Ultimately, incredibly, the 
Alcocks' story becomes a kind of prophetic vision of the future. They "were pioneers in 
the country South Africa will one day become - a truly African country, where whites 
have no guarantees... It was a worst-case scenario... and yet, and yet, and yet: It was not 
entirely bereft of hope..." (422, also 413). There was, according to Malan, just enough 
light to show the rest the way. Creina Alcock stayed on amidst a continuing catalogue 
of disasters:
'I think you will know what I mean if I tell you love is worth nothing 
until it has been tested by its own defeat. I felt I was being asked to try to 
love enough not to be afraid of the consequences. I realized that love, 
even if it ends in defeat, gives you a kind of honour; but without love you 
have no honour at all. I think that is what I misunderstood all my life.
Love is to enable you to transcend defeat'. (409, also 423)
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To go forward into the unknown with no guarantees is a telling summary of the 
challenge confronting, particularly white, South Africa. But to do so purely on the basis 
of love? Is the choice really between opening one's arms to Africa or taking up arms 
against it? The parable of the Alcocks is a revealing conclusion to Malan's story. They 
had come to terms with what Malan conceived of as 'other', had seen, in his terms, 
through African eyes. But they had done so in a particular way. The text is littered with 
phrases such as the following: Neil Alcock came to heal the land, "to show homeland 
Africans how it could be done" (352), and, blacks would say, '"We are weak, but when 
Neil is with us we feel strong'" (371). In Neil Alcock, Malan found himself a surrogate 
Just White Man, a man who made his dream of leading blacks to the barricades seem 
possible again.
Life history as crime, as the annihilation of the 'other'
So, what is the truth of Rian Malan?: "I'm so deeply enmeshed in half-truths and 
fictional izations of myself that I'll never escape until I simply tell the truth... I am not 
sure I'm any of the men I have pretended to be" (410). This is a roller-coaster ride of the 
self, a schizophrenic, fractured self and/in text caught in an ambiguous embrace with a 
similarly divided country.
My people were still standing guard with guns at the ready and jackboots 
on Africa's back, and I was one of them. I didn't have to dig in the 
archives for Dawid Malan; I looked in the mirror and there he was. His 
frontier had moved inside my head... If Dawid Malan had a disease of 
the soul, then Rian Malan had it too... So I threw away the book that was 
to be and set out to confront this thing in a place where I knew it lay - in 
myself. I have told you several murder stories, but the true subject of this 
narrative has been the divided state of my own heart. 1 have always been
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two people, you see - a Just White Man, appalled by apartheid and the 
cruelties committed in its name, and an Afrikaner with a disease of the 
soul. (411-12)
Caught between these two selves, and between the T and eye, the window and the 
mirror, was the 'other'. "This is the trouble with white people in my country. Our eyes 
are sealed by cataracts against which our white brains project their chosen 
preconceptions of Africa and Africans. Some whites see danger, some savagery, some 
see victims, and some see revolutionary heroes. Very few of us see clearly" (227, also 
189). Initially a function of race,9 the 'other' was inflated into an infinitely elastic 
domain which simultaneously shaped all meaning and eliminated all possibility of 
meaning.10 On his return to South Africa, Malan thought redemption lay in "the 
acquisition of certainty, in the act of joining one side or the other" (418). But he 
repeatedly moved from certainty and clarity to a state of radical unknowing, journeying 
towards a complete epistemological breakdown in a country for which he came to have 
no explanation or theory. His faith became his complete lack of any faith(s).
Malan sought to resolve the paradox of his South African life in tales of murder. But the 
narrative, unfolding in a country where "anything", any act of horror, "could be true"
(114), becomes a frenzied catalogue in which everyone is guilty and everyone has blood
9
The text is full of unanswered questions and forlorn quests that centre on the 
question of race. Malan came home to face his demons, to "resolve" the issue of race: 
"Where do we stand in relation to one another, 'b ra '?" (274); what is to be done? how is 
he to live in this strange country? how is he to come to terms with the 'other1? In a 
pre-election article, Malan described himself partly, but only partly, with tongue in 
cheek, as an "ethno-fascist" ("Confessions of a White South African”. S u n d a y  T i m e s  
M a g a z i n e  27/3 1994:9 (8-13)). There is, however, something about the issue of race in 
South Africa that Malan captures: its ready decline into stereotype and caricature; the 
relationship between not knowing, fear, guilt, projection and racism in the South 
African psyche; its pervasive reality. What the text grapples with is the question of 
what function the concept of race performed/performs among white South Africans.
10
Lewis Nkosi has noted that incoherence about blacks eventually renders whites 
incoherent about themselves (1965:124).
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on their hands. All are aggressors and all are victims.11 Chaos and darkness reign. There 
is no-one to blame and no political solution. Apartheid is so pervasive it has become 
invisible. Seeing clearly is accompanied by obfuscation and terror. The eye sees more 
than the 'I* can understand or bear. Self-blinding is the price of self-preservation. 
Confronted by this abyss Malan turns back, unable to bear the world as he finds it, that 
he feels partly responsible for creating, and finds refuge in (d)illusion.
Malan moves from innocence to a radically unsettling unknowing and back again to a 
kind of naive innocence. Felman asks: "What does it mean to inhabit history as crime, 
as the space of the annihilation of the Other?" (in Felman and Laub 1992:189). The 
secular faith Malan discovers in Msinga is an opiate, an opiate for those who inhabit 
(life) history in this manner. He attempts to answer crime (the annihilation) with crime 
(his investigation of murder in which everyone becomes both a murderer and a victim), 
and then to resurrect both himself and the 'other' - to create meaning - through the 
exchange of love. He sees with his heart: "There is a Zulu saying 'I see you with my 
heart'" (1991:373). The final epistemological collapse is, paradoxically, this desperate 
search for meaning, this wilful self-blinding in a vain search for redemption.
Malan's story presents a profound act of witness to apartheid precisely because of its 
congregation of seemingly disparate elements. The main themes running through the 
book - the processes of fragmentation and 'othering'; the search for meaning/faith and 
recurrent epistemological collapse; paradox within and paradox without; the attempt to
As has been discussed previously in relation to Breytenbach, Coetzee and 'border 
literature1, attempts to dismantle or traverse the dichotomous division between self and 
'other' can result in the arguably irreconcilable becoming or appearing to become the 
same: in his case, the oppressor rendered victim and the victim rendered oppressor.
Malan also deals throughout with what he depicts as a country of extremes and he is 
paralysed in the middle trying to reconcile and/or mediate and/or simply survive/escape 
the paradox of his self-definition. Again, on various levels, the hybrid and the in- 
between are shown to be hazardous products, particularly in relation to constructing a 
sustainable identity and cogent political analysis and action/resistance. There is no 
clearer example of the untenability of the in-between than the form of liberalism, of 
which Malan is at least in part a supporter, which enabled its adherents to 
simultaneously perpetuate and disown apartheid.
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transcend the distance between divided worlds - provide an extraordinary 'community of 
testimonial incommensurates' from the scene of the crime, which itself unfolds over 
time, voicing a commentary of interpretations of earlier interpretations. The evolving 
commentary, however, is ultimately incomplete because the narrative harbours a 
complexity of truth not available to its author; the testimony eludes and exceeds its 
author's grasp and control. Malan's incapacitating vision provides an opportunity to see 
and see through his own sense of self and important aspects of apartheid's dehumanising 
essence: its pervasive and internalised violence; the fact that the crime is eventually, 
inevitably, inflicted upon the self - "'The crime that is latent in us we must inflict on 
ourselves..."' (Coetzee 1982:146) - the triumph of the 'other' over/as meaning and the 
'other' as both annihilated and annihilating. This is a violently collaborative life story, 
where the agents of violence are not only the apartheid state but also the society that 
apartheid had attempted to remake in its image.
Malan ends up where he began, pondering whether to leave or stay, and concludes:
"This is where I come from, and this is where I will stay" (1991:422). Rather like 
Camus' Rambert, the journalist trapped in Oran by the plague, it is the process of 
witnessing that marks Malan, that inscribes him as irretrievably South African. He 
returned to try and understand South Africa, and South Africa wrote itself all over him: 
"'now that I've seen what I have seen, I know that I belong here whether 1 want it or not'" 
(Camus 1960:170).
Extraordinary combinations of suffocating intimacy and alienating distance, 
confinement and estrangement, were variously reproduced in lives under apartheid:
Rian Malan's is one such life, Poppie Nongena's is another.
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Poppie Nongena: Witnessing as Life
Bearing witness can also be a way of life, the attrition of day to day existence. The 
position of apartheid's most obvious victims was that they inhabited it and its various 
notions of'otherness'. It was not something they had to enter 'into'. They inhabited 
history as crime, as the space of the attempted annihilation of themselves. This 
self-obliterating intimacy precluded any possibility of being simply an observer. It 
meant that the witness testified to a blindingly oppressive and enveloping inside and to 
an outside, or 'other', that was usually perceived as the source of the crime or, 
sometimes, was barely conceptualised at all.
In many ways Poppie, is generically a testimonio. Like new journalism, the genre of 
testimonio emerged in the 1960s in response to particular social and political 
circumstances, notably in Latin America. It is a form used by/with regard to 
marginalised groups often in a situation of political urgency and it implies the need for 
social/political change. Testimonio's situate an individual life within a collectivity of 
voices and identities creating a shifting, plural subject that transgresses any simplistic 
private/public divide. As a collaborative enterprise the form represents the "staging of 
social difference" (McClintock 1991:223) in which a privileged scribe records, 
packages and presents the oral testimony of an'other'. Experience and/as interpretation 
are layered, shared, separate. Collaboration necessarily encompasses an uneven 
solidarity across a complex matrix of sameness and difference and the numerous 
complications and contradictions implied in such a representation of 'the popular voice'. 
Notions of'the author' are replaced by the more neutral categorisation of 
collator/compiler.12 Poppie both consciously and unconsciously subscribes to these 
generic criteria, perhaps the most significant of which is the process of collaboration.
12
On t e s t i m o n i o  see Beverley 1989,1991, and McClintock 1991:222-4.
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Collaboration or Annihilation?
'"Whose book is this?'" (Malcolm X to Alex Haley: in Sanders 1994:456)
On Boxing Day 1976, with the uprisings that began in Soweto still reverberating 
through South Africa, the woman who came to be called Poppie Nongena arrived at the 
home of Elsa Joubert, an established Afrikaans writer. The two women were drawn 
together as women and mothers, as Afrikaners and first language Afrikaans speakers, 
driven by the reciprocal urges to tell and to listen to a story, a life, that through its 
telling would bear witness. "Her need to talk was as great as my need to listen", writes 
Joubert (1984:60). It is equally clear that there were fundamental differences that 
divided the two women, notably, race and class.13 Power relations between the women 
and between each of them and the structures of apartheid were fundamentally unequal. 
In this context, a collaborative creative relationship was destined to both challenge, as a 
form of counter-visibility, and reproduce, the structural inequality inherent in the 
society.
At one level, for example, it was agreed by the two women that the proceeds from the 
joint initiative would be divided equally between them. But there are many other layers 
of collaboration: can the collaborative act, involving participants from such radically 
different yet interdependent worlds, resurrect anything from the scene of the apartheid 
crime? For Joubert the book represented if not the end then at least a significant staging 
post in her quest to bear witness. Describing her mood post Sharpeville, she talks of 
having felt it "vital... to 'bear witness'". Through Nongena and her story she found "a 
kind of peace" (59,61). For Joubert the act of collaboration provided access to the
13
Cope states that Nongena was employed by Joubert as a domestic worker (1982:194).
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'other', a means of trying to see through African eyes. An eye for an T. And for 
Nongena?
This discussion situates the various claims made with reference to the authorship and 
genre classification of the text. Poppie has been marketed as a novel, by Joubert, about 
Nongena, with the latter denied the status of collaborator or co-author and the former 
elevated above the status of collator or compiler. Yet what the 'author' denies the text 
reveals by tracing the contours of its own telling. It is scarred by the process of its 
collaborative genesis and construction, by the lives told and voices heard, on unequal 
terms and in unequal times, through one another. The text was reportedly read back to, 
and checked with, Nongena; questions and corrections are preserved within the text. It 
reveals pervasive imbalances of power while simultaneously containing a corrective 
and undermining component (see McClintock 1991:208,214-7,224-8).14 Furthermore, 
Joubert is among those to have stated that this generically complex text is a novel. In a 
preface she writes the following note to the reader:
The novel is based on the actual life story of a black woman living in 
South Africa today. Only her name, Poppie Rachel Nongena, bom 
Matati, is invented. The facts were related to me not only by Poppie 
herself, but by members of her immediate family and her extended
McClintock writes: "the reader is obliged... to experience the discomfort of these
imbalances as a central experience of the reading itself, and to be conscious at every 
moment of the contradictions underlying the process of narrative collaboration... the 
imbalances... are inscribed in the narrative itself... [they] are flagrantly there, 
unavoidable and vexing, contradictory and irresoluble, insisting on interpretative 
contest and political analysis" (1991:228). The book’s reception indicates that many, 
less perceptive, readers found it only too easy to miss/ignore such imbalances. Various 
commentators have noted that Poppie Nongena's life story pre-dated the oral history 
movement in South Africa by several years. Oral historians have invariably attempted to 
render themselves invisible, to erase contradictions and their interventions in the 
narrative process, and constructed an artificially pure narrator's voice. While granting 
"executive authority to the invisible historian" such texts practice the "politics of 
concealment" (McClintock 1991:228). The demands of political correctness have overcome 
those of accurately describing the power relations of the narrative process itself. The 
tale erases its own telling. The historians become what I have described elsewhere as a 
"ghost in the autobiographical machine" (Gready 1994). On the politics and violence of 
collaborative narrative, in part predicated on the translation of the oral into the 
written, and residues of resistance, see Sanders 1994.
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family or clan, and they cover one family's experience over the past forty 
years.15
Joubert claims to have 'authored' the narrative, yet it is openly based on interviews and 
what she has written betrays its collaborative origins; it is a novel, but one based on an 
'actual life story' in which only a name has been invented. What are the meanings and 
implications of this inter-textual matrix?
The 'staging of social difference' within collaborative narrative is a process rather than a 
single event. The layering of, and potential fracture between, experience as 
interpretation and narration, and (re-)interpretation by others, spans the telling and the 
representation and reception of the telling: it is a process without end. Within the 
production of the text and the narrative itself experience and/as interpretation were/are, 
to a degree, negotiated. What was already an unequal contestation over meaning, 
however, became more one-sided during and after publication. Because of Elsa 
Joubert's structurally privileged position and also because Poppie Nongena wished to 
remain anonymous - her views are therefore not known - beyond the evidence of the 
text itself, the finished product, the dynamics of the process of creation, in short the 
entire enterprise, were presented on Joubert's terms. The narrative could be what she 
wanted it to be. As the chasm grew between experience as interpretation/narration and 
subsequent interpretations, the need for an interpretation of these interpretation became 
all the more pressing.
What are the consequences of this pattern within the 'staging of social difference'? In 
this instance, Joubert could claim for herself a kind of'ownership' of both the text and
15
She has also stated: "I knew at once: no travelogue, no allegory, but the stark 
truth, the story of this woman's life... I checked and rechecked her story because no 
error, however slight, could be allowed to slip in and jeopardise the truth of the whole 
stark tale" (1984:60-1).
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the life/lives it is about. Through the lens of one reading this, in conjunction with the 
changing of Nongena's name, makes the latter strangely invisible - fictional as a 
character and non-existent as a collaborator/co-author - within her own life story. 
Identity within the collaborative representational act is woven from what Michael 
Taussig (1993) refers to as mimesis and alterity. The mimetic faculty grants the 
representation (but also file representer, driven by the desire to yield into and become 
'other') power over the represented. But what if the representer who shares in, extracts, 
captures the power of the 'other' is guilty of annihilation in the process? As with Malan, 
the narrative and political space in which an attempt is made to resurrect both the self 
and the 'other' becomes, at least in part, the site of a further annihilation; a life told 
through the lives and deaths of the 'other'. In the case of Nongena, it was one more 
annihilation in a long line of annihilations of her self and identity; another journey 
through the 'space of death'. In this context, the collaborative narrative space was 
unequivocally resurrective only for Joubert. An altogether different sense of'put 
yourself in my place'; an eye for an 'I'.
This collaborative process exhibits unsettling parallels with the characteristics of the 
life story genre at the interface between an oppressive state and its subjects: life stories 
as battlefields over who gets to say 'I'; the violence of collaboration; the simultaneity of 
narration and being narrated; author-/owner-ship of the text as the subject of, often 
protracted, struggle; meaning as contested and inter-textual. Being a component of 
witnessing/being witnessed as an act of violent collaboration, it can be argued that these 
characteristics permeated apartheid society to the extent of even polluting attempts at 
collaborative political/narrative contestation and redress, including much more 
conscious and overt attempts than this endeavour. The collaborative creative process is 
one of numerous 'communities of testimonial incommensurates' relating to the 
production, content, presentation and reception of Poppie, which are themselves
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interpretations in need of interpretation. The construction of identity in Poppie is 
another such community.
'I saw the sides of life, like wings, moving, and fear came over me’
This is a story predominantly told by and about women. The family genealogy is traced 
through the mother's line, and within this matrilineal genealogy Nongena (whose - 
fictional? - Xhosa name, Ntombizodumo, means "girl bom from a line of great women" 
(1980:13)) takes her place. She also takes her place within what McClintock describes 
as a "dynamic, collective continuum of voices and identities... distinct and... 
inseparable" (1991:216). The narrative is a swirling cauldron of voices, identities and 
narrative viewpoints, over and above the dominant coupling of collaboration. Voices 
merge and divide like a maze of railway lines, there are no quotation marks to designate 
proprietorship over speech; Nongena herself does only about a third of the narration; 
identity and narrative perspective are constructed as multiple, shifting and unstable, as 
collective, familial, female:
one hears a polyphony of female voices, the ancestral reverberations of 
great-grandmothers, grandmothers, and mothers, mingling, redoubling, 
and echoing almost indistinguishably within each other. (McClintock 
1991:209)
This wonderful collage of voices and identities - presumably the result of Nongena's 
telling, the telling of other family members interviewed by Joubert, and Joubert's 
(re)telling - constructs a community of lives told through one another, into an arena 
dense with prior versions. The community flows around, within and through Nongena 
herself; the various tellings and retellings consist, in part, of the many voices 
against/through which Nongena speaks/is made to speak, narrates and is narrated.
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Nongena moves in and out of, and often occupies simultaneously, a variety of subject 
positions. Bom the youngest of four children in 1936 she left school to look after her 
mother's younger children at the age of nine; by thirteen, she was working in a fish 
factory as a cleaner. By her mid-teens Nongena was married, to Stone Mqwati (later 
tata-ka-Bonsile). Their first son died of whooping cough. A second son followed shortly 
afterwards, called Bonsile. Nongena was not yet 20 years old. Later in her life Nongena 
juggled roles, in the face of enormous social and political pressures, in an attempt to 
keep her family together - "One day, I promise you, we will live together again" 
(1980:245) - as it became her personal domain, her arena of struggle and the bedrock of 
her identity.16
A kind of structural fragmentation forged a many-sided life for Poppie Nongena and her 
family. They were dispersed and redispersed - largely between Mdantsane in the Ciskei, 
Herschel, the home of her husband's family, also in the Ciskei (and later the Transkei) 
and Cape Town - and lacked the sanctuary of a real home.1’ Nongena was tom within 
and between her urban family and the rural family of her husband; she was both 
dependent and asserted a form of independence. She was an Afrikaner and a Xhosa, a 
Christian - a Methodist and later an Anglican - but adhered to Xhosa beliefs and 
customs. She resided within an apartheid world but also worlds that had little or nothing 
to do with apartheid. Nongena inhabited a many-sided South Africa, negotiating its 
diversity. She had a sense that her immediate family, which ultimately consisted of six 
children, needed to inhabit all these worlds to be whole: "They must not be children
16
As David. Schalkwyk (1989) has illustrated, domestic struggle lies at the centre of 
Nongena's life.
17
Mdantsane, for example, was a totally new and unfamiliar world: "I felt very 
heartsore... I felt, really, I'm now quite thrown away... We had been put in a desolate 
place. Loneliness was all around us... it seemed to Poppie as though she had come to lie 
down in her grave... she felt the emptiness of being completely alone, discarded. She 
felt some part of her had been lost" (200-2).
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who lack something, they must not be half of a whole; 1 must make them a whole"
(270). This conception of human wholeness perhaps provides a different perspective on 
that which was experienced by Malan as an unsettling expansion of the racial 'other' 
beyond the familiar confines of black as victim of apartheid.
Are these multiple identities and worlds a contradiction or a reflection of lives built 
upon a more collective construction of the self and the flexibility needed to survive? 
Nongena's is a life folded intricately into patterns that create their own chronology, 
logic and constructions of identity. It is only by fulfilling a multitude of roles - being an 
adult almost as soon as she became a child, still young after having grown old, 
daughter-wife-mother-single parent-sister-grandmother - and by trying to inhabit a 
multitude of worlds, that Nongena could attempt to hold the lives of others, and through 
their lives her own life, together, and seek to become whole. It was an awesome task: "I 
saw the sides of life, like wings, moving, and fear came over me" (262). Life was a 
maelstrom - of voices, identities, relationships, worlds - within, through and against 
which she sought to acquire certainty, to locate that domain which could be absolutely, 
irrefutably hers. The social maelstrom that characterises the narrative, however, also 
masks a sense of loss - the situation, for example, which is significantly a function of 
loss, where "[g]randmothers are mothers, cousins are sisters, brothers are forgotten, 
there is no father, mothers are strangers, then they are mothers again. Together and 
apart..." (McClintock 1991:213) - created by apartheid.
Inhabiting apartheid's structural violence
Analysing the initial rapturous reception received by Poppie Nongena's life story, David 
Schalkwyk describes being "struck by urgent and systematic attempts to depoliticise the
415
work" (1986:186).18 The reader is not 'obliged', as McClintock claims, to experience the 
imbalances inherent in the collaboration process, or indeed the evils of apartheid, as part 
of the experience of reading. They could all too easily be overlooked and denied. Elsa 
Joubert led the chorus of voices denying that the book was political. It has never been 
banned. For the text to be read as literary/aesthetic to the exclusion of the political, 
certain attributes have to be highlighted - the twin pillars of individualism and 
universalism: the main values attributed to Nongena are a Christian faith ("The church is 
my mainstay, Poppie thought. As long as I remain true to the church, the Lord will be 
with me" (1980:172, also 257-9)) and a related fatalism ("So it had to be, it could have 
been no different"; "What has to be, has to be" (231,296, also see 76,298-9)), a concern 
for family, an almost endless capacity to endure, and a general conservatism. Other 
attributes have to be defined as apolitical or outside politics (such as a woman's attempt 
to keep her family together) and further characteristics overlooked altogether (notably 
the structures which governed Nongena's life and the social and political nature of her 
identity and story).19
To apply this narrow reading, however, is a way of seeing that needs to be seen through. 
The divorce and overlap between experience as interpretation/narration and subsequent 
(re-) interpretation by others, can also be seen to extend into the post-publication phase 
through the reading process. Poppie Nongena's story reveals the "'structural violence'" of 
apartheid (Degenaar in Schalkwyk 1986:192) - the pass laws, forced removals and 
'homeland' policy, the disregard for black family life, the inherent discrimination and 
violence - as lived through an individual life. Nongena and her family, for example,
18
Interestingly, such a reading was not characteristic of its few black reviewers 
(190). Also see McClintock 1991:198-204. For a response to Schalkwyk, see Carlean 1989.
19
A narrow conception of what constituted the political was not confined to 
readers/critics from the right: see, for example, Carlean 1989, also McClintock 
1991:199-205, Schalkwyk 1986. Mdebele's (1994) argument for an expanded definition of 
the political and the relevant provides an important counter-discourse (also de Kok and 
Press eds. 1990). I am grateful to Daniela Volk for these observations.
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were constantly on the move: "They were like a stone you picked up in one place and 
put down in another" (1980:197). Her experience in Cape Town, in particular, provides 
powerful testimony to life under the pass system for a black woman. The Cape was a 
'coloured' labour preference area and while Nongena's husband could remain to sell his 
labour, she and her children were constantly harassed to leave. As he came from the 
Ciskei this was the family's designated 'homeland'. At times, life was so unbearable that 
it made leaving seem preferable: "For close on ten years I struggled to get my 
extensions to stay in the Cape, says Poppie... If I have to leave, I'll not weep... Does 
mama think this is Heaven that I'm being sent away from" (179-80, also see 89,189- 
92,230). As an exile within her own country, time and again Poppie Nongena was 
reduced to anger, despair and resignation by the injustice (and arbitrariness - see 
141,207,255-6), of the pass system.
What then have they got against me?... It was for seven years now that 
she hadn't known longer ahead than two months or sometimes three that 
she could stay in the Cape. The longest extension had been six months. 
Sometimes she got nothing... More than once I hid because I did not 
have an extension... Luckily I was never caught, but this always running 
to hide was no life for me... Mr. Steyn [at Native Affairs] was a believer, 
religious man, a man of much faith. He told me: If it is the Lord's will 
that you stay, then you will stay, and if it is the Lord's will that you go, 
then you will go... The big boss can’t help it that he can’t give the 
extension, Mr Steyn told us. If s not him that wants the people to leave.
It’s the law. (168-70)
Poppie went to Native Affairs in Observatory... A nausea rose in her, she 
had difficulty in lifting her feet, in pushing on... The dates, carved on the 
ridges of the stamp, can be turned by a twist of his fingers without him
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having to give it a glance, he knows the feel of the dates, extension for 
one month, two months, three months, a year. Or nothing... spasms 
passed through her body... she doubled up retching... Mr Stevens pointed 
to the map with a stick. Now you must choose... I do not know these 
places, said Poppie... We will give you a house... There will be a school 
for your children. Is it all right so... It is all right. Then we put down your 
name for a house in Mdantsane... What can I do?... I can't break the law 
with my hands? (184-5)20
To overlook the centrality of politics to this life story is an extraordinarily powerful 
illustration of self-delusion and blindness. The Soweto uprisings also provide an 
eloquent illustration of apartheid's 'structural violence' underpinning and undermining 
Nongena's life.
'Through this I can find no way'21
Initially the Soweto unrest of 1976 seemed very remote, but it later became clear that 
like other troubles before them they would spread to Cape Town where Nongena was at 
this stage living.22 In their wake they brought riots, marches, boycotts, funerals, the 
shutting down of services and consumer outlets and the isolation of townships. The 
youths' wrath focused on beer halls and shebeens, buses, schools and other government 
buildings; Christmas was to be a time of mourning for those who had died, there would
20
Also see 140-3, 151,154-6,158-63, 178-80,182,187-92,196-7, 210, 240, 300.
21
The already mentioned post-Soweto novels by black writers cover some of the same 
terrain to that discussed below, but from a different ideological perspective.
22
This was not the first time that Nongena had been caught up in political events that 
shook the fabric of the country. The late 1950s and early 1960s was a period of 
considerable political unrest. Nongena’s story, for example, mentions the potato 
boycott, the introduction of passes for women, and, in particular, the 1960 strike 
against passes and for a pound a day. Around the time of the Soweto uprisings, 
'homeland' 'independence' also became a significant issue.
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be no celebrations, no gifts, nothing new; parents were told that children at school in 
rural areas had to return home so that no one would write exams. There was also 
random and opportunistic destruction of property and vehicles, and looting. In the end 
the unrest and violence, in the words of Maria Tholo, "was all the way around us"
(Hermer 1980:172).
Within the black community attitudes to the unrest varied enormously, unity of purpose 
combined with sharp divisions. Migrants were in conflict with residents, there were 
class cleavages within the black community, divisions between different ethnic groups, 
tsostis/skollies took advantage of the situation to loot and steal, and families were torn 
apart. Parents and children represented two different political generations, with often 
very different political ideals. Adults were condemned as too compliant and submissive 
- the youth actively sought to break the law with their own hands - as complicit in the 
problem rather than the solution. "Your time is past: When we speak, you must listen" 
(1980:314, also see 325). Dismissive and afraid of informers the students did not talk to 
their parents, nor did they listen to advice. "The children didn't want advice. They didn't 
talk things over with us, says Poppie... no one knew what they wanted" (314, also see 
310).23 Parents struggled to enforce old codes of discipline as the youth/events provided 
a radical challenge to the prevailing social structure. The power, courage, and autocratic 
ruthlessness of the youth generated admiration, fear, tension, frustration and resentment. 
They were seen as cheeky and rude - Nongena says: "The children have no more respect 
for us. They mock us" (322) - but they also acquired respect and a higher status within 
their communities. Poppie Nongena's family reflected these divisions within the black 
community, spanning from her conservatism to her step-brother Jakkie, one of the many
23
The lack of information fed by distrust was compounded by rumour: "Nobody had news, 
everyone heard something different" (312). In T h e  D i a r y  o f  M a r i a  T h o l o , another 
collaborative narrative, the following remarks are relevant: "I wish I knew the truth"
(Hermer 1980:56); "The children make so many demands, one never knows how serious they 
are" (74); and, "[i]n this situation you never know whether you are doing the right 
thing" (164).
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school students in their early twenties, who was a leader: "I am fighting for you and 
your children, sisi. It's for you that I fight" (313, also see 319). We're waiting to die, he 
said.
The students saw drink as the scourge of the older generation and the black community 
in general. Migrant workers in particular resented what they saw as interference in their 
affairs and this resentment escalated into widespread violence between the migrants or 
homelanders in the special quarters and the other residents or city-bomers. The police 
pursued tactics of divide and rule, siding with the migrants. Poppie Nongena saw trouble 
brewing on Christmas day while at a friend's house located near the migrants' quarters. 
This was what she witnessed:
I saw it all... I could see the city-bomers stand in a line in front of their 
houses to protect them from the migrants. It was just like... a hand 
dropping... and the special quarters men shielded themselves behind the 
riot squad to break through our lines... I saw the bottle coming. I saw the 
arm with the white cloth round it that threw the bottle which burnt 
Mamdungwana's house... we ran out of the back door... into another 
house... We were standing in the woman's house... when the first stone 
came through the window... stones came through the kitchen window.
Our children were in the kitchen... I heard Vukile give a ciy... Better 
outside... Better dead outside in the street than being burnt to death... At 
that moment you couldn't stop to look at a corpse... to see who it was, 
you just had to run for your life... Everything that happened... had made 
me so stupid I didn't even know how to get to Mosie's house... When we 
got to my brother's house everybody was out in the street... he said to me:
Sisi, why is your child so quiet? I answered: Maybe sleeping. I have seen 
too much fighting to think of other things; my child is next to me, that is
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all... The child is dead, Rhoda [Poppie's sister-in-law] said... a stone... 1 
did not want to believe that the child was dead... For what, I thought, all 
this for what? (331-6).24
Many of Nongena's responses to the unrest were unsympathetic and plagued by 
misgivings: "Poppie had no heart for what was happening in the location", people were 
"stirring up a trouble that would get too big for them to control"; "When will this 
trouble come to an end? Poppie said to Mosie" (313). She was against the Christmas 
ban and critical of youths "who stay away from school doing nothing" (338). Jakkie, 
whom Nongena had loved like her own child, she felt was "wasting his life with the 
Comrades" (325); and he participated - let the youths into the house and held him down 
- in what she saw as an unforgivable beating of buti Plank for drunkenness. Nongena 
felt that smashing buses and burning schools was simply wrong, and was indignant that 
many actions seemed to mean more suffering for people like her. When buses were 
smashed she had to walk: "Now but why do they do it?" (310). She found it difficult to 
make the students' demands and actions her own: "Why didn't you fight for me when 1 
was made to suffer so?" (313): "This trouble is not mine..." (318).
The ongoing disturbances on occasion drew Nongena into a sympathetic response, 
when they touched upon her experience and main terms of reference: her family and 
children. When children were shot, for example, that "worked on" her (306), affected
Nongena had witnessed traumatic events, and experienced a similar sense of 
disorientation, during previous political unrest in Cape Town:
The second week of the strike the hate and death came to Poppie's street. 
She saw it with her own eyes. It came during the night... She saw they 
were young fellows, all carrying kieries. They went across the street to 
the house of Mr Mfukeng, the shopkeeper... Come on outside, Mfukeng, 
we'll burn down your house over your head. . . The next morning they were 
back... Poppie heard the shouting and came out to see... the young people 
took him. . . I  c a n n o t move, my f e e t  a r e  s t o n e .  I  c a n  s e e  b l o o d  on t h e  
r o a d , but I  c a n n o t  d o  anything. . . She had drawn the curtain in front of 
the window, because she did not want to see Mr Mfukeng1 s house. All day 
long the curtains remained drawn... I have seen a lot of ugly things but 
this was the first time I had seen people kill somebody with their bare 
hands... It was the worst thing I have seen... (126-30)
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her badly, because she also had children to whom such things could happen. The church 
women were glad that the children had taken a stand against drink: "My children don't 
drink yet, thought Poppie, but how do I know that they will not one day do like the other 
children do. I must join the women in their gladness that the children have turned against 
liquor" (318). When the violence erupted between residents and migrants, Nongena's 
response was similarly conditioned by the horizons and experience of family: "They are 
our people... tata-ka-Bonsile lived with the migrants... when I was sent away. If Bonsile 
stayed behind, he would also have lived there. They marry our girls, there are location 
women and their children who lived with them... Why must we turn against each other?" 
(324). Although on occasion Nongena recognised that she had grievances ("I must be 
honest, I have my grievances too. If I had the strength I would try to do something to 
change matters but now I don't have the strength... I am tired. I want peace now" (318)) 
and knew that they were shared with others ("Now she knew: The trouble is not only 
mine, it has come over them as well" (187)), her chief concern was that her children not 
be caught up in the revolt and that her family domain remain intact.25
As Nongena's story draws to a close the voices, identities and narrative perspectives of 
others assume a more central role, providing new, more radical political perspectives.
25
Such an ambiguous set of attitudes to the political situation was by no means unique. 
See, for example, The Diary o f  M a r i a  T h o l o  (Hermer 1980). Initially, there was great 
excitement - "It is difficult to describe or understand the kind of excitement everyone 
is feeling. There is danger around but you still want action all the time... Everyone 
wants to know what’s new, what's happening" (52-3) - and a groundswell of support: "I
get the impression that most people sway more towards the continuation of the struggle 
than the ending of it without proper results" (55-6). Maria Tholo1s own views, however, 
and those she ascribes to others, are fascinatingly mixed: "Once it touches you, you
don't like it... But if t h e y  go on fighting, O.K. let them. I think this is the way 
everyone is feeling" (52); "There is a policeman's wife living next door. When I talk to 
her about the riots, of course, I am against the children. You've got to take sides with
the right people. When you talk to the children you are with them. When you meet
somebody who is opposing them you also oppose because really you don't know where you 
stand" (108); "I can't help wishing I had never been born to live through this" (113, 
also see 55,56,68-9). Tholo's mixed reaction was in part a function of the
contradictions of her being both middle class and black. Like Nongena she resented the 
way her everyday life was continually interfered with. She felt that the tide was 
turning against the students - "People have begun to turn against the students. I think 
it is because they went beyond what it was all about in the beginning. They should have 
stuck to the education issue and not interfered with orher activities in the township... 
We are the sufferers..." (116) - as people grew tired of the tension, the breakdown in 
essential services, the suffering, and resentful of the loss of education and earnings.
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While Jakkie was from a different political generation, Nongena's brother, Mosie was 
not:
I don't like these riots. You and I are the Lord's people, his 
church-people. I don't like it that the children tease the government and 
get hurt, or that they stop my car with stones and shout: Donate! Donate! 
till I get out and tap off petrol for their petrol bombs. But... I cannot help 
it, deep down in my heart I hear: At last! I suppress \his thought 'cause 
why, this violence is not the way of the Lprd. But then again I hear deep 
down: At last! (311, also 313,320-1, 339-40)
The effect of these multiple, competing voices is to reduce Nongena's own centrality 
and to vocalise a fracturing of the black, and more specifically the family, voice. It is 
also to voice counter-arguments to the views expressed by Nongena herself. An 
apolitical reading of Poppie, therefore, not only rests upon a blinkered and partial focus 
on Nongena as an individual, but also on the exclusion of other, more militant, voices.
Finally, Poppie Nongena's family was drawn into the conflict. Jakkie shot a policeman 
attempting to arrest him and, like so many of his generation, went on the run. Later 
Nongena's mother and the mother's youngest child, Baby, were arrested. She "felt 
everything in her die" on hearing that Jakkie was going to Bonsile: "Why must my 
children come into this thing?... Why can't he leave my children out of this? They have 
done nothing. They know nothing of all this" (349). Nongena said to herself that her 
children were safe, they had done nothing wrong. But others who had done nothing 
wrong were taken in and tortured. Children who had been detained came out changed, 
hard, nothing was the same again, they could not forget what had been done to them. 
Nongena's mother and Baby were released. Jakkie had gone to Mdantsane and then to
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Herschel so as to cross the border into Lesotho. He escaped, but Bonsile and his sister 
were arrested.
Bonsile, Nomvula, Thandi, Fezi... whom I had to leave without a mama; 
has it finally caught up with you? What have I done wrong, where have I 
sinned? I who thought: You're free of it all... For you I have suffered hard 
times that you could live in peace and go to school, away from all this...
Now the time of trouble has come down upon us all, as Jakkie said to 
me: Let the roof of the gaol cover the whole of the location, let the whole 
of the location become a gaol, because, why, we are bom to die. Let 
them put you all in the cells... It was as if her face had melted, as if the 
cheeks and comers of her mouth could not stop trembling... the hardness 
of heart that had come into her, she knew, would be there for always. I 
have found my way through everything, she thought, but through this I 
can find no way. Because this has been taken out of my hands, it has 
been given over into the hands of the children. It is now my children who 
will carry on. Peace will not come... Even those that wish for peace will 
be dragged into the troubles... About that we can't do nothing. But God is 
my witness, Poppie said, I never sought out this trouble... Lord, Lord, 
where, at what place, did I turn from your path? She wiped her eyes, still 
dry, with her handkerchief, as if she wanted to wipe away the 
uncleamess. If the Lord wants you to go, you will go; if the Lord wants 
you to stay, you will stay, goes through her mind. If the Lord wanted 
Jakkie to go, it had to be so, she thought. And if my children had to be 
drawn into this thing, then that is what they were bom to. And who can 
take from their path that to which they were bom? (353-5)
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Nongena previously had repeatedly engineered resurrections - from the grave of 
Mdantsane, from the death of her husband which occurred on the same day as the birth 
of her son's child, Vukile, meaning arisen - simply in order to survive. But the 
incredible piece of prose quoted above, Nongena's glimpse into the abyss of chaos and 
darkness as fate, concludes the book with a sense of overwhelming loss. Who - Poppie 
Nongena or Elsa Joubert - chose such an ending is impossible to know, but there is, 
more generally and in any event, a terrifying prophetic quality to this life of pain which 
provides no resolution or redemption.
... she felt the strength in her... I am stronger than buti Mosie or buti 
Plank or buti Johnnie Drop-Eye. I am bigger than them. Because in her 
heart she knew that what she had undergone would come their way too. I 
have gone ahead of you, buti Mosie, she said. Your feet too will be set 
on the road that mine were put upon. That you cannot escape. (299)
Life history as crime, as the annihilation of the self
In a way that strangely parallels the experience of Malan, Poppie Nongena had seen so 
much - 'I saw it all' - and yet she had seen nothing at all. To inhabit apartheid was to 
inhabit an inside that could be overwhelming in its oppression, obliterating in its 
alienation and intimacy. Due to the full range of 'structural violence’, Nongena was 
unable to situate and contextualise her inside. Hers was, to use Margaret Lenta's phrase, 
a "life... almost entirely without theory" (1984:152). As a result, the outside, or ’other’, 
of apartheid was barely conceptualised let alone seen through or challenged. It was 
through this identity without theory that Nongena identified the cause of her final 
collapse within herself. Insidiously, apartheid, again so pervasive as to be invisible, 
obscured the source of its own crime.
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Apartheid was the taken-for-granted that structured Nongena's experience and delimited 
her horizons, making life within it seemingly inevitable and even preferable to the 
alternatives. She was able to create an ambiguous niche of independence within and 
between the uneven and sometimes contradictory impacts of the structures - apartheid, 
capitalism, patriarchy - that oppressed her. The break-up of the family brought about by 
apartheid, for example, gave Nongena a greater degree of independence in the domestic 
realm. But it was an independence that was accompanied by tremendous poverty and 
isolation, and which remained confined to her role as an, eventually, single parent with 
children. It challenged neither apartheid nor patriarchy. Schalkwyk describes Nongena 
as being caught in a "double bind": "she cannot oppose the system that is palpably the 
cause of her suffering because that would mean the negation of herself as a product of 
that system, and it is not possible for her, as an individual, to transcend the social and 
historical conditions in terms of which she has struggled to forge an existence" 
(1989:271). A fragment of freedom provided a vested interest in the status quo and the 
little autonomy Nongena had within the only life she knew. The result was an identity - 
drawing on the opiate of religious fatalism and the seemingly uncollapsible categories 
typical of those who know life only as survival and lack the resources with which to 
imagine anything else/different - better suited to trying to survive the system than 
seeking its overthrow.
This is a life stoiy scarred by layers of annihilation. “Let the roof of the gaol cover the 
whole of the location, let the whole of the location become a gaol, because, why, we are 
bom to die”. Nongena inhabited history as crime, as the space of the annihilation of 
herself. The stoiy ends with Nongena in a state of collapse as the 1976 uprisings 
fracture the foundation of her identity - the possibility of a coherent family over which 
she could preside and in which she could trust - and with her voice being increasingly 
crowded out by the voices of others. Rather than seeing with her heart, Poppie Nongena 
is left with a hardness of heart which, she knew, would be with her always. In the end,
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she was stripped of everything, including her own story. These repeated annihilations 
are symptomatic of a society saturated with apartheid's essential violence, to the extent 
that a life story that is in part a form of counter-visibility to apartheid is simultaneously 
marked by the brutality and blindness of its living, telling and reception. Important 
questions remain to be answered. What does it mean to come from the 'other1 (wrong?) 
side of the narrative tracks? What can be resurrected, how, and by whom from the scene 
of the apartheid crime? And what of the juxtaposition of compromised narrative 
creative process with powerfully illuminating narrative product?
*  *  *
The notion of testimony as no longer in the control or possession of its author(s), that 
articulates a complexity of truth not available to its narrator, and, therefore, that needs 
to be seen and seen through, returns, albeit from a new trajectory, to the struggle for 
textual ownership, the absence of any monopoly over the political function of writing, 
and to the inter-textuality and context-bound nature of meaning. The political abuse of 
narrative meaning is not the sole preserve of the state. It potentially extends from the 
collaborative narrative enterprise to the reader and beyond. This discussion of Rian 
Malan's My Traitor's Heart and, Poppie, by Elsa Joubert and Poppie Nongena, attempts 
to do justice to the dominant intention, purpose and truth of the author(s), even when as 
in the latter text this is so difficult to establish, and to provide an interpretation of their 
interpretations, a seeing through of their seeing.
From anywhere within such a divided society, from both sides of the apartheid crime, 
from within history as the space of annihilation, life stories were/are told through the 
lives and deaths of others. Lives are superimposed as inter-linked layers of experience 
and/as interpretation, one on another. When a witness is found to such a life, as these 
two life stories illustrate, the possibilities and dangers are immense: of a meeting and/or
427
missing of the self and the 'other' (where the 'other' can be anything from overwhelming 
to beyond conceptualisation), and of both shared and contested experience and/as 
interpretation; of visibility, invisibility and counter-visibility; of seeing clearly, blindness 
and delusion/illusion; of reworkings and replayings of interactions between the powerful 
and powerless; of projection, transference, appropriation, resurrection, and annihilation; 
of the healing and (re)opening of wounds. The resulting 'communities of testimonial 
incommensurates' provide interpretations in need of interpretation due to the manner in 
which they are, both consciously and unconsciously, understood and misunderstood, 
revealed and concealed, imposed, negotiated and contested, interpreted, misinterpreted 
and reinterpreted. They are so explosively revealing because they capture something 
about lived life and/in its apartheid context.
What this chapter has sought to illustrate is that narrative and power relations between 
an oppressive state and its opponents variously infect similar relations within society as a 
whole, and more specifically that the act of witnessing and bearing witness, as, for 
example, made manifest in narrative collaboration, is an often violently collaborative 
contest over identity and meaning. The lives of Poppie Nongena and Rian Malan are 
symbols of apartheid - albeit perhaps not the symbols their creators would have chosen - 
of its imprisonment and exile, to different degrees and in different ways, of an entire 
nation; of its conditioning of seeing, knowing and being and, therefore, of pasts lived and 
remembered, presents/realities inhabited, and futures hoped for and imagined. They raise 
a final, even definitive, question, about how to reclaim and preserve a more complete 
picture of the past for the future?
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have described the nature of detention, political imprisonment, exile and 
homecoming within the context of apartheid South Africa, the more general dynamics 
of repression and resistance, and the role of the life stoiy, particularly auto/biographical 
counter-discourses, within these contested arenas. To this end, and in an attempt to 
make a distinctive contribution to the relevant areas of study, the thesis is run through 
with a number of central themes which are summarised and concluded below.
The first concerns the dynamics of oppression, articulated through the prism of 
apartheid. The oppressive state violently un/remade the oppositional, subjugated 
subject. The incarcerated and exiled self was fragmented - body from mind from voice, 
in space (inside from outside) and in time (present from past and future) - isolated, 
stripped bare of contact and connection, incarcerated within/expelled into an alien 
world. The state attempted to recast all dimensions of this recalcitrant self in its image. 
In a way that appears inimical to apartheid's more essentialist fervour for categorisation 
and boundaries, but which is in fact illustrative of the manner in which this was 
permeated by pragmatism, the truth and power of state violence ultimately resided most 
profoundly in its capacity and intent to blur, erase and redraw, boundaries, to respect no 
border or threshold, and, thereby, to unsettle and manipulate reality. Violence, for 
example, could be a servant of racist ideology and/or of random terror, legal and/or the 
extra/illegal, marshalling the physical and/or the psychological, truths and/or lies, in an 
overt/spectacular and/or covert manner, across a range of geographical terrains. This 
dynamic, affecting methods/means, agents/perpetrators, targets, objectives and results, 
underwrote state violence. Examples of its operation included the mechanics of torture, 
the relationship between court room and torture chamber (torturer, lawyer and doctor), 
and the operations of the special forces throughout southern Africa. A further blurring 
and unsettling occurred through the proximity of control and order to chaos and
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rebellion. Oppression functioned through simultaneity, cumulatively towards a whole 
that was greater than the sum of its parts; the un/remaking of reality was deliberate, 
unconscious and unintended, and undertaken in error. Apartheid oppression was, 
therefore, inherently, out of control. The absence of definitive closure or easy resolution 
to its effects, as illustrated by the (non-)resolution of return (permanent exile/ 
retrospective migrancy and ambiguous homecoming), provides a further example of this 
phenomenon.
The second general argument of this study relates to the dynamics of resistance. In 
outlining the profile of both sides of the oppression-resistance equation, I have placed 
more emphasis on the latter component, and attempted to establish that the relationship 
between the two was an extraordinarily complex one of mutual dependence - the one 
implying and creating the conditions for the other - of complicity (of mind, body and 
voice in torture, of state witness and askari, of self-censorship; and also complicity in 
the more fundamental sense that the violence of oppression, for both oppressor and 
oppressed, was ultimately, inevitably, inflicted upon one's self), and of course of 
animosity and contestation.
In a terrain characterised by enormous inequality in relation to power, resistance 
nevertheless attempted to take advantage of the contradictions and imprecision within 
apartheid's oppressive design. In a world where everything became a weapon, the 
weapons of oppression were double-edged, available to both sides, could be turned 
against their original author(s) and primary objective. I have examined the word, 
writing/autobiography, and being a writer; complaints and safeguard mechanisms and 
the classification system/privileges for the incarcerated; the documentation and records 
of a conscientious bureaucracy; the courts/law and medicine; aspects of the conditions 
of imprisonment; the body and the senses, space and time; other people, including 
fellow detainees/prisoners and exiles, the community of activists, family and friends. As
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noted in the introduction, such weapons were subject to mimicry, distortion, 
management, contestation and reversal. The detainee/prisoner and exile reworked their 
intended/dominant meaning and purpose to retain/regain access to a chosen self, voice 
and world, to the ability to reassemble themselves in an image other than that of state, 
and, thereby, to agency and power.
To cite an example of weapons turned against their intended purpose, the prisoner/ 
detainee and exile contrived ways to un/remake the undifferentiated, infinite, empty/ 
blank time and space of incarceration and exile. They showed a similar disregard for 
boundaries and thresholds to that shown by the state. The landscapes of time and space 
were marked with horizons and landmarks, in turn inscribed and erased, and thereby 
transgressed and un/remade in a relentless mapping towards release, return, and home. 
The exile and the detainee/prisoner were strung between a present without past/future 
and a past/future without present, and between various insides and outsides. To 
transgress and un/remake time and space was to reunite these territories, to embrace the 
full temporal/spatial range, and to reactivate the movement of time and the journey 
across space towards the place of home. Communication was one weapon in this 
endeavour. It bridged/breached divisions between inside and outside and between 
territories of time, establishing their simultaneous coexistence, enabling self-extension 
into, contact and connection with, familiar worlds. Similarly, autobiography, and 
writing more generally, were a 'guide-line across the [temporal and spatial] chasm', 
which in their composition and subsequent fate forged links and reactivated motion 
across the landscapes of time and space/place.
A third set of issues relate specifically to the life story as a discourse and agent of 
oppression and resistance. A major preoccupation of this thesis has been with the 
articulation and application of a theory of the life story in the context of political 
struggle, the chief components of which are outlined below. The oppositional self
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carried the inner tension of a desire for an uncompromisingly unified and pure identity 
that was continually underscored by the need to be partial, provisional, contingent, 
strategic, inventive, by the necessity to be continually un/remade, adapted, in its 
imposition and self-construction, to suit an evolving political purpose and context. This 
pattern of identity formation has been illustrated by a diverse array of examples in 
previous chapters: the use of'legends' in interrogation; the juggling of assumed names; 
the 'management' of accounts from statements/confessions to 'half-told' and 'half-known' 
autobiographies; the inventive use of components of identity such as when the body is 
surrendered to save the mind/soul during torture; the marshalling of narrative devices 
such as repetition and the orchestration of a cast of characters and selves in the service 
of survival.
State and opposition shared the desire to document lives at the critical junctures of 
repression and resistance, which, as crucibles of struggle, unmasked the essence of 
apartheid’s various possibilities and potentials. What was fought over within the 
contested texts and archives of the self was the right to say T and/or 'We'. The central 
characteristic of the construction of identity was violent collaboration. Incarceration, 
exile and homecoming, as well as the structures of apartheid more generally, introduced 
a violent component into the collaborative relationship. Political opponents wrote and 
were written by/with/against/through the apartheid state. The most illuminating forms 
of the life story genre were those created at the interface between state and opponent, 
between rival powers of writing, during moments and encounters when lives were 
contested in and through a range of texts and when the violence of collaboration was 
most apparent: narratives such as the confession/statement, the tortured body, 
incarcerative and exilic time and space, and the censored/self-censored text. At an 
individual level illustrations of this theory range from the violence of Breytenbach's 
hidden contestatory dialogue, engaging invisible and implied voices, to Jacobson's 
modes of apprehension, formed in the violent and non-violent collaborative embrace
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of/with a South African past. Most perniciously of all, narrative and political violence 
pervaded apartheid society, influencing interactions between subjects, including those 
devised as acts of resistance such as oral histories and testimonio-Xike, collaborations.
As this discussion implies, under apartheid a diverse textual congregation expanded the 
conventional range of life-story forms. Texts that were articulations of life stories or 
impacted on their narration included the oral, written and somatic, the bureaucratic and 
legal, documents of the torture chamber, the court room, and from the medical 
profession, public and hidden transcripts, those insistent on and/or promiscuous with 
the truth, realist and other fiction, and more conventionally auto/biographical texts 
(narratives of witness, testimonio, new journalism, and more). Proliferation, diversity, 
juxtaposition, superimposition and repetition, encompassing voids of silence and arenas 
of saturation, created a palimpsest of lives variously and irreconcilably told, without 
completion or consensus; a 'community of testimonial incommensurates'.
Authorship and meaning in this circulating, active, inter-textual narrative network were 
provisional and contested, subject to manipulation and appropriation in unintended and 
unexpected ways. Narrative interpretation, alongside and inextricably interlinked with 
narrative construction, was violently collaborative in nature. The absence of any 
monopoly over political function was a characteristic of texts which was open to 
tremendous abuse by/in an oppressive state. The use of autobiographical accounts 
within interrogation, to which I refer in the opening chapter, was a poignant example of 
this form of barbarism. The final chapter of the thesis adds a further dimension to this 
narrative violence. Both the possibilities for interpretive violence and a central 
characteristic of testimony - understood as intrinsically exceeding the awareness and 
beyond the absolute control of the testifier - were accentuated within such a divided and 
political society as South Africa. As a result narrative abuse was endemic and extended 
beyond the immediate intentions and range of the state. Hence the importance not only
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of seeking to redress state (and other) discursive and interpretive violence, but also of 
attempting to do so, self-consciously and -critically. I have tried to do this by 
articulating ways of interpreting testimonial interpretations, of seeing through conscious 
and unconscious deception and self-deception, and by identifying a dominant narrative 
and political trajectory. This strategy provides a means of anchoring in the particular 
perspective of the original author the potentially endless proliferation of equivalent 
interpretations implicit in the former strategy and of avoiding and unmasking the 
potential excesses of interpretive violence. Ultimately, in relation to the state, and other 
sources of narrative violence not all so readily identified as the enemy, the already 
quoted words of Breytenbach retain their force: "It is possible to falsify for some time 
the thrust of one's words by inserting them in an environment controlled by the enemy, 
but eventually - if what you write is 'true' to yourself at that moment - it will become 
evident and be rectified" (1985:158). The power of the life story is that no amount of 
political and narrative violence can ultimately divert it from its meaning and task, even 
if this particular homecoming is only achieved in the context of apartheid's demise.
A fourth concern of the thesis has been the relationship between the triumvirate of 
incarceration, exile, homecoming and theories of creativity. At one level the 
relationship circles around the overtly auto/biographical. All three experiences were 
autobiographical moments in the sense of being occasions when life for the prisoner, 
exile, and returnee could appear to be patterned by order and structure, delimited by 
closure, and when life stories provided a bridge, or 'guide-line', to survival, normality, 
and home. A second dimension of the relationship relates more to fictional narratives. 
The incarcerative, exilic and homecoming rites of passage were creatively enabling and 
compulsive, because they provided a metaphor not only for power relations within an 
oppressive state but also for the creative act. The repressive cycle may unmask 
something about the workings of the literary imagination given the essential unreality of 
its components, the coexistence of intimacy and distance, attempts to transcend
434
divisions and divides, and the embrace of violence and the unknown. But it is important 
to register an element of paradox and contradiction in this scenario, to recognise the co­
existence of creative life and death, and to break down generalisations with patterns of 
difference.
The moments/encounters provided the subject matter for creativity in their own right and 
destroyed the terrain of experiential and imaginative familiarity. They were redolent with 
death: almost all political prisoners were not allowed to engage in creative writing, while the 
work of exiles was banned and censored. The encounter/moment and its aftermath need to 
be creatively distinguished. With regards to their creative implications and potential, 
components of the triumvirate were similar but also different (the prisoner had neither 
means nor audience, the exile had the means but no audience, the returnee sometimes had 
both means and audience), internally differentiated (Breytenbach as a prisoner was allowed 
to write), and harboured more positive implications and potential for autobiographical 
writing than for fiction. It is not possible for the experiential troika to be seen as creatively 
stimulating, equally stimulating and/or stimulating in the same way, for the writer who 
engaged with them only at the level of idea, theory, imagination, for the activist who 
became a writer only in writing about these experiences, and/or for the writer who they 
reduced to silence. If the passage through apartheid’s various 'spaces of death' harboured the 
potential for a life-affirming transformation, and the life story was an agent of 
transformation, for whom? in what form? and at what price? While those who have 
undergone incarceration, exile and homecoming inhabit a kind of experiential privilege when 
it comes to their representation, those lacking this privilege have the problematic task of 
balancing questions of authority and responsibility. J. M. Coetzee's in some ways 
understandable intimation that it is obscene to make suffering such as torture the occasion 
for imagining and his reluctance to give his voice to and speak on behalf of the 'other', for 
example, not only reproduces the violent silencing of repression but also has
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unsettling parallels with the collaborative failure to imagine ('put yourself in my place') 
that contributed to the structure and longevity of apartheid. The terms of creative 
engagement are perhaps best understood as another double-edged weapon in the 
armoury of struggle. This brief concluding overview, alongside the treatments of this 
issue in previous chapters, establishes the existence of a complex and nuanced 
relationship between repression and creativity.
A fifth argument that recurs throughout my analysis addresses the profound ambiguity of 
postcolonialism's method and central tenents, especially construed as universal reality and 
unqualified good, when applied to contexts of political struggle.1 One example of this 
ambiguity is the postcolonial blur which generalises heterogeneity and homogenises 
difference. The postcolonial blur, as discussed in chapter 3, merges categories of 
displacement/movement. A further dimension of the same pattern deconstructs 
distinctions between self and 'other'. For Breytenbach the self and/as 'other' operates as a 
component of the dictum - deny opposites, read one in the other, and go beyond; in 
analysing how to go beyond cliche in the representation of the torturer, J. M. Coetzee's 
main strategy is an attempt to deconstruct the dichotomy between self and 'other'; and 
this creative strategy functions similarly for 'border literature' with regards to the 
selfi'other' distinction as manifest in the divide between black/white, perpetrator/ victim. 
A meeting of various selves and 'others' is clearly of inestimable importance in South 
Africa. In isolation, however, this particular gesture towards the 'other' - from whites, 
from the disenchanted within the realm of power/perpetrator, facing an uncertain 
future at a time of ideological crisis and decline - can give the appearance of 
prioritising the world of ideas over reality/practice, and of advocating an identity politics 
of self-preservation and an ideology of reform rather than resistance or more
1
Whether apartheid South Africa was historically/politically postcolonial is open to 
question. By nevertheless applying aspects of its method I have sought to question what 
is specifically postcolonial about many of its central ideas (see Ranger 1996}, and to 
test their efficacy in the context of political struggle, a number of characteristics of 
which arguably transcend the specificities of historical and political circumstance.
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substantial change. Excess identification with the 'other' by the oppressed is 
incapacitating with reference to the choices required for political action. These attempts 
to traverse and dismantle difference result in the arguably irreconcilable being 
construed as the same: all are human, all aggressors, all guilty, all victims. Such a 
blurring of boundaries obfuscates the sources of oppression and resistance, and blurs 
lines of contestation.2
Another, overlapping, example of postcolonial ambiguity concerns a basket of its 
central concepts: the negotiation of binaries, hybridity, the in-between, difference, 
plurality. Across arenas as diverse as identity construction, political strategy/action, and 
modes of analysis, such concepts can be contentious, detrimental and dangerous in a 
politically contested environment, especially for the oppressed. Providing an example 
of mimicry, reversal and distortion, both repression and resistance wielded as a weapon 
a lawless disregard for, and the capacity to erase and redraw, thresholds and boundaries. 
But, equally, for both camps there were times and places when/where lines had to be 
drawn, when/where it was imperative to join one side or the other, and know which side 
one was on. To occupy the space in-between, to be neither one thing nor the other, to 
embrace hybridity and difference, was to occupy a battleground. Illustrations of this 
point - individuals/authors, fictional characters, countries - litter the chapters of this 
study. Breytenbach at his trial, in prison and exile, lived out the paradox of his identity 
as an Afrikaner and maverick dissident, on both sides and neither, regarded as 
contaminated by all. Rian Malan went from seeing the imperative to choose sides to a 
belief that there were no rational choices available. In a polarised society he was 
incapacitated in the middle, unable to commit himself either way. Other examples of 
the in-between, isolated, ostracised, and alienated include doctors and magistrates
2
Paradoxically, some of the rhetoric of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) - all suffered trauma, all need healing - runs the danger of repeating 
this blurring. This is not to deny that perpetrators and victims shared not only some 
experiences but also certain responses to them, Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome being one 
obvious example. On the psychological experiences of white conscripts in the townships, 
see Sandler 1989.
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presiding over the complaints and safeguard mechanisms for detainees, caught in- 
between detainee and state; Coetzee's magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians; 
Modisane as eccentric intellectual and cosmopolitan, a 'situation' stranded between 
racial and political worlds; and the Frontline States, geographically and politically 
caught between the main players in struggle for South Africa. The study of writers like 
Breytenbach and Modisane illustrates the profound ambiguity of an uncritical 
acceptance of key tenents of postcolonial discourse across identity, culture and politics, 
in a context such as South Africa, and the centrality of components of its vision to 
alienation and political incoherence/incapacitation.
The truth-power dynamic, or societal 'regime of truth', constitutes a sixth, and final, set 
of concerns, and it is with an examination of these concerns and their current 
manifestations that I will conclude.
Magical Truths
Every government assumes political responsibility for the deeds and misdeeds o f its predecessor 
and every nation for the deeds and misdeeds o f the past. (Arendt 1977:298)
Later we can expect the unravelling, the recriminations, the not-so-guilty confessions, 
the church-run commissions, the government-sponsored investigations, the arrests of 
tense and unyielding men in uniform, and finally the optimistic reports... After the fall, 
after the aberration, we expect a return to the normative, to peacetime sobriety, to 
notions of civil society, human rights, the sanctity o f the person... habeas corpus, and 
the unalienable rights to the ownership of one's body.
But here I intrude with a shadowy question. What if... (Scheper-Hughes 1992:219)
One o f the things that is remarkable about the stories of both Brazil and Uruguay is the way in 
which, to a large degree, the rehabilitation o f the torture societies, to the extent it has occurred, 
was accomplished by the torture victims themselves. These victims - hollowed-out, burnt-out 
shells - came alive once again by testifying to the truth of their own experiences. And that truth, 
to a degree, has set both themselves and their societies free. (Weschler 1990:246)
Our land holds its hard / Wooden truths like a peach / A pip... This unfinished task. 
(Cronin, "Our land holds...", 1987:57)
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The quotations above indicate not just that societies such as South Africa have a 
responsibility with regards to their violent past, but also the tremendous accompanying 
potentials and pitfalls. Political transition and democratisation confronted and continue 
to confront South Africa with divergent demands in relation to its apartheid past, to be 
prioritised and/or reconciled. Should the emphasis be placed on the past or future; on 
amnesty and forgetting, on the need to know the truth and acknowledgement, or on 
accountability and justice; on the rule of law and the morally desirable or on the 
politically feasible and an acceptance that the political constraints may preclude 
optimal solutions? What is the best route to consolidate a still insecure democracy, 
developing under siege from the past and the future, within the context of a negotiated 
and incomplete transition? Transitions generate demands and expectations on numerous 
levels, all of which, simultaneously, seek to be addressed and satisfied. Broad 
official/political agendas coexist alongside intimate private memories and needs. Can 
any process achieve healing, catharsis and reconciliation at the level of the individual, 
the community and the nation?3 An increasing stock of experience of transition
management from around the globe provides some useful indicators but no definitive 
answers or universally applicable models.4
At its most stark the debate is about whether to prosecute or pardon, Neier argues that 
"in some circumstances it is only justice that can be an appropriate acknowledgement of 
the past" (1994:7).5 Using the analysis of previous chapters, it can be argued that
3
Michael Ignatieff asks: "What does it mean for a nation to come to terms with its 
past?" {1996:110). Can we talk of psyche, trauma, identity, reconciliation, healing for 
nations as we do in relation to individuals? Can nations act, be responsible, bear 
guilt? Ignatieff's negative answers to the latter two questions draws a more absolute 
division between individual and nation than I would want to support.
4
See, for example, Hayner 1994,1996, Mendez 1997, Steiner and Alston 1996:1084-1109.
5
To date Argentina is the only example of a country that has gone the route of 
prosecution. What was initially intended to be a limited, circumscribed process of 
prosecution focusing on those who gave the orders for, and those who committed excesses 
in implementing orders within, the 'Dirty War', proved difficult to contain. Judicial 
proceedings were terminated after a series of rebellions by junior army officers (see 
Mendez 1994, Dworkin/Neier, in Steiner and Alston 1996, and also Manguel 1996). In "To 
Prosecute or to Pardon? Human Rights Decisions in the Latin American Southern Cone”, 
Pion-Berlin (1994) examines factors which influenced the different paths taken by 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay during their respective political transitions. On the
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blanket amnesty and systematic forgetting repeat the silencing/silences of torture, 
incarceration, exile, and oppression more generally, whereas the pursuit of truth, and 
more particularly of justice, restores the voice, self and world to the victim of abuse and 
ultimately, perhaps, to the national community and its past; or, in a related argument, 
that a state-sanctioned amnesty and forgetting is a collective suicide note for the past, 
and one which unlike the autobiographical suicide note does not even constitute an 
historical record. Can historical time be cut loose from the past into a blank present and 
future? Will such a moment of erasure and release inevitably carry a hidden and 
subversive baggage into the future? Can a secure future be built by perpetuating an 
official sanctioning of the collaborative unknowing or 'willed ignorance' that has often 
been complicit in past violence?
Decision-makers are faced with a range of imperfect solutions, and each solution has 
its price, Zalaquett states that politicians "are dealing with an exercise in 
maximisation [achieving the best that is possible in the circumstances], not simple 
righteousness" (1994:9-10). Elsewhere, he talks of life under a newly established 
repressive regime in Chile in 1973 and a realisation that courage "was just another 
name for learning how to live with your fears" and, almost two decades on, under 
equally new but changed circumstances, of a further realisation that a less striking 
form of courage was called for: "It is the courage to forgo easy righteousness, to 
learn how to live with real-life restrictions, but to seek nevertheless to advance one's 
most cherished values day by day to the extent possible. Relentlessly. Responsibly" 
(1992:1438). As the life of Albie Sachs illustrates, a softer form of heroism is not 
unrelated to a soft vengeance; nor is it unrelated, to the ongoing evolution, in 
changing circumstances, of the truth-power dynamic, to a new 'regime of truth'.
transformation of the dominant oppositional vision of democracy and justice during 
political transition, see Vergara and Estev6z 1994.
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South Africa has chosen/created an innovative and complex path through the past 
into the future. The main institutional manifestation of this path is the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.6 The truth within political transition has a magical 
quality and power (Weschler 1990:4,217). Truth Commissions are potentially the 
institutional embodiment of the magical quality and power of truth, a benchmark 
counter-inscription to the previous state archive of oppression. They represent 
official recognition of the right to know and to mourn, both of which have in the past 
been denied to varying degrees by both sides in the apartheid conflict. Through a 
Truth Commission the new state sanctions, acknowledges and 'owns' the past and 
rewrites official history within a different 'regime of truth'.7 As a result of the TRC 
certain claims and assertions - that there was no torture, for example - will be 
impossible to make in the future in South Africa. In this process of truth-telling, 
credibility is restored to the state and meaning/integrity is restored to official 
language and discourse. As torture epitomises the structure of oppression as the 
detainee is stripped of voice, self and world, while the interrogator gains a 
corresponding self-extension, the Truth Commission, like the life story of which its 
message is essentially composed, contains within it the possibility of a redistribution 
of voice, self, world, and ultimately power. Each testimony is potentially an act of 
rescue from anonymity, misinformation and forgetting, a reclamation from the state 
of the right to say T and 'We'. Some, situated within this new 'network of writing', 
may be "mended by the mention" (Weschler 1990:74), for others, the truth and its
6
On the establishment/operation of the TRC see Boraine, Levy and Scheffer eds. 1994 
(second edition 1997), Boraine and Levy eds. 1995, du Toit 1994, Garton Ash 1997,
Sarkin 1997, Simpson 1994, Simpson and van Zyl 1995, Wilson 1996; also see the 
regular contributions by Antjie Krog in the W e e k l y  M a i l  a n d  G u a r d i a n .
7
It is worth noting that within the TRC as elsewhere there are different kinds of truth 
in circulation. Ignatieff (1996) proposes a useful distinction between factual truth 
(what happened) and moral truth (which attempts to explain why things happened and who 
is responsible). The latter is much more difficult for a Truth Commission to establish 
or achieve shared agreement on. In some contexts, he argues, shared moral truth - the 
path from truth to reconciliation - is impossible. Is shared truth possible where a 
version of truth is inextricably linked to identity? Where to refute your own truth is 
to refute your identity? "The problem of a shared truth" argues Ignatieff "is also that 
it does not lie 'in between1. It is not a compromise between two competing versions" 
(114); such compromises are unlikely to be credible to either side. It remains an open 
question whether truth in such contexts heals and reconciles.
441
acknowledgement may even set them free. Such commissions announce a new 
relationship between state and subject, one in which lives can be told, and thereafter 
hopefully lived, through a more co-operative collaboration between the two.
The task of collaborative healing, like the past reach and present ramifications of the 
violent collaboration it seeks to redress, extends beyond state and subject to affect 
the relationship between all citizens of South Africa. Life stories, told by and to the 
entire national community, can, ideally, be heard and recognised as authentic for the 
first time. In South Africa, witnesses have been found from various sides of the 
apartheid crime; testimony has been shared about what it meant to inhabit history as 
crime, as the space of the annihilation of the 'other' and self. Individual stories - of 
state and subject, victim and perpetrator, black and white, male and female, self and 
'other' - have again been juxtaposed and superimposed, narrated many times over 
into an arena already dense with prior versions and/or into an arena best 
characterised as a void.8 This process begins the multi-dimensional process of filling
8
The TRC1s Committee on Amnesty was assigned the power to grant amnesty conditional 
upon full disclosure and political objective/motive. Provision was made for perpetrators 
not to be granted amnesty for particularly brutal, heinous or barbaric crimes. Rather 
than a blanket amnesty, therefore, the granting of amnesty was individualised, available 
only to those who personally applied for it, and made part of the truth telling process 
(the implication being that those who do not follow this route, or who do not 
successfully apply for amnesty, will be liable to prosecution). This direct link between 
amnesty and truth is the most original and creative aspect of South Africa's transition 
management process. Among the problems encountered by the amnesty process are that 
tension, hostility and obstruction have characterised the attitude of the courts to the 
TRC with regards to the perpetrators of apartheid violence. The acquittal of former 
defence minister, Magnus Malan, on charges of murder, is in many ways emblematic. A 
series of actions by the courts have undermined the TRC1s amnesty procedure, which 
relies on the threat/fear of prosecution in the absence of an application for or the 
granting of amnesty. As a result amnesty applications have been patchy - while senior 
police officers have applied for amnesty, the top military have not - and the success of 
the provision as a whole is still an open question. This uncertainty is due in part to 
the operation of the TRC alongside institutions (specifically the courts and judiciary) 
and within a society that are still significantly unreformed and unchanged.
Despite these shortcomings the amnesty provision promises greater, if partial, detail 
and knowledge of that most impenetrable terrain: the psyche of the perpetrator. 
Perpetrator history is a particularly difficult field of study. Few torturers, for 
example, confess to their crimes (Stover and Nightingale eds. 1983:7, also 13). Among 
the issues to be addressed by perpetrator histories are the following: how to go beyond 
organisational/institutional, ideological history and the history of leaders to an 
experiential understanding of the oppressor in all his/her guises and a history of all 
levels in the oppressive hierarchy? how to deconstruct binary oppositions and 
stereotypes without suspending all distinctions and judgement? and, what are the 
implications of the quest for understanding and the inevitable conclusion that the enemy 
were human too? (on the problems inherent in writing perpetrator history in relation to 
the Holocaust, see Browning 1992). In this context, the TRC and the amnesty provisions 
in South Africa are enormously suggestive, because truth-telling was at least arguably 
in the interests of the perpetrator.
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out the 'half-told' and 'half-known'. A 'community of testimonial incommensurates' 
has been formed by superimposed layers of experience and lives, interpretations, 
subject to re-interpretation, counter-interpretation, and still in need of interpretation.9 
Within this montage of lives, this new inter-textual archive that both builds on and 
departs from the old, the partial and fragmented will begin to constitute a greater 
whole, a convergence that will never be without dissent, a consensus that will never 
be complete.10
Truth Commissions are potentially transformative institutions. In chapter 2 ,1 argued, 
drawing on work by Veena Das, that pain and its effects on the body and/as memory 
can both destroy (torture) and engender (initiation rites) a sense of community. The 
TRC, as a potentially therapeutic space, raises, and perhaps in time will answer the 
following question: is it possible, through a process of sharing and acknowledgement, to 
begin to transform the former into the latter, or in other words, a pain and suffering that 
was world-destroying into the possibility of a new moral, social and political order?
(Das 1995:190-6). Another transformation is required in the temporal realm. Apartheid 
crimes remain locked in the "eternal present"; there is a simultaneity of the past and/in 
the present which means that the past is "not past at all" (Ignatieff 1996:121, see 119- 
22). There is a need, while acknowledging an inevitable and desirable temporal 
simultaneity, to liberate the present and future from the burden of the past which 
threatens to overwhelm them. To come to terms with the past means superimposing
9
In the context of interpretations requiring interpretation, the following point is also 
worth noting: those who most need to testify are also potentially those - having been 
caught in an environment calculated to deceive, having lived lives without theory - "at 
the mercy of their persecutors in a l l  ways - even in their attempts to testify against 
them" (Young 1987:417). But it is also worth reiterating that the 'higher' truth of such 
testimony lies precisely in its theoretical unselfconsciousness and intimate knowledge, 
in the textures and grounding of lived experience and the manner and circumstances of 
narration. Such observations have profound implications for the TRC and its interpretive 
and analytical ethos.
10
The following quotation from an article by Antjie Krog illustrates this point:
"After the first political submissions last year I interviewed Tutu. 'Weren't you 
irritated that you had to listen to four versions of South Africa's past?’ He spreads 
his four skinny fingers under my nose. 'Four versions[...] four(...] exist of the 
life of Christ. Which one would you have liked to chuck out?1" ("Unto the Third or 
Fourth Generation", W e e k l y  M a i l  a n d  G u a r d i a n  13-19/6 1997).
443
serial time on simultaneous time, it means reactivating the movement of time. The 
TRC, like the life story, is potentially one component of the motor moving time 
forward. These urgently necessary transformations illustrate the way in which South 
Africa's political transition is itself a journey through the 'space of death' where reality is 
'up for grabs'.11
Another dimension of a reality/past being 'up for grabs' is that political transition, and 
the TRC in particular, will create, impose, transform memories and the dominant plots 
of recall; and do so within the constraints, agendas, priorities, demands, needs and 
contexts of the present. The dominant trope of the transition in South Africa is the 
powerful state-sanctioned drive for reconciliation and forgiveness. Just as the past 
informs the present, so the present influences the recollection and narration of the past. 
To what extent, and by which constituencies - state and subject, perpetrator and victim, 
beneficiary and non-beneficiary of transition - are the demands and needs of the present 
shared? What are the counter-demands and needs to those sanctioned by the new state 
and how will they find expression? What will happen to the narrative structures and 
central plots of remembering which conflict with those of the dominant ethos of 
transition? Memory is the way in which the past erupts into contemporary life and the 
present. To articulate the past historically is "to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up 
at a moment of danger" (Benjamin 1973:257).
For this and other reasons attempts to circumscribe memory, to artificially constrain or 
impose closure on the processes of remembering would be counter-productive. Firstly, 
diverse textualities of the life story and of memory - oral, written, somatic, of the 
senses; public and hidden; legal and bureaucratic; of the state and of the opposition -
Alongside its enormous potential, there have also been a range of questions raised, 
problems encountered and controversies generated in relation to the TRC in South Africa. 
These include allegations of political bias, legal challenges, criticism of the emphasis 
placed on forgiveness, and questions about the form of reparations and who will pay.
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are inscribed with versions of the past, each with their own avenues of remembering/ 
recall and silence/forgetting. They constitute another 'community of testimonial 
incommensurates1, the components of which are unique, contradictory, complementary, 
subversive, containing histories and identities yet to be made; there are memory worlds 
as yet unknown and untouched.
Contrapuntal sensory histories can be recovered from the scattered wreckage of 
the inadmissible: lost biographies, memories, words, pains, glances, and faces 
that cohere into a vast secret museum o f historical and sensory absence. 
(Feldman 1994:415)
The second reason to resist calls for closure is that it is impossible to over-estimate the 
scale of the task of healing and reconciliation in South Africa - the already mentioned 
imbalance between needs/expectations/demands and the potential to deliver - the major 
burden of which has been placed on and indeed accepted by the TRC. There is 
evidence, however, that the TRC is not intended to tackle the task alone or in isolation.12 
Truth Commissions are most appropriately envisaged as neither a beginning nor an end 
but a significant moment within an ongoing process of dealing with the past in a way 
that embraces the future. Testimony at the TRC narrated individual and collective 
memory into (official/national) history. "The collective memoiy thus becomes a 
collected memory, at once a private and a public legacy..." (Hartman 1994:38).15 While
the TRC has facilitated this imprint of memory on history, it has also enabled history to
Truth Commissions are too often set up and assessed in isolation. South Africa has 
a range of institutions dedicated to contributing to a 'rights culture": the Gender 
Equality Commission, the Human Rights Commission, the Public Protector and programmes 
instigated by the Ministry of Justice. It also has a Day of Reconciliation on December 
16, which commemorates those who died at the hands of fellow South Africans. Other 
initiatives could include national monuments, memorials and museums, as well as legal 
and educational reforms aimed at enhancing the promotion and protection of human rights 
and an understanding of the past.
13
It is worth noting that it is equally important to see memory as active and alive as
well as an object of collection, to find ways of making it serve multiple purposes.
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inform memory.14 Testimony, therefore, occupies a complex position emphasising the 
rupture while contributing to the process of convergence between the two. Memory and 
history remain multi-vocal and their relationship remains one of negotiation, but, such 
engagements, by leading to a greater memory-history coincidence, also facilitate a 
greater societal sense of a shared past. This is one, pivotal, way of beginning to build a 
more corroborative memory and history of apartheid - Hilda Bernstein talks of "a 
history that has thirty years of tom and missing pages" (1993:12) - and a more 
comprehensive 'community of witnessing', based on a collaborative and willed knowing 
and imagining, in a deeply divided society.15 Without this sense of a more shared past 
there can be no shared identity or nation building. The creation and inscription of 
memory and history, the past and identity, however, is a process that will engage all the 
energies of society for generations; it is a process without end.16
Nowhere is this latter process more crucial than in the imperative that South Africa, 
and particularly white South Africa, 'own' its apartheid past. How many white South 
Africans will now admit to supporting apartheid? This is a joke told by emigre Jews who 
had returned to Germany: "A Jew enters a Munich train station, and joins the ticket 
line. He asks one neighbor if he had been a Nazi during the war. 'No! Never! What do you
take me for?' 'Forgive me,' cries the emigre, all meek apology. He asks another
neighbor, and receives the same reply. Finally he turns to a third, and the man shrugs
and says, 'Of course I was.' 'Ah, wonderful!' cries the Jew. 'I was looking for an
honest man I could leave my bags with'11 (Heilbut 1983:470). On paradoxical, self- 
interested flux in (ideological) affiliation, on all sides, that often accompanies 
political change, see Lelyveld 1987:213-14.
Typically, Breytenbach provides a voice of dissent: "Is full memory a mantra of public 
protection? Or just the mouthing of self-indulgence? May it not be argued that the more 
fulsome the memory the less scope we have for pain and inventive recollection?"
(1994:160).
16
Healing and reconciliation are not only legal, quasi-legal, and psychological 
phenomena, but also require political, economic, and social change. This is Charity 
Kondile: "’It is easy for [Nelson] Mandela and [Desmond] Tutu to forgive[...] they lead 
vindicated lives. In my life nothing, not a single thing, has changed since my son was 
burnt by barbarians[...] nothing. Therefore I cannot forgive'" (Krog, "The Parable of 
the Bicycle", Weekly M a i l  a n d  G u a r d i a n  7-13/2 1997) . Furthermore, there is no absolute 
safety from forgetting, refashioning or distortion in relation to the past. "No memory 
can ever survive the death of its original holder without the collective will to keep it 
alive" (Jay 1992:107). Maintaining historical memory is an ongoing, collective task. So 
long as such a process achieves a momentum and structure that is both individual and 
institutional, within civic society and the state, there will be a co-operatively 
collaborative and corroborative body of truth against which to critically judge 
reconstructions of the past. Given such a context, no individual will be able to impose
their will on history. There is a considerable literature on reactionary revisionist
rewritings of Nazi history and the Holocaust. See, for example, Funkenstem 1992:76-81 
and LaCapra 1992. Much can be learnt by historians of apartheid from the issues
confronting their colleagues working on Nazi and Holocaust history, from debates
involving revisionists and counter-revisionists to the issues raised by the approaching 
death of the last survivors.
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A third reason to resist an arbitrary announcement on the end of memory/remembering 
relates to the structure and dynamics of memory and forgetting. Traumatic events can 
be shrouded in a sense of unreality at the moment of occurrence; what it is not possible 
to integrate, transmit, bear witness to at the time can sometimes only later, with the 
therapy among other things of time, be made one's own; literature on traumatic memory' 
and sequelae and their various treatments is laced with concepts such as repetition, 
delay, and latency.17 It is, therefore, impossible to dictate a moment of catharsis, during 
political transition or at any other time. The passage of time brings recall and 
remembrance as well as distortion and forgetting.
With concerns about memory and closure still firmly in mind, a final set of questions 
about the implications and possibilities for the life story of the arrival of a new 
political dawn in South Africa will be addressed. Counter-discourses of resistance, 
specifically the life story written on return/release or unbanned and thereby 
otherwise returned/released, can be seen as a form of "re-incorporealisation" of the 
missing and 'disappeared' into South Africa's official discourse and literary history 
(Lindfors 1994:161). Texts and lives can, furthermore, be put back in touch with, 
situated within, their dominant intention, purpose and truth. With the decline of 
apartheid, therefore, life stories are being both inserted into a different context of 
interpretation and told in a different context of narration:
Personal testimony is piecing together the chronicle of an era tom apart by 
silencing decrees, which without this witness would remain blown about in the 
gutters of time. This is not so much an alternative history as a gathering-in of 
what was missing in South Africans' perception of their country, the actual
On the relationship between trauma and truth, see Caruth 1991.
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context of their lives... this testimony is the liberation of openness. (Gordimer
1995:22-3)
Gordimer goes on to state the following of Ronnie Kasrils' autobiography Armed and 
Dangerous: "his testimony provides a dimension of the life of a fellow South African 
that was unknown and unimagined but that, nevertheless, belongs to us; what we have 
been and are" (1995:28: on Carl Niehaus' Fighting for Hope, see 34). A changed context 
- with reference to secrecy, censorship, misinformation - has led to different modes of 
telling. Such testimony, told against the backdrop of shredding machines, convenient 
forgetting/erasure, and closure without resolution, is not only an investment against 
forgetting and a reclamation/rewriting of the apartheid archive, but, as Gordimer 
reminds us, also an articulation of what was never known, and/or, in other 
circumstances, 'half-told' and 'half-known'.
The different context of interpretation/narration also offers new possibilities for 
reflection. Gordimer argues that testimony creates the conditions for reflection: for a 
re-examination of moral positions and easy judgements, for a questioning of the self- 
justified limits to opposition by those who claimed total condemnation (1995:29-30). 
Another possible form of reflection is suggested by Kobus in Jacobson's The God- 
Fearer. of a life that when folded back on itself, to the loss of a unique chance to 
make something of life, is seen in a new light; of 'unspent possibilities, lives denied, 
stories never told, breaths never taken, souls forever houseless, hopes forgotten...'; of 
the unlived life/lives of oneself and others to be mourned. A final example of the 
altered conditions of reflection returns to the realm of'half-told', 'half-known' lives. 
Perspectives on, and representations of, solidarity and division within the white 
political prisoner community were determined by personality, political affiliation/ 
beliefs, the era of imprisonment and, crucially, the time of writing. More recent 
accounts can take advantage of the fact that the prison community has ceased to
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exist. Baruch Hirson, for example, is more critical than others in his analysis of 
personalities and political differences (1995:2-4,139-42,161-2,246-9,265-6,340-1,346-9, 
also see Niehaus 1994:127-9). Similarly, Lewin can now take on a novel including 
elements - strengths, weaknesses, possibilities - left out of his original prison account, 
Bcmdiet.
Beyond their potential in the spheres of knowledge and reflection, testimony and the life 
story, again as illustrated by the TRC, will be required to play an important role in 
mourning, healing, catharsis and the redemptive un/remaking of the self. Survival is a 
creative act. The ability and inability/refusal to mourn through self-narration impacts on 
the un/remaking of identity.
In my experience, repossessing one's life story through giving testimony is 
itself a form of action, of change, which has to actually pass through, in order 
to continue and complete the process of survival after liberation. The event 
must be reclaimed because even if successfully repressed, it nevertheless 
invariably plays a decisive formative role in who one comes to be, and in how 
one comes to live one's life. (Laub in Felman and Laub 1992:85-6)’*
18
A contributory factor to the absence of healing which kept alive the many deaths of 
resistance was their politicisation by the liberation movements. Death became public 
property at funerals which were vehicles for political mobilisation rather than private 
grief. The bereaved were urged to carry on, to find solace in action, rather than to 
mourn.
you know, you have no idea what death does to you, I certainly didn't, 
and I've buried hundreds of comrades. But when it is you it's a different 
kettle of fish. One of the things I took issue with Oliver Tambo, he sent 
me a telegram: 'Don't Mourn, Mobilise'. This was one of our slogans. And
I said, that bloody slogan is wrong. Because if you don't mourn, if you 
don't give vent to these feelings, then you just stay bottled up with it, 
and you're crippled by it, you know. And I think that is what's happened 
to me.(Naidoo interview)
[there was a] strong sense in the ANC and I think it is still there - 
captured in the slogan 'Organise Don't Mourn' ... the rallying cry in 
late 70s and 80s when anyone got killed in detention or... around 
funerals and so on... people never really acknowledged and dealt with 
death and loss in the way I think people need to in a very personal, 
private sort of way. Very much the unwritten rule, unstated rule in the 
ANC, was that you have to just continue, and if you don't continue the 
struggle, somehow... And I think it has affected people...(Richer 
interview)
449
An impediment to creative survival is that here are violations and experiences for which 
there are no words, no categories of comprehension or means of assimilation, violations 
that challenge the culture and categories of knowing:
testimony seems to be composed of bits and pieces of a memory that has been 
overwhelmed by occurrences that have not settled into understanding or 
remembrance, acts that cannot be constructed as knowledge nor assimilated into 
full cognition, events in excess of our frames of reference. What the testimony 
does not offer is, however, a completed statement, a totalizable account of those 
events. (Felman in Felman and Laub 1992:5)
Participants and commentators at the TRC were reduced to silence, without language, 
struggled for words, but also, remarkably and poignantly, found words and language (see 
Krog, "Cry, Beloved Country", Guardian 18/1 1997). The limits of language provide 
another reason to include the many texts of memory and the life story in the process of 
healing. Due to the extraordinary human range and capacity in the realm of 
communication, the tendency to reify and aestheticise the limits to representation that 
characterises some literature on atrocity, trauma and representation should be treated 
with caution. Of greater importance is the need to develop creative forms o f’listening', to 
extend the range of'hearing', so that they more adequately cover the spectrum of 
communication. Ultimately to claim that crimes are incomprehensible and 
unrepresentable aids their denial; refutation becomes rational. As an outsider in the midst 
of a squatter settlement in the process of being destroyed, racked with violence,
Elizabeth Curren, in Coetzee's Age o f Iron, states: '"To speak of this... you would need 
the tongue of a god"1 (1991a:91). The only spoken response is a challenge - '"Shit"' - 
another person turns and walks away.19
19
While there is a kind of multi-faceted urgency to testimony in the context of 
transition, it is interesting to speculate about the long term fate of such narratives 
and about the creative media through which apartheid will ultimately be remembered. See, 
for example, Gordimer1s claim that poetry has a lonqer historical reach than testimony 
(19 95:41-2).
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This discussion of memory and the life story suggests that healing and reconciliation 
will overflow beyond the temporal confines of the present and the institutional arena of 
the TRC. The life story, that was central to the dynamic of repression and resistance, is 
equally important in their complex and uncertain aftermath as a source of knowledge, 
understanding, reflection, survival, healing, and creative un/remaking. Its role is nothing 
less than contributing to forging the link between a liveable past and a future that can be 
embraced.
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APPENDIX
Listed below are the names of those interviewees quoted within the text along with 
the date and place of interview. In the thesis they are refered to simply by name and 
the designation ‘interview’ (eg: Cronin interview).
Jeremy Cronin - 6 February 1995 (Johannesburg)
Mandla Langa - 21 February 1995 (Johannesburg)
Willie Leslie - 13 February 1995 (Durban)
Hugh Lewin - 7 February 1995 (Johannesburg)
Lineo Harriette Mabitsela - 8 February 1995 (Johannesburg)
Hlengiwe Mkhize - 10 February 1995 (Johannesburg)
Phyllis Naidoo - 13 February 1995 (Durban)
Lauren Richer - 11 February 1995 (Johannesburg)
Sunny Singh - 15 February 1995 (Durban)
Marius Schoon - 11 and 20 February 1995 (Johannesburg)
Rocky Williams - 9 February 1995 (Johannesburg)
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